IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA IN THE CIRCUIT BENCH AT JALPAIGURI CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Present:- The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Sarkar and The Hon’ble Justice Smita Das De C.R.A (DB) 77 of 2023 Roshan Oraon vs. State of West Bengal For the appellant : Mr. Narendra Nath Das, Adv. For the State : Mr. Jagriti Mishra, Ld. AAAG. Mr. Arko Sarkar, Mr. Abhilash Mittal Reserved for Judgment on : 28.07.2026 Judgment pronounced : 29.09.2026 Judgment uploaded on : 29.09.2026 Shampa Sarkar J. :- 1. The appeal arises out of the judgment and order of conviction dated August 20, 2013 and order of sentence dated August 22, 2013, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mal, Jalpaiguri in connection with Sessions Trial No. 05 (12) of 2009, arising out of Sessions Case No. 274 of 2009 connected with Nagrakata Police Station Case No. 221 of 2008. By the judgment and order dated August 20, 2013, the learned Trial Judge convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Anil alias Mathur Baraik and by the consequent 2 order of sentence dated August 22, 2013, the appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life together with a fine of Rs. 10,000, in default whereof to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period. 2. This was a jail appeal and was filed with an application for condonation of delay of approximately 10 years. The application for condonation of delay was allowed and the appeal was admitted. By an order dated April 3, 2025, a Co-ordinate Bench directed that, the order of conviction and sentence shall remain suspended till disposal of the appeal or until further orders, whichever was earlier. By applying the ratio of Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1977) 4 SCC 291, the release of the appellant on bail was allowed, upon furnishing a bond of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties of like amount each, one of whom was local, to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalpaiguri and on further condition that the appellant would be personally present or be represented before this court when the appeal would be taken up for hearing. 3. Mr. Das, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that the order of the learned Trial Judge suffered from erroneous appreciation of law. The learned Trial Judge failed to consider that the prosecution case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution case was entirely based on preponderance of probability. The evidence of the sole eyewitness lacked credibility. The investigation proceeded on the suspicion of the FIR maker. On the basis of such suspicion, investigation was completed and the appellant was tried for commission of offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. It was further submitted that the investigation was faulty. The oral testimony of the PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, and PW-19 indicated that the police 3 had gone to the place of occurrence (PO) before the FIR maker (PW-1) had reached the PO. Whereas, the investigation started on the basis of the written complaint filed by the PW-1 on December 8, 2008 at 10:35 hours. The filing of the written complaint was an afterthought, according to Mr. Das. He urged that the discrepancy would be more evident from the fact that, although the formal FIR and the written complaint (original FIR) revealed that the same was lodged on December 8, 2008 at 10:35 hours, but they were forwarded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mal, Jalpaiguri on December 10, 2008. Sections 154 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) were violated. In the absence of any explanation for such delay, it could be safely presumed that the time mentioned in the original FIR and the formal FIR, were subsequently endorsed by the police in order to develop the prosecution case. According to Mr. Das, summoning a scribe who belonged to ‘Grass More Tea Estate’, although the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Nagrakata Police Station, indicated the lack of spontaneity ordinarily associated with prompt filing of FIR. A case for acquittal was sought to be made out by Mr. Das, by pointing out the falsities in the gradual development of the prosecution’s story. He submitted that the testimony of the witnesses were full of exaggerations and inclusion of untrue facts. The prosecution case was shrouded with doubts. Thus, such an investigation with loose ends did not warrant conviction. With regard to the quality of evidence, Mr. Das submitted that the star witness (PW-3) who was the sole eye witness was suffering from bad eyesight. She could see with only one eye and such fact was extracted in her cross examination. The conduct of the eye-witness also gave rise to a doubt with regard to the reliability of her testimony. She testified that she had 4 watched the incident at 9 pm of the previous night, but reported the matter to the villagers and the relatives of the deceased at 5 am the next morning. The fact that she was silent throughout the night was an unnatural human conduct. None of the neighbours who resided in close proximity to the PO had given any reaction to the incident which occurred on December 7, 2008. Although, the PW-3 stated that there was huge hue and cry which had woken her up, but none other than the PW-3 could hear the noise. As an example, Mr. Das submitted that PW-2 was also a resident of the same area and his house was 10 metres away from PO, but PW-2 could not hear anything. 5. Mr. Das contended that, the version of the PW-3 was tutored and set up by the police in order to prove the prosecution case. To point out the questionable circumstances, Mr. Das submitted that the statement of the PW-3 under Section 164 of the CrPC was recorded after 25 days from the incident. The PW-3 told the Magistrate that she did not see the weapon, whereas, in her testimony before court, she was made to identify the knife and the same was marked as Material Exhibit 1, upon her identification. According to Mr. Das, the offending weapon was never recovered and the material exhibit was procured from the market. The next issue urged by Mr. Das was that, the house of the star witness from the PO was quite far away and the weather condition on a December night reduced visibility on account of fog and mist. Such fact, coupled with the bad eye sight of the witness rendered her evidence unworthy of reliance. The discrepancy in the testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 with regard to the distance between the house of the PW-3 and the PO was highlighted by Mr. Das to contend that, while PW-3 stated that her house was 20 to 25 cubit from PO, PW-1 