1 2026:CGHC:8850-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 117 of 2018 State of Chhattisgarh Through The In- charge, Police Station Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Pushpendra Kumar R/o Village Bhatapara Lachhanpur, P. S. Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 2 - Nand Kumar S/o Shivdayal Jangde Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Bhatapara Lachhanpur, P. S. Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Tilbai W/o Nand Kumar Jangde Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Bhatapara Lachhanpur, P. S. Janjgir, District Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For State/Appellant : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. G.A. For Respondents : Mr. Ravindra Sharma and Mr. Sahil Sahu, Advocates. Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 18.02.2026 Digitally signed by AMIT PATEL 2 Per, Rajani Dubey, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 13.10.2017 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Janjgir, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 57/2015, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondents of the charges under Section 304-B of IPC and in alternate Section 302/34 of IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the deceased Anjali Kurre was married to Pushpendra Kumar Jangde of Lachhanpur on 17.05.2013. Approximately two months after the marriage, her husband Pushpendra Kumar Jangde, father-in-law Nandkumar Jangde, mother- in-law Tilbai Jangde, brother-in-law Shashikant Jangde, and other family members, in furtherance of their common intention, allegedly subjected her to cruelty and physical assault in connection with unlawful demands of dowry, namely a motorcycle, gold and silver ornaments, and ₹50,000/- in cash. The deceased informed her parental family about the harassment, whereupon the complainant Gopichand along with community elders, visited Lachhanpur to counsel the accused persons; however, the alleged cruelty persisted. On 06.07.2014, within approximately 14 months of her marriage, Anjali Kurre died under suspicious circumstances due to consumption of poison. On the report lodged by Gopichand, a case was registered for offence punishable under Sections 304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. During investigation, it was prima facie established fact that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment soon before her death in connection with dowry demands by the accused persons, 3 namely Pushpendra Jangde, Nandkumar Jangde, Tilbai Jangde, Shivdayal Jangde and Laxminbai Jangde and the matter was registered against them and the matter was taken up for investigation. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer prepared an inquest memo of the dead body of the deceased and conducted necessary proceedings. The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. A spot map of the incident was prepared and a spot map was also prepared through the concerned Patwari. Statements of witnesses were recorded and seizure memos were duly prepared. The seized articles were sent to F.S.L for its chemical examination. After completion of due and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was led before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate who, in turn, committed the case for trial. On the basis of the material contained in the charge- sheet, learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondents of charges punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and in alternate Section 302/34 of IPC. against which the present appeal has been filed by the State/appellant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is bad in law and facts, hence the same is liable to be set aside. The Learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in its true and correct perspective and the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondents, despite the same, the accused/respondents have been acquitted. He further submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting respondent no.1 to 3/accused persons, especially when the evidences available on record show that the deceased- Anjali was subjected to cruelty just for demand of dowry. Learned State 4 counsel further submits that in para 45 of the judgment has found that in the FSL report the poison namely; pyrethroid pesticide, cypermethrin was found in the viscera of the deceased. Needless to mention herewith that Dr. M.D. Tenduwa (PW-8) who conducted the autopsy gave a specific finding in the post-mortem report as well as in his deposition that the death of the deceased was due to consumption of the said poison. Learned trial Court has further erred in law in not raising the mandatory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act which prescribes that when a death is occurred in unnatural circumstances within a period of seven years, a presumption would be raised that the deceased had died due to harassment in connection with demand of dowry, but the trial court utterly failed to consider the aforesaid facts. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside. 4. Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondents/accused supporting the impugned judgment submits that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly acquitted the respondents/accused. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any irregularity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that it framed charges under Section 304-B of IPC and in alternate Section 302/34 of IPC against the accused/respondents and after appreciation of oral 5 and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid charges. 7. It is not disputed before learned trial Court that accused/respondent No. 1 is the husband of the deceased (Anjali), their marriage was solemnized on 17.05.2013. It was further undisputed that the deceased died on 06.07.2014 as a result of consumption of poison. 