1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay C.R.A. (SB) 141 of 2023 (Assigned) Central Bureau of Investigation -Vs- Ratan Chandra Batabyal & Anr. For the Appellant : Mr. Amajit De For the Opposite Party No.1 : Mr. Masud Karim For the Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Sumitava Chakraborty Ms. Bratati Pramanick Judgment on : 16.09.2026 Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.12.2009 passed by the Learned Judge, Special (C.B.I.) Court No.1, Bichar Bhawan, Kolkata in Special (C.B.I.) Case No.02/2013 arising out of RC 09(A)/1986 dated 24.02.1986, acquitting the opposite parties from offences under Section 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and for offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and separately against the opposite party no.1 from the offence under Section 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and for offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and against the opposite party no.2 for the offence under Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 2 2. The appellant, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has filed this appeal upon grant of Special Leave by an order dated 04.08.2023 passed by this Court. 3. Sadhu Charan Pal was also charge-sheeted. However, during trial, he expired and the case against him was filed forever. 4. The genesis of the prosecution case was that the opposite party no.1 while being posted as the Inspector-in-Charge of Ghatal F.C.I., in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy with opposite party no.2, a M.R. Distributor of F.C.I., misappropriated (food grains) to the tune of Rs.13,70,952/-, stored excess food grains without any authorization in the godown of opposite party no.2 and also adjusted the stock dubiously. Subsequently, upon a physical verification of the stock, the shortage at the F.C.I. depot, Ghatal transpired where after RC 09(A)/1986 dated 24.02.1986 was registered for investigation. 5. The appellant further stated that during the course of the trial, prosecution in order to bring home the charges framed against the respondents examined 15 witnesses, while the defence examined none. Apart from the oral testimony of witnesses, prosecution also adduced documentary evidences. 6. The Learned Advocate appearing for the Central Bureau of Investigation submitted that the prosecution case arose from the alleged concerted activities of Opposite Party No.1, who was then posted as Inspector-in- Charge of the Ghatal Food Corporation of India establishment, and Opposite Party No.2, an M.R. Distributor of the Food Corporation of India. According to the prosecution, during the period between 1983 and 1985, 3 Opposite Party No.1, acting in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy with Opposite Party No.2, facilitated the misappropriation of F.C.I. foodgrains valued at Rs.13,70,952/-. Excess foodgrains were allegedly stored in the godown of Opposite Party No.2 without authority, following which the stock position of the said godown was adjusted by issuance of release orders in favour of the distributor. Physical verification thereafter disclosed shortage of foodgrains at the F.C.I. depot. 7. The discovery of such shortage resulted in registration of R.C. No.09(A)/1986 dated 24th February, 1986 by the Central Bureau of Investigation under Sections 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, together with offences under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 8. The Learned Advocate submitted that, upon completion of investigation, three charge-sheets were submitted by the C.B.I. Charges were thereafter framed against the accused under Sections 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. A separate charge under Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 was framed against Opposite Party No.2. 9. Considerable reliance was placed upon the sanction for prosecution. The prosecution case was that P.C. Sen had issued the sanction order on 30th April, 1987 under Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against Opposite Party No.1 in respect of acts committed during the discharge of his official duties. P.C. Sen subsequently expired. According to the C.B.I., the sanction nevertheless retained its legal efficacy, since the 4 sanctioning authority had considered the relevant materials collected during investigation before granting sanction. The Learned Advocate submitted that the sanction order constituted an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial determination and, consequently, the law did not require a detailed recital of reasons in the sanction order. The Learned Special Judge, according to the submission, had failed to appreciate the legal character and evidentiary significance of the sanction and had rejected the prosecution case on a technical consideration. 10. The Learned Advocate further submitted that the vigilance enquiry preceding the C.B.I. investigation was departmental in character. Information arising from such enquiry was supplied to the competent authorities, whereupon the C.B.I. commenced its own investigation, collected further materials and, upon completion thereof, submitted the challan before the competent Court. The prosecution relied upon the sequence of events to demonstrate that the investigation had proceeded through a continuous chain of official action, commencing with the vigilance enquiry and culminating in the filing of the charge-sheet upon collection of evidence by the C.B.I. 11. The Learned Advocate assailed the conclusion of the Learned Special Judge that Opposite Party No.1 was merely a receiver of foodgrains acting pursuant to the direction of the District Manager and had neither misappropriated nor dealt with any portion of the stock. Reliance was placed upon the evidence of PW-4, PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7, whose evidence, according to the prosecution, disclosed the active role of the opposite parties in the transactions forming the subject matter of the prosecution. 5 The submission was that the evidence of the said witnesses, read together, disclosed the participation of the opposite parties and ought not to have been discarded in a manner which severed individual pieces of evidence from the prosecution case as a whole. 12. Reliance was also placed upon the deposition of PW-9, who stated in his examination-in-chief that he had gone to the house of Opposite Party No.1 and had seized the articles concerned in the presence of an independent witness. The prosecution relied upon Exhibit-20 in support of the seizure and submitted that the Learned Special Judge had failed to attach due significance to the said exhibit while recording acquittal in favour of Opposite Party No.1. 13. The evidence of PW-12, an employee of the Food and Supply Department, was also relied upon. According to his examination-in-chief, Opposite Party No.1 was the receiver of the foodgrains and was in charge of the F.C.I. establishment. The witness further stated that Opposite Party No.1 had been suspended in connection with irregularities in the stock. The prosecution relied upon Exhibit-2/1, bearing the signature of Opposite Party No.1, as documentary material supporting the allegation concerning his role in the transaction. 14. PW-13, described as the Government Examiner, was also relied upon by the C.B.I. According to the submission, the witness stated in his examination-in-chief that the opposite parties had failed to discharge their duties in accordance with law. The Learned Advocate contended that the Learned Special Judge had discarded such evidence without assigning proper significance to the testimony of the witness. 6 15. The Learned Advocate further submitted that, in cases concerning cheating and breach of trust, deception need not necessarily be expressed in words and may emerge from conduct or from the nature of the transaction itself. In the present case, the alleged misappropriation of essential foodgrains, according to the prosecution, involved deliberate conduct directed towards personal gain and carried out with knowledge of its consequences. On such premise, the prosecution submitted that the acts alleged against the opposite parties satisfied the ingredients of the offences for which charges had been framed. 16. The prosecution also addressed the period between the transactions and registration of the criminal case. According to the C.B.I., the transactions extended from 1983 to 1985, while the case was registered in 1986 after the investigating agency had received relevant information. The Learned Advocate submitted that the lapse of time could not be attributed to any delay on the part of the prosecution and that the Learned Special Judge had failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter. 17. The answers furnished by the opposite parties in their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also relied upon. According to the prosecution, the answers were vague and principally amounted to denial of the allegations put to them. The C.B.I. submitted that such answers did not satisfactorily meet the prosecution evidence or the documentary exhibits placed before the Court. 18. The Learned Advocate submitted that the prosecution witnesses, when read with the documentary exhibits, the seizure evidence, the evidence relating to stock irregularities, the sanction order and the course of 7 investigation, furnished a coherent evidentiary chain concerning the participation of the opposite parties. The prosecution accordingly contended that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Judge, Special C.B.I. Court No.1, Bichar Bhawan, Kolkata, warranted interference by the High Court and that the opposite parties ought to have been convicted for the offences under Sections 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, in accordance with the respective charges framed against them. 19. The Learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 submitted that the order of acquittal called for no interference, since the prosecution had failed to establish, by cogent evidence, either the alleged shortage of food grains valued at Rs.13 lakh or any act of respondent No.1 which could attract the penal consequence contemplated by Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 20. It was submitted that the prosecution had produced certain documents showing receipt of food grains by respondent No.1, namely, Ratan Chandra Batyabal, yet neither the oral evidence nor the documents established any subsequent unlawful distribution, diversion or misuse of the essential commodities. No witness had spoken to any act of respondent No.1 whereby the food grains received by him had been distributed to persons lacking authority to receive them. The prosecution had likewise produced no evidence to demonstrate that respondent No.1 had participated in any such activity. 8 21. The Learned Advocate further submitted that Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act cast upon the prosecution the obligation of establishing a contravention of the regulatory regime governing the supply and distribution of essential commodities and of connecting respondent No.1 with the particular act constituting such contravention. Evidence capable of satisfying either limb of that requirement was absent. No material had been placed before the Trial Court to establish that respondent No.1 had contravened Section 3 of the Act in a manner attracting punishment under Section 7(1)(a)(ii). 22. The principal allegation concerning shortage of goods valued at Rs.13 lakh was also assailed. The Learned Advocate submitted that the prosecution had neither furnished an account showing how the alleged shortage arose nor demonstrated the manner in which the shortage had been detected, quantified or attributed to respondent No.1. No prosecution witness had supplied a reliable account of the alleged loss, while no documentary material had established the particulars of the shortage or connected it with respondent No.1. The vigilance report, upon which considerable reliance had been placed, was itself vague and inconclusive. The inspection report supplied no meaningful particulars capable of establishing the alleged shortage or the asserted loss of goods of the value of Rs.13 lakh. 23. A further circumstance pressed into service was the evidence of PW-14, the second Investigating Officer. The Learned Advocate pointed out that PW-14 had not even visited the godown of respondent No.2 during the investigation. Such investigation, it was submitted, yielded no evidentiary 9 link between the alleged shortage and the participation of respondent No.1. The prosecution consequently failed to demonstrate how the alleged loss of goods could be attributed to respondent No.1. 24. The delay in lodging the First Information Report was also urged as a circumstance affecting the prosecution case. The alleged incident dated back to 1983, whereas the FIR was lodged only in 1986, after an interval of three years. The Learned Advocate fairly submitted that delay in lodging an FIR, by itself, does not destroy a prosecution case; the unexplained three-year interval in the case at hand, however, acquired significance in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. PW-1 and PW-12, upon whom reliance had been placed, had not furnished any concrete account of the alleged defalcation or loss or of the involvement of the concerned respondent in relation thereto. 25. The Learned Advocate thereafter addressed the scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal. Reliance was placed upon M.S. Narayan Menon Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39, particularly paragraph 54, for the proposition that even where the High Court exercises appellate or revisional jurisdiction against an acquittal, the settled restraint governing interference with an acquittal remains relevant and a finding of acquittal should not be displaced where two reasonable conclusions arise from the evidence. 