JUDGMENT : IRSHAD ALI, J. 1. Heard Shri Mohiuddin Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri S.G. Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-State and Shri Dinesh Chandra, learned counsel for the subsequent allottee. 2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 10.09.2002 passed by the Commissioner (opposite party no.2) whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioners has been dismissed and the order dated 31.03.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority under the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 has been affirmed. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that on 08.07.1974 a notice under Section 10(2) of UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holding Act was issued in which area held by the petitioner's father and grand-father of ( petitioners no. 9 to 12) was shown 23.056 acres land un-irrigated equivalent to 13.697 acres irrigated land was proposed to be declared surplus and an area 29.400 acres irrigated land was held within the ceiling limits. The petitioner's father and grand father of the petitioner no. 9 to 12 filed an objection with the allegation that the entire land is unirrigated ancestral land and 5 major sons were in existence on the date of vesting and thus they are the co-tenure holder along-with Gulam Mohammad Khan. The Prescribed Authority (Opposite Party No. 3) dismissed the objections vide order dated 26.12.1974. Against the said order petitioner preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Bahraich ( Rent Appeal No. 32 of 1975) which was allowed and accordingly the order dated 26.12.1974 was set aside vide order dated 05.04.1975. In a review application filed by OP No.1 the order dated 05.04.1975 was dismissed and the order dated 26.12.1974 was upheld vide order dated 18.09.1980. The petitioner filed a writ petition 3026/80 in this Hon'ble Court which was allowed vide order dated 12.01.1984 with following direction : " The writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Distt. Judge dated 5.4.1975 Annexure Ho. 5) in review application is quashed and is directed to recalculate the land in accordance with laws" The matter was remanded back to the Prescribed Authority to recalculate the land of the petitioner in the light of order dt. 12.01.1984. The Prescribed Authority vide order dated 31.03.2001 declared 13.657 acres irrigated land equivalent to 20.485 acres unirrigated land as surplus. 5) in review application is quashed and is directed to recalculate the land in accordance with laws" The matter was remanded back to the Prescribed Authority to recalculate the land of the petitioner in the light of order dt. 12.01.1984. The Prescribed Authority vide order dated 31.03.2001 declared 13.657 acres irrigated land equivalent to 20.485 acres unirrigated land as surplus. Against the order dated 31.03.2001 petitioners filed an appeal in the court of Commissioner, Devi Patan (OP No. 2) which was dismissed vide order dated 10.09.2002. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the appellate Court has arbitrarily and illegally passed the judgment and order dated 10.9.2002 upholding the order dated 31.3.2001 passed by the opposite party no. 3 has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and without applying its judicial mind at the time of passing the impugned order and without considering the pleas and arguments raised by the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submits that opposite party no. 3 has committed manifest error of law in not deciding the application for substitution of the legal heirs of late Abdul Wahab Khan and without substituting the sons of late Abdul Wahab and grandsons of Late Gulam Mohamaad Khan passed the impugned order dated 10.9.2002. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 26.12.1974 also rejected the plea of mutual partition cum family settlement on the ground that no documentary evidence to the said effect has been led whereas it is well settled principle that mutual partition and family settlement can be orally done and there is no necessity of reducing the same in writing. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Prescribed Authority passed the order dated 31.03.2001 without considering the facts of the order dated 12.1.1964 passed by this Hon'ble Court wherein it was held that the District Judge Bahraich allowed the review application under mistaken belief that the original tenure holder had four major sons and three sons are entitled to 6 hectare of land and as such even if the original tenure holder had 4 sons an area of 5.160 acre land was not reduced, the order passed by the District Judge in review application order dated 18.9.1980 thus deserves to be quashed, but the Prescribed Authority Ceiling Bahraich did not follow the remand order of the Additional Commissioner Faizabad nor the order dated 12.1.1984 passed by this Hon'ble Court and without deducting the area of land and declared 13.657 acres irrigated land equivalent to 20.485 acres unirrigated land acres as surplus. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that according to the petitioner, out of total surplus land, 0.461 acres has been shown as grove, 0.410 acres of land has been kept out of ambit of ceiling and in remaining land petitioners are entitled to retain 7.30 hectares in terms of irrigated land plus six hectare for 4 major sons and other family members and thus remains 8.09 acres land only and after excluding 5,160 only, 2.98 acres land allegedly remains surplus. 9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments: (i) Wadood Ahmad v. ADJ , 2020 SCC OnLine All 1930 (ii) J asraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand, (1977) 2 SCC 155 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the orders passed by the authorities under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 are legal, valid and passed in accordance with law. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents next submits that a notice under Section 10(2) of the Act was issued on 08.07.1974 to the tenure holder Ghulam Mohammad Khan, indicating that he possessed 43.057 acres of land (in terms of irrigated land). After calculating the permissible ceiling limit of the tenure holder and his family members 23.056 acres (unirrigated equivalent) were proposed to be declared surplus land. Accordingly, the Prescribed Authority/Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Bahraich passed an order dated 02.12.1974 declaring the said land as surplus. 12. After calculating the permissible ceiling limit of the tenure holder and his family members 23.056 acres (unirrigated equivalent) were proposed to be declared surplus land. Accordingly, the Prescribed Authority/Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Bahraich passed an order dated 02.12.1974 declaring the said land as surplus. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents next submits that the tenure holder filed Appeal No. 32/75 before the District Judge, Bahraich, which was dismissed on 18.09.1980. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed before the High Court, and by order dated 12.01.1984, the High Court directed the authorities to recalculate the land in accordance with the rules. In compliance with the High Court’s direction and the order dated 22.04.1998 of the appellate authority, the land was recalculated. After recalculation, the total holding of the tenure holder was found to be 43.057 acres (irrigated equivalent). After deducting the permissible ceiling limit of 29.400 acres, 13.657 acres of irrigated land (equivalent to 20.485 acres unirrigated) was found to be surplus. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents next submits that after the death of the tenure holder, notices were duly served upon his legal representatives, who were substituted in the proceedings on the basis of the Tehsildar’s inquiry report dated 23.04.1999. The legal representatives appeared on 26.09.2000 and 30.09.2000, but subsequently failed to appear, due to which ex-parte proceedings were conducted. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents next submits that the Prescribed Authority passed an order dated 31.03.2001 declaring 13.657 acres of irrigated land (20.485 acres unirrigated) of Gata No. 301M as surplus. Against this order, the legal representatives filed Appeal No. 21/2001 (Nisar Ahmad Khan & Others vs State), which was dismissed on 10.09.2002, and the order of the Prescribed Authority was affirmed. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents lastly submits that the State has contended that all proceedings were conducted after issuing proper notices, providing opportunity of hearing, and strictly in compliance with the directions of the High Court and the appellate authority. Therefore, the grounds taken in the writ petition are not tenable in law, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material available on record. 17. Therefore, the grounds taken in the writ petition are not tenable in law, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material available on record. 17. To resolve the controversy involved in the present writ petition, operative portion of judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is extracted herein below: (i) Wadood Ahmad (supra): "17. On the issue, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 further relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj; (2008) 9 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 Supp SC 526): “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or Tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior Tribunals within the limits of law. 18. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 relied upon aforesaid judgments to show that the findings recorded by the trial court on erroneous impression of legal position could be interfered with and the Revisional court can re-assess and record its findings. The case of Smt. Nattho (supra) relates to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC, likewise, in the case of Ram Swaroop (supra), the provisions of Section 2(2) of Act No. 13 of 1972 were considered as well as in Hemlata Tripathi and Bhoopal Singh (supra), it was held that the finding regarding non-applicability of the Act are findings of fact. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad (supra) case relates to the bona fide requirement of the landlord. 19. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad (supra) case relates to the bona fide requirement of the landlord. 19. On a careful consideration of the entire facts and the evidence on record as well as the case laws, it is now evident that this court after setting aside the findings recorded by the respondent No. 1 vide judgment dated 06.11.2006 regarding the question of rate of rent and applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the entitlement of the petitioner for the benefit under Section 20(4) of the Act, quashed the same and remanded the matter to the respondent No. 1 to decide the revision in accordance with the directions contained therein within two months. 