( 2026:HHC:14389 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CMP(M) No. 2122 of 2025. Decided on :29 th April, 2026. State of H.P. & Ors. ...Petitioners. Versus Pammi Devi & Ors. ....Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, Addl. A.G. For the Respondents: Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ajeet Jaswal, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral). The present application has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the regular second appeal. The plaintiffs/respondents preferred a suit in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P. on 19.11.2016 for declaration, possession and permanent prohibitory injunction against the State and the private respondents. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit preferred by the present respondents on 13.01.2023. 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 2. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge-1, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. on 10.04.2023. The learned first appellate court vide its judgment and decree dated 26.03.2024 accepted the appeal and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding the plaintiff and proforma defendants No. 5 to 8 to be owner in possession of the suit land which was granted as Nautor land under Antodaya Scheme and entries in revenue record showing the suit land in the ownership of State of H.P., and in possession of Forest department are declared as null and void, not binding on the rights of plaintiff and proforma defendants No. 5 to 8 and further the defendants are permanently prohibited from dispossessing the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 5 to 8 from the suit land. 3. Feeling dissatisfied, the State has filed the present regular second appeal before this Court. The State/appellants filed the appeal on 21.08.2025. 4. In the application, it has been averred that the appeal against the impugned judgment could not be filed within time before this Court due to the reason that after the receipt of 3 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree, the matter was dealt by the office of District Attorney and thereafter the case file was sent to Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Law department. That the opinion of the law department was received in the matter and directions to file appeal was received from the government. It has been averred that the delay was neither intentional nor willful but time was consumed in obtaining the required opinion and permissions from the higher authorities for filing the appeal. That the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was applied on 26.03.2024 and the same was attested on 10.04.2024 and received on 12.04.2024. The final opinion for filing appeal was prepared on 25.04.2024 and was sent to the defendants. 5. AS per applicants, the matter was examined by the law department on 20.06.2024 which opined that the impugned judgment has to be assailed in the appeal and the same has been received in the office on 29.06.2024, through Additional Chief Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh vide letter dated 24.06.2024. That after receipt of the opinion from the 4 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) government, it was forwarded to the office of District Attorney, Mandi on 16.07.2024, but due to clerical mistake it has been wrongly mentioned in the letter that the order passed by the learned Court is just and proper. Thereafter, District Attorney, Mandi has again forwarded the case file to the office of deponent i.e. Collector, Mandi on 22.07.2024 and informed that the findings are contrary to the opinion of law department. Again the matter was put up by the dealing assistant on 21.08.2024 through E-office and in the meanwhile the file along with entire record was inadvertently misplaced due to rush of work and when the file was again traced on 04.04.2025, the same was forwarded to the office of Principal Secretary (Revenue) for filing the appeal vide letter dated 07.04.2025. That the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of H.P. vide letter dated 22.05.2025 has directed the applicant to file appeal before this Court and thereafter District Attorney, Mandi was directed on 19.06.2025 to prepare the appeal. It has been prayed that the delay of 407 days in filing the appeal be condoned. 5 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 6. Reply to the said application has been filed by the private respondents by denying all the averments as made in the application. It has been stated in the reply that there is no reasonable and plausible explanation for condonation of delay and that the story has been concocted by the applicants in order to avail undue and unfair advantage. It has been stated in the reply that the application itself apparently demonstrates administrative lethargy and administrative inefficiency, therefore, the same itself estopped the applicants from seeking discretionary relief from this court. It has been stated in the reply that since there is huge delay of more than 407 days in filing the appeal, which remains unexplained by the applicants, therefore, in view of the mandate laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the application deserves to be dismissed. 7. On 31.03.2026, the case was taken up for consideration and after hearing the same for some time, the applicant-State was directed to file supplementary affidavit in order to explain the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal. The supplementary affidavit have been filed, whereby, the averments 6 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) as made in the application have been reiterated stressing on the fact that the original file along with the entire record was inadvertently misplaced due to rush of work and the same was located on 04.04.2025 and thereafter the case was forwarded to the office of Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of H.P. for filing of the appeal. That the Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of H.P. vide communication dated 22.05.2025 directed the applicant to file the instant appeal. 8. It is contented by Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General that the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, rather it is for the reasons as described in the application, therefore, after condoning the delay the appeal be taken up for consideration. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ajeet Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the application by submitting that there is huge delay of 407 days in filing the appeal, which cannot be condoned in the absence of plausible explanation to be given in the application. 7 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the case file. 11. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal ap- proach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. 12. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind that whil construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an 8 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that  even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The concept of ‘liberal approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It is a well settled principle of law that the limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. 14. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been pre- sented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an 9 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. No court could be justified in condon- ing such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatso- ever. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. & others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Spe- cial Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has laid down the pa- rameters for condonation of delay in following manner: “12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The excep- tions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with 10 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14 to 20 xx xx xx xx 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfac- tory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. xx xx xx 11 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limita- tion may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress re- sulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which 12 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands at- tracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be con- sidered while interpreting a statute.” 16. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shivamma (dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025, decided on 12th September, 2025, has held that irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private person, the provisions of law applicable are the same and as such same consideration that is shown by courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be adopted towards the State. The expression “suffi- cient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Government and the courts are not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf of the State to explain the delay. 17. Hon’ble Apex Court deprecated condonation of delay in filing appeal therein that was occasioned not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government pleaders concerned, merely be- 13 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) cause the party seeking condonation happened to be the State. In doing so, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to thwart the substantial law of limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. The distinction between the State or any instrumentalities vis-a-vis a private individual, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should be understood in its proper context and true spirit. Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be put on the same footing as a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the judgment has given a clear message to the State and all its instrumentalities that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue for all times to come. The State and all public authorities to constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved in the decision by the courts, if not then endeavour should be made towards arriving at a settlement 14 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) instead, rather than re-agitating the belated causes before the courts. Differential treatment cannot continue for all times to come. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court after setting aside the judgment passed by the High Court whereby the delay was condoned, dismissed the application for condonation of delay by imposing additional costs of Rs.25,000/- on the respondents in the said case. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such litigant listless yet again. 15 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 20. The said exposition of law has been reiterated in var- ious judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the present case, the applicant-State has filed an application to make out a case for condonation of delay. From the perusal of the application, it re- veals that cryptic and deceptive averments were made in order to condone the delay. In para-2 of the application, it has been averred that the matter was dealt by office of the applicant and thereafter the case file was sent to Principal Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of H.P. and law department. The opinion of law depart- ment was received in the matter and directions to file the appeal was received from the government/competent authorities. There- after, it has been again averred that the file went through differ- ent channels and then again in para-8, it has been averred that the file was submitted to the office of Principal Secretary (Revenue), to the Govt. of H.P., who gave his note for filing of the appeal vide its letter dated 22.05.2025. Such excuses have been taken by the ap- plicant in order to defeat the right of the defendants/non-appli- cants and to justify the condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. 16 ( 2026:HHC:14389 ) 21. It has been observed by the courts that in every case the State is taking excuse that the file got misplaced due to rush of work. Such explanation and the averment cannot be accepted without any reasonable and probable cause. The applicants could not satisfy this Court to come to the conclusion that the delay in filing the present appeal is not willful or intentional, rather the application and the supplementary affidavit reveal that the story as projected by the State for condonation of delay is not plausible or correct. 22. Consequently, in view of above, the present application being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. (Romesh Verma) Judge 29th April, 2026. (jai)