26. Reliance was also placed upon Arulvelu & Anr. v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor & Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206, for the principles governing a finding of perversity and appellate scrutiny of an acquittal. The Learned Advocate submitted that a finding could be regarded as perverse where it 10 had no evidentiary support, ran contrary to law, ignored relevant evidence, relied upon inadmissible material, or was so contrary to the evidence as to suffer from irrationality. The same principle, it was submitted, had been reiterated in Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665, and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636. 27. The decision in Guru Dutta Pathak v. State of U.P., (2021) 6 SCC 116 was relied upon to submit that, in an appeal against acquittal, the primary question is whether the High Court is justified in disturbing the order recorded by the Trial Court. The Learned Advocate further relied upon Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal merely because another appreciation of the evidence appears possible. The entire evidence has to be examined before the finding of the Trial Court can be displaced, particularly where the prosecution seeks to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for a conclusion reasonably available to the Trial Court. 28. Reference was also made to Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535, Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2), and the principles reiterated in subsequent decisions. The Learned Advocate emphasised the significance of the Trial Judge's opportunity to observe the witnesses, the presumption of innocence, the further reinforcement of that presumption following acquittal, the right of the accused to the benefit of reasonable 11 doubt and the need for restraint in disturbing a factual conclusion reached by the Court which had seen the witnesses. 29. Reliance was placed upon Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, particularly paragraph 42, to submit that although an appellate court possesses full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which an acquittal rests, expressions such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances” and “distorted conclusions” do not curtail the appellate jurisdiction. At the same time, the existence of two reasonably possible conclusions attracts the settled principle of restraint, since an acquitted accused carries a reinforced presumption of innocence. 30. The same submission was supported by reference to Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, where due weight was directed to be accorded to the decision of the Trial Court, particularly because the Trial Court had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 was cited for the proposition that an order of acquittal ought not to be disturbed merely because some evidence may point towards the accused. 31. The Learned Advocate further relied upon State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271, where circumstances warranting interference with an acquittal were delineated, including an erroneous approach to settled law, conclusions contrary to the evidence and documents, a patently illegal approach to the evidence resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, and findings manifestly unjust or unreasonable on the facts and law appearing 12 from the record. Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 was also cited in support. 32. The judgment in Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 was relied upon for the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the distinction between legitimate appellate reappraisal and interference merely because another conclusion may be drawn. The Learned Advocate submitted that where the Trial Court's conclusion is a possible conclusion on the evidence and has not been shown to be perverse, irrational, or devoid of evidentiary basis, a different appreciation by the appellate court does not by itself justify reversal. 33. Reference was thereafter made to Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461, State of U.P. v. Awdesh, (2008) 16 SCC 461, and Rathinam alias Rathinam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2011) 11 SCC 140, in support of the same governing principles. Jawaharlal v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 was also relied upon for the proposition that an appellate court hearing an appeal against acquittal should not disturb the Trial Court's conclusion in the absence of substantial and compelling reasons, particularly where the Trial Court's appreciation of the evidence represents a possible conclusion. 34. The Learned Advocate submitted that the circumstances recognised by the Supreme Court as warranting appellate interference were conspicuously absent in the case at hand. The Trial Court had neither ignored material evidence nor proceeded upon an erroneous legal premise. No material document had been disregarded in a manner capable of altering the evidentiary position. The prosecution had failed to establish the alleged 13 shortage, had failed to account for its origin or quantification, and had failed to connect respondent No.1 with any diversion, defalcation or prohibited distribution of the food grains. 35. The absence of proof concerning the incident and the role attributed to the accused was further emphasised. The Learned Advocate submitted that, where the prosecution could not establish the occurrence complained of or the participation of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the question of motive carried no decisive significance. The evidentiary deficiency went to the substance of the charge under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. 36. Finally, The Learned Advocate submitted that respondent No.1 was then about 86 years of age. In the circumstances, and having regard to the complete absence of material warranting appellate interference with the acquittal, it was prayed that the order of acquittal recorded by the Learned Trial Court be maintained and the appeal be dismissed, with costs. 37. The Learned Advocate appearing for respondent no. 2, Diptendu Nath, resisted the criminal appeal preferred by the Central Bureau of Investigation against the judgment and order dated 28th November, 2017, whereby respondent no. 1, Ratan Chandra Batyabal, stood acquitted of the charges under Sections 120B/409 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, while respondent no. 2 stood acquitted of the charge under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 14 38. The prosecution case, as placed before the Court, arose from a written complaint of the District Manager, Food Corporation of India, Midnapore District, alleging that during the tenure of respondent no. 1 as Inspector, FCI, Ghatal, from 1983 to 1985, he had entered into a criminal conspiracy with respondent no. 2 and Sri Sadhu Charan Pal, an M.R. dealer, and had thereby facilitated pecuniary gain of Rs.13,70,952/- by misuse of FCI stocks. Ghatal FCI depot had a storage capacity of only 500 metric tonnes, whereas substantial quantities of foodgrains moved through the depot, particularly during June and July, 1983. A proposal for hiring a private godown was rejected on security considerations, following which, according to the prosecution, respondent no. 1 stored surplus stocks in private godowns belonging to Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath. The prosecution further alleged that respondent no. 1 manipulated stock balances by issuing release orders, including a release order for 50 quintals of sugar in favour of Sri Ajit Chowdhury, an M.R. distributor of Khirpai; that he personally received foodgrains, signed invoices and made ledger entries in his own handwriting showing receipt of stocks; and that declarations dated 30th September, 1985, purportedly issued by respondent no. 2 and Sadhu Charan Pal acknowledging custody of FCI stocks were subsequently recovered from the residence of respondent no. 1. 39. The Learned Advocate drew attention to the physical verification conducted by Sri S.K. Das, the then District Manager, FCI, which resulted in sealing of the Ghatal FCI godown on 29th October, 1985 and a request for deputation of a special verification squad. On 19th November, 1985, 15 Sri A.K. Mitra, Assistant Manager (Vigilance), FCI, accompanied by other officials, opened the godown and conducted a further physical verification in the presence of respondent no. 1. The verification disclosed shortage of foodgrain stocks at the Ghatal depot. A criminal case, Crime No. 9 of 1986, was registered on 24th February, 1986, initially by R.K. Sarkar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI/SPE Division, Calcutta, who endorsed himself as Investigating Officer; subsequently R.N.P. Sinha, PW- 14, was deputed to investigate. Following investigation, the agency submitted charge-sheet under Sections 120B/409 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 5(1)(c)/5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. So far as respondent no. 2 was concerned, charge was framed only under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act for alleged contravention of paragraph 9(2) of the West Bengal (Rice and Paddy Licensing and Control) Order, 1967 and paragraph 4(2) of the West Bengal Wheat and Wheat Products (West Bengal Licensing Control and Prohibition of Certain Classes of Commercial Transactions) Order, 1973. Respondent no. 2 pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 40. The Learned Advocate submitted that the evidence of PW-1 to PW-12, taken as a whole, did not connect respondent no. 2 with the alleged shortage, diversion or misappropriation of foodgrains. 41. PW-1, Asim Kumar Mitra, the initial investigating officer of FCI who examined the alleged discrepancies at Ghatal, made no allegation against respondent no. 2 in cross-examination and had given no statement against him before the investigating agency. 16 42. PW-2, Arbinda Barua, conducted a search at the residence of respondent no. 2, yet failed to establish any connection between the documents recovered and the alleged offence. Mere possession of documents, without proof of their nexus with the alleged occurrence, could not advance the prosecution case against respondent no. 2. 43. PW-3, Purnashib Mukhopadhyay, conducted a search at the shop and godown of M.R. distributor Sadhu Charan Pal and made no reference to respondent no. 2. 44. PW-4, Ashok Kumar Gupta, deposed regarding dispatch of 1,245 bags of wheat, weighing 116 quintals 52 kilograms, to Ghatal Godown on 13th March, 1985. During cross-examination, he confirmed his acquaintance with Sadhu Charan Pal but expressly stated that he did not know respondent no. 2. 45. PW-5, Prafulla Chandra Paul, who was posted as AG-I at FCI Food Depot, Midnapur, gave no evidence against respondent no. 2. 46. PW-6, Jatish Chandra Chakraborty, admitted during cross-examination that he did not personally know respondent no. 2 and could not confirm whether foodgrains had ever been dispatched to him. 47. PW-7, Subodh Karmakar, posted as Inspector at Midnapore FCI Godown and responsible for receiving and maintaining stock registers under the directions of the District Manager, made no allegation regarding misappropriation and stated during cross-examination that he had no knowledge of the subject matter of the criminal case. 17 48. PW-8, Kunja Behari Dhar, posted as Sub-Inspector at Midnapore FCI Godown and responsible for loading and unloading trucks, gave no evidence against respondent no. 2 and admitted having no knowledge of the alleged incident. 49. PW-9, Debiprosad Dey, conducted a search at the residential premises of respondent no. 2 but failed to establish any connection between respondent no. 2 and the alleged misappropriation of foodgrains. 50. PW-10, Swapan Kumar Sengupta, posted as a messenger under respondent no. 1, stated that a release order had been issued in favour of respondent no. 2. His evidence, however, contained no assertion that the food stock had actually been stored at the godown of respondent no. 2. 51. PW-11, Shanti Kumar Kundu, a peon responsible for counting sacks of foodgrains sent to the godown for storage, categorically stated that no space was available in the godown for storing the foodgrains. His cross- examination yielded no allegation against respondent no. 2. 52. PW-12, Biswanath Das, despite extensive examination by the prosecution, stated that he was unaware whether Diptendu Nath had received the articles in terms of the delivery order produced. His evidence consequently supplied no knowledge regarding either the alleged supply or the participation of respondent no. 2. 53. According to the Learned Advocate, none of the independent prosecution witnesses furnished direct or corroborative evidence implicating respondent no. 2. The witnesses concerned with the movement, receipt and storage of foodgrains at Ghatal either made no reference to respondent no. 2 or expressly disclaimed knowledge of his participation. 18 The evidence therefore did not establish any role played by him in the alleged shortage or misappropriation. 54. The Learned Advocate further submitted that the charge against respondent no. 2 was confined to Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, founded upon the alleged contravention of paragraph 9(2) of the West Bengal (Rice and Paddy Licensing and Control) Order, 1967 and paragraph 4(2) of the West Bengal Wheat and Wheat Products Order, 1973. 55. Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act empowers the Central Government to regulate or prohibit production, supply and distribution of essential commodities for securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. Penal consequences under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) arise upon proof of contravention of an order made in exercise of such statutory power. The prosecution, according to the submission, produced no evidence demonstrating any act of respondent no. 2 amounting to unlawful distribution, diversion or supply of rice, wheat or any other essential commodity in breach of such regulatory order. 56. The documents exhibited during trial regarding receipt of foodgrains by respondent no. 1 did not establish that the goods had been unlawfully distributed by respondent no. 2. No witness spoke to any act of diversion, misuse or unauthorised distribution attributable to him. No evidence established that the conduct of respondent no. 2 contravened Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act or any order issued pursuant thereto. 