stated that 5 the distance between the house of the PW-3 and the house of the deceased was 200 feet. Moreover, the garden path did not have electric lights and an elderly lady, with low vision, could not have witnessed the murder. It was also contended that there were contradictions in the statement recorded under section 164 CrPC and in the oral testimony with regard to the presence of Belarush @ Bhaley Oraon (other accused). In the statement before the Magistrate, the presence and role of Belarush was not mentioned, whereas in the oral testimony of PW-3 and other witnesses who were hearsay witnesses, the presence of Belarush have been mentioned on the basis of the narration of PW-3. Under such circumstances, Mr. Das submitted that PW-3 was a projected witness and she deposed falsely, at the insistence of the police authorities. The other witnesses were rehearsed witnesses and their versions were inadmissible in evidence as they had all heard about the incident from PW-3. PW-3 was planted by the investigating agency to lend support to the prosecution case. Her testimony did not inspire confidence, PW-3 should not be treated as a eye witness. For similar reasons, the evidence of the hearsay witnesses should not be relied upon. 6. The appellant laid particular emphasis on the reporting of the time of the incident. PW-1 (FIR maker) who was the brother of the deceased had made contradictory statements. In his examination in chief, PW-1 stated that he heard about the incident on December 7, 2008, at 9 p.m., and he went to the house of the deceased and saw that the body was lying on the road adjacent to the house. In his cross-examination, he stated that, at about 8 a.m. of December 7, he received information of the incident and reached the spot at about 10 a.m. From the written complaint, it would appear that the incident was informed to the police by PW-1 on December 8, 6 2008, at about 10.35 hours. According to Mr. Das, the FIR was not a spontaneous narration of the account and was prepared later, at the instance of the police. The maker was uncertain about the time of the incident. This cast doubt as to whether the information of PW-1 was truly the earliest version of the incident. In his cross-examination PW-1 stated that, the information of the murder was received in the morning of December 7, 2008, whereas, the incident according to the FIR, occurred at around 9 p.m. of December 7, 2008. Thus, the contradictions with regard to the version of PW-1 in the FIR and in the deposition, were material and struck at the genesis of the prosecution case, thereby, impairing the credibility of the prosecution's version. PW-13 testified that the body was lying at the PO at around 2 p.m., but the body was dispatched for post- mortem at 12.50 p.m., as per the challan. Such discrepancies in the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses did not inspire any confidence in the version of the prosecution. Further, the deposition of the other hearsay witnesses were exaggerated, embellished and developed. It was next contended that, motive could not be established. The Salisinama, which was proved by PW-14 to indicate that there was an enmity between the appellant and the deceased, was a false and fabricated document, created only to implicate the appellant. The prosecution witnesses had failed to corroborate the FIR and the inquest report. The versions of the prosecution witnesses with regard to their arrival at the PO did not inspire confidence. Each and every witness stated that they heard about the incident either from the public or from the PW-3. They narrated the incident in an omnibus manner, and their statements did not have any evidentiary value. 7 7. According to Mr. Das, the offending weapon Material Exhibit-1 (knife) was planted later by the investigating agency with the aid and assistance of the witnesses. The recovery of the knife was based on the statement of the appellant, as admitted to the police, but such admission was not obtained in a proper manner and could not be used as per the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution failed to corroborate discovery of the weapon. No independent witness was present during the recording of the statement of the accused under Section 161 CrPC. PW-16 also admitted that the signatures of the witnesses were not available in the seized alamat. Thus, the article placed before the Trial Court was not identical with the article alleged to be seized. Learned Advocate further pointed out the discrepancy in the nature of injuries. While the inquest report mentioned three injuries, the post-mortem report mentioned two. The PW-1 deposed that there were two injuries, one in the waist and the other in the shoulder. PW-2 deposed that the injuries were on the waist and chest. PW-4 deposed that the injuries were on the chest and right side of the upper waist. PW-7 stated that the injury was on the chest and one on the right side of the rib above the waist. Some of the witnesses deposed that, when they arrived they saw blood oozing out from the injury, but such fact was a false and concocted story and an exaggeration. The chance of blood oozing after 12 to 14 hours of the injury was not medically possible. PW-15 had deposed that the accused was in his house till 10 pm of December 7, 2008 to attend the ceremony of Annaprasan of his daughter. Thus, the presence of the appellant at the PO at 9 pm of December 7, 2008 was not proved. Such alibi was not considered by the learned Trial Judge. 8 8. Mr. Das relied on the decision of Alil Mollah and Anr. vs State of West Bengal decided in Criminal Appeal No. 400 of 1987, in support of the contention that conduct of a witness who did not tell anyone about the incident until the next day was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court to be unnatural and the same created an impression that the witness had not seen the occurrence at all. It was held that, although the witness tried to take shelter under the plea that he was frightened and therefore did not appear before the police, but the fact that he did not pick up courage to inform anyone, either in the village or in the brick fields regarding the occurrence, was not impressive. Finally, it was submitted that, at best the offence would be one under Section 304 IPC, as motive could not be proved. The deceased provoked the appellant, when he refused to turn down the volume of the television. 9. Per contra, Mr. Mishra emphatically argued that the version of the eyewitness has remained constant and consistent throughout. Defence could not shake the prosecution case to the core. The evidence of rustic witnesses could not be judged by the same standard of exactitude as that of an urban sophisticated witness. 