[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Criminal Appeal (Db) No. 305/2018 Ram Prakash @ Prakash S/o Gopal, R/o Khairali Police Station Baran Sadar Distt. Baran Raj. (At Present He Is Confined In Distt. Jail Baran) ---Accused-Appellant Versus State Of Rajasthan Through PP, Raj. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Girish Khandelwal with Ms. Swati Sharma and Mr. Khizer Iqbal Khan For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Choudhary, GA-cum-AAG with Mr. Aman Agarwal Mr. Vinod Sharma Ms. Neha Goyal Mr. Amit Kumar Punia, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHUWAN GOYAL Judgment 16/04/2026 PER HON’BLE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL, J. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted the status report dated 14.04.2026 furnished by SHO, Police Station, Baran Sadar, District Baran which is taken on record. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment dated 04.08.2018 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Baran (for short, ‘learned trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.304/2016 CIS No.293/2016 whereby, the accused-appellant (for short, ‘appellant’) has been convicted and sentenced as under: [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (2 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] Section 302 IPC:- Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.25,000/-; in default whereof, six months’ additional simple imprisonment. Section 452 IPC:- Five years’ simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-; in default whereof, two months’ additional simple imprisonment. Both the sentences to run concurrently. The relevant facts in nutshell are that based on the parcha bayan of Mukesh Kumar (PW14) made at about 12:30 pm on 03.08.2013 in the emergency ward, Maharao Bhimsingh Hospital, Kota, an FIR No.217 dated 03.08.2013 came to be registered at Police Station Baran Sadar, District Baran for the offences under Sections 452, 308, 323/34 IPC. It was alleged therein that at about 8:00 pm on 02.08.2013, the appellant came with a sword and inflicted multiple blows on the person of his brother-Rajendra including his head. It was averred that upon hearing scuffle, Rakesh, Banshi Lal and Kanhaiya Lal, armed with lathies and gandasi- a sharp edged curved instrument, also came and they also inflicted injuries to Rajendra. It was further alleged that he was also hit with a lathi by Rakesh. During the course of investigation, Rajendra expired. After investigation, the appellant, along with co-accused Kanhaiya Lal and Banshi Lal, was charge- sheeted under Sections 452, 308, 302 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC whereunder, charges were also framed. After trial, while, co-accused Kanhaiya Lal and Banshi Lal were acquitted of the charges framed against them, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced, as stated hereinabove. [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (3 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] Assailing the impugned judgement, learned counsel for the appellant, inviting attention of this Court towards the parcha bayan (Ex.P4) made by the injured eye witness-Mukesh Kumar, submitted that though, it contained allegations of infliction of multiple blows to the deceased by him as also by three other co- accused person; he, however, in his examination-in-chief as PW14, changing the story, stated that since he was wrongfully confined in a room by the accused, he was unaware as to who had beaten his brother after infliction of 2-3 injuries by the appellant. But, as per the postmortem report of the body of the deceased (Ex.P11), only four injuries were found. He contended that as per the medical opinion, cause of death was head injury but, Smt. Chhaya (PW3)- an eye witness and wife of the deceased, has attributed the head injury to the appellant with a sword as also to Kanhaiya Lal with the gandasi. He submitted that it is established from the evidence on record that in the scuffle, he has also received injuries turning out it to be a case of free fight. Learned counsel canvassed that from the prosecution evidence, it was not established that he had trespassed in the house of deceased Rajendra armed with a deadly weapon with an intention to cause his death; rather, the incident occurred on spur of the moment on account of falling of a common wall in between the houses of the parties. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, learned counsel would contend that the case would not travel beyond the scope of Section 304 Part-I IPC and therefore, his conviction is liable to be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC and since, he has already served the sentence of more than 15 years [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (4 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] including remission, the substantive sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor, opposing the submissions, contended that since, the appellant has come armed with a sword and inflicted multiple blows on the person of the deceased, the learned trial Court did not err in recording his conviction under Section 302 IPC. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Heard. Considered. As per the postmortem report of the body of the deceased (ExP11) and the testimony of Dr. Surendra Meena (PW10) who conducted the autopsy, four external injuries were found on the body of the deceased; a 3 cm long stitched wound on right forehead, a 3x2 cm bruise on right side of head, a 2.5 cm stitched wound on right cheek and a 10 cm long stitched wound below right ear. On dissection, the scalpel hematoma was found towards right side of scalp with fracture of right fronto parietal region, subdural and subarachnoid hematoma on both side of the scalp with contusion of brain. Cause of death was opined to be coma on account of the head injury. In view of the aforesaid, it is found to be an established case of homicidal death. Although, in his parcha bayan, Mukesh (PW14)- the injured eye witness and brother of the deceased, has stated that multiple blows were inflicted on the person of the deceased by the appellant with a sword and by the co-accused namely Rakesh, Banshi Lal and Kanhaiya Lal with lathies and gandasi; but, improving his statement, in his examination-in-chief, he stated [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (5 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] that after 2-3 injuries were inflicted by the appellant, he was wrongfully confined in a room by the accused and he was unaware who had beaten his brother thereafter. Smt. Chhaya (PW3)- the eye witness and wife of the deceased, has, in contradiction with the statement of PW14, stated that on the head of deceased, one injury with the sword was inflicted by the appellant and another by the co-accused Kanhaiya Lal with the gandasi. Since, as per medical opinion, cause of death was found to be the head injury, it is rendered doubtful as to whose blow was fatal and was, the cause of the death. Further, we find from the material available on record that in the scuffle, the appellant has also received injuries. In his arrest memo (Ex.P17), it is mentioned that there was swelling below his both eyes with white bandage on his head. It also shows that he was medically examined on 03.08.2013; however, no such medical report is part of the record. Although, Mukesh (PW14) denied the suggestion that he, along with his brother, has