JUDGMENT : Sandeep Jain, J. 1. The instant appeal under Section 96 CPC has been preferred by the plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.9.1986 passed by the Court of 7th Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in O.S. No. 200 of 1982 Ashok Kumar vs. Tejvir Singh and others , whereby the plaintiff 's suit for the relief of specific performance of agreement for sale and possession dated 03.9.1981 has been dismissed and the suit for the alternative relief, for the recovery of Rs. 41,000/- , i.e. earnest money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 along with an interest @17% per annum has been decreed. Plaint Case 2. The plaintiff/appellant filed O.S. No. 200 of 1982 against the defendant respondents with the averments that the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh is the bhumidhar of the disputed land, which was agreed to be sold for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/- in favour of plaintiff and a registered agreement to sell was executed on 03.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant no.1 accepted Rs. 36,000/- at the time of the execution of agreement to sell and Rs. 5,000/- at the time of registration of the agreement to sell, before the concerned sub- registrar and the remaining amount of Rs. 38,500/- was agreed to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant no.1 at the time of execution of sale deed in his favour. 3. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the defendant no.1 had undertaken to obtain certificate from the income tax department, before the execution of sale deed and also undertaken that till 02.11.1981 the sale deed would be executed in plaintiffs favour. It was further agreed between the parties that if defendant no.1 did not execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration then the plaintiff will have the right to get the sale deed executed through court. It was further averred that within the agreed period of limitation, the plaintiff requested the defendant no.1 many times to accept the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed but on one pretext or the other, the sale deed was not executed in favour of the plaintiff. 4. It was further averred that within the agreed period of limitation, the plaintiff requested the defendant no.1 many times to accept the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed but on one pretext or the other, the sale deed was not executed in favour of the plaintiff. 4. It was further averred by the plaintiff that in terms of the agreement to sell, he always remained ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in his favour after paying the balance sale consideration, and he was still ready and willing to do so. It was further averred by the plaintiff that he gave a registered notice dated 25.9.1981 to the defendant no.1, to inform the plaintiff through registered post, on which date he was ready and willing to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration, so as to enable him to reach the office of sub-registrar, Hapur. This notice was received by the defendant no.1 on 30.9.1981, which was neither replied to nor the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff. 5. It was further averred by the plaintiff that orally also he requested defendant no.1 many times to execute the sale deed in his favour on which, an assurance was given by the defendant, that he will execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on 02.11.1981 before the sub- registrar, Hapur but when the plaintiff went to the office of the above sub-registrar on 2.11.1981, the defendant was not present, but the plaintiff marked his attendance before the concerned sub-registrar. Ultimately, the defendant no.1 refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 6. During the pendency of the suit, with a malafide intention, in order to cause financial loss to the plaintiff, the disputed land was illegally sold on 11.10.1982 by defendant no.1 through sale deed executed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, which was barred under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, on the basis of which no right title and interest accrued in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were not bonafide purchasers of the disputed land, since they were fully aware of the registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1, earlier in his favour. 2 to 7. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were not bonafide purchasers of the disputed land, since they were fully aware of the registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1, earlier in his favour. It was further averred by the plaintiff that the subsequent purchasers were bound by the earlier agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 in his favour. 7. In view of the above backdrop, the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs:- (i) By decree of the court, the defendants be directed to execute the sale deed of the disputed land situated in khasra no. 611, area 4-10-17-17 situated in village Mamoodpur, Pargana and Tehsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad, after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs. 38,500/- and the defendants be further directed to handover the actual possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff and if the defendants failed to do so, then the sale deed of the disputed land be executed in favour of the plaintiff by the court and the actual possession of the land be also handed over to the plaintiff. (ii) That the plaintiff be awarded annual damages @ Rs. 5,000/- from the date of filing of the suit ,till the actual possession of the disputed land was handed to him by the defendants. (iii) If for any legal reason, it was not possible to get the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff be returned the earnest money of Rs. 41,000/- along with interest @17% per annum during the pendency of the suit till the actual payment was made to the plaintiff. (iv) The costs of the suit be also awarded to the plaintiff against the defendants. (v) Any other relief as the court deems fit and appropriate be also awarded to the plaintiff against the defendants. Written Statement of defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh 8. The defendant in his written statement accepted that a registered agreement to sell was executed on 3.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, out of which he has received Rs. 41,000/-. He also accepted that he was required to obtain permission from the income tax department and was also supposed to execute the sale deed till 2.11.1981 in favour of the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. 79,500/-, out of which he has received Rs. 41,000/-. He also accepted that he was required to obtain permission from the income tax department and was also supposed to execute the sale deed till 2.11.1981 in favour of the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. The defendant also accepted that a registered notice was sent by the plaintiff on 25.9.1981, which was received by him. The defendant also accepted that he has executed a registered sale deed on 11.10.1982 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7. 9. It was further averred by the defendant that he has not willingly executed the sale deed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, regarding which he has not received any consideration from them, which was void. It was further averred by the defendant that if any document has been fraudulently got executed from him by defendants no. 2 to 7, then it was not binding on him. It was further averred by the defendant that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were well aware that he had earlier executed an agreement to sell regarding the disputed land, in favour of the plaintiff. It was further averred that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed executed within the prescribed period in his favour. It was further disclosed that the answering defendant was not able to obtain the certificate from the income tax officer. 10. It was further averred that due to the above reasons the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. The answering defendant always remained ready and willing to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration and he is still ready and willing, but in the intervening period, due to some differences, he was not ready, now the differences between him and the plaintiff have been resolved. Written Statement of defendants no. 2 to 7 11. The defendants in their written statement has denied that any alleged agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. Written Statement of defendants no. 2 to 7 11. The defendants in their written statement has denied that any alleged agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff, regarding the disputed land. The defendants have averred that on 11.10.1982 after receiving appropriate consideration, the defendant no.1 has executed the sale deed of the disputed land in their favour and its possession has also been handed to them, as such, the plaintiff has got no right to get the sale deed of the disputed land executed in his favour. 12. It was further averred by the defendants that fraudulently the plaintiff, Ravindra, Narendra, Trilokchand, Kripal and Surendra have got executed the sale deed from defendant no.1 in favour of his servant Jaggu and brothers on 4.3.1981, who belong to the same family, and after getting the above information, the defendant no.1 filed O.S.no. 234 of 1981 Tejvir vs. Jaggu and others before the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, during the pendency of which Ashok Kumar, Ravindra, Narendra, Trilokchand, Kripal, Surendra and others, acted as mediators between defendant no.1 and Jaggu and others, during which it was agreed that the agreement of the disputed property be executed in favour of other persons, so as to bind them with the compromise. 13. It was further averred by the defendants, that acting upon the above compromise, defendant no.1 executed the sale deed of his house on 07.8.1981 in favour of Kripal, thereafter, Jaggu and his brother withdrew from the mediation, who refused to execute the document in favour of Kripal, due to which the earlier document dated 07.8.1981 was got cancelled on 13.8.1981. Thereafter, Jaggu and others, were willing to execute the agreement in favour of their family members Dalchand, as such, an agreement was executed on 25.8.1981 in favour of Dalchand for a consideration of Rs.68,175/-, of which Ravindra and Kripal were witnesses. It was further averred that the mediators in order to force the defendant no.1 to get the matter compromised, forced the defendant no.1 to get the agreement to sell executed in favour of the plaintiff without any consideration, in which Trilokchand and Surendra were witnesses and on the other hand, the 2nd document regarding a house was registered in favour of Kripal, in which Surendra and Ravindra were witnesses. 14. 14. It was further averred that on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 was neither the owner of the disputed land nor had any right to execute any agreement to sell regarding it, as such, no question arises of getting any consideration by defendant no.1. It was further averred that acting on the advice of mediators, defendant no.1, Jaggu and others got the sale deed dated 4.3.1981 cancelled through decree of the court on 7.9.1981, as such on 7.9.1981 the defendant no.1 became the owner of the disputed land. It was averred that in view of the above facts, the defendant no.1 did not have any right to execute the agreement of disputed land in favour of the plaintiff on 3.9.1981, which was a void document. 