1 sa15.2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR SECOND APPEAL NO.15/2026 Smt. Leelabai W/o Murlidhar Meshram ..V/s.. Smt. Indubai W/o Bajirao Naik and others - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mr. K.J. Rawandhe, Counsel for the appellant. Ms. Eshita Milind Wadodkar, Counsel for respondent No.1. Mr. Syed Salman Ali, Counsel for respondent No.2. CORAM : MRS. VRUSHALI V. JOSHI, J. DATED : 21.8.2026. The appellant has filed the present appeal, being aggrieved by the order passed by the Appellate Court rejecting the application for condonation of delay. There is a delay of 7 years, 10 months and 7 days in filing the appeal. 2. The appellant is the original defendant No.1. The suit was filed for possession of the property. An ex parte decree was passed, and the appellant filed an application before the Appellate Court seeking permission to file the appeal after the aforesaid delay. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Counsel who was appearing for defendant No.1 had not properly guided her with regard to filing the appeal and, therefore, the delay had occurred. 4. In this regard, he relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Giani, reported in 2011 Supreme (SC) 185, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that, if there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellant, the application for 2026:BHC-NAG:11163 2 sa15.2026 condonation of delay may be allowed even though there may not be sufficient cause in the strict sense. He also relied upon the observations in M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam, reported in 2001 Supreme (SC) 1003, in support of his submission that, while considering an application for condonation of delay in setting aside an ex parte decree, the Court should consider the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved, and the stake of the parties. 5. The appellant, who is defendant No.1, is 80 years of age and is in possession of the property. She had purchased the property from defendant No.2, who is the husband of the plaintiff. They were residing separately. Thereafter, the judgment and decree impugned herein came to be passed ex parte. Considering the ex parte judgment and the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, the learned Counsel for the appellant prayed for condonation of the delay. 6. The case revolves around the question as to whether the Appellate Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not appreciating the distinction between sufficient cause and negligence, particularly when an aged litigant was allegedly misled by her Counsel. 7. The learned Counsel for Respondent No.1 opposed the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, contending that incorrect advice given by a Counsel cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for condonation of delay. 8. In this regard, she placed reliance upon the observations made by this Court in Writ Petition 3 sa15.2026 No.3723/2009, Shri Sanjay N. Puri v. Shri Rameshchandra D. Jeswani, decided on 01.09.2009. She also relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 2014 SC 746, in support of her submission that there must be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. If an appeal is presented beyond the prescribed period of limitation, the applicant has to explain the sufficient cause which prevented him or her from approaching the Court within the prescribed period. Sufficient cause means an adequate and sufficient reason which prevented the applicant from approaching the Court within the period of limitation. Considering the reasons stated in the application, the fact that the appellant had appeared in the execution proceedings through her Advocate cannot be a ground for condoning the delay. Accordingly, she prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 9. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The ex parte decree was passed by the Civil Court. Though the appellant appeared before the Executing Court and was aware of the ex parte decree, she did not take steps to prefer an appeal for nearly eight years. She was negligent and relied upon the guidance of her Counsel, which, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be considered a sufficient cause, particularly when the delay is of about eight years. The execution proceedings have reached the stage of issuance of a possession warrant. Considering the reasons stated 4 sa15.2026 for the delay and the fact that the appellant was represented by her Counsel, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. 11. In view of the above, the pending Civil Applications do not survive and are accordingly disposed of. (MRS. VRUSHALI V. JOSHI, J.) Tambaskar. Signed by: MR. N.V. TAMBASKAR Designation: Senior Pvt. Secretary Date: 27/08/2026 18:22:35