R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 11354 of 2017 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL ================================================ Approved for Reporting Yes No √ ================================================ TAUSIF AYUB MIRZA & ORS. Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ================================================ Appearance: MR VISHAL B. VINCHI for MR HARDIK H DAVE(6295) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5 MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1 RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2 ================================================ CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL Date : 29/09/2026 ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Though served, none appears for the respondent No. 2 - de facto complainant. The matter is old, of 2017 and hence, the Court proceeded with the matter on merits, in accordance with law. R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) 2. This application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the Code) is filed by the applicants praying to quash and set aside the FIR being C.R. No. I-228 of 2015, dated 04.12.2015, registered with Kosamba Police Station, District: Surat (Rural) for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 323, 504, and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Atrocity Act), with all consequential proceedings pursuant thereto. 3. Brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 04.12.2015 when de facto complainant was returning home on his motorcycle along with his mother in between 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., and while passing through an STD shop belonging to Village Sarpanch – namely Hanif Patel, near Kothva Dargah, the applicants herein got stopped his motorcycle, started abusing the complainant of his caste, gave fist and kick blows and upon intervention of uncle of the de facto complainant, the accused, after threatening not to vote for Kamal else their huts would be burnt, went away from the spot. Thus, on the said facts, the FIR in question came to be registered against the accused. 4. At the outset, the learned advocate for the applicants does not press this application so far as offences under the IPC are concerned and accordingly, the matter is heard only qua the offence under the Atrocity Act. Page 2 of 10 R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) 5. Heard, learned advocate for the applicants and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State. 5.1 The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that provisions of Section 3(1(x) of the Atrocity Act are at all not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. He submitted that Charge-sheet in the case is already filed and from reading of entire papers of Charge-sheet, though the alleged incident had taken place near a Dargah, no independent witness who would have heard the caste related utterances, was available at the place, even though it falls in a public place but not in public view and accordingly, in the submission of the learned advocate for the applicants, the provisions of the offence under the Atrocity Act as are not attracted, present FIR is required to be quashed qua the said offence. In support of his submission, he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 531 = 2008 (0) AIJEL-SC 42194. 6. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State would submit that when the utterances related to the caste of the de facto complainant were in the public place, more particularly near a Dargah, and such place is even not disputed by the applicants herein, the question of presence of other independent witnesses does not arise and it would ultimately a subject matter of trial and has, thus, argued that when Charge-sheet in the case is already filed and when a prima facie R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) case is made out against the present applicants, this Court may not interfere at this stage and eventually, it is urged that this application may be rejected. 7. Prior to assessing the factual matrix on the touchstone of criminal jurisprudence, it is apposite to reinforce the settled legal position governing the scope, ambit, and limits of the inherent jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Code. The jurisprudential parameters regulating the exercise of this extraordinary power have been authoritatively catalogued by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a long line of precedents, chief among them being the authoritative in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604]. Therein, Hon’ble Supreme Court crystallized seven distinct, illustrative categories of cases where judicial intervention under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution is necessitated to secure the ends of justice and clip any abuse of the process of Court. The relevant portion of Paragraph 102 of the said judgment is extracted below: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 7.1 Evaluating the present applications on the anvil of the principles enunciated in Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court has to determine whether the allegations in the FIR so far as offence under the Atrocity Act is concerned, even when accepted at face value, satisfy their essential statutory ingredients or not. This Court must ensure that criminal machinery is not permitted to degenerate into an engine of harassment where liability under criminal law is completely absent. 8. It is the case of the de facto complainant in the FIR that while he was returning home along with his mother on a motorcycle and when he reached near a Dargah, the applicants stopped them and by giving abuses relating to the caste of the de facto complainant, gave him fist and kick blows and also threatened him and accordingly, the applicants are charged for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act, which provides for intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. A perusal of the section reveals that for implication of this section, an act as defined in this section, has to be committed in a R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) public view. Now, adverting the case on hand, the incident in question admittedly, had occurred while the de facto complainant was returning home on his motorcycle along with his mother, and near a Dargah and thus, the place in question can be said to be a public place. Now, it is required to be seen as to whether the incident in question had occurred within the public view or not. On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the investigation papers, there appears nothing on record to suggest that any independent witness was present when the incident in question had occurred and there appears nothing from the Charge-sheet papers to suggest that any independent witness has deposed to state such a fact. In the circumstances, in the considered opinion of the Court, though alleged offence might have occurred in a public place but it was not within the public view and thus, ingredients of the offence alleged under the Atrocity are not satisfied. 8.1 In the case of Gorige Pentaiah (supra), as relied on by the learned advocate for the applicants, the Apex Court observed as under: “7. As far as Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as under: “3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe:- (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.” 8. In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused- appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustied leading to abuse of process of law.” 8.2 Further, in the decision in Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 75033, the Apex Court observed as under: “11. We cannot but find that there are gross inconsistencies insofar as the complaint and the oral evidence led by way of deposition before the Court. The place of occurrence was stated to be the house, in the complaint, while all the witnesses spoke of the alleged incident having occurred in the field, which was the disputed land. In any event, there is no scope for finding either clause (r) or (s) of Section 3(1) of the SC & ST Act since PW-1 has categorically stated that there was no member of the public present at the time the incident occurred. Insofar as the allegation under clause (f) of Section 3(1) there is nothing to indicate that the complainant and her family were forcefully evicted from the disputed land or that the accused occupied it illegally after delivery was effected on 25.04.2005. As far as the house trespass is concerned, the oral evidence does not support it. On the above reasoning we find absolutely no reason to sustain the conviction as entered into by the Magistrate’s Court R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) confirmed by the High Court. We set aside the order of the Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court and acquit the appellants herein.” 8.2.1 In the case on hand also in the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused were not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and they intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate the de facto complainant in a place within public view. 8.3 Further in Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansar (supra), though place of incident was under cloud, as to whether it was in the house or in the field, however, for want of presence of any independent member of public, the Apex Court did not find any scope for Section 3(1)(r) which is analogues to Section 3(1)(x) as invoked in the case on hand. In the case on hand also, there appears no presence of any independent member of public at the time when alleged offence occurred 8.4 In view of above, in the considered opinion of the Court, the case falls within Clause (1), (3) and (7) of Bhajan Lal’s case so far it relates to offence under the Atrocity Act and accordingly, the Court is inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the applicants. 9. For the afore-stated discussion and reasons, this application succeeds and is, accordingly allowed, in part. FIR being C.R. No. I- 228 of 2015, dated 04.12.2015, registered with Kosamba Police R/CR.MA/11354/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026 (GJHC240619982017) Station, District: Surat (Rural) and all consequential proceeding emanating pursuant thereto, so far they relate to offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby quashed and set aside qua the present applicants. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. 9.1 It goes without saying that the observations made herein above are solely for deciding this application and accordingly, trial Court shall proceed in accordance with law qua the rest offences without being influenced by the same. 9.2 Direct service is permitted. [ P. M. Raval, J. ] hiren/SB/1/2tss29926 Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: HIREN VIRENDRABHAI MER(HC00351), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 29/09/2026 17:06:52