15. It was further averred that on 25.9.1981 Jaggu and others and Dalchand, got cancelled the agreement dated 25.8.1981, which was witnessed by Narendra, and as such, on 25.9.1981 the title of defendant no.1 became clear in the disputed land. 16. It was further averred by the defendants that, they were not aware of the agreement to sell executed in favour of the plaintiff and they bonafidely purchased the disputed land after paying appropriate consideration to the defendant no.1 and also are in its possession since then. 17. It was further averred that the defendant no.1 got is right in the disputed land on 7.9.1981 after the cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of Jaggu and others, subsequent to that, no agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff, and if any agreement to sell has been executed prior to that, then the defendants are not bound by it nor they had any knowledge of such agreement nor it can be presumed that they had any knowledge of the above agreement. It was further averred that the agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 is non-effective, which has been fraudulently got executed by plaintiff, which has got no legal sanctity. It was further averred that during litigation between defendant no.1 and the answering defendant's, the answering defendants were never informed by the defendant no.1 that he has executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff. 18. It was further averred that during litigation between defendant no.1 and the answering defendant's, the answering defendants were never informed by the defendant no.1 that he has executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff. 18. It was further averred by the answering defendants that after the month of July 1983, the defendant no.1 has colluded with the plaintiff, in order to cause wrongful loss to the defendants, who proclaimed that the agreement to sell was legal and has also challenged the validity of the sale deed. It was further averred that in the mutation proceedings before the Court of Tehsildar, the defendant no.1 has given testimony in support of the plaintiff, which proves the collusion and conspiracy of the defendant no.1 with the plaintiff. It was further averred that the admission of defendant no.1 has no adverse effect on the answering defendants legal rights. Issues framed by the trial court 19. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the defendant no.1 executed an agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing and still ready and willing to perform his part of contract? (iii) Whether the defendant no.1 executed the alleged sale deed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, as alleged in paragraph 11-A of the plaint? If so, its effect? (iv) Whether the defendants no. 2 to 7 are the bonafide purchasers for value and without notice? If so, its effect? (v) Whether the suit is barred under Section 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act? If so, its effect? (vi) Whether the defendant no.1 executed an agreement to sell in the circumstances as alleged in paragraph 18 to 21 and 31 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to7? If so, its effect? (vii) Whether the defendant no.1 was not competent to execute agreement to sell as alleged in para 22 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to7? If so, its effect? (viii) Whether the defendant no.1 is in collusion with the plaintiff as alleged in para-33 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to 7? If so, its effect? (ix) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? Oral Evidence of the parties 20. 2 to7? If so, its effect? (viii) Whether the defendant no.1 is in collusion with the plaintiff as alleged in para-33 of the WS of the defendants no. 2 to 7? If so, its effect? (ix) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? Oral Evidence of the parties 20. The plaintiff Ashok Kumar examined himself as PW-1, Ravindra Singh as PW-2, Trilok Singh as PW-3 and Dhirendra Singh as PW-4, whereas, defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh examined himself as DW-1, defendants No. 2 to 7 examined Mahipal Singh as DW-2,Hetram as DW-3 and Kripal Singh as DW-4. Documentary evidence of the parties 21. The plaintiff has filed the original agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981, carbon copy of legal notice, applications given to subregistrar Hapur to mark his attendance, carbon copy of the receipts issued by the subregistrar, Hapur, postal receipts, acknowledgement AD. 22. The defendants No. 2 to 7 have filed copy of agreement to sell executed by Tejvir in favour of Kripal dated 7.8.1981, copy of cancellation of agreement to sell executed by Kripal in favour of Tejvir dated 13.8.1981, copy of agreement executed by Jaggu, Buddu and Sukhdev in favour of Dalchand dated 25.8.1981, copy of sale deed executed by Tejvir in favour of Kripal dated 3.9.1981,copy of compromise in OS No. 334 of 1981 Tejvir vs. Jaggu dated 7.9.1981, copy of decree in OS no. 334 of 1981,etc. Reasoning of the trial court Issue no.1,2,3,5,6,7,8:- 23. On the basis of documentary and oral evidence, the trial court concluded that a registered agreement to sell was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff on 03.9.1981 for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-which was not a sham transaction, the plaintiff was always ready and willing and was still ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, the sale deed of the disputed land was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982, the suit was not barred under Section 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 had no authority to enter into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff regarding the disputed land and there was no collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1. Issue no.4 and 9:- 24. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982, the suit was not barred under Section 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 had no authority to enter into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff regarding the disputed land and there was no collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1. Issue no.4 and 9:- 24. The trial court considered that the suit was filed on 25.3.1982 and the disputed property was transferred by the defendant no.1 to defendant No. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982, which was during the pendency of the suit. The trial court concluded that in the above circumstances Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable instead of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act,1963. The trial court concluded that the defendants no. 2 to 7 had no knowledge of the agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff and they became aware of it for the 1st time when they received a summons from the court. In view of the above reasoning, the trial court concluded that defendants no. 2 to 7 purchased the property in good faith for consideration and without notice of the agreement in question. 25. The trial court concluded that the defendant no.1 had no authority to enter into an agreement of the disputed land on 3.9.1981, and the disputed land stood transferred in the name of defendant no.1 on 7.9.1981,when the sale deed of the disputed property in the name of Jaggu and others was cancelled. The trial court concluded that subsequently, the defendant no.1 became the owner of the disputed land and due to this, the plaintiff could have compelled the defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed of the disputed land in his favour. Since, the defendant no.1 had transferred the disputed land to the defendants no. 2 to 7, who were held to be bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, hence, the trial court did not grant the primary relief of specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff but ordered the defendant no.1 to return the earnest money of Rs. 41,000/- with interest @17% per annum, aggrieved against which, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal under Section 96 CPC. Submissions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant 26. 41,000/- with interest @17% per annum, aggrieved against which, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal under Section 96 CPC. Submissions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant 26. Sri Nipun Singh learned senior counsel for the plaintiff appellant submitted that except issue no. 4 and 9, all the other issues have been decided in favour of the plaintiff appellant, which has not been challenged by the defendants by filing any appeal before this Court, as such, the finding in regard to the other issues have attained finality. 27. Learned counsel further submitted that from the documentary and oral evidence on record it was proved that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were well aware of the agreement to sell, of the disputed land executed earlier by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff, as such, the defendants no. 2 to 7 were not bonafide purchasers of the disputed property. Learned counsel submitted that since the disputed property was purchased by the defendants no. 2 to 7 during the pendency of the suit, as such, the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 were not applicable but provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were fully applicable on the facts and circumstances of the case. 28. Learned counsel further submitted that it is true that on 3.9.1981 the defendant no.1 was not the owner of the disputed land, which he became subsequently on 7.9.1981, but the suit was only filed on 31.3.1982 and on that date, the defendant no.1 was the owner of the disputed land, as such the provisions of Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of this, the trial court ought to have decreed the plaintiff 's suit for the primary relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 and it has erred in granting the alternative relief of return of earnest money with interest to the plaintiff, which is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. In support of his above contention learned counsel has relied upon the case law:- (i) Shingara Singh vs.Daljit Singh and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2823. (ii) Guruswamy Nadar vs. P.Lakhmi Ammal(Dead) through Lrs. and others (2008) 5 SCC 796 . In support of his above contention learned counsel has relied upon the case law:- (i) Shingara Singh vs.Daljit Singh and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2823. (ii) Guruswamy Nadar vs. P.Lakhmi Ammal(Dead) through Lrs. and others (2008) 5 SCC 796 . (iii) Alka Shrirang Chavan and Another vs. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale and others 2026 SCC OnLine SC 55. (iv) Tanu Ram Bora vs.Promod Ch.Das(Dead) through LRS. and others (2019) 4 SCC 173 . (v) Silla Chandra Sekharam vs.Ramchandra Sahu 1964 SCC OnLine SC 345(By 3 Judges) 29. Service is sufficient on all the respondents but despite notice, none has appeared for the respondents. It is apparent that the learned counsel for the respondents has not intentionally appeared to counter the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 30. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, perused the impugned judgment and the record of the trial court. 