57. A further submission concerned the alleged shortage of goods valued at approximately Rs.13 lakh. The Learned Advocate contended that the 19 prosecution produced no satisfactory account showing how the alleged shortage arose, how it was calculated, what quantity was actually missing, or how the alleged loss could be connected with respondent no. 2. 58. The vigilance report relied upon by the prosecution lacked the necessary detail and specificity to establish the alleged shortage. The inspection material did not provide a reliable computation of the loss or disclose the precise manner in which the figure of approximately Rs.13 lakh was arrived at. No prosecution witness furnished a clear account of the alleged defalcation, and no documentary material established a nexus between the alleged shortage and respondent no. 2. 59. PW-14, the second Investigating Officer, did not visit the godown of respondent no. 2 during investigation. Consequently, the investigation itself did not produce any physical or documentary correlation between the alleged shortage and the premises or activities of respondent no. 2. 60. The Learned Advocate also placed considerable emphasis upon the delay in setting the criminal law in motion. The alleged occurrence related to 1983, whereas the FIR was lodged only in 1986, approximately three years later. Though delay by itself does not destroy a prosecution case, the prosecution had furnished no satisfactory explanation for such prolonged delay. The delay assumed significance in the present case because the prosecution evidence itself failed to provide a concrete account of the alleged loss or to connect respondent no. 2 with the alleged occurrence. 61. PW-1 and PW-12, upon whom the prosecution relied, could not furnish a concrete account of the alleged defalcation or loss and could not establish the involvement of respondent no. 2. 20 62. The Learned Advocate relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the limited circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an acquittal. 63. Reliance was first placed upon M.S. Narayan Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39, particularly paragraph 54, for the proposition that while an appellate court possesses jurisdiction to examine an appeal against acquittal, interference is governed by the settled principle that where two views are reasonably possible, the view adopted by the trial court leading to acquittal ought not to be displaced merely because another view could also be taken. 64. Reliance was next placed upon Arulvelu & Anr. v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor & Anr., reported in (2009) 10 SCC 206, particularly paragraphs 24, 36 and 40. The Learned Advocate relied upon the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between a finding capable of being regarded as perverse and a finding which represents a possible appreciation of the evidence. The appellate court may reassess the evidence, but interference with an acquittal calls for substantial and compelling reasons. A different appreciation of the evidence, merely because another conclusion appears possible, does not by itself warrant reversal of the trial court's decision. The presumption of innocence receives added strength after acquittal. 65. Reliance was also placed upon Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 461, paragraph 9, where the Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court hearing an appeal against acquittal may reassess the evidence and arrive at an independent conclusion, yet ought not to 21 exercise that power as a matter of routine. Where two views arise from the same evidence and the trial court has adopted one view, interference requires a conclusion that such view is perverse, incapable of being reached by a reasonable person, or unsupported by the material on record. 66. The Learned Advocate further relied upon State of Uttar Pradesh v. Awdhesh, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 461, paragraph 12, where the Supreme Court declined interference with an acquittal even though certain reasoning of the trial court was not legally supportable, since the ultimate conclusion remained a possible one. 67. Reliance was then placed upon Rathinam Alias Rathinam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., reported in (2011) 11 SCC 140, paragraph 30, for the proposition that interference in an appeal against acquittal must remain sparing where the finding is alleged to be perverse, and where two views are possible, the view resulting in acquittal ought to remain undisturbed. The additional presumption arising from an acquittal was also relied upon. 68. The Learned Advocate cited Jayaswamy v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 219, paragraph 13, reiterating the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an acquittal, namely where substantial and compelling reasons exist, where the trial court's conclusion is palpably erroneous, where the decision rests upon an erroneous legal approach, where grave miscarriage of justice is likely to result, where the treatment of evidence is patently illegal, or where material evidence or documents have been ignored or misread. In the 22 absence of such circumstances, a possible conclusion resulting in acquittal calls for restraint. 69. Finally, reliance was placed upon Banareddy and Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2018) 5 SCC 790, particularly paragraphs 10, 25 and 26. The Supreme Court reiterated the duty of an appellate court to accord due regard to a well-reasoned acquittal following proper appreciation of evidence. Where two conclusions are reasonably possible from the evidence, one favourable to the accused and another adverse to him, the existence of such alternatives itself indicates that guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The Learned Advocate relied upon the further proposition that, where the facts concerning the incident and the role of the accused remain incapable of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the motive behind the alleged occurrence becomes immaterial. The decision also emphasised that an appellate court ought not to reassess the evidence merely because it could arrive at another conclusion where the trial court's findings disclose no grave infirmity. 70. On the cumulative effect of the evidence, the Learned Advocate submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge against respondent no. 2 under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. No witness connected him with the alleged shortage; no witness established any unlawful distribution or diversion by him; no reliable documentary account quantified the alleged loss or linked it to his conduct; the investigation did not examine his godown in relation to the alleged shortage; and the prosecution had failed to explain the three-year delay in lodging the FIR. 23 71. The Learned Advocate accordingly submitted that the judgment of acquittal dated 28th November, 2017 called for no appellate interference. Respondent no. 2 was stated to be approximately 75 years of age, and the submission concluded with a prayer that the acquittal recorded by the Learned Trial Court be maintained and the CBI's appeal be dismissed. 72. A circumspection of evidence of the prosecution witnesses revealed as follows:- i. PW-1, Asim Kumar Mitra, deposed that in 1986 he was posted as Assistant Manager (Vigilance) at the Regional Office of the Food Corporation of India, Calcutta. The then District Manager, FCI, Midnapur, addressed a letter dated 1st November, 1985 to the Senior Regional Manager reporting suspected serious discrepancies at the Ghatal FCI Godown. The Senior Regional Manager thereafter entrusted PW-1 with an investigation into the matter. The letter, marked Exhibit- 1, was handed over to him and he consulted the relevant records in the course of his inquiry. ii. PW-1 stated that he visited the Ghatal FCI Godown for investigation, accompanied, perhaps, by three Inspectors, although after the lapse of time he could not recall the exact composition of the team or the precise date of his visit. His inspection covered the period from 19th November, 1985 to 12th December, 1985. A consolidated physical verification report bearing his signature, as well as the signatures of the other Inspectors and accused R.C. Battabyal, was prepared and marked Exhibit-2. PW-1 stated that the investigation required weighing each bag of foodgrain and that a substantial shortage was 24 detected, which he assessed during his evidence at approximately Rs.25 to Rs.30 lakhs. The inspection report prepared under his dictation and bearing his signature was marked Exhibit-3. iii. After completion of the investigation, PW-1 collected statements of FCI officials, marked Exhibit-4 series, and consulted stock registers, declarations of the person in charge of the godown and other connected records. His report mentioned the total alleged misappropriation at approximately Rs.13/14 lakhs. During each day's investigation, the seal of the godown was opened and thereafter resealed in the presence of the charge officer. PW-1 stated that R.C. Battabyal was the charge officer at the relevant time. PW-1 further explained that the seal register had initially been maintained by the District Manager and that day-to-day entries were thereafter made by members of the investigating team and the officer in charge of the godown. He identified the signatures appearing in the register, including his own and that of R.C. Battabyal. The relevant signatures were marked Exhibit-5 collectively. iv. A significant part of PW-1's cross-examination concerned the scope and limitations of his investigation. He stated that the capacity of the Ghatal Godown was 500 metric tonnes, although he could not explain the manner in which quantities exceeding that capacity could have been stored there. He further stated that, when 9 full bags of rice and 6 full bags of wheat were detected short, no verification had been conducted as to the cause of such shortage. At the time of his investigation S.C. Das was the District Manager and N.C. Saha had 25 already been transferred. PW-1 had made no adverse assertion against N.C. Saha in his report. PW-1 also stated that, owing to the passage of approximately thirty years, he could no longer recall every detail of his investigation. His report was a preliminary investigation report, and no final investigation report had been submitted by him. He stated that the seal had been broken in the presence of other officials and an Executive Magistrate and that no report of any Zonal Investigation Team or District Investigation Team had come before him. He had proceeded on the complaint of the District Manager, FCI, Midnapur. v. After breaking the seal of the godown, PW-1 collected the relevant documents and registers available there. His report recorded that such a large-scale misappropriation could not have occurred without the involvement of the District Manager and other district-level managers. He further stated that during his investigation he never proceeded on the premise that R.C. Battabyal alone was responsible for the incident. vi. PW-2 deposed that on 18th March, 1986 he was attached to the CBI as an Inspector. On that date, acting upon the direction endorsed by the DSP, CBI, he proceeded to conduct a search and seizure at the residence of Diptendu Nath at Midnapur pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Midnapur-Ghatal Court. vii. The search was conducted on 19th March, 1986, in the presence of independent witnesses and Diptendu Nath himself. PW-2 prepared two seizure lists in his own handwriting and affixed his signatures thereon. The search and seizure lists were marked Exhibit-6 collectively, while the acknowledgement of Diptendu Nath appearing on the seizure list 26 was marked Exhibit-6/1 collectively. Copies of the seizure lists were supplied to Diptendu Nath. The documents seized included certain release orders, which were marked Exhibit-7 collectively. viii. PW-2's cross-examination is of particular significance concerning the evidentiary connection of Diptendu Nath with the alleged shortage. He stated that he did not know Diptendu Nath personally and had no knowledge whether Diptendu Nath was present at the relevant place during the investigation. He had made no statement before the CBI officers specifically implicating Diptendu Nath. His report contained no suggestion that N.C. Saha was one of the persons responsible for the alleged occurrence. ix. PW-2 further stated that the capacity of the godown was 500 metric tonnes, but he could not explain the manner in which quantities exceeding that capacity could have been accommodated. Apart from the preliminary investigation report, he had submitted no further report. He also stated that, when the shortage of 9 bags of rice and 6 bags of wheat was detected, no verification was carried out regarding its cause. x. At the time of the investigation, S.C. Das was District Manager and N.C. Saha had been transferred. PW-2 had made no allegation against N.C. Saha in his report. He also accepted that, after a lapse of approximately thirty years, he was unable to recollect every detail of the investigation. xi. PW-2 stated that the seal of the godown was broken in the presence of other officials and the Executive Magistrate. No report of a Zonal 27 Investigation Team or District Investigation Team had reached him. His investigation proceeded on the complaint lodged by the District Manager, FCI, Midnapur. After breaking the seal, he collected the relevant records and registers. He stated in his report that, without the involvement of the District Manager and other district-level managers, such a large quantity of alleged misappropriation could not have occurred. He did not proceed during investigation on the premise that R.C. Battabyal was the sole offender. xii. PW-3 deposed that in 1986 he was posted on deputation from the West Bengal Police as Inspector of Police, CBI/ACB, Calcutta. On 18th March, 1986, he proceeded to Ghatal for execution of a search warrant at the