2026:JHHC:8362-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI F.A No. 39 of 2024 ---- Abhishek Kumar Pandey, aged about 34 years, son of Kamdeo Pandey, Resident of Suriya, PS+PO-Suriya, District-Giridih, Jharkhand ....Petitioner(s) Versus Aarti Devi, W/o-Abhishek Kumar Pandey, D/o- Anil Mishra, Resident of Marwari Colony, Tripua Sundari Mandir More, Barahiya, PS+PO-Sarahiya, District-Lakhisarai, (Bihar) ....Respondent(s) --- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --- For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prashant Gupta, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mrs. Neeharika Mazumdar, Advocate --- 17/ Dated: 24th March 2026 I.A No. 16033 of 2025 1. The matter was argued by Dr. S. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant before the pre-lunch session. The issue of limitation has been argued at length. 2. We have considered the ground as has been referred in the instant interlocutory application wherein save and except the issue of compromise said to be with the respondent-wife no other grounds have been taken. On the request of Dr. S. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant, the matter has been deferred to be taken up in the post-lunch session, however, when the matter has been taken up, it has been informed by Mr. Prashant Gupta, the practicing advocate of this Court, that he has been instructed by Dr. S. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant, to inform to this Court that he has left the Court premises. Since this Court has already heard Dr. S. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant, in the pre-lunch session, as such on consideration of the argument and the reason assigned in the instant interlocutory application as also 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 2 the response filed on behalf of the respondent-wife this Court thinks it proper to decide the instant interlocutory application. 3. We have considered the reasons assigned particularly in paragraph no. 5 of the interlocutory application wherein the issue of compromise has been said to be with the respondent and the same has been prayed to be accepted as a sufficient ground to condone the delay of 131 days. 4. A reply to the instant interlocutory application has been filed denying the element of compromise or any talk with respect to the compromise as has ever been taken place in between the husband and the wife. 5. We are conscious that the delay is to be condoned irrespective of the length of period, if the sufficient cause is being shown by the litigant concerned to codone the delay in exercise of power conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. The consideration of meaning of „sufficient cause‟ has been made in “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81] wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraph nos. 9 to 15 hereunder:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 3 allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195] . 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 4 of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 7. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 5 enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157. 8. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression „sufficient cause‟ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. In this regard, a reference may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in overjubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 6 explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 9. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the inordinate delay of 131 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning the delay. 10. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression „sufficient cause‟ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. 11. In I.A. No. 16033 of 2025, it has been stated as under: “4. That the impugned judgment was passed on 12.9.2023 and the decree was signed on 16.9.2023, thereafter the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was issued on 30.09.2023. 5. That the appellant tried to settle the dispute with the respondent wife and there was talk of compromise outside the court and as such he waited for sometime hence the appellant could not file this appeal in time.” 12. The talk of compromise cannot be a ground to accept as a sufficient cause to condone the delay that too when it is being objected by the respondent-wife. Further a suit has been preferred by the appellant-husband for dissolution of marriage which has been denied by dismissing the suit. In such 2026:JHHC:8362-DB 7 circumstances where is the occasion for the husband to have a talk of compromise and that itself appears to be a misleading statement. 13. This Court in view of the above is of the view that the reason which has been explained said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay of 131 days is not the sufficient cause. 14. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application being I.A No. 16033 of 2025 stands dismissed. In consequence thereof F.A No. 39 of 2024 is also dismissed. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) 24th March 2026 Jk/Amit Uploaded on 31/03/2026