10. Reference was made to the decision of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Chhakki Lal and Anr. reported in (2019) 12 SCC 326. He submitted that, the Trial Court, upon observing the demeanour of the witness found the evidence to be credible and trustworthy. Thus, the High Court must not record a finding of doubt about the credibility of the eyewitness. PW-3 could not be expected to have an exact sense of time nor the version of PW-15 that the appellant was present in his house at till 10 pm on the fateful night, could be taken to be an exact depiction of the time until when the appellant 9 was at PW-15’s house. A minor discrepancy in the versions of the witnesses with regard to the time, did not go to the root of the prosecution case. More than a year from the incident had passed and fading memory with regard to the time could not be ruled out. 11. It was further submitted that in Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli chand Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1999) 9 SCC 525, the Apex Court held that, there were bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they spoke on the details and unless the contradictions were of material dimension, the same could not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties could not be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishments and variations should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies could not obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. With regard to the delay in reporting the incident to the villagers by the PW-3, Mr. Mishra submitted that, different witnesses reacted differently under fearful situations. Some would become speechless, some would start wailing, while others would run away from the scene. There were also some who would come forward with courage and conviction and believe that the wrong should be punished. Thus, there could never be a set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction. To discard a piece of evidence on the ground that the reaction did not fall within a set pattern, would be a pedantic exercise. 12. Mr. Mishra urged that, despite being cross-examined extensively, the testimony of PW-3 remained consistent and unshaken. She vividly described the place of incident, time of incident, the manner in which the offence was committed. The defence could not elicit anything in the cross-examination to 10 discredit PW-3 on the core aspects. The topography of the PO as narrated by PW-3 was corroborated by the other witnesses. The evidence of PW-3 as a whole contained the ring of truth. The evidence should not be doubted. Reliance was placed on Chhaakkilal (supra). 13. Mr. Mishra further cited Prithu alias Prithi Chand and Anr. vs State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2019) 11 SCC 588, in support of the contention that, undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, which did not go to the root of the matter and did not shake the version of the prosecution witnesses. The discrepancy with regard to time in the statement of the PW-1, was on account of fading memory. The version of lay witnesses that blood was oozing from the injury could not be used to discredit their evidence as they were not in a position to describe and express the nature of injury scientifically. Exhibit-9, (photographs) clearly depicted the condition of the body. Mr. Mishra submitted that, the defence failed to establish that the night was misty and foggy, which impaired visibility as a whole. Relying on Section 134 of the Evidence Act, Mr. Mishra submitted that no particular number of witnesses were required to prove any fact. Evidence had to be weighed and not counted. He submitted that defence failed to prove any motive behind PW-3 wanting to falsely implicate the appellant. 14. To controvert the contention of Mr. Das that the offence should be treated as one under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and not 302, Mr. Mishra relied on Dhupa Chamar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2002) 6 SCC 506 which was followed by a catena of decisions. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that, when the solitary injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the accused intended to inflict 11 that particular injury, the offence would be that of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It was next submitted that the four tests laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1958 SC 465 were fully satisfied. In this case, bodily injury was present, multiple witnesses saw the injuries. The inquest report and the post-mortem report confirmed the same. The nature of injury was proved. The injuries were on the chest and upper waist, grievous in nature and were inflicted with a sharp cutting weapon. He prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 15. Before dealing with the submissions, the factual matrix as borne out from the prosecution case are discussed. On the night of December 7, 2008, a commotion broke out after the appellant and his brother objected to the deceased playing his television at a high volume. The deceased was called out of his house and a quarrel ensued. The appellant stabbed the deceased with a sharp weapon while his brother Belarush held the deceased. The deceased died on spot. The incident was witnessed by a neighbour, Elisabha Asur, (PW-3). On the following morning at around 5 am, the PW-3 narrated the incident to the uncle of the deceased and other villagers. Chaitu Baraik, PW-1, was not present at the place of occurrence, but he was the informant who lodged the written complaint on December 8, 2008. After being informed by his uncle about the incident he went to the place of occurrence. When he reached the place of occurrence, PW-3 narrated the entire incident to him. Upon hearing the version of PW-3, he dictated the incident to the scribe, who reduced the same into writing. Accordingly, the written complaint was filed. Investigation followed. The appellant and his brother were arrested. The weapon was recovered pursuant to the information furnished by the appellant. Such recovery was corroborated by an 12 independent seizure witness PW-11. Both the accused persons were subsequently released on bail, upon the prosecution's failure to file a charge sheet within the statutory period. After grant of bail, both the accused absconded. The appellant was later apprehended and he faced trial. The co- accused Balarush could not be traced and he did not face trial. 