20. The respondent No. 1 even without complying the order of remand passed by this court earlier, had again endorsed the same findings which in view of the law relied upon by counsel for the petitioner are beyond scope of the powers conferred on him under Section 25 of the Act" (ii) Jasraj Inder Singh (supra): "12. The remand order was undoubtedly binding on the lower court and had directed a limited enquiry and passing of a decree “in favour of the party in whose favour the balance will be found due”. The High Court held that after the remand the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to look into the Bombay accounts as a whole and on account of the misapprehension of the observations of the remand order an illegal decree had been passed in favour of the plaintiff. 13. What was the misapprehension about? While directing a remand, the High Court ordered that Issue 6 should be decided by the trial court and this issue has been set out earlier by us. Naturally, the trial court took the view that the High Court, having ordered an adjudication of Issue 6, vested it with the jurisdiction to enquire into the Bombay accounts in toto and pass the decree that we have already indicated viz. a deduction of the surplus due to the defendant from the Bombay accounts from the amount due to the plaintiff from the defendant according to the Khamgaon accounts. a deduction of the surplus due to the defendant from the Bombay accounts from the amount due to the plaintiff from the defendant according to the Khamgaon accounts. The arithmetic is not in dispute and, indeed, while both the counsel have taken us through the evidence in the case we are satisfied that if both the Khamgaon and the Bombay accounts had to be gone into the decree passed was correct both regarding the quantum and on the issue of limitation. This we affirm because Shri Phadke had feebly pressed before us that in any case his client should be given a fresh opportunity to make out his case regarding the various entries in the Bombay khata. We are not satisfied that the defendant has not had a full say and we are therefore disinclined to accede to this request. 14. The surviving question before us is whether it was in order for the trial court to have investigated the accounts in the two shops together as if they were transactions between the same two persons or whether the remand order of the High Court at the first round had fettered the trial court's hands in doing justice in this comprehensive way. The suit is for a sum due on accounts. The parties are the same. There are two shops belonging to the same owner. The return of the income from the two shops, for income tax purposes, is a consolidated one. In short, there was only one person who owned two shops and it is wrong to construe the situation as if there were two juristic entities or personae. Secondly, the defendant, who dealt with the plaintiff in the two shops, was the same person. He had no dual characters to play. The dealings were either in one or in the other shop. They were business dealings between two businessmen, during the same period, and even inter- related, to such an extent that sometimes advances were made from one shop and realisations were made in the other shop. In short an artificial dissection of these transactions could not square up with the reality of the situation. Shri Phadke urged that one contract was one transaction and a set of contracts need not be necessarily brought up in the same action between the same parties. In short an artificial dissection of these transactions could not square up with the reality of the situation. Shri Phadke urged that one contract was one transaction and a set of contracts need not be necessarily brought up in the same action between the same parties. We consider that the true nature of the action here is a suit on accounts for the sum due on striking a balance. That itself is the cause of action. Such a suit is not unfamiliar and such a cause of action may be made up of various minor transactions. Viewed at the micro level each may be a single contract. But viewed at the micro level as a suit on accounts, it is a single cause of action. If the present action is one on accounts and if the various entries in the two shops at Khamgaon and Bombay involve transfusion of funds and goods, there is no reason why we should not accept as sound the approach made by the trial court that the entirety of accounts in the two shops should be viewed as a composite one. It reduces litigation; it promotes the final financial settlement as between the parties; it has the stamp of reality. Otherwise it would be an odd distortion to grant a decree for the plaintiff for, say Rs 10,000 on the strength of the Khamgaon accounts while he owes the defendant Rs 50,000 according to the Bombay accounts. Order 8 Rule 6 CPC deals with a specific situation and does not prevent the court, where the facts call for wider relief, from looking into the accounts in both places to do ultimate justice between the parties. Procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of justice and, in this spirit, the trial court's adjudication cannot be faulted. 15. Be that as it may, in an appeal against the High Court's finding, the Supreme Court is not bound by what the High Court might have held in its remand order. It is true that a subordinate court is bound by the direction of the High Court. It is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the matter on a second occasion or any other court of coordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a remand order cannot bind a higher court when it comes up in appeal before it. It is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the matter on a second occasion or any other court of coordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a remand order cannot bind a higher court when it comes up in appeal before it. This is the correct view of the law, although Shri Phadke controverted it, without reliance on any authority. Nor did Shri S.T. Desai, who asserted this proposition, which we regard as correct, cite any precedent of this Court in support. However, it transpires