31. On the basis of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, the perusal of the impugned judgment and the evidence on record, the following questions arise for determination in this appeal :- (1) Whether the defendants no. 2 to 7 were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration in good faith who had no notice of the earlier registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiff ? (2) Whether the doctrine of lis pendens enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the facts and circumstances of the case , which will prevail over Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? (3) Whether in terms of the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 the plaintiff can enforce the agreement to sell against the defendant no.1 and subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants no. 2 to 7 ? (4) Whether the trial court has erred in not granting the primary relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff ? Analysis of case laws 32. The Apex Court in the case of Guruswamy Nadar (supra) was considering what is the effect of the lis pendens on the subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the 2nd purchaser. It was held as under:- “9. Analysis of case laws 32. The Apex Court in the case of Guruswamy Nadar (supra) was considering what is the effect of the lis pendens on the subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the 2nd purchaser. It was held as under:- “9. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on 3-5-1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5-5- 1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the overriding effect on the first sale. 10. The principle of lis pendens is still settled principle of law. In this connection, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Peary [ AIR 1978 All 318 ] has considered the scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench has referred to a decision in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 44 ER 842] (ER at p. 847) wherein it was observed as under: (Ram Peary case [ AIR 1978 All 318 ] , AIR p. 319, para 4) “4. …‘It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the courts often so describes its operation. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party. Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the court in the suit shall be binding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end.’ ” 11. Similarly, the Privy Council in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Munshi Prag Narain [(1906-07) 34 IA 102] where the Court laid stress on the necessity for final adjudication and observed that otherwise there would be no end to litigation and justice would be defeated. 12. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court further referred to the work of Story on Equity, 3rd Edn., (Para 406) which expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows: (Ram Peary case [ AIR 1978 All 318 ] , AIR p. 319, para 6) “6. … Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representations or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase without any notice, the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise, alienations made during an action might defeat its whole purpose, and there would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendente lite, nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to annul the conveyance but only to refer it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendente lite, nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to annul the conveyance but only to refer it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them.” 13. Normally, as a public policy once a suit has been filed pertaining to any subject-matter of the property, in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis pendens has been evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate without intervention of a third party. This is because of public policy otherwise no litigation will come to an end. Therefore, in order to discourage that same subject-matter of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a third person, this kind of transaction is to be checked. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end. 14. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab [ (2000) 6 SCC 402 : AIR 2001 SC 1658 ] . In this case it was observed that a person who purchased the property should have made necessary effort to find out with regard to that property, whether the title or interest of the person from whom he is making purchase was in actual possession of such property. In this case, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract and during the pendency of the suit, rest of the defendants brought subsequent transaction of sale by the defendant in their favour claiming the title to the suit property on the ground that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without notice of prior agreements in favour of the plaintiff and they were also aware that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property as a tenant for last several years and that they did not make any inquiry if the plaintiff had any further or other interest in the suit property on the date of execution of sale deed in their favour apart from that he was in possession of the property as a tenant. In that context Their Lordships observed that subsequent purchaser cannot be said to be bona fide purchaser of the suit property for value without notice of suit agreement and the plaintiff would be entitled to relief of specific performance. Their Lordships after considering the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act as well as Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that subsequent purchaser has to be aware before he purchases the suit property. 15. So far as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser of the same property, has purchased in good faith but the principle of lis pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case notwithstanding the fact that under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his rights could be protected.” 33. The Apex Court in the case of Shingara Singh (supra) was again considering whether doctrine of lis pendens applies to an alienation during the pendency of the suit whether such alienees had or had no notice of the pending proceedings. It was held as under:- “11. In Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144 this Court held that the doctrine of lis pendens applies to an alienation during the pendency of the suit whether such alienees had or had no notice of the pending proceedings. The following has been held I paras 18 & 23: “18. Before one-and-half century, in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER 842], Lord Cranworth, L.C. proclaimed that where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the court in the suit shall be binding not only on the litigating parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end. 23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent court. The doctrine of “lis pendens” prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject- matter of suit. 23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent court. The doctrine of “lis pendens” prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject- matter of suit. “Lis pendens” itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rules 98 or 100 of Order 21.” 12. This Court in Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608 was dealing with a suit for specific performance. During pendency of the suit, a temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff and different portions of the suit land were sold whereafter the purchasers applied for impleadment, which was rejected by the Trial Court but allowed by the High Court against which special leave to appeal was filed. In the above background, this Court observed the following in para 12: “12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the TP Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the TP Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the court.” 13. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the court.” 13. Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796 also arose out of a suit for specific performance of agreement wherein this Court considered the effect of subsequent sale of properties by owner (proposed vendor) in favour of a third party. In the above facts, this Court held thus in paras 9 & 15: “9. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on 3-5-1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5-5- 1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the overriding effect on the first sale. 15. So far as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser of the same property, has purchased in good faith but the principle of lis pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case notwithstanding the fact that under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his rights could be protected.” 14. In a recent judgment of this Court in Chander Bhan (D) through Lr. Sher Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh 204 INSC 377 it is observed, “once it has been held that the transactions executed by the respondents are illegal due to the doctrine of lis pendens the defence of the respondents 1 - 2 that they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and thus, entitled to protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is liable to be rejected.” 15. In the case in hand also, it is an admitted position that the suit was filed on 24.12.1992 and the sale deed was executed on 08.01.1993 by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2/appellant during pendency of the suit. The doctrine of lis pendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to a transaction during pendency of the suit. The Trial Court found execution of agreement to be proved and directed for refund of the amount of Rs. 40,000/- by defendant no. 1 to the plaintiff/appellant with further finding on issue no. 5 that the agreement was not a result of fraud and collusion. The defendant did not prefer any cross-appeal or cross-objections against the said partial decree and allowed the finding to become final. The plaintiff was non-suited only on the ground that defendant no. 2 had no notice of the agreement and is a bona fide purchaser. However, once sale agreement is proved and the subsequent sale was during pendency of the suit hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and passing a decree for specific performance.” 34. The Apex Court in the case of Alka Shrirang Chavan (supra) was again considering the doctrine of lis pendens enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act along with applicability of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It was held as under:- “39. At the outset, let us advert to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on which the entire lis between the parties are centered around. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus: 52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto. It was held as under:- “39. At the outset, let us advert to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on which the entire lis between the parties are centered around. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus: 52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto. — During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. 40. This section has been subjected to judicial dissection on numerous occasions. It is not necessary for us to advert to the long line of precedents inasmuch as two recent judgments of this Court have succinctly summed up the essence and amplitude of this provision. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act encapsulates the doctrine of lis pendens. 41. In Celir LLP, this Court examined the expression ‘lis pendens’ in the following manner: 155. The term “lis pendens” as explained in the Law Lexicon is as under:— “Lis means a suit, action controversy, or dispute, and lis pendens means a pending suit. The doctrine denotes those principles and rules of law which define and limit the operation of the common-law maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur, that is, pending the suit nothing should be changed. A pending suit. The doctrine denotes those principles and rules of law which define and limit the operation of the common-law maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur, that is, pending the suit nothing should be changed. A pending suit. As soon as proceedings are commenced to recover or charge some specific property [Ex parte Thornton [L.R.] 2 Ch. 178] there is “lis pendens” - a pending suit, the consequence of which is that until the litigation is at an end neither litigant can deal with the property to the prejudice of the other. 