beaten the appellant but, in the same breath, admitted that he was facing a criminal case of physical altercation. The eye witness-Chhaya (PW3) has also admitted during her cross-examination that in the scuffle, the accused party also received injuries and his brother-in- law (Mukesh) was facing a criminal case on that count. In these circumstances, we are not convinced that the prosecution has come with clean hands with regard to true genesis of the case and it appears to be a case of free fight on account of a dispute between the parties due to falling of the common wall in between their houses as not denied by Mukesh (PW14) during his cross- examination. [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (6 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] It may also be worthy to note here that the prosecution has not projected any enmity between the parties. Although, Mukesh (PW14) has stated that after intoxication, the accused party had outraged the modesty of his sister-in-law (Chhaya) which led to scuffle but, his version was not corroborated by Chhaya herself as PW3. In these circumstances, a possibility cannot be denied that the incident occurred on spur of the moment without any premeditation in which both the parties received injuries. The Hon’ble Apex Court has, in the case Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar Vs. State of Gujarat IN Criminal Appeal No. 1266 of 2014, held as under: 5.6 In Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana, this Court observed thus, “The distinguishing feature is the mens rea. What is prerequisite in terms of clause (2) of Section 300 is the knowledge possessed by the offender in regard to the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal. Intention to cause death is not an essential ingredient of clause (2). When there is an intention of causing a bodily injury coupled with knowledge of the offender as regards likelihood of such injury being sufficient to cause the death of a particular victim would be sufficient to bring the offence within the ambit of this clause.” (Para 10) 5.6.1 For the above purpose, the exceptions contained in Section 300, IPC are taken into consideration. In the same judgment, the Court further explained the distinction between ‘culpable homicide amounting to [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (7 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] murder’ and ‘not amounting to murder’, stating, “Culpable homicide is genus, murder is its specie. The culpable homicide, excluding the special characteristics of murder, would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Code recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. When a culpable homicide is of the first degree, it comes within the purview of the definition of Section 300 and it will amount to murder. The second degree which becomes punishable in the first part of Section 304 is culpable homicide of the second degree. Then there is culpable homicide of third degree which is the least side of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for is also the lowest among the punishments for the three grades. It is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” (Para 11) 5.7 In other words, where the two ingredients namely that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased was caused intentionally and secondly that it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, are satisfied, the offence would amount to murder. There may be circumstances which may emerge from the facts and evidence of a given case that the offence becomes ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. 5.8 In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab and further in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra , this Court stated that divided into two Parts, Section 304, IPC deals with the situations where ‘culpable homicide’ would not be a murder. The conceptualisation of the ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ were explained in the following way, as quoted in para 4 of the Kesar Singh , “If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to cause death, but [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (8 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] with no intention to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall under Part I but where no such intention is established and only knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part II.” A co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in the case of Ajay Ghos Vs State of Rajasthan in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 731/2017, held as under: 10. Distinction between whether an offence is culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder has been dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Rafiq v. State of Madhya Pradesh: (2021) 10 SCC 706 after taking into consideration earlier judgments on the point. The Court held that even though it is difficult to distinguish whether the punishment for offence would fall Under Section 302 or Section 304 of Indian Penal Code, there is a subtle distinction of degree of intention and knowledge involved in both the crimes. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced below: “Para 11 - The question of whether in a given case, a homicide is murder, punishable Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, or culpable homicide, of either description, punishable [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (9 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] under Section 304 Indian Penal Code has engaged the attention of courts in this country for over one and a half century, since the enactment of the Indian Penal Code; a welter of case law, on this aspect exists, including perhaps several hundred rulings by this Court. The use of the term "likely" in several places in respect of culpable homicide, highlights the element of uncertainty that the act of the Accused may or may not have killed the person. Section 300 Indian Penal Code which defines murder, however refrains from the use of the term likely, which reveals absence of ambiguity left on behalf of the accused. The Accused is for sure that his act will definitely cause death. It is often difficult to distinguish between culpable homicide and murder as both, involve death. Yet, there is a subtle distinction of intention and knowledge involved in both the crimes. This difference lies in the degree of the act. There is a very wide variance of degree of intention and knowledge among both the crimes. Para 12 - The decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. notes the important distinction between the two provisions, and their differing, but subtle distinction. The court pertinently pointed out that: 12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide"is genus and murder its specie. All murder is "culpable homicide" but not vice- versa. Speaking generally,"culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder".For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (10 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] offence, the Code practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is,what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide,which is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first part of Section304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 13. The academic distinction between "murder" and"culpable homicide not amounting to