that in Lonankutty [Lonankutty v. Thomman, (1976) 3 SCC 528 ] this proposition has been affirmed. Viewed simplistically, the remand order by the High Court is a finding in an intermediate stage of the same litigation. When it came to the trial court and escalated to the High Court, it remained the same litigation. The appeal before the Supreme Court is from the suit as a whole and, therefore, the entire subject-matter is available for adjudication before us. If, on any other principle of finality statutorily conferred or on account of res judicata attracted by a decision in an allied litigation the matter is concluded, we too are bound in the Supreme Court. Otherwise, the whole lis for the first time comes to this Court and the High Court's finding at an intermediate stage does not prevent examination of the position of law by this Court. Intermediate stages of the litigation and orders passed at those stages have a provisional finality. After discussing various aspects of the matter, Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Court in Lonankutty [Lonankutty v. Thomman, (1976) 3 SCC 528 ] observed : (scc p. 535, para 23) “The circumstance that the remaining judgment of the High Court was not appealed against, assuming that an appeal lay therefrom, cannot preclude the appellant from challenging the correctness of the view taken by the High Court in that judgment.”\ 18. Perusal of the above-extracted judgments reveals that though the powers of a High Court under Article 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act a court of appeal or a court of error. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or Tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior Tribunals within the limits of law. It also reveals that the remand order was undoubtedly binding on the lower court and had directed a limited enquiry and passing of a decree “in favour of the party in whose favour the balace will be found due”. It was held that after the remand the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to look into the matter as a whole. 19. Perusal of the record shows that an application for substitution of the legal heirs of late Abdul Wahab Khan had been filed. However, the Prescribed Authority proceeded to decide the matter without first determining the substitution application and without bringing the legal heirs on record. It is a settled principle that proceedings conducted without impleading the necessary parties, particularly legal heirs of a deceased party whose rights are directly affected, cannot be sustained in law. In this view of the matter, the order impugned is vitiates in law and has been passed without applying its judicial. 20. The orders impugned also reveal that earlier proceedings in the matter had culminated in a remand by the superior authorities. Once a remand order had been passed with specific directions, it was incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority to strictly adhere to those directions. The law in this regard has been clearly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand (supra) where it has been held that the subordinate Court is bound by the remand order and cannot travel beyond its scope. 21. Similarly, this Court in the case of Wadood Ahmad (supra) reiterated that failure to comply with the directions issued in a remand order renders the subsequent order unsustainable. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. Similarly, this Court in the case of Wadood Ahmad (supra) reiterated that failure to comply with the directions issued in a remand order renders the subsequent order unsustainable. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, it appears that the Prescribed Authority did not properly understood the directions issued in earlier proceedings nor examined the question regarding deduction of land as indicated by the superior authorities. 22. The Prescribed Authority, without considering the observation that Hon’ble Court declared 13.6547 acres irrigated land equivalent to 20.485 acres of unirrigated land as well as the observation that the initial 5.160 acres of land declared as surplus has to be reduced vide order dated 31.03.2001, passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind and is contrary to the observation made by the Hon’ble Court. 23. The Appellate Authority while affirming the order of the Prescribed Authority has also failed to examine these aspects and passed the impugned order in a cursory manner without taking into account the aspects narrated in the aforesaid paragraphs. 24. Both the Courts-Below have failed to re-calculate the land surplus in accordance with direction issued by this Hon’ble Court and hence not duly complied with the remand order, hence both the orders are liable to be set aside. 25. It is very strange that specific direction issued by the Hon’ble High Court has not been taken into account and ignored while passing the orders impugned by the Courts-Below. It is duty of the Courts Below that while passing any order by the Courts-Below, remand order passed by the Hon’ble High Court / Superior Authority must be taken into account and pass order in accordance with the direction issued by the Superior Authority. 26. Considering in totalities of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that both the Courts-Below have passed the orders impugned without complying with the remand order of this Hon’ble Court dated 12.01.1984 in which a direction was specifically made to recalculate the land of the petitioners. 27. Accordingly, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed . Order dated 10.09.2002 passed by the Commissioner (opposite party no.2) and the order dated 31.03.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority are quashed.