41.1. Explaining the aforesaid doctrine, this Court has held that nothing new can be introduced during the pendency of a petition and if anything new is introduced, the same would be subject to the final outcome of the petition. This Court explained that the doctrine of lis pendens is duly recognized in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act which declares that during the pendency of any suit in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings. Explanation to Section 52 clarifies that pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of presentation of the plaint or institution of the proceeding in a court and shall continue until the suit or proceeding is disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction of the order is obtained, unless it has become unobtainable by reason of expiry of any period of limitation. This Court held thus: 156. As per the doctrine of lis pendens, nothing new can be introduced during the pendency of a petition and if at all anything new is introduced, the same would also be subject to the final outcome of the petition, which would decide the rights and obligations of the parties. 157. The doctrine of lis pendens is duly recognized in Section 52 of the TPA which states that during the pendency in any court of any suit in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings. 157. The doctrine of lis pendens is duly recognized in Section 52 of the TPA which states that during the pendency in any court of any suit in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings. The explanation to the provision states that for the purposes of the Section, the pendency of a suit or proceedings shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or institution of the proceeding in a court, and shall continue until the suit or proceeding is disposed by a “final decree or order” and complete satisfaction of the order is obtained, unless it has become unobtainable by reason of the expiry of any period of limitation. 41.2. Elaborating further, this Court culled out five conditions which must be fulfilled for application of the doctrine of lis pendens. It has been noted that the only exception to the principle of lis pendens is when the property is transferred under the authority of the court. But where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property or a portion thereof to a third party, the latter would be bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or proceeding. Relevant portion of the decision of this Court in Celir LLP is extracted hereunder: 158. The following conditions ought to be fulfilled for the doctrine of lis pendens to apply:— i. There must be a pending suit or proceeding; ii. The suit or proceeding must be pending in a competent court; iii. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive; iv. The right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question in the suit or proceeding; v. The property must be transferred by a party to the litigation; and, vi. The alienation must affect the rights of any other party to the dispute. 159. In short, the doctrine of lis pendens, which Section 52 of the TPA encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property during the pendency of litigation. The only exception to the principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms imposed by it. 159. In short, the doctrine of lis pendens, which Section 52 of the TPA encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property during the pendency of litigation. The only exception to the principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms imposed by it. Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property (or a part of it) to a third- party, the latter is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or proceeding. 41.3. It was canvassed on behalf of the subsequent transferee that it was a bona fide third party purchaser of the secured asset since it was neither arrayed as a party to the proceedings in the main appeals nor was issued a notice of the said proceedings either by the petitioner or by the bank. Repelling such contention, this Court referred to its previous decision in Sanjay Verma where it was held that the principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not only based on equity, good conscience and justice but is also a principle of public policy. No party can claim exemption from the application of this doctrine on the ground of bona fide or good faith. Further, this Court referred to another of its earlier decisions in Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal [ (2008) 5 SCC 796 ] where it was held that the principle of lis pendens will apply irrespective of whether the subsequent purchaser had bought the property, which is a subject-matter of a pending proceeding, in good faith or not. 42. It may be mentioned that in a recent judgment of this Court in Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214] it has been held that the doctrine of lis pendens kicks in the moment a proceeding is instituted irrespective of whether such institution or filing is defective or notice is yet to be issued by the court. 43. One of the questions which fell for consideration in Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805] is whether transfer of the suit property in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis pendens? 43. One of the questions which fell for consideration in Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805] is whether transfer of the suit property in favour of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis pendens? It was in that context this Court looked into Section 52 and held as follows: 49. Section 52 of the 1882 Act stipulates that during the pendency of any suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in which any right to the immovable property is directly and specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred or otherwise be dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings with a view to affect or defeat the rights of any other party under any decree or order. The only exception that the provision carves out is with regard to a situation where the transfer of the property is made permissible under the authority of the court and in accordance with the terms imposed by the court. 50. The explanation to the section further elaborates that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint and would continue until the suit is disposed of by a final decree, and the “complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree” has been obtained, unless the same cannot be obtained due to the expiry of the prescribed limitation period. 43.1. This Court also referred to its earlier decision in Celir LLP and noted the essentials of Section 52. Thereafter, this Court held thus: 52. This Court in Celir LLP (supra) had also emphasized that such a pendente lite transferee would be bound by the result of the proceedings irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or not. In other words, the lack of knowledge of the proceedings would not be a valid defence against the application of the doctrine of lis pendens. ********** 46. At this stage, we may also advert to the provisions of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (‘the Specific Relief Act’ hereinafter). Section 19 is included in Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act which deals with specific performance of contracts. Heading of Section 19 is ‘Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title’. Section 19 reads thus: 19. Section 19 is included in Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act which deals with specific performance of contracts. Heading of Section 19 is ‘Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title’. Section 19 reads thus: 19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title .- Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against— (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant; (ca) when a limited liability partnership has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another limited liability partnership, the new limited liability partnership which arises out of the amalgamation; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company: Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract. 46.1. The only clause which may be of some relevance is clause (b) of Section 19. It says specific performance of a contract may be enforced against any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. 46.2. Section 19 in general and clause (b) thereof in particular acknowledges the claim of a person to a contract qua a subsequent transferee. But clause (b) carves out an exception when a subsequent transferee acts in good faith and without notice of the original contract. 47. In K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2378] , the subsequent purchasers were seeking to bring themselves within the status of bona fide purchaser under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It was in that context, this Court examined Section 19(b) as under: 68. 47. In K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2378] , the subsequent purchasers were seeking to bring themselves within the status of bona fide purchaser under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It was in that context, this Court examined Section 19(b) as under: 68. ………Section 19 provides for the categories of persons against whom specific performance of a contract may be enforced. Amidst all, Clause (b) of Section 19 states that specific performance may be enforced against any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. Thus, a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract is excluded from the purview of the said clause. In the case of Ram Niwas v. Bano [ (2000) 6 SCC 685 ] , this Court had set out three factors that a subsequent transferee must show to fall within the excluded class: (a) he has purchased for value the property, which is the subject matter of the suit for specific performance; (b) he has paid his money to the vendor in good faith; and (c) he had no notice of the earlier contract for sale specific performance of which is sought to be enforced against him. The Court observed that “notice” can be (i) actual notice or (ii) constructive notice, or (iii) imputed notice. As per Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact or when but for wilful abstention from inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it…….. 47.1. Thereafter, this Court referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and held thus: 69. 47.1. Thereafter, this Court referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and held thus: 69. Similarly, in Durg Singh v. Mahesh Singh [2004 SCC OnLine MP 9] , the Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that there are two factors that are necessary for the adjudication of suit for specific performance of the contract where the subject matter property has been sold to a subsequent purchaser: (i) that whether the plaintiff remained always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to purchase the suit property and the readiness and willingness should exist till the date of the passing of the decree, and (ii) that whether subsequent transferee was having prior knowledge of the earlier agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff. Both these factors need to have nexus with the facts of each case and conduct of parties………. 