Judgment : Saurabh Lavania, J. 1. Heard Sri Balkeshwar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the revisionist, Sri Adarsh Kumar Maurya, learned Counsel for the side opposite, whose name inadvertently could not be mentioned when the order dated 12.03.2026 was reserved, Sri S.P.Tiwari, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State and perused the records. 2. This criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (in short "Act of 2015") has been filed against the order dated 25.01.2023, passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Lakhimpur Kheri (in short 'JJB'), arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2014 under Sections 302, 201, 377 IPC and 3/4 POCSO Act, Police Station-Paliya, District-Kheri. 3. Learned A.G.A. has raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability/entertainability of the present 'Revision' by stating that revisionist has bypassed the remedy of 'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 and as such the present revision be dismissed with liberty to the revisionist to avail, the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of 2015. 4. The availability of statutory remedy i.e filing of an 'Appeal' against the order under challenge dated 25.01.2023 passed by JJB Kheri, arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2014, under Sections 302, 201, 377 IPC and 3/4 POCSO Act, Police Station-Paliya, District-Kheri, has not been refuted. 5. It is stated that instant 'Revision' under Section 102 of the Act of 2015 is entertainable and maintainable, therefore, the order be passed on merits. 6.On the issue of entertainability and maintainability of the instant 'Revision', the reference has been made to paragraph no(s). 46 to 48 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Child in Conflict with Law through his mother Versus State of Karnataka and another , reported in (2024) 8 SCC 473 . Paragraphs, referred, are extracted hereunder:- "46. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that there being remedy of appeal available with the complainant against the order dated 12-4-2024 vide which two members of the Board had directed inquiry into the offence allegedly committed by CCL by the Board. Paragraphs, referred, are extracted hereunder:- "46. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that there being remedy of appeal available with the complainant against the order dated 12-4-2024 vide which two members of the Board had directed inquiry into the offence allegedly committed by CCL by the Board. In our opinion, even though such a remedy may be available to the complainant which should normally be availed, but what is evident from the facts of the case is that there was an earlier order passed by the Principal Magistrate on 5-4-2022, which was final regarding conduct of trial of CCL by the Children's Court, still subsequently two members of the Board without the Principal Magistrate being there passed an order on 12-4-2022 directing inquiry into the offence by the Board. In fact, the subsequent order was totally non est. Even if in such a situation the aforesaid order was not challenged by availing the remedy of appeal, in our opinion the revision under Section 102 of the Act cannot be said to be not maintainable. 47. Firstly, there is no time-limit provided for filing a revision therein, and secondly it could be on an application filed by any of the parties. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. Besides the legality of the order dated 12-4-2022, the case in hand is such where even the propriety of the proceeding was also in question. The proceedings before the Board could not continue after the passing of the order dated 5-4-2022, in terms of Section 7(4) of the Act. 48. Hence, non-availment of the remedy of appeal by the complainant in such a situation cannot be held to be fatal. We may also add here that even the appellant could have availed the remedy of appeal against the order dated 5-4-2022, but he thought of continuing before the Board in a non est proceeding." 7. In response of aforesaid, it is stated that a perusal of paragraphs referred i.e. paragraph no(s). We may also add here that even the appellant could have availed the remedy of appeal against the order dated 5-4-2022, but he thought of continuing before the Board in a non est proceeding." 7. In response of aforesaid, it is stated that a perusal of paragraphs referred i.e. paragraph no(s). 46 to 48 of the report, would indicate that the Hon'ble Apex Court declined to interfere in the order dated 15.11.2023 passed by High Court in exercise of power under Section 102 of the Act of 2015, on the ground to the effect that without availing the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' available under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 against the order dated 12.04.2022 passed by JJB Kheri, the 'Revision' in terms of Section 102 of the Act of 2015 was filed, for the reason that the order dated 12.04.2022 was a 'Non-est' order. 8. It is also stated that instant case the order dated 25.01.2023 passed by JJB, challenged in the instant 'Revision' is not a 'Non-est' order and therefore, the judgment on which reliance has been placed would not apply in the present case. 9. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record. 10. The order impugned dated 25.01.2025 ought to have been impeached by way of an 'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 and without availing the remedy of 'Appeal' the instant 'Revision' has been filed under Section 102 of the Act of 2015 challenging the order dated 25.01.2023. 11. It is settled principle of law that a 'Non-est' order can be ignored and can be questioned/impeached at any stage or/and in any proceedings. 12. On the aforesaid aspects of the case, this Court finds it appropriate to refer the relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Bismillah Versus Janeshwar Prasad and Others , (1990) 1 SCC 207 , which reads as under:- "7. It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. The provisions of a law which seek to oust the jurisdiction of civil court need to be strictly construed. It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. The provisions of a law which seek to oust the jurisdiction of civil court need to be strictly construed. Section 331 of the Act has been the subject of series of pronouncements of the High Court as to the circumstances and the nature of the suits in which its exclusionary effect operates. Distinction was sought to be drawn between the class of cases where the binding effect of a deed had had to be got rid of by an appropriate adjudication on the one hand and the class of cases in which a transaction could be said to be void in law where what the law holds to be void, there is nothing to cancel or set aside on the other. In the former case, it was held, a suit was cognisable by the civil court while in the latter, it was not, it being open to the statutory authority to take note of the legal incidents of what was non est. 8. In the instant case, the High Court has construed, in our opinion not quite correctly, appellant's pleadings to amount to a plea of nullity of the sales and has held that the prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds was 'simply illusory' and that such a relief was neither necessary nor appropriate in the context of a plea of nullity. The High Court has further held that the relief of possession, though appearing to be a consequential relief, was really the main relief and would fall within the statutory jurisdiction. 