16. During the course of trial, prosecution examined 22 witnesses including PW-3 (sole eye-witness), PW-1 (informant), independent seizure witness PW-11, investigating officer PW-16 and the villagers and relative of the deceased. No evidence was led by the defence and no witnesses were examined. Upon examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant simply denied the incriminating circumstances put to him and he pleaded innocence, without furnishing any further explanation. Upon appraisal of the evidence, the Trial Court found that the statement of PW-3 (eye-witness) was credible and adequately corroborated. Her testimony bore the ring of truth. The same was cogent, credible and convincing. She was found to be truthful and a reliable witness. The defence case that PW-3 was old and the night was too dark and foggy for her to have witnessed the incident and identify the appellant, was rejected by the learned Trial Judge. 17. We first deal with the issue of delay in sending the FIR to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Mr. Das contended that the formal FIR (Exhibit 12/1) and the written FIR (Exhibit 4), would reveal that the FIR was registered on December 8, 2008, but the same was sent to the court on December 10, 2008. The delay of two days between the registration of the FIR and receipt of the same by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalpaiguri had not been explained. It was argued that the delay was in 13 violation of the requirement of Section 157 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that the FIR should be transmitted ‘forthwith’ to the Magistrate. On this issue we find that a complaint was registered as Nagrakata Police Station Case No. 221 of 2008 on December 8, 2008 at 10.35 hours. The formal FIR recorded December 8, 2008, as the date of dispatch to the court, but the endorsement of the court was made on December 10, 2008. These circumstances indicate that the FIR was laid before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on December 10, 2008. Even if, we were to proceed on the premise that this interval constituted a delay in transmission, the appellant cannot derive any benefit from such delay. Mere delay in receipt of the FIR by the Magistrate does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution case. In Pala Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1972 SC 2679, the Hon’ble Apex court held that when the FIR was recorded without delay, the investigation commenced on its basis and no infirmity indicating fabrication or manipulation was brought to the notice of the court. Delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate would not itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution case was insupportable. This ratio has been consistently followed. Anjan Dasgupta Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 2006, decided on November 25, 2016. State of Rajasthan Vs. Daud Khan (2016) 2 SCC 607, Jafel Biswas and Ors. v. State of West Bengal reported in (2019) 12 SCC 560 are some of the precedents. The appellant has not been able to demonstrate actual prejudice on account of the delay in transmission. In Deo Prasad & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2026 INSC 707, the Hon’ble Apex Court had set aside a conviction, holding that delay in transmission was vital, but in this case no 14 compounding features exist, unlike those which were present before the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the present case, the body was attended to and sent for post-mortem examination without delay. The inquest report and the medical report are consistent with the evidence of the eyewitness and other witnesses who saw the body of the deceased lying on the road, with the injuries. Such delay alone, is insufficient for rejecting the prosecution case. 18. Moreover, no question was put to the investigating officer (IO) touching the issue of delay in transmission of the FIR. Notwithstanding the fact that the IO was the best person to explain the delay, no cross- examination was held on this point. No such plea was taken before the Trial Court. Such contention was raised for the first time before us, and it lacks factual foundation. The cross-examination of the IO, PW-16 has been considered. Two admissions were extracted from him. First one was that the label affixed to the weapon was not present and the appellant's signature was not visible and the second one was that, during investigation the IO did not enquire into either the mental or the physical fitness of PW-3. 19. Thus, by applying the ratio of Anjan Dasgupta (supra), the appellant is not entitled to press this ground at this stage. Moreover, no prejudice of any kind, whether by way of ante-timing, embellishment or manipulation of the FIR's contents has been either demonstrated or even suggested. 20. We find that three principal issues were canvassed before the learned Trial Court. First, that the PW-3 had failing eyesight. Her poor eye sight, coupled with the darkness and fog prevailing on a winter night, rendered her incapable of witnessing the incident and identifying the assailant. The learned Trial Judge rejected such contentions, upon observing that no 15 suggestion had ever been put to the witness, that she was unable to see the incident or that she was not present at the place of occurrence. 21. Next comes the question of reliability of the evidence of PW-3. The learned Trial judge held as follows:- “The most vital witness is Eleshabha Asoor, PW 3, the only eye witness as claimed by the prosecution. She stated that she resides at Naya line of Jiti Tea garden, knows the deceased and also the accused persons. She also clearly described the Topography of the house of the deceased and PO. According to her about one year ago at about 9 PM Belarush and Roshan called for the deceased person from his house and Eleshabha was then standing on the path way at that spot. Belarush and Roshan asked deceased Anil to stop the TV but he did not pay heed. Then Belarush caught the hands of the deceased and Roshan hit at his chest and upper side of his waist by means of Chaku. The deceased fell down sustaining bleeding injuries blood was coming out from those injuries. Eleshabha disclosed the Incident to the villagers and relatives of the deceased including Jagmohan Baraik and Chaitu Baraik. This witness identified the weapon of murder, that is, the chaku in open court which is marked as Mat exhibit 1 and her statement U/S 161 CrPC has also been proved and marked. In cross examination again the defence tried to shake off the evidence adduced by this witness in her examination in chief but again it failed. The only thing she admitted is that there is no electric light on the Path Way in there Garden and that she can see only with her right eye being a lady of 54 years.” 