47.2. This Court analysed the expressions ‘wilful abstention from inquiry or search’, ‘notice’ and ‘good faith’ and concluded that to claim protection under Section 19(b), the purchaser must show three things: (a) purchase for value, (b) payment in good faith, and (c) absence of notice of the earlier contract. ‘Notice’, it has been emphasized, includes not merely actual knowledge but also constructive and imputed knowledge. 48. However, it is evident that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of a suit or proceeding. 49. We have already analysed Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the interpretation given thereto by this Court. In our view, the interpretation and understanding of clause (b) of Section 19 has to align with the interpretation given to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as any other interpretation would lead to an incongruous and anomalous situation which should be avoided. 50. As pointed out above, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would be available to a party to a contract who suffers a subsequent transfer of property. However, the moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in which event the doctrine of lis pendens would come into force.” 35. However, the moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in which event the doctrine of lis pendens would come into force.” 35. The Apex Court in the case of Tanu Ram Bora (supra) was considering a situation where if at the time of transfer, the vendor/transferor had a defective title or had no title and/or no right or interest, however subsequently the transferor acquires the right, title or interest and the contract of transfer subsists, in that case at the option of the transferee, such transfer was held valid, on the basis of applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held as under :- “6.3. Section 43 of the Act reads as under: “43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in property transferred.— Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option.” 6.4. Section 43 of the TP Act provides that where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operates on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Thus, if at the time of transfer, the vendor/transferor might have a defective title or have no title and/or no right or interest, however subsequently the transferor acquires the right, title or interest and the contract of transfer subsists, in that case at the option of the transferee, such a transfer is valid. In such a situation, the transferor cannot be permitted to challenge the transfer and/or the transferor has no option to raise the dispute in making the transfer. 6.5. In such a situation, the transferor cannot be permitted to challenge the transfer and/or the transferor has no option to raise the dispute in making the transfer. 6.5. The intention and objects behind Section 43 of the TP Act seem to be based on the principle of estoppel as well as the equity. The intention and objects seem to be that after procuring the money (sale consideration) and transferring the land, thereafter the transferor is estopped from saying that though he has sold/transferred the property/land on payment of sale consideration, still the transfer is not binding on him. That is why Section 43 of the TP Act gives an option to the transferee and not the transferor. The intention of Section 43 of the Act seems to be that nobody can be permitted to take the benefits of his own wrong. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 43 of the Act would come into play and protect the rights of the original plaintiff. 7. An identical question came to be considered by this Court in Ram Pyare [Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain, (1985) 2 SCC 162 ] . In the aforesaid decision, on considering Section 43 of the Act, it is observed and held by this Court that as the sale deed in favour of the vendee was result of an erroneous representation of the vendor, thereafter the sons of the vendor, cannot claim to be transferees in good faith and therefore their suit for cancellation of the sale deed would not be maintainable. In the aforesaid decision, this Court considered the following observations of this Court in another decision in Jumma Masjid [Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847 ] : (Ram Pyare case [Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain, (1985) 2 SCC 162 ] , SCC pp. 166-67, para 4) “4. … ‘15. This reasoning is open to the criticism that it ignores the principle underlying Section 43. That section embodies, as already stated, a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation. It is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is to be noted that when the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words of Section 43 were, “where a person erroneously represents”, and now, as amended by Act 20 of 1929, they are “where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents”, and that emphasises that for the purpose of the section it matters not whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation, and that what is material is that he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it. Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer. Section 43 would then have no application, and the transfer will fail under Section 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in Section 43, however fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been.’ [ As observed in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847 , p. 852, para 15.] ” 36. The Apex Court in the case of Silla Chandra Sekharam (supra) was considering the interpretation of Section 18(a) of the old Specific Relief Act ,1877, which is in pari materia to the Section 13(a) of the new Specific Relief Act 1963. It was held as under :- “5. Section 18(a) of the Act reads: “Where a person contracts to sell or let certain property, having only an imperfect title thereto, the purchaser or lessee (except as otherwise provided by this Chapter) has the following rights: if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the sale or lease acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest:” 6. The question is whether the expression “subsequently to the sale or lease” means “subsequently to the contract to sell or let” or means “subsequently to the execution of the sale deed or lease deed by the vendor or the lessor, as the case may be” in pursuance of the contract to sell or let. The question is whether the expression “subsequently to the sale or lease” means “subsequently to the contract to sell or let” or means “subsequently to the execution of the sale deed or lease deed by the vendor or the lessor, as the case may be” in pursuance of the contract to sell or let. It is contended for the appellant that this expression means subsequently to the contract to sell or let, while the contention for the respondent is that it means subsequent to the actual sale or lease. We are inclined to agree with the contention for the appellant. 7. The case, in a way, is concluded by the decision of this Court in Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1953) 2 SCC 656. In that case the Government agreed to let the lease of the hills to Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd., but the lease could not be executed as the forfeiture of the lease of a previous lessee was held invalid by the Court. When the lease of the previous lessee expired, Kalyanpur Works Ltd., wanted the execution of the lease for a period during which the lease to it would have continued if it had been granted in 1934. This Court held that the case fell within Section 18(a) of the Act. It said at p. 972: “We agree with the High Court that Section 18(a) of the Specific Relief Act applies to the case. That section lays down that where a person contracts to sell or let certain property having only imperfect title thereto, if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the sale or lease acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest. There can be no doubt whatever that when the Government entered into the contract to grant leases to the Lime Co. in 1934, it had an imperfect title, inasmuch as it could not grant a fresh lease to anyone during the existence of the previous lease in favour of Kuchwar Co. No doubt the Government thought it had the right to forfeit those leases and did in fact order forfeiture but it having been found subsequently that the forfeiture was legally invalid, rights of the previous lessees were restored. No doubt the Government thought it had the right to forfeit those leases and did in fact order forfeiture but it having been found subsequently that the forfeiture was legally invalid, rights of the previous lessees were restored. As already pointed out above this is not the case of absence of title but is one of imperfect title and hence falls within the meaning of Section 18. After 31st March, 1948, when the leases in favour of Kuchwar Co. expired, the impediment in the way of the Government to grant leases of the property stood removed, and the Lime Company's right to get the leases revived in its favour. This right of the plaintiff was resisted by the Government who, on the other hand, granted the leases to Defendant 2. The High Court of Patna rightly took the view that Section 18(a) was applicable to the facts of this case and although Defendant 1 was not in a position to grant a lease from the time it agreed to do, the impediment being now removed and a suit for specific performance not being barred, the Lime Company was entitled to sue for that relief. We have already held in agreement with the view of the High Court that Section 18 is attracted to the facts of this case, and the contract of which specific performance can be decreed in favour of the plaintiff is the one embodied in Exhibits 22 and 22 (a).” ****** 11. If clause (a) of Section 18 was to apply after the completion of the sale or lease and on the vendor or lessor acquiring interest in the property in which he had imperfect title to start with, there would be considerable overlapping between the provisions of clause (a) of Section 18 and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into play when a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, while clause (a) of Section 18 would come into play when the person with imperfect title has sold or leased the property. There is some sort of representation whenever a person sells or leases property, the representation being implicit and to the effect that he is competent to sell or let the property. There is some sort of representation whenever a person sells or leases property, the representation being implicit and to the effect that he is competent to sell or let the property. Thus there is overlapping of the provisions of the two sections. 13. The actual right of the transferee under Section 43 and clause (a) of Section 18 is however expressed in different language. In cases where Section 43 operates, the transferee, at his option, can have the transfer operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in the property at any time during which the contract for transfer subsists. The illustration to the section indicates that the transferee can require the transferor to deliver the property acquired to him. The purchaser or lessee on the other hand, acting under clause (a) of Section 18, can compel the seller or the lessor to make good the contract out of such interest. The difference between the two provisions is this that in the case of the operation of Section 43, no recourse to Court is necessary. The transfer operates on the property transferred and the transferee can call upon the transferor to deliver the property to him. The purchaser or the lessor having the right mentioned in clause (a) of Section 18 has to go to Court to compel the vendor or lessor to perform the contract out of the interest subsequently acquired by him. The purchaser or lessee goes to the Court to enforce the contract and the contract in clause (a) of Section 18 must refer to the contract to sell or let and not to the contract of sale or lease, which, as indicated earlier, if voluntary, would have covered the entire property contracted to be sold or leased, and if enforced through Court no occasion for the operation of clause (a) of Section 18 would arise. 