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2026 DAILYLAW 4386 (JHR)

M/S SRI GOPIKRISHNA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. THR. ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY-CUM-MANAGER (ACCOUNTS) v. JHARKHAND BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LIMITED THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN -CUM- MANAGING DIRECTOR

WPC/1896/2026 · 2026-03-24

Rajesh Shankar

Writ Petition (Civil)body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2026:JHHC:8284-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 1896 of 2026 M/s. Sri Gopikrishna Infrastructure Private Limited, having its registered office at 30/B Vengal Rao Nagar, PO & PS- S.R. Nagar, District-Hyderabad, through its Authorized Signatory-cum-Manager (Accounts), Mr. Shamshad Ali, S/o Late Md. Shafiullah, R/o Raza Colony, Kanta Toli, Ranchi ... ... Petitioner Versus 1. Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, through its Chairman-cum- Managing Director, having its office at Engineering Building, HEC, Dhurwa, Ranchi 2. General Manager (R-APRDRP), Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, having its office at Engineering Building, HEC, Dhurwa, Ranchi 3. Electrical Superintending Engineer, Electric Supply Circle, Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, Hazaribagh ... … Respondents ----- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR For the Petitioner : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Sr. Advocate Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate Mrs. Lavanya Gadodia Mittal, Advocate Mr. Yashdeep Kanhai, Advocate Mr. Arya Vardhan Singh, Advocate Ms. Divya Choudhary, Advocate Mr. Sourav K. Jha, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Ajit Kumar, AC to Mr. J.F. Toppo, Advocate ----- Order No. 02 Dated: 24.03.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the issue raised in this petition stands covered by our order dated 17.03.2026, disposing of W.P.(C) No. 1601 of 2026 and connected matters. 3. The petitioner seeks an appropriate writ upon the respondents for quashing and setting aside the letter issued by the respondents directing the deduction of certain amounts on account of highly quoted items. 4. The petitioner argues that such deduction was inconsistent with and in fact contrary to the terms of the contract between the parties. 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 2 The petitioner has urged that such deduction was made despite the fact that the variation in contract price due to change in quantity was within the prescribed limits and further, the same, was at the instance of the respondents themselves. 5. Based on the above contention, the petitioner, seeks a writ of mandamus upon the respondents to refund the deducted amount of Rs.3,14,97,728/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum because according to the petitioner, such deduction was unilateral, illegal and in violation of the terms of the contract. 6. The issue raised in this petition is almost identical to the issue involved in W.P.(C) Nos.5303, 6007 and 2583 of 2025 which were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 22nd January, 2026. There, this Court noted that the dispute, similar to the dispute raised in this petition, was a purely contractual dispute and any resolution of such dispute would involve adjudication into highly disputed question of facts with regard to excess quantities, if any, the rates that would apply to such excess quantities, whether the variation was within the permissible limits or not and which of the parties was indeed responsible for the variation. 7. The resolution of the above-referred disputes would undoubtedly involve adjudication into highly disputed questions of fact. Such an exercise cannot be ordinarily undertaken when exercising the summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is especially so when the petitioner has undisputedly agreed to resort to arbitration to resolve the said dispute. 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 3 8. Mr. Mittal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, pointed out that arbitration clauses are to be found in the agreement which is the subject matter of the present writ petition. 9. The presence or absence of an arbitration clause is not crucial. The crucial issue is that the dispute raised in this petition arises from allegations and counter-allegations of breaches of the contract between the parties. Further, any resolution of such dispute would involve adjudication into highly disputed questions of fact, some of which are referred to hereinabove. 10. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to attempt to resolve such disputes in our summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This is more so in cases where the parties have themselves agreed to resolve such disputes through arbitration. 11. As noted earlier, in almost identical circumstances, this Court, by its common judgment and order dated 22nd January, 2026, disposing of W.P.(C) Nos. 5303, 6007 and 2583 of 2025, declined to entertain writ petitions but relegated the parties to arbitration. In those cases, since the parties agreed upon the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal, with the express consent of the parties, this Court proceeded to appoint the Arbitral Tribunal so that the disputes could be resolved expeditiously. The reasoning in our order of 22nd January, 2026, will equally apply in the present case. 12. In Kulchhinder Singh Vs. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a writ petition is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. The fact that the 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 4 respondent was a “State” is not sufficient and an enquiry should be whether what is sought to be enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J observed as follows:- “The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and legalistics, stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the society agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions to various posts or an omnibus, all-embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a government school or cheese to a government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under Article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, bypassing the normal channels of civil litigation. ........... Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction (emphasis supplied)”. 13. In Divl. Forest Officer Vs. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 238, the petitioner tried to enforce through writ petition the right to remove timber under a contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not allow this by observing that ordinarily where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract if the contract is capable of being specifically performed or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by civil court. 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 5 The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific performance of contract or for recovering damages. 14. In LIC Vs. Asha Goel, (2001) 2 SCC 160, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in no case, the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a contract for life insurance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court that the determination of the question depends upon consideration of several factors like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of dispute raised, the nature of enquiry necessary for determination of the dispute, etc. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, Courts must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction consistently followed by the High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations which involved disputed questions of facts. The Courts have consistently taken the view that in case where for the determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to enquire into facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 6 for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to bypass the agreed forum of dispute resolution. 15. In State of Bihar Vs. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216, the petitioner questioned the deduction of an amount from the final bill to be paid to the petitioner-contractor by alleging breach of contract by him. The High Court allowed the petition. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, reversing the High Court’s order, held that even if it is possible to decide the question raised in the petition, based on affidavits and counter-affidavits, it would not be proper to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases of alleged breach of contract. 16. As noted above, this is a matter where no public law element is shown to be involved. Notwithstanding the language used in the present petition alleging unfairness or arbitrariness, this matter involves alleged breach of non-statutory contract. A resolution of the dispute would involve adjudication of highly disputed questions of fact. Admittedly, in the present matter, the agreement contains an arbitration clause. Therefore, upon cumulative consideration of all these factors, we are satisfied that this is not a matter where we should entertain writ petition or exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. For the above reasons, we decline to entertain this petition. However, we grant the petitioner liberty to invoke the arbitration clauses, if any, in its agreement or to resort to the ordinary civil 2026:JHHC:8284-DB 7 remedies before the Civil Court for resolution of their disputes, as has been raised in this petition. 18. Since this Court has not adjudicated upon the rival disputes on merits, all contentions of all parties on the merits of the disputes are left explicitly open to be decided through arbitration and/or the ordinary civil remedies before the Civil Courts. 19. The writ petition is disposed of with liberty in the above terms. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) March 24, 2026 Manish/Ritesh Uploaded on 26.03.2026