22. Two sketch maps were prepared by the investigating officer, one relating to the place of occurrence and the second tracing the route to the site of recovery of the weapon. PW-3 herself stated that her house was 20 to 25 cubits, (approximately 38 feet) from the house of the deceased. The incident took place in front of the house of the deceased, approximately 40 feet away. Thus, the proximity of the PW-3 with the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. The contention of Mr. Das that the version of PW-3 and PW-1 with regard to the distance between the house of the deceased and the place of occurrence were inconsistent, cannot be accepted. No question was put to the PW-3, nor was any suggestion made that she was not a neighbour of the deceased and that she was not present at the place of the incident. No 16 question was put to the PW-3 that she was not in a position to identify the assailant. Mr. Das contended that PW-3 had exaggerated and developed her testimony from what she had stated before the learned Magistrate under Section 164 of the CrPC. Learned Advocate contended that, the role of the brother Belarush had not been mentioned, before the learned Magistrate, but in the evidence recorded in court there was a material improvement which shook the credibility of the witness. This contention of Mr. Das is not acceptable. 23. It has been well settled in Rammi alias Rameshwar vs State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1999 SC 3544, that a former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence would not necessarily amount to contradiction. Section 145 of the Evidence Act enabled the cross examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but the Section cautioned that if it was intended to contradict the witness, the cross examiner was enjoined with an obligation to comply with the formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of the CrPC also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness for a limited purpose of contradiction. In Tahsildar Singh and Anr. v. State of UP reported in AIR 1959, SC 1012, it was held that the attention of the witness should have been drawn to the specific passage said to be inconsistent, failing which neither defence nor the court could treat the omission as a proved contradiction. This principle was also reaffirmed in Anees v. State Government of N.C.T. Delhi reported in 2024 INSC 368. The court cannot suo moto treat an unconfronted prior statement as a contradiction. As no admission from PW-3 or from the IO was elicited, the contradiction should 17 be treated as a mere omission. PW-3 she explained that she had told the Magistrate about the role of Belarush, upon being questioned. 24. Moreover, statements recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC are not a substantive piece of evidence, but can only be used for corroboration and contradiction. Thus, the omission to mention Belarush in the statement recorded under section 164 of the CrPC, does not go to the very root of the evidence of PW-3. Her evidence cannot be discredited. Evidence given in court under oath, has greater sanctity. 25. Mr. Das contended that the statement of PW3 under Section164 of the CrPC, that she could not see the weapon, was contradictory to her oral testimony and identification of the weapon (knife) in the court and mmarking of the same as Material Exhibit No.1 was erroneous. We do not accept such contentions. First of all, no confrontation with regard to the said statement made before the learned Magistrate was done in cross- examination. Secondly, Material Exhibit-1 was marked without any objection from the defence. 26. In the matter of Rana Partap & Ors. vs State of Haryana reported in (1983) 3 SCC 327, the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the behaviour of the witnesses, held as follows:- “6. ……. Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.” 18 27. In the State of H.P vs Mast Ram, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 660, it was held that, there was no set rule as to the reaction of an eyewitness. The natural reaction of man was unpredictable. Each person reacted in his own way and, hence, natural human behaviour was difficult to prove by credible evidence. The reaction has to be appreciated in the context of the given facts and circumstances of the case. Similar view has been reiterated in Lahu Kamlakar Patil & Anr. & Anr. vs State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 6 SCC 417. In this case, an elderly neighbour witnessed the incident in a winter night. She could identify the assailants and the deceased. She identified the weapon, informed the uncle of the deceased immediately at the break of dawn. As she was scared to take the garden path at night and inform PW2 who had ferocious dogs in the house, she informed him at 5 am the next morning. The account of PW3 has been corroborated by the other witnesses who had heard of the incident from PW3. They all went to the PO upon hearing such version and found the deceased lying on the road with injuries. 28. In the matter of Shahaja@Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh Vs State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) 12 SCC 558, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “29. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: 29.1. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether 19 the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. 29.2. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. 29.3. When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. 29.4. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. 29.5. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. 29.6. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. 29.7. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. 29.8. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. 29.9. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. 29.10. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person. 29.11. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid 20 succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. 29.12. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross- examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. 29.13. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” 29. Next, the defence highlighted an inconsistent account by the PW-1 with regard to the date and time when he received the news and when he arrived at the place of occurrence. This discrepancy is not a circumstance corroborating the prosecution case, but an ordinary lapse of recollection from memory, attributable to the passage of several years. The learned Trial Court held as follows:- “Here we can not by pass the point that there are discrepancies regarding the date and time of the alleged incident in the oral testimony of PW 1. I am to discuss that there is no doubt some discrepancies in this respect. But it is the Cardinal Principle of law that man may lie but documents do not. Moreover we are to keep in mind that with the passing of time human memory fades. Both incidents happened here. All the documents marked as exhibits without objection show that murder was committed in the night of 07.12.2008 and on the subsequent morning the same was known to the villagers. So, when the documents establish the same and all other witnesses corroborate, then the said discrepancies are already washed away.” 30. The inconsistency in the testimony of the FIR maker, (PW-1) with regard to the date and time of receipt of the news of the incident and his presence at the place of incident were considered by the learned Trial Judge. 21 The discrepancy was attributed to fading memory of an uneducated and rustic witness The factum of filing of written complaint by the PW1 has been corroborated by the scribe PW-5 and other witnesses. The witness may have been under stress while deposing in court. He was not expected to have a photographic memory. The natural fallibility in human recollection cannot undermine the prosecution case. 31. The testimony of PW-15, a hostile witness was pointed out by the appellant, to establish an alibi for the appellant. This was found by the learned Trial Judge to be inherently inconsistent and wholly unworthy of credence. The relevant portion is quoted below:- “PW 15 Abram Tirkey became hostile though he stated that he has heard on the next morning that Anil was murdered in the previous night. During cross examination by the prosecution he stated that police interrogated him and he stated that on 07.12.2008 in the evening the accused Roshan came to his house as his invitee. But in the cross examination he could not maintain his stand because once he stated that upto 10 p.m on that night Roshan stayed with him, but on being asked by the Ld. Court he stated that the eating in their ceremony started at about 11p.m. and it was finished at about 12 midnight. It is not expected that the host of one annaprasan ceremony will allow his guest to leave his house at 10 p.m. without having the dinner when it started at about 11p.m.So the reliability of the evidence of this witness is questionable and cannot be believed at all.” 32. With regard to the account of blood flowing from the wounds, as per some of the witnesses, the learned Trial Judge considered this account to be an imprecision that was natural to lay witnesses who were recalling a traumatic scene. The inquest report and the post-mortem report otherwise corroborated the extent of the injuries. These were marked as exhibits without any objection. The defence did not point out any discrepancy in the medical evidence. The learned Trial Judge held as follows :- “On careful scrutiny and perusal of the entire materials on record it can be seen that the accused Roshan Oraon has faced 22 the trial for alleged commission of offence U/S 302/34 IPC. We are getting only one eye witness that is Elisabha Asoor, the PW 3. The defence has tried its best to establish that said Elisabha Asoor is an old woman having short sight, the night of the alleged incident was a foggy and rainy night but its attempt has been fully demolished by the evidence of PW 3 herself and the other prosecution witnesses of the locality. It might be that none of them except PW 3 is an eye witness of the incident as alleged but they, without fail, corroborated the statement that they have heard about the incident from Elisabha Asoor who has seen the incident and that Elisabha told them that Belarush caught hold of Anil and Roshan hit him with "Chaku"/Knife"/"Sharp Weapon" whatever be the nomenclature by which the weapon is called. It is also established beyond doubt that Anil @ Mathur Baraik suffered from homicidal death in the night of 07.12.2008. It is also proved beyond doubt that the defence raised no objection at the time of marking of the documents even including the weapon of the offence. It also allowed the statement of the accused recorded U/S 161 CrPC by the police to be marked as exhibit without objection wherein the accused admitted that he murdered-Anil @ Mathur by hitting him with "Chaku" ( Dagger) on his chest just bellow the ribs. He further made statement in the said exhibit that he led the police to recover the weapon and also signed on the seizure list by which the recovered weapon was seized. The Exhibit 9 series which are the photographs of the dead body of the deceased from different angels marked without objection explicitly show the injuries which are totally corroborating with the injuries as mentioned in the PM report and the oral evidence of the witnesses who have seen the dead body. In addition thereto the xerox copy of the "Salishnama" marked as Exhibit 10/1 (without objection) proves that there was a continuous dispute in between the deceased and the accused Roshan Oraon and Salish was held over the same issue. Therefore it is clear that there was sufficient motive for the alleged murder of the deceased by the accused Roshan Oraon. The chain of the circumstances of the instant case, taken cumulatively points only to the accused Roshan Oraon as the alleged offender, because in no way I can disbelieve the evidence of the only eye witness PW 3. The reasons behind the same is that though the defence tried to establish her as a persons of old age having short sight but it did no where give any suggestion that she could not see at all or she was not present nearby the spot at the time of alleged murder of the deceased or that she was not mentally and physically fit to describe the incident which she repeatedly on oath stated before the Ld. Court. The Ld. Defence counsel argued on the point that some of the witnesses told that when they found the dead body on the next morning, blood was coming out from the injuries which, according to him, is not at all possible if somebody is murdered in the previous night. Through out the entire night of the cold of December blood will usually clot. I am of the same 23 opinion to that of the LD. Defence Council but we are to keep in mind the witnesses are laymen and we can not deny the pictures where from it is clear that blood came out from the injuries and covered the entire upper frontal portion and a small portion of the lower part of the body of the deceased.” 