14. The expression in clause (a) of Section 18 should preferably be construed in a way so that there will be no overlapping between the provisions of this clause and of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, as ordinarily the legislature does not intend to make duplicate provisions for similar situations. 15. 14. The expression in clause (a) of Section 18 should preferably be construed in a way so that there will be no overlapping between the provisions of this clause and of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, as ordinarily the legislature does not intend to make duplicate provisions for similar situations. 15. The use of the words “vendor or lessor” in clause (a) are no definite pointers to the conclusion that the expression “subsequently to the sale or lease be given the meaning subsequently to the actual sale or lease”. 16. The sections preceding Section 18 deal with specific performance of contracts in general and therefore use the expression “party to a contract”. Section 18 deals with the cases of contracts to sell or let and therefore appropriately uses the simple word “vendor” or “lessor” with respect to the party contracting to sell or let and “purchaser” or “lessee” with respect to the party agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease. There is no incongruity in using such expressions so long as one knows to whom those expressions refer. In fact the word “purchaser” or “lessee” can be appropriately applied to persons agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease.” 37. From the above law laid down by the Apex Court in Guruswamy Nadar (supra), Shingara Singh (supra) and Alka Shrirang Chavan (supra) ,it is evident that where the disputed property is sold after the institution of the suit for the relief of specific performance of agreement to sell by the plaintiff, then since the transfer was made during the pendency of the suit, the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act are attracted to such lis pendens transfer. In such a situation, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is further evident that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of the suit or proceeding. In such a situation, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is further evident that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of the suit or proceeding. It is further evident that section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith of bona fides arises, and as such, the subsequent purchaser of the disputed property during the pendency of the suit of specific performance for the agreement of sale cannot take a plea that he was not aware of the earlier agreement to sell that was entered into between his vendor and the plaintiff and he is a bona fide purchaser of that property for valuable consideration without notice. 38. It is also evident from the above law laid down by the Apex Court in Silla Chandra Sekharam (supra) and Tanu Ram Bora (supra) that in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 (a) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 read with Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act ,when the vendor was not having any title or was having an imperfect title to the disputed property, but subsequently, the vendor acquires any title to the disputed property, regarding which an agreement to sell subsists, then the purchaser of that property can compel the performance of that agreement to sell and the vendor cannot cancel that agreement on the ground that when such agreement was executed between him and the plaintiff, he was not having any title or was having an imperfect title to that property. Documentary evidence of the parties on record 39. The plaintiff has filed the original registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 (Exhibit-1) which was executed between defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh and plaintiff Ashok Kumar for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, out of which Rs. 38,500/- was to be received at the time of execution of the sale deed. This agreement was executed in the presence of witnesses PW-3 Trilok Singh and Surendra Singh. The plaintiff has also filed the carbon copy of application written to the concerned sub-registrar and the receipts issued by the concerned sub- registrar marking his attendance in the sub-registrar office on 2.11.1981(Exhibit 3 to 6). This agreement was executed in the presence of witnesses PW-3 Trilok Singh and Surendra Singh. The plaintiff has also filed the carbon copy of application written to the concerned sub-registrar and the receipts issued by the concerned sub- registrar marking his attendance in the sub-registrar office on 2.11.1981(Exhibit 3 to 6). The plaintiff has also filed the carbon copy of the legal notice given to the defendant no.1 on 25.9.1981(Exhibit-2). 40. The defendants No. 2 to 7 have filed the certified copy of the sale deed executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of Kripal Singh for a consideration of Rs. 17,000/- dated 3.9.1981, which was registered on 23.11.1981 in the office of sub-registrar Hapur(Exhibit Kha-2), certified copy of the compromise application and the decree passed thereon by the Court of Civil Judge Ghaziabad in O.S. No. 334 of 1981 Tejvir Singh vs. Jaggu and another on 7.9.1981(Exhibit Ka-3 & 4), certified copy of sale deed executed by Tejvir Singh on 11.10.1982 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7 regarding the disputed land for a consideration of Rs. 62,500/- which was registered on 22.11.1982 in the office of sub-registrar Hapur, etc. Oral evidence of the parties 41. Plaintiff Ashok Kumar PW-1 in his examination in chief duly proved the execution of the registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981, regarding the disputed property, in his favour by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, out of which an amount of Rs. 38,500/- was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. He further deposed that the witnesses to this agreement were Trilok Singh and Surendra Singh. He further deposed that it was agreed between the parties that the defendant no.1 would prior to the execution of sale deed, obtain permission from the income tax Department and only 2 months time was given to the defendant to execute the sale deed. He further deposed that he always remained ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in his favour after paying the balance sale consideration and was still ready and willing to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement. He further deposed that when the defendant no.1 failed to execute the sale deed in his favour, then he gave a legal notice through his advocate to the defendant. He further deposed that when the defendant no.1 failed to execute the sale deed in his favour, then he gave a legal notice through his advocate to the defendant. He further deposed that the defendant no.1 assured him that he will remain present on 2.11.1981 at the sub-registrar office and will execute the sale deed in his favour, as such he remained present at the sub-registrar office Hapur on 2.11.1981 with balance sale consideration and expenses of the sale deed, but the defendant failed to arrive. He further deposed that he remained present at the office from morning to evening and also marked his attendance in the sub- registrar office. He further deposed that subsequently, he always remained ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in his favour but the defendant no.1 failed to execute it. He further deposed that the disputed land was agricultural and if the sale deed would have been executed in his favour, then he would have earned at least Rs. 5,000/- per year from it. 42. He further deposed that during the pendency of the suit the sale deed of the disputed land was executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no. 2 to 7, who were having knowledge of the agreement to sell executed in his favour. He further deposed that the defendant no.1 was not having any right to execute the sale deed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7. 43. He further deposed that the market rate of interest was 17% per annum. He further deposed that the possession of the disputed land was with defendant no.1. He had seen the documents regarding the ownership of defendant no.1 in the disputed property. 44. PW-1 in cross-examination deposed that he was required to pay Rs. 38,500/- at the time of execution of sale deed. He was having that much money and he still had that much money. He further deposed that as per the terms of the agreement, it was agreed that the defendant no.1 was to obtain the permission from the income tax Department and the sale deed was to be executed within 2 months. He further deposed that the defendant no.1 disclosed to him that the permission has not been obtained and as soon as it was obtained, he will execute the sale deed. He further deposed that the defendant no.1 disclosed to him that the permission has not been obtained and as soon as it was obtained, he will execute the sale deed. He admitted that the defendant no.1 only delayed the execution of sale deed on the ground that permission from the income tax Department was not obtained. He denied the suggestion that defendant no.1 always remained ready to execute the sale deed. 45. He further deposed in cross-examination that he was not aware whether on 4.3.1981 the sale deed of the disputed land was executed by Tejveer in favour of Jaggu and his brother. He was never told by Tejvir whether above sale deed was cancelled or not.It was also not told by Jaggu that a compromise has been reached between him and Tejvir regarding the disputed land, but it was told by Tejvir that his dispute with Jaggu has been settled. He was not aware whether on the date the agreement of sale regarding disputed land was executed, any case for cancellation of sale deed regarding the disputed land was pending in the District Court Ghaziabad or not. He was also not aware that in that case his brother Ravindra acted as a mediator or not. He was not aware whether on 3.9.1981 any sale deed was executed by Tejvir in favour of Kripal or not and he is also not aware, whether in this sale deed his brothers Ravindra and Surendra were witness or not. 46. He further admitted in cross-examination that he was aware that the house which was purchased by Kripal from Tejvir, has been sold by Kripal to his brother Ravindra. He disclosed that prior to execution of agreement to sell ,he got conducted an inspection from the Registry whether Tejvir was the owner of the disputed property or not. He denied the suggestion that defendants no. 2 to 7 were not aware of his agreement. 47. Ravindra Singh PW-2 deposed in his examination in chief that the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh had executed the sale deed of his house on 3.9.1981 willingly after receiving consideration, without any undue influence or coercion. 48. PW-2 in cross-examination deposed that he was not aware whether any dispute was going on regarding the disputed land between Tejvir and Jaggu. 47. Ravindra Singh PW-2 deposed in his examination in chief that the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh had executed the sale deed of his house on 3.9.1981 willingly after receiving consideration, without any undue influence or coercion. 