IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) CRR 3808 of 2024 Rasmita Acharya & Anr. Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners : Mr. Antarikhya Basu, Mr. Anirban Dutta, Mr. Sayan Mukherjee. For the State : Ms. Samira Grewal, Ms. Ananya Chakraborty. For the O. P. No.2 : Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed, Ms. Ghazala Firdaus, Ms. Smita Saha, Mr. Md. Arsalan. Judgment reserved on : 02.09.2026 Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2026 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of proceedings being Shasan Police Station Case No. 15 of 2024 dated 10.02.2024 under Sections 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding to G.R No- 489 Of 2024) pending before the Learned 2 Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat, 24 Parganas (North) in respect of the petitioners herein. 2. The allegations in the written complaint are to the effect that the de- facto complainant being a food business owner named and styled as M/S. K.H. ENTERPRISE was allegedly approached by Rasimita Acharya (co-accused), Managing Director of M/S J.R Sara Foods Marketing Private Limited and Shailendra Bajpai (petitioner) director of the company, to become the company's distributor and super stockiest. An AGREEMENT was signed between the parties on 07/08/2023. A sum of Rs.14,45,000/-(Fourteen Lakh Forty-Five Thousand) was taken from the de facto complainant by the accused persons by making false promises. The de facto complainant paid the said money through his bank to the account of the said company whose Account No 0353201002766, Canara Bank, Bapugi Nagar, Bhubenaswar Branch, while the said company's Director Shalendra Bajpai (petitioner) and the Managing Director Rasimita Acharya (co-accused) promised him that one truck of food products (Chips and Rings) will be sent. After few days, some food products was sent which was damaged and date expired. 3. De facto complainant immediately informed the company and they admitted the mistake over the phone and promised to send good quality Food products (Chip's and Rings) very soon. But till the date of complaint no Food products (Chip's Rings) have been sent. But the accuseds have neither refunded his money nor replaced the goods. Hence the registration of the case. 3 4. The petitioners’ case is that the genesis of the dispute lies entirely in a commercial relationship governed by a written contract, namely the Consignee Sales Agent Agreement dated 31.07.2023 (Annexure P/2, Pg. 60-64). The advance payments totaling Rs. 14,45,000/- were remitted directly into the corporate current account of M/s J.R. Sara Food Marketing Pvt. Ltd. via RTGS for commercial transactions. Allegations regarding delay in consignment delivery, damaged packaging, or non- replacement of stock pertain strictly to breach of contractual obligations. The agreement itself contains specific clauses governing product replacement, liabilities and an explicit arbitration. 5. The registration of the FIR under both Section 406 (Criminal Breach of Trust) and Section 420 (Cheating) IPC on identical facts represents a gross legal fallacy being mutually exclusive. (Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2024) 10 SCC 690). 6. The subsequent addition of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC by the Investigating Officer on 06.08.2024 is non est and legally void. In Ram Nath v. State of U.P. (2024 INSC 138 / (2024) 2 S.C.R. 743), the Hon'ble Supreme Court settled that the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSSA) is a comprehensive, self-contained special statute. Section 89 of the FSSA gives the Act an absolute overriding effect over all other laws in respect of food safety and adulteration. Offences relating to unsafe or noxious food are comprehensively covered under Section 59 of the FSSA, thereby completely excluding and barring police prosecution under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. 4 7. The petitioners state that the police machinery was set into motion mechanically upon receiving a complaint arising out of corporate dealership agreements and bank transfers. This mechanical registration directly violates the mandatory directive of the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Para 120.6(b)), which mandates that in commercial and contractual disputes, a preliminary enquiry must be conducted prior to registering an FIR to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed. 8. The petitioners state that the malicious intent of the complainant is conclusively established by his own subsequent conduct. After lodging the FIR on 10.02.2024, the complainant issued an official "Claim Statement" email on 10.04.2024 and a statutory Legal Notice on 15.06.2024 demanding commercial refund. In both communications, the complainant completely suppressed the existence of the criminal case. This active concealment demonstrates a calculated attempt to use criminal law as a tool of coercion and recovery for a purely commercial claim. 9. Admittedly, a Consignee Sales Agent Agreement dated 07.08.2023, was executed with the de facto complainant. 10. As per clause 21, 22 and 23 of the Consignee Sales Agent Agreement (Liability for Loss and Damage), it was agreed that the First Party shall ensure replacement of the goods against the manufacturing defects, if reported within 25 days against the invoice and further no replacement or no refund of amount to Second Party shall be liable in case of 5 negligence of storage and / or any kind there to and in case of non- implementation of any terms & condition in the agreement, by either of the parties shall be responsible for the said party Business Losses & expenses incurred. 11. The petitioners have relied upon the following judgments:- (i) Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited – Vs- P. Mohan & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC online SC 315. (ii) Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited – Vs. - State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020 SCC online SC 958. (iii) SM Dutta – Vs.- State of Gujrat (2001) 7 SCC 659, 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361, 2001, SCC (L &S) 1201. (iv) Chand Dhawar – Vs. – Jawahar Lal (1992) 3 SCC 317 1992 SCC (Cri) 636. (v) Bhajanlal’s Case (Supra) also hold in Paragraph 114. (vi) Trisuns Chemical Industry – Vs. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors. AIR 199 SC 3499. (vii) Orissa & Ors. Vs. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan 2012 (2) RCR (Criminal) 467, the Apex Court. (viii) S. W. Palanitkar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 2001 (4) RCR (Criminal) 572. (ix) Mr. Debapratim Neogie – Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr. On 1 April, 2024. 12. In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6 1570 of 2021), decided on March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court held:- “5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. 6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7 7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.” 13. In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2682 of 2020), decided on September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court held:- “11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High Court possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed restraints evolved through judicial pronouncements. 11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories where quashing of proceedings is justified. These are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- 8 cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to balance two competing considerations – (a)preventing abuse of process of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed questions of fact. 11.2. 11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “minitrial” or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR / complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 , HMT Watches v. Abida12, and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others13]. 11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar 14 , it was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits of the prosecution’s case and holding that charges were not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial. 9 11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized where the defence relies upon unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of sterling quality – such as documents of undisputed authenticity – which ex facie demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. This principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent decisions. 11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial. 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. 10 (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others18 , it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19 , this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 11 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 20 , this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other 12 proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the wellsettled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.”” 14. The petitioners also rely upon the judgment in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesb & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 690, wherein the Supreme Court held:- “38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious 13 misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405IPC, punishable under Section 406IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC.” 15. From the materials on record including the case diary it appears that the dispute in the present case is clearly a civil dispute arising out of a business transaction based on an agreement and in such cases of alleged breach of agreement, it has to be prima facie shown that there was/is criminal intent present. Admittedly there was a business arrangement between the parties and certain disagreements has arisen in course of such transactions. 16. The materials on record, herein including the case diary, do not prima facie show presence of the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners herein, with prima facie absence of criminal intent and as such the proceeding in this case is thus liable to be quashed in the interest of Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process of law. 17. CRR 3808 of 2024 is thus allowed. 18. The proceeding being Shasan Police Station Case No. 15 of 2024 dated 10.02.2024 under Sections 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding to G.R No- 489 Of 2024) pending before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat, 24 Parganas (North), is 14 hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Rasmita Acharya and Shalendra Bajpai @ Sailendra Bajpai. 19. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of. 20. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 21. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 22. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)