33. The discrepancies pointed out by Mr. Das, cannot be considered in isolation and are not of such character which would go to the root of the prosecution case. The version of the witnesses and especially PW-3 corroborated the nature of injury. The inquest report and the post-mortem reports have been marked as exhibits without any objection. Intention to inflict the injury was also proved. When the appellant had called the deceased from his house he was holding the deadly weapon (knife) and he stabbed the deceased with the knife as per the version of the eyewitness (PW-3). The injury was sufficient to cause death and death was instantaneous in this case, out of haemorrhagic shock. Medical evidence supports the evidence of PW3 and other witnesses with regard to the description and nature of injury. The accused used a chaku, (a deadly weapon), the blows were aimed at the chest and upper waist which also punctured the lung. The appellant did not offer any explanation that the injuries were either accidental or unintentional, although he had the chance to do so. In the post-mortem report, the doctor opined that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The motive was established. The Salishinama was proved. There was a pre-existing enmity between the accused and the victim. The prosecution’s case, as can be deciphered from the written complaint was that the appellant and his elder brother, Balarush, were neighbours of the deceased and they resided at Nayaline, Jiti Tea Garden within the jurisdiction of Nagrakata police station. There had been friction between the deceased and the two brothers. A 24 written record of a village mediation (Salishinama) was seized during investigation and marked as an exhibit. 34. With regard to the Serology Report, we find that the sample was disintegrated. This cannot lend any advantage to the defence case. Motive was primarily known to the accused himself and it may not be possible for the prosecution to explain what exactly prompted or excited the accused to commit the particular crime. However, it appears from the evidence that there was a prior enmity between the appellant and the deceased. Motive loses its significance in view of the direct evidence provided by PW-3. Moreover, the appellant had called the deceased from his house and there was a quarrel. At that time, he was already armed with the knife. The appellant was aware of the nature of injury that could be inflicted if he stabbed the deceased with the knife. The identity of the appellant as the person who inflicted the blows with the knife, is consistent. The role attributed to Belarush is consistent. 35. PW2 explained in his cross examination why PW3 did not inform him about the incident on the same night. PW2 stated that when he asked PW3 why she was silent until morning, she told PW2 that he had dogs in his house which would bite. PW3 got scared. PW2 confirmed that his dogs were attacking in nature. 36. Exhibit-15 is the statement of the appellant recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code. It contains the statement leading to discovery of the weapon. The Trial Court recorded that the defence raised no objection to the marking of the document. The absence of objection when a document is marked as an exhibit goes to the proof of its execution. However, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act renders admissible only so 25 much of the information given by a person in police custody which relates distinctively to the fact thereby discovered. 37. Although the Trial Court erred in treating the whole of Exhibit-15 as proved evidence, we have confined our consideration of Exhibit-15 to the portion which distinctly relates to the fact discovered, namely the location of the concealed weapon. 38. The relevant portion of the decision in Pulukuri-Kotaya v. King Emperor, reported in A.I.R. 1947, P.C. 67. “15. The position therefore is that in this case evidence has been admitted which ought not to have been admitted, and the duty of the Court in such circumstances is stated in Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides: The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision. 16. It was therefore the duty of the High Court in appeal to apply its mind to the question whether, after discarding the evidence improperly admitted, there was left sufficient to justify the convictions. The Judges of the High Court did not apply their minds to this question because they considered that the evidence was properly admitted, and their Lordships propose therefore to remit the case to the High Court of Madras, with directions to consider this question. If the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient admissible evidence to justify the convictions, they will uphold them. If, on the other hand, they consider that the admissible evidence is not sufficient to justify the convictions, they will take such course, whether by discharging the accused or by ordering a new trial, as may be open to them. 17. Their Lordships have, therefore, humbly advised His Majesty that this appeal be allowed and that the case be remitted to the High Court of Madras, with directions to consider whether the evidence on record apart from the confessional statements of accused No. 3 and accused No. 6 which their Lordships have held to be inadmissible, is sufficient to justify the convictions 26 and to make such order in the matter as may be right having regard to their decision upon the question remitted to them.” 39. The recovery was also proved not only by the IO, but also by the independent witness PW-11. The evidence considered as a whole established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 40. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require certainty of a mathematical or absolute character. It requires the degree of assurance upon which a prudent person would act in matters of highest importance to himself. 41. In the matter of Goverdhan & Anr. vs State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 INSC 47, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “20. It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate stitching the pieces of evidence in a watertight manner, for the standard of proof in a criminal case is not proof beyond all doubts but only beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, if a clear picture emerges on piecing together all evidence which indicates beyond reasonable doubt of the role played by the accused in the perpetration of the crime, the court holds the accused criminally liable and punishes them under the provisions of the penal code, in contradistinction to the requirement of proof based on the preponderance of probabilities as in case of civil proceedings. 21. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is meant by “reasonable doubt”. It means that such doubt must be free from suppositional speculation. It must not be the result of minute emotional detailing, and the doubt must be actual and substantial and not merely vague apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense as observed in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 wherein it was observed as under : “24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overly emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt 27 based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.” 