48. PW-2 in cross-examination deposed that he was not aware whether any dispute was going on regarding the disputed land between Tejvir and Jaggu. He admitted that in the sale deed executed on 3.9.1981 by Tejvir in favour of Kripal, he was a witness along with Surendra. He also admitted that in the agreement to sell which was executed on the same day in favour of his brother, Surendra was a witness. He admitted that the sale deed and the agreement to sell were prepared by the same person, firstly sale deed was prepared and then after 2 hours, agreement was prepared. This witness was not cross-examined by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh. 49. Trilok Singh PW-3 in examination in chief deposed that he was witness along with Surendra in the agreement to sell, regarding the disputed land which was executed by Tejvir Singh in favour of Ashok Kumar. In cross-examination he deposed that an amount of Rs. 41,000/- was given in his presence.This witness was also not cross-examined by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh. 50. Dhirendra Singh PW-4 in examination in chief deposed that he purchased tractor no.UTG-8862 from plaintiff 's grandfather Daryao Singh on 2.9.1981 for Rs.40,000/-, out of which Rs. 32,000/- was paid at the time of its delivery and the remaining Rs. 8,000/- was paid after 2 years. This witness proved the sale receipt of the above tractor as Exhibit- 7. He further deposed that in official records he is the owner of the above tractor. In cross-examination he disclosed that the tractor was registered in his name on 17.8.1985.This witness was not cross-examined by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh. 51. Tejvir Singh, defendant no.1, examined himself as DW-1 who admitted in his examination in chief that he entered into an agreement to sell regarding his land situated in khasra no. 611 of which he was the owner in possession, for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, an amount of Rs. 36,000/- was received by him prior to its registration and Rs. 5,000/- was received by him at the time of its registration, the remaining amount was agreed to be paid at the time of the execution of sale deed. 611 of which he was the owner in possession, for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, an amount of Rs. 36,000/- was received by him prior to its registration and Rs. 5,000/- was received by him at the time of its registration, the remaining amount was agreed to be paid at the time of the execution of sale deed. This witness duly accepted that the agreement to sell produced by the plaintiff, was duly executed by him in favour of the plaintiff, which was subsequently registered ,in which Trilok Singh(PW-3) and Surendra Singh were witnesses. He further admitted that within the prescribed period as mentioned in the agreement, he could not execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff because his uncle Mahipal Singh had refused to do so, who was twice his age. He admitted that he executed a sale deed on 11.10.1982 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, but without any consideration, which was not executed willingly and consciously, according to him which was not a proper sale deed. He also disclosed that the defendants no. 2 to 7 were aware that regarding the same land, he had executed an agreement in favour of plaintiff, but now he was ready to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff. 52. DW-1 in cross-examination by plaintiff accepted that he received the legal notice dated 25.9.1981 of the plaintiff and he also accepted that, he gave an assurance to the plaintiff that he will remain present on 2.11.1981 in the subregistrar office but he did not went on that date, to execute the sale deed. He further denied the assertion of the defendants no. 2 to 7 as incorrect, that the plaintiff did not pay any consideration to him and he had not executed the agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff. 53. DW-1 in cross examination by defendants no. 2 to 7 disclosed that since the last 2 – 3 months he was ready to execute the sale deed, but previously he was not ready. He also accepted that no certificate was obtained by him from the income tax Department. He also accepted that he has not filed any suit for cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7. He also accepted that no certificate was obtained by him from the income tax Department. He also accepted that he has not filed any suit for cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7. He also accepted that he has not moved an application in any court that since he was not paid the consideration, the sale deed was inadmissible. He was not ready to execute the sale deed because the defendant Mahipal had directed him to do so. He accepted that he failed to return the money to the plaintiff. He further accepted that he executed the agreement willingly. He further disclosed that he accepted the advice of defendant Mahipal because there was enmity between plaintiff and Mahipal. He denied the suggestion that Mahipal was not aware about the disputed agreement to sell. He further disclosed that regarding the disputed land, an agreement was agreed to be executed in favour of Jaggu and others but instead of it, a sale deed was executed in their favour, regarding which a compromise took place and the suit for the cancellation of sale deed was filed by him before Civil Judge Ghaziabad, which related to the same disputed land, in which the sale deed was cancelled. He further disclosed that the consideration of that cancelled sale deed was returned by him. He further deposed that he had only a house and the disputed land, besides that he has no other property. He also deposed that at the time of execution of agreement ,he was the owner of the disputed property. 54. Mahipal Singh DW-2 on behalf of defendant no. 2 to 7 deposed in his examination in chief that the disputed land was purchased on 11.10.1982 from Tejvir for a consideration of Rs. 62,500/-, the sale deed was executed willingly by Tejvir without any coercion, he had perused the revenue record prior to execution of sale deed, also got inspected the records of the registrar office, he also gave a copy of the decree of cancellation of sale deed to the sale deed writer, the decree of cancellation was passed on 7.9.1981, no agreement to sale which was executed after 7.9.1981 was found in the sub-registrar office, only cancellation of agreement was found. He also deposed that he was not aware of any agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff on 3.2.1981(sic 3.9.1981), he was also not informed about this by Tejvir, the copy of decree cancellation was given to him by Tejvir, the sale deed which was cancelled was executed by Tejvir in favour of Jaggu. His relations with plaintiff are restrained since the last 6 – 7 years, he came to know about the agreement only about 2 1/2 – 2 3/4 years back, after receiving the summons from the court. Thereafter, he made an enquiry through Kripal and also asked Tejvir, who informed that agreement has not been executed. Tejvir executed the sale deed regarding the disputed land in favour of Jaggu, regarding which a case was pending in the civil court, which was compromised with the assistance of Kripal, Ravindra, Ashok, Trilok and Surendra. He further deposed that had he been aware that Tejvir has executed an agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff, then he would not have got sale deed executed from Tejvir. An income of Rs. 2,000/- annually accrues from this land. On 3.9.1981 Tejvir was not the owner of the disputed land, on that day Jaggu was the owner, after passing of the decree of cancellation on 7.9.1981, Tejvir became owner. 55. DW-2 deposed in cross-examination by the defendant no.1, that on 7.9.1981 decree of cancellation of the sale deed, which was executed by Tejvir in favour of Jaggu was passed in favour of Tejvir, due to which Tejvir became the owner of the land. Prior to it, Jaggu had executed an agreement of sale regarding the same land in favour of Dalchand, the cancellation of which was obtained by him from the registry, only then he became aware. He neither asked Tejvir about the sale deed and agreement nor Tejvir told him anything. He disclosed that he got conducted an enquiry through Lalla Shyamsunder of Hapur of the records of the registry, who after enquiry told him that on 25.9.1981 a cancellation of agreement between Jaggu and Dalchand was found. He accepted that he became aware of the agreement executed by Tejvir in favour of plaintiff about 2 1/2 – 3 years back when he received summons of this case from the court. He accepted that he became aware of the agreement executed by Tejvir in favour of plaintiff about 2 1/2 – 3 years back when he received summons of this case from the court. He denied the suggestion that he was aware of the agreement executed by Tejvir in favour of plaintiff, at the time of execution of sale deed in his favour. 56. DW-2 in cross examination by plaintiff disclosed that he never got conducted an inspection of record of the last 12 years. He got conducted the inspection of record on 11.10.1982 but he has no documentary proof regarding it. He was orally informed about the result of inspection by the deed writer. He accepted that when he became aware of the registered agreement then he got conducted inspection of the records of the registry but he could not disclose the date of inspection. He denied the suggestion that he was well aware of the agreement at the time of execution of sale deed in his favour. He disclosed that Tejvir told him that since he returned the consideration to Jaggu hence the sale deed was cancelled. He has filed the copy of the decree of cancellation of the sale deed which are paper no. 40-C and 41-C. He further deposed that on 7.8.1981 the registered agreement of house was made which was also cancelled through registered document. The agreement which was executed on 25.8.1981 in favour of Dalchand was also regarding the disputed property, which was also cancelled through registered agreement. Now he is aware that the disputed agreement has been executed on 3.9.1981 in favour of plaintiff. He disclosed that his relations with Ravindra, Ashok, Jaggu and others are strained since the last 6 – 7 years due to criminal proceedings between them. 57. Hetram DW-3 deposed in examination in chief that he was witness of the sale deed which was executed by Tejvir in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7 after receiving consideration of Rs. 62,500/-. In cross-examination he deposed that the sale deed was registered in Tehsil,Hapur. The plaintiff was not present at that time. 58. Kripal Singh DW-4 deposed in his examination in chief that he was a mediator between the disputes of Tejvir and Jaggu, relating to sale deed, along with Ravindra,Trilok, Surendra and Ashok. 62,500/-. In cross-examination he deposed that the sale deed was registered in Tehsil,Hapur. The plaintiff was not present at that time. 58. Kripal Singh DW-4 deposed in his examination in chief that he was a mediator between the disputes of Tejvir and Jaggu, relating to sale deed, along with Ravindra,Trilok, Surendra and Ashok. He further deposed that Mahipal became aware of the agreement to sell about two and half years back, from him. The disputed land is now in possession of Mahipal. In cross-examination he admitted that on the same day, Tejvir executed sale deed of his house in his favour and Tejvir also executed the agreement to sell of the disputed land, in favour of plaintiff. Conclusion by this Court 59. From the pleadings and testimony of plaintiff PW-1 Ashok Kumar and the unequivocal admission of defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh, it is proved that an agreement to sell regarding the disputed land was executed by Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff, for a consideration of Rs. 79,500/-, in the office of sub-registrar Hapur on 3.9.1981, and an amount of Rs. 36,000/- was given by the plaintiff to the defendant at the time of execution and Rs. 5,000/- at the time of registration of the above agreement, in all an amount of Rs. 41,000/- was given by the plaintiff as earnest money, in part consideration to the defendant Tejvir Singh. The above agreement has been proved by the plaintiff as Exhibit-1, which was subsequently registered in the office of sub- registrar Hapur in book no.1, Zild no. 1800, at pages 44/45 at serial no. 6430 on 23.11.1981. 