murder" has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300; Para 13 - The considerations that should weigh with courts, in discerning whether an act is punishable as murder, or culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, were outlined in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. This Court observed that: 29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (11 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] the case falls Under Section 302 or 304Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters-plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the Accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable Under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable Under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder are treated as murder punishable Under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances; (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the Accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (12 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the Accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.” Another co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in the case of Hari Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan IN D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 341/2007, held as under: The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayanand Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2008 Cri.L.J. 2975 considering the identical issue that in absence of motive or intention and upon the fact that there was no repeated blow upon the vital part of the body, made following adjudication which reads as under:- “10. The crucial question is as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (13 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 11. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done - INTENTION [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (14 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] (a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of death; or causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 12. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (15 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 13. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (16 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury.......sufficie ufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.” From the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, it is apparent that whether an offence would fall under Section 302 IPC or, under Section 304 Part-I or, Part-II IPC, would depend on multiple factors including intention/knowledge of the accused, whether it was premeditated or the incident occurred on spur of the moment, the nature of weapon used, the intensity and gravity of the blow, the body part which received the injury, repetition of blows, his criminal antecedents etc. In the conspectus of aforesaid analysis of the material available on record, we are of the considered view that a possibility cannot be ruled out that the incident occurred on spur of the moment without any premeditation on account of falling of the common wall in between the houses of the parties, it was a case of free fight in which person from both the sides received injuries and the injuries on the person of the accused remained unexplained by the prosecution, there was no previous enmity between the parties and it is doubtful as to whose blow; whether that of appellant or that of Kanhaiya Lal, was fatal and in the backdrop of aforesaid precedential law, conviction of the appellant [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (17 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] deserves to be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC. So far as sentence part is concerned, we find from the custody certificate submitted along with the status report dated 14.04.2026 that the appellant has already served the actual sentence of 12 years 4 months and a day till 14.04.2026 and the total sentence, including remission, for a period of 15 years 1 month and a day. It is also reflected that he has successfully availed the benefit of four paroles and in view of his satisfactory jail conduct, at present, he is in open air camp. From the report dated 14.04.2026 furnished by Gram Panchayat Kherali, District Baran, it is revealed that he has a wife and two sons and are living in the state of penury. Their Lordships have, in the case of Nawabuddin Vs. State of Uttarakhand: MANU/SC/0165/2022, held as under: “10.1.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx However, the punishment provided for the offence under Section 6, as it stood prior to its amendment and at the time of commission of the offence in the instant case for aggravated penetrative sexual assault was rigours imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. Now as per the amended Section 6 with effect from 16.08.2019, the minimum punishment provided is twenty years and which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. Therefore, at the relevant time the minimum punishment provided for the offence Under Section 6 of the POCSO Act,2012 was ten years RI and which may extend to imprisonment for life. It is reported that today the Accused is aged 70-75 years of age and it is also reported that he is suffering from Tuberculosis [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (18 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] (TB). Therefore, considering such mitigating circumstances we are of the opinion that if the life sentence is converted to fifteen years RI and the fine imposed by the Trial Court confirmed by the High Court to be maintained, it can be said to be an adequate punishment commensurate with the offence committed by the a ccused .” (emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid factual scenario as also in the backdrop of aforesaid precedential law, we think that ends of justice would be served if the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. Resultantly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed in following terms: 1. The conviction of the appellant, recorded by the learned Special Judge, SC/St (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Baran vide judgement dated 04.08.2018 in Sessions Case No.304/2016 CIS No.293/2016 under Section 302 IPC is altered to the conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC. 2. The substantive sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone. Since, the appellant is in jail, he shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. 3. The appellant is granted three months’ time to deposit the fine, if not already deposited. In case of default, learned trial Court shall ensure that he serves the default sentence imposed vide impugned judgment dated 04.08.2018. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant namely Ram Prakash @ Prakash S/o Gopal is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety in the like [2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (19 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018] amount within four weeks before the Registrar (Judl.) of this Court which shall be effective for a period of six months with the stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against the judgement or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of accordingly. (BHUWAN GOYAL),J (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J DIKSHA /45