shop-cum-godown of M.R. Distributor Sadhu Charan Pal. xiii. PW-3 conducted the search in the presence of independent witnesses and other CBI officers. Sadhu Charan Pal was absent when the search party arrived. His son, Sanjit Pal, was present and identified himself as Sadhu Charan Pal's son. PW-3 showed him the search warrant, explained the purpose of the search and proceeded with the search in his presence. xiv. During the search, PW-3 seized 23 documents relating to the case and thereafter produced them before the Investigating Officer for production before the Court. Most of the seized documents concerned stock registers relating to wheat and sugar, release orders concerning wheat and sugar belonging to FCI and other connected records. The search and seizure list was prepared in PW-3's handwriting in the presence of independent witnesses and contained his signature as well 28 as the signatures of the independent witnesses. The seizure list was marked Exhibit-8. A copy was supplied to Sanjit Pal, who also affixed his signature; the relevant acknowledgement was marked Exhibit-8/1. xv. The search warrant had been issued by the Learned SDJM, Ghatal Court, on 18th March, 1986, and had been endorsed to PW-3 for execution. After execution, PW-3 submitted his report on the reverse of the warrant, which was marked Exhibit-9. He also seized eight stock registers and two issue registers, marked Exhibit-11 collectively and Exhibit-12 collectively, respectively. xvi. During cross-examination, PW-3 stated that no warrant of arrest had been endorsed to him in connection with the case. His assignment related only to execution of the search warrant concerning the shop- cum-godown of Sadhu Charan Pal. Sadhu Charan Pal was absent at the time of search and seizure. Sanjit Pal identified himself as his son, and PW-3 conducted the search in his presence. xvii. PW-3 admitted that he had not recorded the age of Sanjit Pal and did not know whether Sadhu Charan Pal was alive or had expired. He further stated that his assignment was confined to execution of the search warrant against Sadhu Charan Pal and that he had made no allegation against any other person in connection with the case. xviii. PW-4 was an employee of the Food Corporation of India who retired from service in 2005. In 1985, he was posted at the Midnapur Food Storage Depot as AG-III, L.D. Clerk. He had joined the depot approximately in 1981 and remained there for about five to six years. 29 xix. As AG-III, PW-4 was entrusted with receiving foodgrains from railway wagons, receiving foodgrains at the depot, preparing official returns and attending to dispatch. Movement orders were issued by the District FCI Office, and the depot received such movement orders for onward dispatch to other depots. PW-4 was attached to the Depot Manager's office and Store/Godown No. 1. xx. PW-4 prepared Invoice No. 23652 dated 13th March, 1985 concerning the dispatch of 125 bags of wheat weighing 116 quintals 52 kilograms to the Ghatal FCI Godown through internal movement. He affixed his signature to the invoice. The foodgrains were received at the Ghatal Godown on the same date by Ratan Chandra Battabyal, who was then the Depot-in-Charge and whose receiving signature appeared upon the document. The invoice was marked Exhibit-13, while the receiving signature of Ratan Chandra Battabyal was marked Exhibit-13/1. xxi. PW-4 further identified the signatures of Ratan Chandra Battabyal appearing upon various invoices dated on different occasions. Such signatures were marked Exhibit-14 collectively. He stated that he had worked with Ratan Chandra Battabyal. xxii. The cross-examination of PW-4 substantially confined his knowledge to the documentary movement of foodgrains. He stated that, having seen the relevant documents after a considerable lapse of time, he was not in a position to recollect every circumstance connected with the incident. He knew Sadhu Charan Pal, who was an M.R. dealer and also a transport contractor, but stated that he did not know Diptendu Nath. 30 xxiii. PW-4 clarified that he was attached to the Midnapur FCI office as AG- III and had no connection with the Ghatal Depot Office or the FCI office there. His role related to dispatch of foodgrains to Ghatal. He was neither the Depot Manager nor the FCI Manager. At the relevant time, movement slips were prepared by the FCI District Headquarters, while PW-4, as the dealing clerk, prepared the invoice and signed it in that capacity. His signature did not signify that he was Depot-in- Charge or Depot Manager. xxiv. PW-4 further stated that he had no knowledge of any gandogol concerning the foodgrains sent to the Ghatal Godown at the relevant time and did not know Diptendu Nath. Consequently, his evidence regarding Diptendu Nath contained no allegation or attribution of any role to him. xxv. PW-5 deposed that in 1984 he was posted as AG-I at the FCI Food Depot, Midnapur. His duties included dispatch of foodgrains to different depots through invoices. He identified 15 invoices, each bearing his signature, which were marked Exhibit-15 collectively. The documents related to dispatch of foodgrains to the Ghatal FCI Food Depot and recorded receipt of the foodgrains at Ghatal by Mr. Battabyal. PW-5 further identified invoices issued by Chittaranjan Guha, AG-I, Midnapur Food Depot, with whom he had worked and whose signature he could identify. The signatures of Mr. Guha appearing upon the invoices were marked Exhibit-16 collectively. Such invoices also related to dispatch of foodgrains to the Ghatal FCI Food Depot and recorded receipt of the foodgrains there. 31 xxvi. PW-5 similarly identified invoices issued by Dharani Dhar Mondal of the Midnapur Food Depot. Having worked with him, PW-5 could identify his signature. The signatures of Dharani Dhar Mondal were marked Exhibit-17 collectively. The invoices related to dispatch of foodgrains to Ghatal and recorded receipt at the Ghatal Food Depot. PW-5 also identified invoices issued by Madan Deb Gupta of the Midnapur Food Depot, with whom he had worked and whose signature he could identify. Such signatures were marked Exhibit-18 collectively. The invoices likewise concerned dispatch of foodgrains to the Ghatal FCI Food Depot and recorded receipt there. The deposition of PW-5, therefore, principally establishes the documentary trail of dispatch of foodgrains from the Midnapur Food Depot to Ghatal and the corresponding receipts recorded at the Ghatal Depot. xxvii. PW-6 stated that he had retired from service as an Inspector of the Food Corporation of India, Paschim Midnapore. He had been posted at the Chandrakona Road FCI establishment, which, during 1983-84, comprised three godowns. Tapan Bapuli, Sukumar Hazra and Prabhat Chatterjee were the Inspectors in charge of the three godowns respectively. Their duties included receipt of foodgrains, dispatch of foodgrains to other godowns and dispatch of foodgrains to M.R. distributors. At the time of movement of foodgrains, invoices and challans were prepared. xxviii. PW-6 identified the signatures appearing upon the invoices. He stated that the invoices bearing the signatures of Sukumar Hazra were marked as Exbt.-14/1 collectively, while the signatures and 32 handwriting of Prabhat Chatterjee, with whose handwriting and signatures he was acquainted, were marked as Exbt.-14/2 collectively. The invoices bearing the signatures of Tapan Bapuli, whose handwriting and signatures he knew, were marked as Exbt.-14/3 collectively. He further identified the signatures of Ratan Chandra Batbyal, the person in charge of the Ghatal FCI godown, upon the invoices, which were marked as Exbt.-14/4 collectively. According to him, foodgrains dispatched from Chandrakona Road were received at Ghatal and thereafter dealt with through the Ghatal godown. xxix. In cross-examination, PW-6 stated that he had entered the service of FCI on 13 December 1965 and had retired in 2001. He could not say whether persons knew him as Jagadish Chakraborty and clarified that his real name was Jatish Chakraborty, son of Basanta Chakraborty, and not Jagadish Chakraborty. He stated that, at the time of his posting at Chandrakona, there was no Depot Manager and that he functioned as Depot-in-Charge. He further stated that there was no Depot Manager or Assistant Manager at the Ghatal godown. xxx. PW-6 stated that he did not know Dipak Hazra, Sunil Pramanik, Shanti Bhattacharjee, Monoranjan Das or Radha Nath Mondal and did not know their signatures. He had never been posted at the same place with Ratan Chandra Batbyal. He had no relationship of kinship with him and knew him because both had been employees of the same establishment under the same District Manager and had occasion to meet in the course of official business. He had passed B.Com from 33 Dhaka University and had never studied Arts or Modern History. He had received no training as a fingerprint or handwriting expert. xxxi. PW-6 further stated that he had not personally handled goods from any consignment; according to him, the Depot-in-Charge at Chandrakona Road had consigned foodgrains through contractors whose signatures were authenticated by the District Manager. He could not identify the signatures appearing on the reverse portions of the invoices collectively marked Exbt.-14, including the signature of Sukumar Hazra. He stated that he had no connection with the discharge of goods at the FCI godown and that the three Inspectors in charge had consigned the foodgrains to Ghatal FCI godown. xxxii. In cross-examination on behalf of accused Diptendu Nath, PW-6 stated that he did not know Diptendu Nath personally and that the Depot-in- Charge alone could state whether foodgrains had been dispatched to Diptendu Nath. xxxiii. PW-7 stated that he had served as an Inspector at the Midnapore FCI godown from 1983 to 1985. His duties included receipt of foodgrains, maintenance of the stock register and dispatch of the foodgrains to different godowns under the direction of the District Manager, FCI. xxxiv. PW-7 identified the invoices through which foodgrains had been dispatched from the Midnapore godown to the Ghatal FCI godown. He stated that such invoices bore his signatures and that, through the transport contractor S.C. Mondal, the consignments were sent to Ghatal. Ratan Batbyal, who was in charge of the Ghatal godown, received the consignments by affixing his signatures. The invoices, 34 numbering 59, were marked as Exbt.-14/14 collectively; the signatures of the witness were marked as Exbt.-14/2 collectively, and the signatures of Ratan Batbyal as Exbt.-14 collectively. xxxv. PW-7 further identified invoices bearing the signatures of Nishikanta Maity, with whom he had worked and whose handwriting and signatures he knew. Such invoices reflected dispatch of foodgrains to the Ghatal FCI godown. The invoices were marked as Exbt.-14/34 collectively, the witness's signatures as Exbt.-14/44 collectively, and the signatures of Ratan Batbyal as Exbt.-14 collectively. xxxvi. In cross-examination on behalf of Ratan Chandra Batbyal, PW-7 stated that he had worked at the Ghatal FCI godown. The deposition as recorded thereafter, however, contains his admission that he had never worked at Ghatal and therefore had no personal conception regarding the functioning of the Ghatal FCI godown. He had served at several godowns within the district of Midnapore except Ghatal and had retired from service long before the deposition. He could produce no document showing that he had worked at the Midnapore FCI godown as its in-charge. He could not state who the District Manager was at the relevant point of time and could not recollect the names of other officers posted at the District Office, FCI, Midnapore. xxxvii. In cross-examination concerning accused Diptendu Nath, PW-7 stated that he had no knowledge of the subject matter of the case, was not acquainted with the subject matter and did not know who were involved in it. 35 xxxviii. PW-8 stated that he was a retired employee of the Food Corporation of India and had served as a Sub-Inspector at the Midnapore FCI establishment. He had remained posted there throughout his service career from 1978 to 2002. His duties included loading and unloading of trucks and discharge of foodgrains to different godowns and dealers. xxxix. PW-8 stated that during 1983 to 1985 he had consigned several consignments of foodgrains from Midnapore to the Ghatal FCI godown, where Ratan Batbyal was the godown-in-charge. He stated that invoices were sent to Ghatal and that Ratan Batbyal received the foodgrains by affixing his signatures. xl. The invoice list comprised 37 invoices and the list had been prepared in PW-8's own handwriting; it was marked as Exbt.-19. The invoices through which foodgrains were sent to Ghatal bore his signatures. The second portion of the invoices contained the signatures of the contractors through whom the materials were sent, and Ratan Batbyal affixed his signature after receipt. The signatures of the witnesses were marked as Exbt.-14A collectively, while the signatures of Ratan Batbyal appearing on the invoices were marked as Exbt.-14 collectively. PW-8 further identified the signatures of several officers with whom he had worked. The signatures of Shakti Sinha were identified and marked as Exbt.-14/7 collectively; PW-8 stated that Shakti Sinha had expired. The signatures of Manik Goswami were identified and marked as Exbt.-14/7 collectively, and he also stated that Manik Goswami had expired. The signatures of Nityananda Bera were identified and marked as Exbt.-14/8 collectively, he having also 36 expired. The signatures of Nityananda Bandopadhya were identified and marked as Exbt.-14/9 collectively, he having also expired. xli. In cross-examination, PW-8 stated that he had been posted at FCI Sector-I Depot, Midnapore and had no knowledge of what occurred at the Ghatal FCI godown regarding the foodgrains. xlii. PW-9 stated that in 1986 he was serving as an Inspector attached to CBI/ACB, Kolkata, on deputation from the State Police Administration. On 18 March 1986, a search warrant issued by the SDJM, Ghatal was endorsed to him by the then DSP, CBI/ACB, Kolkata, for execution. Pursuant to the warrant, PW-9 conducted a search at the residential premises of R.C. Batabyal, in the presence of two independent witnesses and R.C. Batabyal. Five sets of documents were seized during the search. According to the deposition, the seized documents related to storage of articles at the FCI godown, purchase deeds and bank passbooks. A seizure list was prepared under his dictation and bore the signatures of PW-9, the independent witnesses and R.C. Batabyal. A copy of the seizure list was supplied to R.C. Batabyal. The seizure list, prepared on 19 March 1986, was marked as Exbt.