9. It is true that the question of jurisdiction depends upon the allegations in the plaint and not the merits or the result of the suit. However, in order to determine the precise nature of the action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole. If as, indeed, is done by the High Court the expression 'void' occurring in the plaint as descriptive of the legal status of the sales is made the constant and determinate and what is implicit in the need for cancellation as the variable and as inappropriate to a plea of nullity, equally, converse could be the position. If as, indeed, is done by the High Court the expression 'void' occurring in the plaint as descriptive of the legal status of the sales is made the constant and determinate and what is implicit in the need for cancellation as the variable and as inappropriate to a plea of nullity, equally, converse could be the position. The real point is not the stray or loose expressions which abound in inartistically drafted plaints, but the real substance of the case gathered by construing pleadings as a whole. It is said "Parties do not have the farsight of prophets and their lawyers the draftsmanship of a Chalmers". 10. Indeed in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 535 : (1974) 1 SCR 339 ] this Court, dealing with the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of the Holdings Act, 1954 where the provision excluding the civil court's jurisdiction is even wider, has had occasion to observe: (SCR p.342 : SCC p.538, para 5) '....but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it...." (emphasis supplied) 11. The assumption underlying the reasoning of the High Court is that if the action had really been one based on the need for the cancellation of the deeds, without which possession could not be granted, the civil court would have had jurisdiction. The cause of action in the appellant's suit does admit of being brought within this class of cases. 12. The common law defence of non est factum to actions on specialities in its origin was available where an illiterate person, to whom the contents of a deed had been wrongly read, executed it under a mistake as to its nature and contents, he could say that it was not his deed at all. In its modern application, the doctrine has been extended to cases other than those of illiteracy and to other contracts in writing. In its modern application, the doctrine has been extended to cases other than those of illiteracy and to other contracts in writing. In most of the cases in which this defence was pleaded the mistake was induced by fraud; but that was not, perhaps, a necessary factor, as the transaction is "invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signor did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore, in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended" [ Chitty on Contracts, 25th edn., p. 341]. 13. Authorities drew a distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. It was held that the defence was available only if the mistake was as to the very nature or character of the transaction. 14. In Foster v. Mackinnon [(1869) LR 4 CP 704 : 38 LJCP 310] , Mackinnon, the defendant was induced to endorse a bill of exchange on the false representation that it was a guarantee similar to one he had signed on a previous occasion. He was held not liable when sued even by an innocent endorsee of the bill. Byles, J. said: "... The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual contents' of the instrument." 15. This decision was referred to with approval by this Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa [ (1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956 ] . It was observed: (SCR pp. 800-01) "It is well established that a contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded." This would be a voidable transaction. But the position was held to be different if the fraud or misrepresentation related to the character of the document. But the position was held to be different if the fraud or misrepresentation related to the character of the document. This court held: (SCR p. 801) "The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable." (emphasis supplied) However the House of Lords in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [1971 AC 1004 : (1970) 3 All ER 961] reviewed the law and held that the essential features of the doctrine, as expressed by Byles, J. in Foster v. Mackinnon [ Chitty on Contracts, 25th edn., p. 341] , had been correctly stated. Lord Reid, however, observed: (AC headnote at p. 1005) "The plea of non est factum could not be available to anyone who signed without taking the trouble to find out at least the general effect of the document. Nor could it be available to a person whose mistake was really a mistake as to the legal effect of the document. There must be a radical or fundamental difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing." 16. However the distinction based on the character of the document and the contents of the document was considered unsatisfactory. The distinction based on the character and contents of a document is not without its difficulties in its practical application; for, in conceivable cases the 'character' of the document may itself depend on its contents. The difficulty is to be resolved on a case by case basis on the facts of each case and not by appealing to any principle of general validity applicable to all cases. Chitty on Contracts ["General Principles" 25th edn, para 343, page 194] has this observation to make on Saunders decision [ (1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956 ] : "....It was stressed that the defence of non est factum was not lightly to be allowed where a person of full age and capacity had signed a written document embodying contractual terms. But it was nevertheless held that in exceptional circumstances the plea was available so long as the person signing the document had made a fundamental mistake as to the character or effect of the document. Their Lordships appear to have concentrated on the disparity between the effect of the document actually signed, and the document as it was believed to be (rather than on the nature of the mistake) stressing that the disparity must be "radical", "essential", "fundamental", or "very substantial." In the instant case, prima facie appellant seems to proceed on the premises that she cannot ignore the sales but that the sales require to be set aside before she is entitled to possession and other consequential reliefs. 