22. While applying this principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt the Court has to undertake a candid consideration of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable manner as observed by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 as follows: “8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove all the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression ‘reasonable doubt’ is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge. 9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law in the United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows: ‘It is difficult to define the phrase “reasonable doubt”. However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster case [Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush 295 : 59 Mass 295 (1850)]. He says:“It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.”’ 10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored by H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th Edn.) thus: ‘The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason, entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference of the possibility of the innocence of the accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which arises from a consideration of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a reasonable doubt.’ 23. The concept of reasonable doubt has to be also understood in the Indian context, keeping in mind the social reality and this principle cannot be stretched beyond a reasonable limit to avoid generating a cynical view of law as observed by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 as follows: 28 “6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned Author [Glanville Williams in ‘Proof of Guilt’.] has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted “persons” and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent .…” In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these lines long ago.” 24. Further, what would be the standard degree of “proof” which would be required in any particular case was also discussed in the aforesaid case of Ramakant Rai (supra) in the following words: “23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to (sic) of 29 probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise, the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, as learned author says : [see The Mathematics of Proof II : Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)] “The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.” 24. ……………….. ……………….. 25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928 : AIR 1988 SC 2154] .” 25. At this point, it may be also relevant to mention an observation made by Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 373 H: “That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the court of justice….” 26. Thus, the requirement of law in criminal trials is not to prove the case beyond all doubt but beyond reasonable doubt and such doubt cannot be imaginary, fanciful, trivial or merely a possible doubt but a fair doubt based on reason and common sense. Hence, in the present case, if the allegations against the appellants are held proved beyond reasonable doubt, certainly conviction cannot be said to be illegal.” 30 42. The defence tried to make out a case that the written complaint was not a spontaneous narration of the incident, by contending that there was no explanation as to why the scribe had to be summoned from a different tea garden in order to take down the narration of the PW-1. However, from the cross examination of the PW-1 and the PW-5, do we find that any question or suggestion had been put that the scribe was not present at the locale when the written complaint was sought to be lodged or that he was brought in from a far off distance after substantial delay, only to strengthen the prosecution case. The presence of the scribe was never disputed before the Trial Judge. From the trend of cross-examination of these witnesses nothing could be extracted, which would render their evidence liable to be rejected. 43. The evidence supporting the conviction comprises of the ocular account of PW-3, which for the reasons given above is considered to be reliable. The medical evidence is consistent with the manner in which the injury was caused and the nature of the injury. A salishinama which was independently seized and proved, established a continuing dispute between the deceased and the appellant, thereby, indicating a motive. Admissible portion of Exhibit-15 leading to recovery of the weapon at the appellant's own instance, supports the prosecution case. 44. Tested against such standards and upon re-appreciation of the evidence as an appellate forum, we do not think that the basis of conviction was either incorrect or erroneous. We do not deem it prudent to disturb the Trial Court's ultimate conclusion. 45. We also notice, as a circumstance not without significance that, upon being released on bail the appellant absconded as did the co-accused, 31 resulting in the appellant being apprehended only after considerable delay. The co-accused has not been traced. Conduct of this nature being subsequent to the offence and connected with the fact in issue is a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. 46. Mere absconsion may not by itself establish guilt, but the same is a conduct pointing to a guilty mind, when not accompanied by any plausible explanation. 47. As a result, the appeal fails. The bail bond is cancelled. The appellant will surrender before the learned Trial Court and he will be taken into custody. We uphold the conviction and the sentence. The stay on realization of the fine is vacated. 48. Period of detention already undergone by the appellant during investigation or trial or thereafter, shall be set off against the substantial punishment in accordance with the provisions of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to Section 468 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 49. Let a copy of this judgment along with the Trial Court records be sent down to the Trial Court at once. 50. This judgment will be sent to jail authorities of the correctional home after the appellant is taken into custody and remanded to the custody of correctional home. 51. CRA (D.B) 77 of 2023 is disposed of accordingly. 32 52. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon fulfilment of requisite formalities. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) I Agree. 53. (Smita Das De, J.)