-20. PW- 9 identified his signatures on both pages, marked as Exbt.-20/1 collectively, and the signature of R.C. Batabyal appearing thereon as Exbt.-20/2. The documents seized from the residence of R.C. Batabyal, reflected as Item No.1 in the seizure list, were marked as Exbt.-21 collectively, and PW-9 identified the signatures of the independent witnesses upon such documents together with the date. 37 xliii. After completion of the search, PW-9 submitted the execution report of the search to the SDJM, Ghatal on 27 March 1986. The forwarding letter bearing his signature was marked as Exbt.-22. The original search warrant, together with the endorsement authorising him to conduct the search at the residence of R.C. Batabyal and the list of documents attached thereto, was marked as Exbt.-23 collectively. xliv. In cross-examination, PW-9 stated that he had no personal knowledge as to whether any purchase of goods had taken place. He had seized documents concerning a transaction relating to wheat between Sadhu Charan Pal and FCI, but could not say whether R.C. Batabyal was connected with that transaction. At the relevant time R.C. Batabyal was an FCI Inspector. PW-9 could not say whether any other person was associated with R.C. Batabyal. At the time of seizure he had not verified such matters and could not state, apart from Sadhu Charan Pal and R.C. Batabyal, whether any other person was present. xlv. PW-10 stated that he had joined FCI, Ghatal in June 1972 as a messenger. During 1984-85, Ratan Chandra Batbyal was the Inspector of FCI, Ghatal. PW-10's duties included release of sacks containing foodgrains, counting the sacks and recording their particulars. He also issued release orders in accordance with the instructions of Inspector R.C. Batbyal. xlvi. PW-10 stated that R.C. Batbyal used to affix his signatures upon the relevant documents. A release order written by PW-10 pursuant to the instructions of R.C. Batbyal was marked as Exbt.-10 collectively, while the signatures of R.C. Batbyal appearing thereon were marked as 38 Exbt.-10/1 collectively. The release orders were issued in the name of Sadhu Charan Pal. PW-10 further identified another series of release orders written by him pursuant to the instructions of R.C. Batbyal, marked as Exbt.-7 collectively, with the signatures of R.C. Batbyal marked as Exbt.-7/1 collectively. Such release orders were issued in the name of Diptendu Nath. PW-10 stated that Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath were M.R. dealers. xlvii. The daily and weekly godown returns bearing the signatures of R.C. Batbyal were marked as Exbt.-24 collectively, and the signatures appearing on the reverse side of every page were marked as Exbt.-24/1 collectively. PW-10 identified the log book register maintained by the FCI godown, Ghatal from 1983, marked as Exbt.-25 entirely, and identified R.C. Batbyal's signatures on its first and last pages as Exbt.- 25/1 collectively. Another log book maintained at the Ghatal FCI godown for 1985-86, comprising pages 1 to 52, was marked as Exbt.- 26 entirely. PW-10 identified R.C. Batbyal's signatures on its first and last pages as Exbt.-26/1 collectively. The stock ledger relating to gunny bags maintained at the Ghatal FCI godown by Inspector R.C. Batbyal from 23 July 1985 to 25 October 1985 was marked as Exbt.- 27. PW-10 identified R.C. Batbyal's signatures on two pages, marked as Exbt.-27/1 collectively. xlviii. In cross-examination, PW-10 stated that, against the release orders, bank deposits were made by the concerned M.R. dealers. After verification by PW-10 and Ratan Babu, the release orders were issued. 39 PW-10 stated that he could not speak of any incident of misappropriation at the FCI godown, Ghatal. xlix. PW-11 stated that he had retired from the post of peon in the Food Department in January 2004. He had joined the Food Corporation of India, Ghatal in 1968 and continued there until retirement. In 1983, Ratan Batbyal was in charge of the Ghatal FCI godown. PW-11's duty was to count the sacks containing foodgrains when the consignments arrived at the godown. l. PW-11 stated that the Ghatal godown did not possess sufficient space to accommodate all articles received from Midnapore. On occasions foodgrains were therefore kept in the godowns of distributors Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath. He could not say under whose instruction or authority excess materials were kept at the premises of such distributors. li. In November 1983, employees of the godown submitted a written protest to Ratan Babu requesting that excess materials should not be kept in the distributors' godowns. An attested copy of the written protest was marked in evidence. PW-11 identified the signatures of S.I., FCI, Ghatal Sanatan Ghosh appearing on both pages, marked as Exbt.-28/1 collectively, and also identified the signature of Ashok Kr. Banerjee. The godown was thereafter officially sealed. lii. In cross-examination concerning accused Ratan Batbyal, PW-11 stated that he could not recollect the name of the Depot Manager of the Ghatal FCI godown at the relevant time. He could not recollect all 40 incidents which had occurred between 1982 and 1984 and stated that he had made a verbal protest concerning the alleged incident. liii. In cross-examination concerning accused Diptendu Nath, PW-11 stated that he could not name all the accused persons and could not narrate in detail the alleged involvement of Diptendu Nath. liv. PW-12 stated that he was a retired employee of the Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal. In the first part of 1982, he was attached to the Food and Supplies Department, Midnapore, under the control of the District Controller. In July 1982, he joined the FCI Ghatal Depot on deputation and remained there until 4 April 1987. PW-12 stated that Ratan Batbyal was in charge of the FCI Ghatal Depot and was responsible for the formalities connected with the godown. Nemai Roy was stated to have been the pay-in-charge of the FSD. After Nemai Roy was reverted to his parent department, Ratan Batbyal assumed the responsibility of pay-in-charge of FSD. PW-12 described the procedure by which M.R. dealers collected articles from the godown against bank drafts. Ratan Batbyal received the bank drafts and issued delivery orders against the purchase of articles. PW- 12 served as Sub-Inspector and assisted Ratan Batbyal in the performance of his duties. Sanatan Ghosh was another S.I.; Ashok Banerjee was AG-III; Swapan Sengupta, Sudhanshu Sekher and Shantimoy Kundu were office peons; and Basanta was the night guard. Sanatan Ghosh and Ashok Banerjee had subsequently expired. PW-12 stated that he could identify the signatures of Sanatan Ghosh and Ratan Batbyal. 41 lv. PW-12 identified signatures of Ratan Batbyal upon invoices-cum- receipts relating to receipt of articles from Midnapore, Kharagpur and other places, marked as Exbt.-29/1 collectively. He also identified signatures of Ratan Batbyal upon documents where he had signed as in-charge of the Ghatal FCI godown, marked as Exbt.-14 collectively, as well as other signatures marked as Exbt.-13/1 collectively. Signatures appearing upon consignment receipts, where Ratan Batbyal had signed as in-charge of the Ghatal FCI godown, were marked as Exbt.-16/1 collectively and Exbt.-17/1 collectively. PW-12 identified copies of weekly returns concerning receipt and delivery of articles, marked as Exbt.-24 collectively. He stated that Ratan Batbyal prepared such weekly returns and sent them to the District Manager, FCI, Midnapore, and that Ratan Batbyal signed as in-charge on the reverse side of each page. Such signatures were marked as Exbt.-24/1 collectively. lvi. PW-12 further recounted of a log book in which entries concerning vehicles carrying commodities were made by him, Sanatan Ghosh or Ratan Batbyal on the basis of invoice-cum-receipts. The log book commenced on 1 April 1984 and its last entry was made on 31 March 1985. The front page contained certification by Ratan Batbyal as in- charge of the godown. The log book was marked as Exbt.-30. PW-12 stated that certain handwritten pages were found with the log book and contained writings of Ratan Batbyal, Sanatan Ghosh and PW-12. Another log book, marked Exbt.-25, had commenced on 1 April 1983 and its last entry was dated 31 March 1984. A further log book, 42 marked Exbt.-26, commenced on 1 April 1985 and its last entry was dated 17 October 1985. lvii. PW-12 identified the attendance register covering the period from 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1986. Ratan Batbyal's signatures appeared in serial No.1 from 1 April 1983 to 10 January 1986, marked as Exbt.- 31/1 collectively. Ratan Batbyal had signed as an employee in serial No.3 from 1 April 1983 to 31 January 1986, marked as Exbt.-31/2 collectively. From 1 February 1986, his signature appeared in serial No.2. His name appeared in serial No.8, while the record contained an endorsement that he had remained under suspension from 11 January 1986, marked as Exbt.-31/3. lviii. PW-12 further stated that, before the suspension order, Ratan Batbyal was in charge of the FCI godown. The suspension followed allegations concerning stock irregularities. N.C. Saha was District Manager, Midnapore until the middle of 1985, after which Mr. Das became District Manager. During Mr. Das's tenure, the Ghatal FCI godown was sealed in the presence of a Magistrate, Police Officer, vigilance team and, perhaps, the District Manager. lix. At that time Sanatan Babu, Ratan Batbyal and Ashok Banerjee were employees of the godown. The vigilance team itself weighed the commodities and conducted verification for approximately 15 to 20 days. A shortage of commodities was detected during the physical verification. Sanatan Babu was thereafter given charge of the commodities. A statement prepared by the vigilance team regarding the stock was handed over to him, and the shortage was recorded in 43 column No.5. PW-12 identified the signatures of Sanatan Babu and Ratan Batbyal appearing on that statement, marked respectively as Exbt.-2/2 collectively and Exbt.-2/1 collectively. He also identified the statements of Ashok Kr. Banerjee, Ratan Ch. Batbyal, Sanatan Ghosh and himself, collectively marked as Exbt.-4, with their respective signatures marked as Exbt.-4/1, Exbt.-4/2, Exbt.-4/3 and Exbt.-4/4. lx. PW-12 stated that during 1983-84 the employees of the Ghatal FCI godown submitted a written requisition to Ratan Batbyal concerning delivery of commodities in excess of the capacity of the godown. He could not state what result followed from the requisition. A sealed register maintained for opening and closing of the godown from 29 October 1985 to 12 December 1985 contained the signatures of Ratan Batbyal as in-charge, marked as Exbt.-5/1 collectively. lxi. PW-12 also deposed of the original statements of the stock register covering the period from 1 April 1983 to October 1985. He stated that the statements had been prepared after comparison with the original stock registers at the instance of R.K. Sarkar, DSP, CBI. The statements comprised 17 pages and were marked as Exbt.-29 collectively. During preparation of the statements, shortage of articles received by the FCI godown was detected. lxii. In cross-examination on behalf of Ratan Chandra Batbyal, PW-12 stated that he had joined the Midnapore District Controller Office as S.I. in 1980 and had been transferred to the Ghatal Depot of Food Storage in 1982, though he could not recollect the month of transfer. He continued there until 1987, when he was transferred to Stephen 44 House, Kolkata. He could not recollect whether one Mr. Roy was the District Manager when he was attached there. He stated that N.C. Saha was the District Manager during his tenure and could not say that every function at the FCI depot was performed pursuant to the District Manager's directions. PW-12 stated the capacity of the Ghatal godown was 500 MT. He had no knowledge of any Government rule prescribing a capacity of 450 MT for retention of articles. He could not recollect whether there had been floods at Ghatal in 1983, 1984 or 1985, though he stated that there had been a flood but could not identify the year. He could not recall whether there was a technical manager at the FCI godown, Ghatal. He stated that the employees generally acted pursuant to the directions of the District Manager. He could not recall whether physical verification of stock had been conducted at the Ghatal FCI godown in 1983, 1984 or 1985. He could not recollect in which year he had verified the stock register. He stated that the weighing machine at the Ghatal FCI godown had not been functioning properly during 1983, 1984 and 1985 and that a beam scale was used for weighing foodgrains. lxiii. PW-12 stated foodgrains were sometimes damaged by insects. He further stated that, during 1983 to 1985, the Ghatal FCI godown was a jumping point for excess supply of foodgrains. Since the godown lacked sufficient capacity, foodgrains were sometimes kept in the custody of local M.R. dealers. He specifically stated that, apart from the FCI depot, Ghatal, foodgrains were generally kept in the godowns 45 of Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath. Detention charges had to be paid for vehicles carrying foodgrains when unloading was delayed. lxiv. In cross-examination concerning Diptendu Nath, PW-12 stated in 1986 he was attached to the Ghatal FCI godown and that a CBI officer had arrived there with a search warrant. He could not recollect against whom the warrant had been issued. He could not recollect whether Sadhu Charan Pal was absent when the warrant was executed, nor whether Sanjit Pal, the elder son of Sadhu Charan Pal, was present. He stated that Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath had not returned the articles kept with them pursuant to the directions of the higher authority. At the same time, he could not say whether Diptendu Nath had obtained the articles pursuant to a D.O. and could not recollect whether he himself had been present at the execution of the search warrants. lxv. PW-13 stated he had retired in October 2001 from the post of Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Hyderabad. In 1987, he was serving as Assistant Government Examiner of Questioned Documents in the office of the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Calcutta. He possessed an M.Sc. degree in Chemistry from BITS Pilani, Rajasthan. After entering service, he received training in identification of handwriting, detection of forgery and allied subjects under the supervision of Lt. R.P. Singh, the then GEQD, Calcutta. During about 35 years of service, he examined a large number of documents and appeared as an expert witness in numerous cases across India. The documents relating to the case reached GEQD, 46 Calcutta on 03.04.1987 from the office of SP/CBI/GOW/Calcutta through letter No.1572/3/9/86/Cal dated 03.04.1987. The forwarding letter contained the questioned, specimen and admitted documents submitted for examination. The forwarding letter, consisting of two pages, was marked Exbt.