28.09.2026 Court No. 12 Item No.45 GB /Sandip MAT 1661 of 2026 With CAN 1 of 2026 Ishaan Metplast Synergy Limited & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. Mr. Soumya Majumdar, Sr. Adv., Mr. Pratik Majumder, Mr. Aditya Mondal, Mr. Snehasish Dey …for the appellants. Mr. Debashis Saha, Mr. Sanjoy Ghosh, Mr. Avirup Roy Sanyal, Ms. Sucheta Pal, Mr. Jyotishman Sarkar …for the Bank of India. Mr. Subhojit Saha, Ms. Ruchira Chatterjee, Ms. Srijani Mukherjee …for the respondent no. 3. Mr. Aman Agarwal, Ms. Rupal Singh, Ms. Rijata Ghosh, Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh …for the respondent no. 4. 1. The cardinal principle of filing a writ petition is that, the petitioners should approach the writ court with clean hands. On this principle, the learned Single Judge refused to extend the interim order by passing the order impugned dated September 24, 2026, in WPA 12205 of 2026 with WPA 22673 of 2026. His Lordship recorded as follows:- “1. Affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent no.3 in WPA 12205 of 2026 be taken on record. 2 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that similar matter is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, accordingly, this Court finds that the petitioner has taken a chance to obtain the interim order before this Court by pending SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 3. In view of the above, interim order is not extended.” 2. Mr. Majumdar, learned senior advocate for the appellants submits that the learned court refused to extend the interim order on a misconception that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court was on the self-same cause of action although, the proceedings were distinct and separate. The interim order was first passed by a learned Judge sitting in the vacation Bench. The same was extended by His Lordship earlier. The order dated September 24, 2026 is perverse, as His Lordship completely changed his approach to the matter, in the absence of any changed circumstances. 3. Before dealing with the submissions of Mr. Majumdar, we would like to point out the interim order that was passed by a learned Single Judge, during vacation. The learned Single Judge by the order dated May 29, 2026 recorded that the writ petition was filed challenging a notice dated May 20, 2026. By the said notice, the bank account of the petitioner maintained with the Bank of India, had been declared as a ‘Non Performing Asset’. Upon appreciating the facts placed 3 before Her Lordship, it was recorded that the writ petitioners had already challenged an order of debit freeze passed under Section 17(1A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA Act) dated September 10, 2025. The SLP was filed from the order passed by a learned Single Judge in WPA 1492 of 2026. 4. Learned senior advocate also submitted before Her Lordship that, while the interim order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court was still in force and the matter was sub judice before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the respondent Bank had proceeded to declare the bank account of the petitioner as NPA on May 26, 2026. Accordingly, Her Lordship directed that any NPA order passed by the respondent bank after the order dated March 9, 2026 passed in the SLP, shall remain stayed till July 30, 2026 or until further orders whichever was earlier. The declaration of NPA was made subject to the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The writ petition was directed to be heard by the regular Bench. Paragraph 6 of the order is quoted below:- “Any NPA order passed by the respondent bank after the order dated 09.03.2026 in the SLP, shall remain stayed till 30.07.2026 or until further orders, whichever is earlier.” 5. The matter went back to the regular Bench and by the order dated September 3, 2026, His Lordship 4 recorded that affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the respondent no.4, but due to paucity of time, the matter could not be taken up for hearing. Thus, His Lordship extended the interim order on the prayer of the writ petitioner till September 24, 2026. 6. Thus, the first contention of Mr. Majumdar that, if His Lordship had consciously extended the interim order on the first occasion, there was no reason for not extending the same on the next date, is not appreciated by us. On September 3, 2026, affidavit-in- opposition was filed by the respondent no.4. His Lordship granted liberty to file a reply. Due to paucity of time, the matter could not be heard. The stand of the respondent was not clear. On the day the order impugned was passed, the vacating application filed by the Bank of Maharashtra was before His Lordship and the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent no.4 was also before His Lordship. 7. The submission of the learned advocate before His Lordship was that, a similar matter was pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. His Lordship recorded that, the writ petitioner had taken a chance to obtain an interim order from the writ court, by showing pendency of the SLP before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 8. Although, the order impugned does not record further reasons, we find from the order sheet that a connected application, that is, the vacating application filed by the Bank of Maharashtra was before His Lordship and the facts were available. 5 9. Question with regard to propriety and legality of the order of His Lordship have been raised by Mr. Majumdar. 10. First of such ground being that the definition of ‘default’ under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) and the Directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India in exercise of power under Sections 12 and 35A of the Banking Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) were the same. Thus, banks could not have issued the demand notice and allowed the accounts of the writ petitioner to be classified as ‘NPA’ without considering the provision of the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning) Directions, 2025, Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Resolution of Stressed Assets) Directions, 2025, and the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Treatment of Willful Defaulters and Large Defaulters) Directions, 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said directions’). 11. According to Mr. Majumdar, the banks were required to follow the guidelines on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning of advances for restructured accounts as prescribed in the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Resolution of Stressed Assets) Directions 2025. 6 12. According to Mr. Majumdar, such guidelines were not followed although they have statutory force. The sum and substance of Mr. Majumdar’s contention before us is that, any demand notice asking the borrower to pay prior to the accounts slipping into NPA, leads to various consequences of sale, creation of third party rights, recovery of the amount due and declaration of fraud and willful default. 