60. It was also proved that as per the terms of the agreement ,the defendant Tejvir Singh had to obtain permission from the income tax Department and then execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within 2 months till 2.11.1981. It was also proved that the defendant failed to obtain the above permission and also failed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It is also proved that the plaintiff gave legal notice dated 25.9.1981 to the defendant no.1, which was received by him and the defendant was supposed to remain present on 2.11.1981 in the office of sub-registrar, Hapur for receiving the balance sale consideration and thereafter, executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, but the defendant failed to remain present. From the evidence on record, it was proved that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was still ready and willing and it was the defendant no.1 who committed default by not obtaining the requisite permission from the income tax Department as well as by not remaining present in the office of the sub-registrar Hapur, on the last date fixed for performance of the agreement i.e 2.11.1981. 61. From the record of the trial court it is evident that the suit for specific performance of the registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 was filed by the plaintiff on 31.3.1982, and subsequent to the filing of the suit, the disputed property has been sold by the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh through registered sale deed dated 11.10.1982 executed in favour of subsequent purchasers defendant no. 2 to 7, who have been impleaded in the suit on behalf of the plaintiff by trial court order dated 22.11.1982, whereby impleadment application 17-A of the plaintiff under Order I Rule 10,Order VI Rule 17 and 151 CPC was allowed. 62. It is apparent that during the pendency of the suit, the disputed property has been sold by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh on 11.10.1982 in favour of the subsequent purchasers defendants no. 2 to 7, for a consideration of Rs. 62,500/- which has been proved by plaintiff, admitted by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh as well as by subsequent purchaser Mahipal Singh DW-2. It is the case of the subsequent purchasers that they are bonafide purchasers of the disputed property for valuable consideration, but without notice of the earlier registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh on 3.9.1981 in favour of the plaintiff. 63. Although the plaintiff PW-1 and defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh DW-1 deposed that the subsequent purchasers were well aware of the earlier registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff on 3.9.1981, but it was denied by the subsequent purchasers in their written statement as well as in the testimony of Mahipal Singh DW-2. 63. Although the plaintiff PW-1 and defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh DW-1 deposed that the subsequent purchasers were well aware of the earlier registered agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff on 3.9.1981, but it was denied by the subsequent purchasers in their written statement as well as in the testimony of Mahipal Singh DW-2. It is further evident that DW-2 accepted in his cross-examination that on 11.10.1982, at the time of execution of sale deed in their favour, he had not got conducted inspection of the property records maintained in the office of the sub- registrar,Hapur.DW-2 could not submit any documentary evidence to prove that prior to execution of the above sale deed in favour of subsequent purchasers, they had exercised due diligence by getting inspected the relevant records maintained at the office of sub-registrar Hapur for ascertaining whether any previous sale transaction has taken place within the last 12 years, regarding the disputed land. The subsequent purchasers have not filed any documentary evidence to prove the above inspection of the relevant documents. 64. To the contrary, from the evidence of defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh it is proved that at the time of execution of the sale deed on 11.10.1982 in favour of the subsequent purchasers, the subsequent purchasers i.e.defendants no. 2 to 7 were well aware that previously registered agreement to sell has been executed on 3.9.1981 in favour of plaintiff by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh. 65. It is apparent that the subsequent sale deed dated 11.10.1982 was executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh during the pendency of suit, in favour of subsequent purchasers being defendants no. 2 to 7, who are bound by the doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. From the above law laid down by the Apex Court in Guruswamy Nadar (supra), Shingara Singh (supra) and Alka Shrirang Chavan (supra) , it is apparent that the subsequent purchaser's plea of bona fide purchaser with valuable consideration and without notice as enunciated in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 has to yield to the doctrine of lis pendens, and as such, with or without notice of the earlier agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff, they are bound by the decree passed in the suit. It is further apparent that the plea available under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is only available to the transfer made prior to the institution of the suit, which is not the case in the instant suit. It is apparent that the subsequent purchasers cannot avoid the decree and cannot claim that subsequent transfer of the disputed property will prevail over the earlier agreement to sell executed by the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff. In view of the above legal position and evidence on record, the trial court has certainly erred in concluding that the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants no. 2 to 7 are bonafide purchaser of the disputed property without notice of the agreement to sell, who are entitled to the benefit of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 66. It is further evident that the registered agreement to sell was executed on 3.9.1981, when the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh was not the owner of the disputed property, who subsequently became owner on 7.9.1981, on the passing of the compromise decree in O.S.no.334 of 1981 Tejvir Singh vs. Jaggu and others, by the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad whereby, the registered sale deed dated 4.3.1981 executed earlier in favour of defendant's of that suit, was cancelled. 67. From the law laid down by the Apex Court in Silla Chandra Sekharam (supra) and Tanu Ram Bora (supra) it is evident that in accordance with the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 even if the vendor was not having any or imperfect title to the disputed property, but if subsequently he acquires any interest in the disputed property and the agreement still subsists, then the purchaser can compel the vendor to make good the contract out of such interest. 68. It is apparent that even though defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh was not having any title to the disputed property on 3.9.1981, but subsequently on 7.9.1981, he has acquired perfect title to it. 68. It is apparent that even though defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh was not having any title to the disputed property on 3.9.1981, but subsequently on 7.9.1981, he has acquired perfect title to it. It is further apparent that the agreement to sell was executed by the defendant on obtaining consideration from the plaintiff ,by fradulently or erroneously representing that he was the owner of the disputed property and the plaintiff never cancelled the registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981, which was subsisting on 7.9.1981 as well as at the time of filing of the suit on 31.3.1982 as well as when the subsequent sale deed was executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh on 11.10.1982 in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, as such, in accordance with the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act,1963 the plaintiff is entitled to demand the specific performance of agreement and it cannot be opposed by the subsequent purchasers on the ground that defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh had no title to the disputed property when the agreement to sell was executed by him in favour of the plaintiff. 69. It is further apparent that neither the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh nor the subsequent purchasers being defendants no. 2 to 7 have challenged the judgment and decree of the trial court on any ground whatsoever by filing appeal or cross objections, as such, the findings recorded by the trial court while disposing all the issues except issue no. 4 and 9 have attained finality, all of which have been decided against the defendants. 70. It is apparent that the trial court has concluded that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform the terms of the agreement to sell and was still ready and willing but only on the ground that during the pendency of the suit, the disputed property was sold by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of defendants no. 2 to 7, who were held to be bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, the primary relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell was not granted to the plaintiff, which is erroneous and legally unsustainable. As analysed previously, it is evident that defendants no. 2 to 7, who were held to be bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, the primary relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell was not granted to the plaintiff, which is erroneous and legally unsustainable. As analysed previously, it is evident that defendants no. 2 to 7 are not bona fide purchasers of the disputed property who were well aware of the earlier agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of the plaintiff, as such, the trial court should have granted the primary relief of specific performance of the registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981, in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court has certainly erred in granting the alternate relief of return of earnest money of Rs. 41,000/- along with interest at the rate of 17% per annum. 71. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout . Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.9.1986 is set-aside and the plaintiff 's suit for the primary relief of specific performance of the registered agreement to sell dated 3.9.1981 is decreed against all the defendant's. 72. It is further ordered that the defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs. 38,500/-along with defendants no. 2 to 7, will execute the sale deed of the disputed property in favour of the plaintiff within 2 months from today, and will also hand over its vacant possession to the plaintiff, failing which, the plaintiff will be entitled to get the decree executed through the court.