-30 and the signature of PW-13 thereon as Exbt.-30/1. The questioned writings were marked Q1, Q1/1 and Q2 to Q4; the specimen writings were marked S1 to S15; and the admitted writings were marked A1 to A3, A5 and A6. lxvi. PW-13 opined that the person who wrote the specimen writings S1 to S3 and S7 to S12, together with the admitted writings A1, A5 and A6, also wrote the questioned writing Q1. He further opined that the person who wrote S13 to S15 also wrote Q1/1. No opinion could be expressed regarding the photocopies marked Q2, Q3 and Q4, since the original writings were not available. lxvii. The opinion regarding Q1 rested upon similarities in both general and individual writing characteristics. Q1 displayed free and speedy execution, with smooth and uniform line quality and no indication of imitation. The questioned and standard writings belonged to the same general class, with similarities in movement, speed, slant, spacing, alignment, relative size and proportion of letters. Individual characteristics included the hooked form of capital “D”, its manner of connection with the succeeding “i” in “Diptendu”, the shape, size and position of the dot, the manner of linking “t” with the succeeding “e”, the loop associated with “t”, the form of the initial “d”, the pen operation employed in the capital “N” of “Nath”, and the manner in 47 which the terminal “t” was connected with “h”. PW-13 stated that no characteristic difference appeared between the questioned and specimen writings and that the cumulative assessment of the general and individual characteristics led to his opinion. lxviii. With regard to Q1/1, PW-13 relied upon similarities in movement, speed, skill, slant, spacing, alignment, relative size and proportion, together with several individual formations. He referred, in particular, to the manner of writing “G” in “Ghatal”, the formation of “f” in “following”, the ticked beginning and finishing stroke of “i”, the connection of “o” with the succeeding “f”, the down position and hooked termination of “f”, the terminal “s” in “qualities”, the upward- left termination of “d”, and the manner of writing the capital letters “D”, “T”, “N”, “E”, “R”, “F” and “G”. Similarities were also noticed in the formation of small letters and in the writing of words such as “Sri”, “Nath”, “Diptendu”, “Distributor”, “Ghatal”, “The”, “Of”, “In”, “Following”, “Qualities”, “Which”, “Were”, “Kept”, “My”, “Said”, “Stock”, “Preserved”, “Godown”, “Is” and “Balance”. PW-13 stated that the questioned and specimen writings disclosed no characteristic difference. lxix. A carbon copy of his opinion, bearing his signature and the signature of Santokh Singh, the then GEQD, Calcutta, was marked Exbt.-31. PW-13 stated that Santokh Singh had also examined the documents and arrived at the same opinion. The original opinion had been forwarded to SP/CBI/Calcutta through letter No.DXC-256/86 dated 21.04.1987; the carbon copy of the letter bearing Santokh Singh’s 48 signature was marked Exbt.-31/1. The documents received for examination, comprising Q1, Q1/1, Q2 to Q4, S1 to S15 and A1, consisting of 20 pages, were collectively marked Exbt.-32. lxx. During cross-examination on behalf of Diptendu Nath, PW-13 stated when he joined service in 1966, India had no institution offering a degree or diploma specifically in handwriting identification. The documents forwarded to his department were sufficient for formation of his opinion, whereas his department generally did not express an opinion from xerox copies of documents. lxxi. During cross-examination on behalf of Ratan Chandra Batabyal, PW- 13 stated that he had not obtained any degree or diploma in handwriting identification from any institution. He further stated that, in 1970, the Ministry of Home Affairs established the National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science at Delhi under the Bureau of Police Research and Development for training serving scientists in document examination and for award of a diploma. PW-13 imparted both theoretical and practical instruction there during his service. He completed his training course in March 1970 after a four-year course and was thereafter declared an expert by the Government of India, followed by issuance of a Gazette Notification. He explained that document examination involved side-by-side comparison of questioned and standard writings with scientific equipment and recording similarities and differences. His M.Sc. qualification in Chemistry and the training received from Lt. R.P. Singh, GEQD, Calcutta, from 1966 49 to 1970 were stated as part of his professional preparation for such examination. lxxii. PW-14 stated that in 1988 he was posted at ACB/CBI/Kolkata as an Inspector of CBI. His role in the case was confined to submitting the charge-sheet; he did not conduct the investigation. The case had been entrusted by the then SP/CBI/ACB/Kolkata for further investigation in 1988, after R.K. Sarkar, then DSP of CBI/ACB/Kolkata, had conducted the earlier investigation. lxxiii. Before submitting the charge-sheet, PW-14 perused the FIR, the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant documents collected by the previous Investigating Officer and the sanction order obtained by the previous Investigating Officer. The case involved three accused persons. lxxiv. The formal FIR was RC-9/86 dated 24.02.1986 and had been drawn up by R.K. Sarkar. PW-14 identified R.K. Sarkar’s signature appearing on the FIR, which was marked Exbt.-33. He also identified R.K. Sarkar’s signatures appearing on the seizure list dated 21.06.1986, collectively marked Exbt.-34/1, and on the production-cum-seizure memoranda dated 24.06.1986, 30.06.1986, 03.07.1986, 10.07.1986, 16.07.1986, 21.07.1986, 22.07.1986, 05.08.1986, 14.08.1986 and 18.09.1986, marked respectively as Exbt.-35/1, Exbt.-37/1, Exbt.- 38/1, Exbt.-39/1, Exbt.-40/1, Exbt.-41/1, Exbt.-42/1, Exbt.-43/1, Exbt.-44/1 and Exbt.-45/1, as reflected in the deposition. lxxv. PW-14 identified the signatures of R.K. Sarkar appearing on the documents contained in Exbt.-32 and stated that he knew R.K. 50 Sarkar’s signatures. The forwarding letter submitted by R.K. Sarkar to the SDJM, Ghatal, concerning transmission of the formal FIR to that Court, bearing R.K. Sarkar’s signature, was marked Exbt.-46. lxxvi. After perusing the documents and the material placed before him, PW- 14 submitted charge-sheet No.3768/88 dated 24.02.1988 against Ratan Chandra Batabyal, Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath. The offences cited were Sections 120B and 409 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. PW-14 stated that Ratan Chandra Batabyal was a Government servant, while Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath were private persons. lxxvii. Cross-examination on behalf of Diptendu Nath indicated several limitations in PW-14’s personal knowledge. He could not recall the date on which he assumed charge of the further investigation. He stated that he submitted the charge-sheet on 24.02.1988 and did not participate in the investigation process. His role was confined to submission of the charge-sheet. He had never visited the residence of any accused during the investigation. He stated that N.C. Saha, another accused, had not been sent up for trial and that, by the time of his deposition, he could not identify any of the accused persons. He could not recall the quantum of the alleged defalcation. He stated that he had gone through the documents contained in the case diary and relied upon the material collected by the previous Investigating Officer before submitting the charge-sheet. 51 lxxviii. PW-15, Prabodh Chandra Sen @ Sengupta, stated that his father, P.C. Sen, had initially joined Government service as an Assistant Labour Commissioner under the Government of West Bengal. After promotion to the IAS, he served as ADM, Birbhum, thereafter held various important posts under the Government of West Bengal and ultimately served as Director of Food and Supply, Government of West Bengal. He retired from service in 1989. PW-15 stated that his father was known as P.C. Sen although the family title was Sengupta. lxxix. PW-15 stated that, before his death, his father had sworn an affidavit in the year 2000 concerning the discrepancy in the surname. When the affidavit was shown to PW-15, he identified it as the affidavit sworn by his deceased father. He also proved his father’s passport, CGHS health card, pension papers and the list showing his postings in different offices under the Government of West Bengal. The documents were retained with the record for inspection and further orders. A sanction order for prosecution of the accused persons was shown to PW-15. He identified the signature appearing thereon as that of his father and stated that it resembled his father’s signature appearing in the passport. The signature on the sanction order dated 30.04.1987 was marked Exbt.-48. lxxx. During cross-examination, PW-15 stated that his own name was Santanu Sengupta and his father’s name was Prabodh Chandra Sengupta. He referred to an affidavit submitted in his father’s name and stated that the document disclosed his father’s name as Prabodh Chandra Sengupta. His Aadhaar card recorded his father’s name as 52 Prabodh Chandra Sengupta; his driving licence recorded it as P.C. Sengupta; and his PAN card recorded it as Prabodh Chandra Sengupta. His mother was Bani Sengupta and ordinarily used her husband’s name as P.C. Sengupta. The health card standing in his father’s name recorded his mother as Bani Sen, with the title Sengupta struck off and Sen inserted in its place. PW-15 maintained that the name of his father appearing in the passport was authentic. His father died on 19.12.2000. The affidavit submitted in his father’s name had been sworn before a Notary Public and, according to PW-15, had been executed approximately nine months before his father’s death. After his father’s death, the family did not use the affidavit for the purpose of changing the name; the document had been used for other purposes. PW-15 further stated that the family did not alter his mother’s name on the strength of the affidavit. lxxxi. The deposition of PW-15, therefore, bears upon the identity and official records of P.C. Sen/Prabodh Chandra Sengupta, the authenticity of his father’s signature and the affidavit concerning the family name, as well as the signature attributed to him on the sanction order dated 30.04.1987. 73. The appeal arises from an order of acquittal recorded in a prosecution concerning alleged diversion and misappropriation of foodgrains during the period when the accused persons were connected with the distribution and storage of foodgrains at and around the FCI godown, Ghatal. The prosecution case attributes a conspiracy to Ratan Chandra Batabyal, Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath and alleges misappropriation of 53 foodgrains valued at approximately Rs.13,70,952/-. The charges invoked Sections 120B and 409 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 74. The record requires examination not merely for the purpose of asking whether suspicion arises from the circumstances, but whether each statutory ingredient has been established through admissible evidence of sufficient probative force. Such examination assumes greater significance in an appeal against acquittal, where the prosecution seeks reversal of a judgment which has already resulted in a judicial affirmation of the accused persons' innocence. 75. It is imminent to comprehend the legal implications and the precedential impact of the aforesaid charges through the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, before collating the facts and legal consequences in the instant case. 76. In the case of N. Raghavender v. State of A.P.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “44. Before we advert to the relevant evidence on record, we deem it appropriate to brace ourselves with the relevant statutory ingredients necessary to bring home the guilt of an accused when charged under Sections 409, 420 and 477-AIPC. Ingredients necessary to prove a charge under Section 409IPC 45. Section 409IPC pertains to criminal breach of trust by a public servant or a banker, in respect of the property entrusted to him. The onus is on the prosecution to prove that the accused, a public servant or a banker was entrusted with the property which he is duly bound to account for and that he has committed criminal breach of trust. (See Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Sadhupati Nageswara 1(2021) 18 SCC 70 54 Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 547 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 979 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 638] ) 46. The entrustment of public property and dishonest misappropriation or use thereof in the manner illustrated under Section 405 are a sine qua non for making an offence punishable under Section 409IPC. The expression “criminal breach of trust” is defined under Section 405IPC which provides, inter alia, that whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over a property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property contrary to law, or in violation of any law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or contravenes any legal contract, express or implied, etc. shall be held to have committed criminal breach of trust. Hence, to attract Section 405IPC, the following ingredients must be satisfied: 46.1. Entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over property. 