8. PW-1 Gopichand, brother of the deceased Anjali, deposed that the marriage of his sister was solemnized with accused Pushpendra approximately two years prior to the incident. He further stated that when the deceased visited her parental home, she informed them that the accused persons had demanded a motorcycle and 50,000/- as ₹ dowry and on account of non- fulfillment of the said demand, the accused/respondents subjected her to cruelty and harassment. Thereafter, he sent his relatives to the house of the accused persons to pacify and counsel them. The relatives returned after the accused assured that they would treat the deceased properly. However, despite such assurance, the accused persons continued to harass the deceased in connection with dowry demand and approximately five to six months after the said settlement, his sister died. When questioned regarding the cause of death, the accused persons gave irrelevant explanations, stating that the deceased had died due to a heart attack or shock, thereby the reasons stated regarding the cause of death of the deceased by the respondents were contrary to each of their statements. He further stated that he informed to Police Station Janjgir about the death of his sister and lodged Morgue Intimation No. 102/2014 (Ex. P/1), lodged a written report (Ex. P/2) against the 6 accused persons, police seized marriage invitation card (Ex. P/3) of her sister and also the spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/4. In his cross-examination, he stated that at the time of marriage of her sister no demand of dowry was made by the accused persons and her sister’s marriage was solemnized amicably with her own free will and she went to her in-laws’ house happily. He also admitted that he neither lodged any report against the accused persons regarding the demand of dowry, nor convened a village meeting for the same. 9. PW-2 Sahatarin Bai, mother of the deceased has also stated in her examination-in-chief that the accused persons had demanded a motorcycle and 50,000/- as dowry and on account of non- fulfillment ₹ of the said demand, subjected her daughter to cruelty and harassment, but in her cross-examination, she admitted that she was aware prior to the marriage that the accused were poor and earned their livelihood through daily wage labour. She further stated that no dowry demand was made by the accused persons at the time of marriage and her daughter’s marriage was solemnized amicably with her own free will and she went with the her husband/accused Pushpendra. She also admitted that she has not lodged any report against the accused persons regarding the demand of dowry. 10. PW-3 Terasram and PW-4 Budhwar Sai deposed that the accused persons had demanded a motorcycle and 50,000/- as dowry from the ₹ deceased Anjali and on failure to comply with the same, subjected her to cruelty and harassment. However, in their cross-examination, they admitted that they neither lodged any complaint with the police nor 7 convened a village meeting regarding the demand of dowry by the accused persons. 11. It has been held by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the matter of Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh Vs. the State of Uttarakhand reported in 2023 LiveLaw SC 341 held in paras 4, 5, 10 and 11 as under:- “4……...The presumption in regard to dowry death can be raised in terms of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘IEA’) only if it is shown that soon before death, such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with the demand of dowry. 5. If the evidence led by the prosecution is examined, no case for conviction under Section 304B or 498A IPC can possibly be made out as none of the witnesses have stated that there was any harassment or cruelty to the deceased or demand of dowry immediately before her death. The marriage took place in the year 1993, the deceased died on 22.6.1995. None of the family members of the deceased including her father, maternal grandmother or the maternal uncle have stated anything about the harassment of the deceased immediately before her death in connection with demand of dowry. In fact, the maternal grandmother and two maternal uncles who were living at distance of about one farlang from the village of the deceased were even present at the time of her cremation. They did not raise any issue either by lodging a complaint to the police or otherwise. In fact, it was admitted by the maternal grandmother and the uncles of the deceased that after the cremation, with the intervention of the panchayat, they had collected all the dowry articles. It was further submitted that intimation was also given to 8 the father of the deceased who in fact was living at a distance of about 290 kms. However, the cremation could not be delayed on account of waiting for the arrival of the father of the deceased. 10. The conviction of the appellant is under Sections 3048 and 498A IPC raising presumption regarding dowry death within seven years of marriage. To appreciate the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, a perusal of Section 304B and 498A IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act would be required. The same are extracted hereinbelow:- "304B. Dowry death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. For the purpose of this sub- section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, 9 being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman: or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 113B. 113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. -For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)" 11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came up for consideration in Baijnath's case (supra). The opinion was 10 summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below:- "25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are: (i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and (ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and (iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty" as: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or (ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 11 27. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression "cruelty", as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.” 12. It is clear upon comprehensive evaluation of record and from the statements of the brother, mother of the deceased Anjali that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized prosperously and at the time of marriage, there was no demand of any dowry by the accused persons and learned trial Court minutely appreciated this fact that the family members of the deceased have not lodged any report regarding dowry and no social meeting was convened for the same prior to the incident 13. The learned trial Court after minutely appreciating the oral and documentary evidence finds that prosecution has only proved this fact that the deceased Anjali was died within 07 years of her marriage due to consumption of poison, but prosecution has failed to prove essential ingredients of murder and essential ingredients of dowry death. Learned trial Court has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Virdhi Chand Sharda vs. State of Maharashtra, passed in AIR 1984 SC 1622 and rightly acquitted the accused/respondents of Section 304-B in alternate Section 302/34 of IPC. 12 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all vidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or 13 perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 16. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE JUDGE AMIT PATEL