17. Even in cases where the transaction was assailed as void, the High Court of Allahabad in Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari [1982 All LJ 1308 : 1982 (8) ALR 517 (All HC)] held the civil court's jurisdiction not barred. The facts in that case were that: (All LJ p. 1309) "... plaintiff-appellants claimed a decree for cancellation of the sale deed dated July 10, 1969 executed by Smt. Ram Pyari Devi, mother of appellant 1 Indra Deo, minor, in favour of Bramha Nand respondent 1 in respect of certain agricultural plots. The cancellation was sought on the ground that Smt. Ram Pyari had no interest in the property in suit and, therefore, she was not entitled to execute the sale deed." In that case the learned District Judge had held that the allegations made in the plaint amounted to saying that the sale deed was a void document. The civil court was held to have no jurisdiction. 18. The High Court, allowing the plaintiff's appeal and reversing the finding of the District Judge, held: (All LJ pp. 1313 and 1314) "A survey of the above decisions shows that the consistent view of this Court is that the cause of action in a suit for cancellation of sale deed is not the denial of plaintiff's title which may be said to be implicit in the execution of the sale deed by the defendant but is the execution of the deed itself." .... Therefore, under the provisions of the Act itself, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be barred when declaration is sought against a person who has transferred agricultural property which the plaintiff claims to be his. Therefore, under the provisions of the Act itself, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be barred when declaration is sought against a person who has transferred agricultural property which the plaintiff claims to be his. Section 229-B does not contemplate all kinds of declaratory suits. It deals with declaratory suits of the specific type hereinbefore mentioned." This case has since been approved by a Full Bench of that Court in Ram Padarath v. Second ADJ, Sultanpur [ (1989) RD 21 (All) (FB)] . The Full Bench held: "We are of the view that the case of Indra Dev v. Smt. Ram Pyari [1971 AC 1004 : (1970) 3 All ER 961] , has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the Division Bench case, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad [ 1981 AWC 469 (DB)] is regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities, but so far as it holds that suit in respect of void document will lie in the revenue court it does not lay down a good law. Suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the civil court and a party cannot be deprived of his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status and a tenure holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the revenue court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the revenue court." In any view of the matter, the present action would be covered by the pronouncement of the Full Bench. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the view of the Full Bench as its correctness was not assailed before us." 13. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Agro Foods Versus State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2008) 7SCC 748. "17. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the view of the Full Bench as its correctness was not assailed before us." 13. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Agro Foods Versus State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2008) 7SCC 748. "17. All irregular or erroneous or even illegal orders cannot be held to be null and void as there is a fine distinction between the orders which are null and void and orders which are irregular, wrong or illegal. Where an authority making order lacks inherent jurisdiction, such order would be without jurisdiction, null,non est and void ab initio as defect of jurisdiction of an authority goes to the root of the matter and strikes at its very authority to pass any order and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties. (See Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [ AIR 1954 SC 340 ] .) However, exercise of jurisdiction in a wrongful manner cannot result in a nullity—it is an illegality, capable of being cured in a duly constituted legal proceedings. 18. Proceedings for assessment under a fiscal statute are not in the nature of judicial proceedings, like proceedings in a suit inasmuch as the assessing officer does not adjudicate on a lis between an assessee and the State and, therefore, the law on the issue laid down under the civil law may not stricto sensu apply to assessment proceedings. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the distinction between a null and void order and an illegal or irregular order, it would be profitable to notice a few decisions of this Court on the point. 19. In Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin [ (2004) 1 SCC 287 ] explaining the distinction between null and void decree and illegal decree, this Court has said that a decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. The Court further held that a distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable. 20. In view of the above, in the present case, apart from the fact that on a plain reading of Section 29(8)(b) of the Act, it is manifestly clear that fresh assessment for Assessment Year 1995-1996, framed pursuant to the order passed by the appellate authority on 8-6-2000, was well within the prescribed time, even otherwise, in the light of the aforestated settled law, the assessment orders in question could not be held to be null and void on account of the stated irregularities committed by the assessing officer during the course of assessment proceedings. In our opinion, therefore, despite scathing observations by the Division Bench on the conduct of the assessing officer, it was a case of an irregularity in assessment proceedings by the officer, who was not bereft of authority to assess the appellant. At best, it was an illegality, which defect was capable of and has been cured by the High Court by setting aside the orders and by granting consequential relief." 14. Upon due consideration, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the order impugned in the instant 'Revision' in exercise of revisional power provided under Section 102 of the Act of 2015, which has been instituted without availing the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of 2015, and therefore without entering into the merits of the case, the present revision is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appellate authority under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 as per law. 15. 15. Aforesaid is for the reason that the impugned order dated 25.01.2023 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Lakhimpur Kheri, in a case arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2014, Police Station- Palia, District-Kheri, if established, would fall under the expression(s) 'irregular order' or 'erroneous order' or 'illegal order' or 'wrong order' but it cannot be termed as 'Non-est' order, as the same has been passed by the Board in exercise of power provided to it under the provisions of the Act of 2015, and therefore it can be cured by the Appellate Court/Authority created under Statute itself i.e. the Act of 2015.