13. As such, the writ petitioner did not have any other option, but to approach the writ court alleging the highhandedness and illegality in the procedure followed by the bank, without resorting to the steps to be taken as per the circulars of the RBI and the provisions of the IBC. He further submits that although the demand notice which was challenged in the writ petition may be innocuous, the consequences of such notice would lead to a cascading effect, thereby frustrating the protective order that was granted by the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is contended by Mr. Majumdar that the actions of the bank have been taken in the teeth of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the learned Single Judge on the first occasion was right in passing such protective order. 14. Mr. Majumder next contends that the order of stay of proceedings under the PMLA Act amounted to an automatic injunction on all banks from proceeding in respect of the loan accounts. 15. We are unable to agree with such submission. The order of the Hon’ble Apex Court is quoted below :- 7 “7. Meanwhile, operation of the impugned judgments and orders dated 17.10.2025 and 03.11.2025 as well as that of the learned Single Judge dated 19.07.2022 and 24.01.2023, shall remain stayed subject to the condition that the petitioners will furnish an undertaking before this Court within two days to the effect that they will not alienate the subject properties in any manner and shall not create any third party rights in such properties without prior permission of this Court. However, status quo re: further proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority shall be maintained.” 16. The adjudication proceeding under the PMLA Act had been stayed, subject to the condition that the appellants would furnish an undertaking that the subject properties involved in that proceeding would not be alienated by creating third party interest, without prior permission of the Hon’ble Apex Court. This order in no way prohibits any bank/financial creditor from proceeding in respect of any account of the borrower in respect of which default has occurred. We record that the SARFAESI Act provides the consequence of default and we disagree with Mr. Majumder’s contention that default and wilful default are analogous terms and unless the Circulars of the RBI with regard to declaration of wilful default are followed, the account cannot be classified as NPA. This submission is contrary to law. The SARFAESI Act has an overriding effect over all other statutes, the section is quoted below:- “35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws.—The provisions of this Act shall 8 have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 17. The steps to be taken by a bank under the 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act is bound by a stipulated time under the Act. Section 36 of the said Act is quoted below :- “36. Limitation.—No secured creditor shall be entitled to take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).” 18. The further contention of Mr. Majumder is that the natural consequence of issuance of a demand notice will result in taking over possession of the property under Section 14, and selling the same for recovery of the amount, in terms of the Security Interest (Enforcement Rule) 2002. Such step offends the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. This contenton is misconceived. 19. The writ petition was filed by challenging a demand notice. By the said notice the Indian Bank had asked the borrower to pay up the amount mentioned in the notice, in order to prevent the loan account from slipping into a non-performing asset. At that point, no notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act had been issued and we find at least four e-mails from the appellants that they were agreeable to pay the money and negotiations were going on. In view of the long standing relationship between the Indian Bank and the appellants, the appellants had committed to fulfil their obligations. Thus, it cannot be said at this juncture that the bank had 9 acted illegally in issuing the demand notice. Most significantly, the Bank of Maharashtra and the respondent no. 4, Small Industries Development Bank of India, were made parties to the said writ proceeding without any cause of action being pleaded against them. No prayer had been made in respect of these banks. A blanket order was passed by taking note of the pendency of the SLP on the basis of the submissions made before the learned single Judge that the SLP was on a similar cause of action. When the matter went back to the regular Bench from the vacation Bench, an application for vacating was filed. His Lordship found that originally, the interim order was passed upon misappreciation of the facts. 20. There is no quarrel with the proposition that the Reserve Bank of India can determine the policy and issue directions to commercial and schedule banks. However, we disagree with Mr. Majumder’s contention that action under the SARFAESI Act could not stand independently and were intrinsically linked to actions under the IBC and the Master Directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India on Wilful Default. 21. The effect of the interim order was that all the respondent banks were restrained from proceeding under the SARFAESI Act on an understanding by the Court that a similar question was pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court had not stayed any proceeding under the SARFAESI Act and none of the bank were parties to the proceeding. 10 22. The law is well-settled. A writ petition should not be entertained, thereby, injuncting the banks, financial institutions and secured creditors from proceeding under the SARFAESI Act, for recovery of public money. All the three banks deal with public money, and as such, in our, prima facie view, the writ Court should have been slow to entertain the writ petition. The case made out by the appellants for interference by the writ Court was the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Apex Court. However, we are of the, prima facie, view that the cause of action is not the same and as such the learned writ Court should have been more conscious and cautious while passing a blanket injunction on any proceeding under the SARFAESI Act. 23. We refer to the following decisions. 24. In the matter of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 25. In the matter of South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip reported in (2023) 17 SCC 311, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “17. We shall reiterate the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in 11 matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting a few of the earlier decisions of this Court wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. 17.1.Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733] : (SCC pp. 748, 755-56, paras 18 & 26-27) “18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against : (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function. *** 26. A company registered under the Companies Act for the purposes of carrying on any trade or business is a private enterprise to earn livelihood and to make profits out of such activities. Banking is also a kind of profession and a commercial activity, the primary motive behind it can well be said to earn returns and profits. Since time immemorial, such activities have been carried on by individuals generally. It is a private affair of the company though the case of nationalised banks stands on a different footing. There may well be companies, in which majority of the share capital may be contributed out of the State funds and in that view of the matter there may be more participation or dominant participation of the State in managing the affairs of the company. But in the present case we are concerned with a banking company which has its own resources to raise its funds without any contribution or shareholding by the State. It has its own Board of Directors elected by its shareholders. It works like any other private company in the banking business having no monopoly status at all. Any company carrying on banking business with a capital of rupees five lakhs will become a scheduled bank. All the same, banking activity as a whole carried on by various banks undoubtedly has an impact and effect on the economy of the country in general. Money of the shareholders and the depositors is with such companies, carrying on banking activity. The banks finance the borrowers on any given rate of interest at a particular time. They advance loans as against securities. Therefore, it is obviously necessary to have regulatory check over such activities in the interest of the company itself, the shareholders, the depositors as well as to maintain the proper financial equilibrium of the national economy. The 12 banking companies have not been set up for the purposes of building the economy of the State; on the other hand such private companies have been voluntarily established for their own purposes and interest but their activities are kept under check so that their activities may not go wayward and harm the economy in general. A private banking company with all freedom that it has, has to act in a manner that it may not be in conflict with or against the fiscal policies of the State and for such purposes, guidelines are provided by Reserve Bank so that a proper fiscal discipline, to conduct its affairs in carrying on its business, is maintained. So as to ensure adherence to such fiscal discipline, if need be, at times even the management of the company can be taken over. Nonetheless, as observed earlier, these are all regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guidelines and not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the company. For other companies in general carrying on other business activities, maybe manufacturing, other industries or any business, such checks are provided under the provisions of the Companies Act, as indicated earlier. There also, the main consideration is that the company itself may not sink because of its own mismanagement or the interest of the shareholders or people generally may not be jeopardised for that reason. Besides taking care of such interest as indicated above, there is no other interest of the State, to control the affairs and management of the private companies. Care is taken in regard to the industries covered under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 that their production, which is important for the economy, may not go down, yet the business activity is carried on by such companies or corporations which only remains a private activity of the entrepreneurs/companies. 27. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with by all concerned including the private companies. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment, say the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispenses with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial 13 Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and has issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance with or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to.” 17.2.United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] : (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras 42-45 & 55) “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred 14 by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 17.3.State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] : (SCC pp. 89-91 & 93-94, paras 5, 8-9 & 15) “5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603] , as follows : (SCC p. 611, para 15) „15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions 15 which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case [Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13 : AIR 1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433] and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.‟ *** 8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the SARFAESI Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimhan Committee I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which would enable them to realise long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the DRT Act”) with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569] that : (SCC p. 570, para 6) „6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast- track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by 16 filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.‟ *** 15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the taxpayer's expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] , has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order : (SCC pp. 123-24, para 46) „46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila 17 Parishad, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 45 : AIR 1969 SC 556] , Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.‟ ” 17.4.Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] : (SCC pp. 359-61, paras 18 & 21) “18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution — ARC — the appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in Praga Tools Corpn. [Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585] and Ramesh Ahluwalia [Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 456 : 4 SCEC 715] relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers. *** 21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the 18 High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the secured properties on payment of Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs 3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent of approximately Rs 117 crores. The ad interim relief has been continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding further with the action under the SARFAESI Act. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed.” 17.5.Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 58] : (SCC p. 183, para 36) “36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers approached the High Court by filing the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ application by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy available under the law. This circuitous route appears to have been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd proviso to Section 18 of the 2002 Act.” 18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has 19 provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal. 26. The writ petition will be heard on its own merits and the appeal is dismissed having been found to be devoid of merits. Cost of Rs. 1.5 lakhs shall be paid by the appellants and be shared equally by the three banks/respondents, for wastage of judicial time. All actions shall abide by the result of the writ. 27. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties, upon usual undertakings. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) (Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)