46.2. That person has dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use. 46.3. Or that person is dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of any direction of law or a legal contract. 47. It ought to be noted that the crucial word used in Section 405IPC is “dishonestly” and therefore, it pre-supposes the existence of mens rea. In other words, mere retention of property entrusted to a person without any misappropriation cannot fall within the ambit of criminal breach of trust. Unless there is some actual use by the accused in violation of law or contract, coupled with dishonest intention, there is no criminal breach of trust. The second significant expression is “misappropriates” which means improperly setting apart for ones use and to the exclusion of the owner. 48. No sooner are the two fundamental ingredients of “criminal breach of trust” within the meaning of Section 405IPC proved, and if such criminal breach is caused by a public servant or a banker, merchant or agent, the said offence of criminal breach of trust is punishable under Section 409IPC, for which it is essential to prove that: (i) The accused must be a public servant or a banker, merchant or agent; (ii) He/She must have been entrusted, in such capacity, with property; and (iii) He/She must have committed breach of trust in respect of such property. 55 49. Accordingly, unless it is proved that the accused, a public servant or a banker, etc. was “entrusted” with the property which he is duty- bound to account for and that such a person has committed criminal breach of trust, Section 409IPC may not be attracted. “Entrustment of property” is a wide and generic expression. While the initial onus lies on the prosecution to show that the property in question was “entrusted” to the accused, it is not necessary to prove further, the actual mode of entrustment of the property or misappropriation thereof. Where the “entrustment” is admitted by the accused or has been established by the prosecution, the burden then shifts on the accused to prove that the obligation vis-à-vis the entrusted property was carried out in a legally and contractually acceptable manner.” 77. In the case of Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “13. In order to appreciate the above contentions, it is useful to refer to the definition and punishment of “criminal breach of trust” and related provisions provided under Sections 405, 406 and 409 IPC which read as under: “405.Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’. *** 406.Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 78. *** 409.Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits 2(2012) 8 SCC 547 56 criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 14. In order to prove the offence of criminal breach of trust which attracts the provision of Section 409 IPC, the prosecution must prove that one who is, in any manner, entrusted with the property, in this case as a dealer of fair price shop, dishonestly misappropriates the property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. In other words, in order to sustain conviction under Section 409 IPC, two ingredients are to be proved, namely, (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty-bound to account for; and (ii) the accused has committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under Section 405 IPC. The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under Section 405 are the requirements to prove conjointly (i) entrustment, and (ii) whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it.” 78. In the case of Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of M.P.3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “27. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the appellant and A-1 and A-2. 28. In the decision of State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan [State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, (2000) 8 SCC 203 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1474] , this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through some physical manifestation : (SCC pp. 211-12, paras 12-13) “12. … As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. … A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for 3(2022) 16 SCC 166 57 connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. … 13. … The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient.” (emphasis supplied) 29. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against the appellant must evidence explicit acts or conduct on his part, manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common design with A-1 and A-2. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715] , this Court held : (SCC p. 691, para 101) “101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution.” (emphasis supplied) 30. In accepting the story of the prosecution, the trial court, as well as the High Court, proceeded on the basis of mere suspicion against the appellant, which is precisely what this Court in TanvibenPankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat [TanvibenPankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1004] , had cautioned against : (SCC p. 185, para 45) “45. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved 58 must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes, unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. (Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa [Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 527] )” (emphasis in original and supplied) 31. It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and express agreement between the accused. However, an implied agreement must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the majority opinion of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI [Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] , this Court had held : (SCC p. 783, para 354) “354. … For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient.” 32. In view of the clear enunciation of law on the criminal conspiracy by this Court, we find that the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior meeting of minds between the appellant and A-1 and A-2. There is no physical manifestation of such a concurrence extractable from surrounding circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the appellant. The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy of the appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a 59 clear and conscientious participation of the appellant in the conspiracy. As noted above, this Court has cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with the legal requirement of proof of agreement.” 79. In the case of Desh Deepak Kumar Vihangam v. State of Bihar4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “19. At this stage it is imperative to discuss the settled position of law with regard to the ingredients and the standard of proof to be achieved by the prosecution for conviction under Section 120-BIPC. In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1734] this Court had elucidated the elements of criminal conspiracy which are reproduced as under : (SCC p. 351, para 17) “17. … The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be : (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed.” 20. Elaborating upon the standard of proof the prosecution has to meet in establishing criminal conspiracy, this Court in State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan [State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, (2000) 8 SCC 203 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1474] held as under : (SCC p. 211, para 12) “12. We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inferences are normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1980) 2 SCC 665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy there must be evidence direct or circumstantial to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the 4(2022) 7 SCC 721 60 circumstances give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of the minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied on for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.” 21. This Court in CBI v. K. Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183] held : (SCC p. 530, para 24) “24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” 61 80. In the case of Vinayak Narayan Deosthali v. CBI5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “16. Thus, the offences of conspiracy, forgery, misappropriation and corruption stand established. It is not necessary to discuss the ingredients of the said offences in detail as the matter has been gone into earlier by this Court in respect of the appellant himself in the reported judgment in Ram Narayan Popli [Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869]. We may only quote the conclusions arrived at in the said case: “About the offence of conspiracy 356. After referring to some judgments of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court in Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab [(1977) 4 SCC 540 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 5 : (1978) 1 SCR 781] and Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India [(1993) 3 SCC 609 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 961 : AIR 1993 SC 1637] the Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] summarised the position of law and the requirements to establish the charge of conspiracy, as under : (SCC p. 668, para 24) ‘24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use.’ (emphasis in original) [See State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan [(2000) 8 SCC 203 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1474] (SCC p. 212, para 14).] 358. Much has also been submitted that repayment has been made. That itself is not an indication of lack of dishonest 5(2015) 2 SCC 553 62 intention. Sometimes, it so happens that with a view to create confidence the repayments are made so that for the future transactions the money can be dishonestly misappropriated. This is a part of the scheme and the factum of repayment cannot be considered in isolation. The repayment as has been rightly contended by the Solicitor General can be a factor to be considered while awarding sentence, but cannot be a ground for proving innocence of the accused.” (SCC pp. 784-86, paras 356 & 358) *** About the offence of criminal breach of trust “361. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract; and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. When a person allows others to misappropriate the money entrusted to him, that amounts to a criminal breach of trust as defined by Section 405. The section is relatable to property in a positive part and a negative part. The positive part deals with criminal misappropriation or conversion of the property and the negative part consists of dishonestly using or disposing of the property in violation of any direction and of law or any contract touching the discharge of trust. …”” 81. In the case of Esher Singh v. State of A.P.6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “34. Merely because the accused A-1 was holding the deceased, as alleged, to be responsible for the killing of six Sikh students, that per se does not prove conspiracy. Section 120-B IPC is the provision which provides for punishment for criminal conspiracy. The definition of “criminal conspiracy” given in Section 120-A reads as follows: “120-A. When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the 6(2004) 11 SCC 585 63 agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.” The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be : (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed. From this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. Law making conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of minds. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to encompass all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Sec. 23, p. 559.) For an offence punishable under Section 120-B, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means. 35. No doubt, in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct 64 evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. 36. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58), the English law as to conspiracy has been stated thus: “58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the discretion of the court. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with every other.” 37. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence, it can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. (See Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682, 686 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 608] .) 38. It was held that the expression “in reference to their common intention” in Section 10 is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words “in furtherance of” in the English law; with the result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant fact only “… ‘as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it’. … In short, the section can be analysed as follows : (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; 65 (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and not in his favour.” (AIR p. 687, para 8) We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy may not ordinarily and is generally not available and its existence invariably is a matter of inference except as rare exceptions. The inferences are normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied on for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 39. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference. 66 40. The provisions of Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC have brought the law of conspiracy in India in line with the English law by making the overt act unessential when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The English law on this matter is well settled. Russell on Crime (12th Edn., Vol. I, p. 202) may be usefully noted: “The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties, agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough.” Glanville Williams in Criminal Law (2nd Edn., p. 382) states: “The question arose in an Iowa case, but it was discussed in terms of conspiracy rather than of accessoryship. D, who had a grievance against P, told E that if he would whip P someone would pay his fine. E replied that he did not want anyone to pay his fine, that he had a grievance of his own against P and that he would whip him at the first opportunity. E whipped P. D was acquitted of conspiracy because there was no agreement for ‘concert of action’, no agreement to ‘cooperate’.” Coleridge, J. while summing up the case to the jury in R. v. Murphy [(1837) 173 ER 502 : 8 Car & P 297] (ER at p. 508) states: “… I am bound to tell you, that although the common design is the root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that these two parties came together and actually agreed in terms to have this common design and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into execution. This is not necessary, because in many cases of the most clearly established conspiracies there are no means of proving any such thing and neither law nor common sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act, and the other another part of the same act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. The question you have to ask yourselves is, ‘Had they this common design, and did they pursue it by these common means — the design being unlawful?’ ” 41. As noted above, the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by 67 the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. Where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 120-A, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfilment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the trappings of the provisions contained in Section 120-B. (See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60 : AIR 1994 SC 2420] .) 42. Conspiracies are not hatched in the open, by their nature, they are secretly planned, they can be proved even by circumstantial evidence, the lack of direct evidence relating to conspiracy has no consequence. (See E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala [(1995) 2 SCC 99 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 329 : AIR 1995 SC 1066] .) 43. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 711 : AIR 1988 SC 1883] (AIR at p. 1954) this Court observed : (SCC pp. 732-33, para 275) “275. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must enquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together in the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is, however, essential that the offence of conspiracy required some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of the two persons is necessary. Nor is it necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient.” “Conspiracy can be proved by circumstances and other materials.” (See State of Bihar v. Paramhans Yadav [1986 Pat LJR 688 (HC)] .) 68 “[T]o establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use.” (emphasis in original) (See State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820 : JT (1996) 4 SC 615] , SCC p. 668, para 24.) 44. The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity. During its subsistence whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts, he would be held guilty under Section 120-B IPC. 45. In Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India [(1993) 3 SCC 609 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 961 : JT (1993) 3 SC 203] it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 617- 18, paras 8-10) “8. … It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements : (1) agreement; (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects. The common-law definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’ was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones case [R. v. Jones, (1832) 4 B 69 & Ad 345 : 110 ER 485] that an indictment for conspiracy must ‘charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means’ and was elaborated by Willies, J. on behalf of the judges while referring the question to the House of Lords in Mulcahy v. R. [(1868) LR 3 HL 306] and the House of Lords in unanimous decision reiterated in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : 85 LT 289 : (1900-03) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] : ‘A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more, to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful; punishable if for a criminal object, or for the use of criminal means.’ 9. This Court in E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828] held: ‘The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Penal Code, 1860, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law.’ In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab [(1977) 4 SCC 540 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 5] the rule was laid down as follows : (SCC p. 543, para 9) ‘The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or overshooting by some of the conspirators.’ 70 10. In Mohd. Usman Mohd. Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 477] it was held that for an offence under Section 120-B IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication.” 46. After referring to some judgments of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court in Yash Pal Mittal case [(1977) 4 SCC 540 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 5] and Ajay Aggarwal case [(1993) 3 SCC 609 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 961 : JT (1993) 3 SC 203] the Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820 : JT (1996) 4 SC 615] (referred to in Kehar Singh case [(1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 711 : AIR 1988 SC 1883] ) summarised the position of law and the requirements to establish the charge of conspiracy, as under : (SCC p. 668, para 24) “24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use.” (emphasis in original) (Also see State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan [(2000) 8 SCC 203 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1474] and Devender Pal Singh v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi [(2002) 5 SCC 234 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 978] .) 82. In the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v. State of M.P.7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “4. Though there is substance in the plea raised by learned counsel for the State, yet, for bringing an application under Section 7 of the Act, the essential requirement is an order, the violation of which is alleged. Unfortunately, neither before the trial court nor the High Court, any effort was made to place on record the order the violation of which was 7(2004) 7 SCC 490 71 alleged. In M.P. Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of M.P. [(1981) 4 SCC 535] it was observed that a scheme like the one at hand is framed under Article 162 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”). That being so, it was necessary for the prosecution to place on record the “order” which, according to it, was the foundation for taking action against the accused-appellant. 5. Section 7 refers to contravention of any order made under Section 3. It is essential for bringing in application of Section 7 to show that some order has been made under Section 3 and the order has been contravened. Section 3 deals with powers to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities. Exercise of such powers, can be done by “order”. According to Section 2(c), “notified order” means an order notified in the Official Gazette, and Section 2(cc) provides that “order” includes a direction issued thereunder. 6. In the circumstances, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we remit the matter to the High Court to hear the matter afresh. The parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stands. It would be incumbent upon the State to file materials to show as to which “order” was violated. If the document in question is placed before the High Court, it goes without saying that the issue shall be examined with reference thereto and necessary adjudication shall be done.” 83. In the case of Major Som Nath v. Union of India8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “10. It would be seen therefore that under Section 5(1)(c) a public servant will be said to commit the offence of misconduct in his duties if he dishonestly allows any other persons to convert to his own use property which is entrusted to the said public servant. The facts which have been set out in the order granting the sanction certainly are sufficient to indicate that the authorities granting the sanction had the offence under Section 5(1)(c) also in their contemplation. In fact the order specifically mentions this provision while granting sanction. 11. We should have thought this was an obvious conclusion but the learned advocate for the appellant strenuously contended that the charge against the appellant was of a motiveless offence and in any case the facts as disclosed show that not only at the time when the First Information Report was given but even at the time when sanction was accorded that the prosecution was merely concerned with the 8(1971) 2 SCC 387 72 charge that the appellant had allowed the crops to be cut on the condition that Rs 2500 will be paid and received the money and misappropriated or converted it to his own use by not paying it into the Government Treasury. There is, therefore, no basis for sanction for a charge under Section 5(1)(c). It is further contended that the stand taken by the prosecution was that the persons who were permitted to cut the crops had not committed any offence. If so a charge under Section 5(1)(c) would implicate those persons also in the commission of an offence which certainly would not have been in the contemplation of the authorities granting the sanction. In support of this contention three decisions have been cited before us namely Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, [AIR 1954 SC 621 : 1954 Cri LJ 1645] Madan Mohan Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 637 : 1954 Cri LJ 1656] and Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. King [AIR 1948 PC 82 : ILR 1948 Bom 316 : 50 Bom LR 399 : 49 Cr LJ 261] . Bhagat Ram case was not concerned with the sanction but only with the question, whether the offence could be altered to one of abetment of an offence of Section 409, IPC, from one under Section 409 simpliciter. It was held that an alteration of the appellant's conviction under Section 409 IPC into one of abetment thereof would imply a definite finding against the subordinate Judge who is not before the court and as such it would be unfair to make such an alteration. We do not see how this case can assist the appellant because in the first place there is no question of an alteration of the charge and secondly the circumstance that someone who is not a public servant abetted the appellant is hardly relevant. But even so the offence with which the appellant is charged under Section 5(1)(c) does not necessarily involve an abetment with the person whom he had dishonestly allowed to cut and take away the crop. For instance it is quite possible that the person whom he allowed to cut the crop may be his own relation or friend in whom he may be interested and who may, however, not know that the accused was doing something dishonest in permitting him to cut the crop. In any case the facts which have been stated in the sanction clearly indicate that the appellant has dishonestly allowed the crops to be cut so that there is no question of any inference or implication that the persons cutting the crops were abetting him in the offence. Even if it were so the sanction cannot be held to be bad on that account. 12.Gokulchand Dwarkadas case also is of no assistance to the appellant because in that case the sanction did not disclose the facts on which it was given but merely sanctioned the prosecution for a breach of certain provisions. Sir John Beamont delivering the Judgment of the Judicial Committee observed at p. 84: 73 “But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority…. Nor, in Their Lordships' view, is a sanction given without reference to the facts constituting the offence a compliance with the actual terms of clause 23. Under that clause sanction has to be given to a prosecution for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Order. A person could not be charged merely with the breach of a particular provision of the Order; be must be charged with the commission of certain acts which constitute a breach, and it is to that prosecution — that is, for having done acts which constitute a breach of the Order — that the sanction is required. In the present case there is nothing on the face of the sanction, and no extraneous evidence, to show that the sanctioning authority knew the facts alleged to constitute a breach of the Order, and the sanction is invalid.” 13. The case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 SCR 762 : (1958) SCJ 355] was also cited by the respondent's advocate in support of the contention that the trial of two offences requiring sanction was not valid. In that case sanction was given under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for the prosecution of the appellant for having received illegal gratification from one Pal Singh. He was charged with and tried for two offences under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act for habitually accepting or obtaining illegal gratification and under Section 5(1)(d) for receiving illegal gratification from Pal Singh. The Sessions Judge had found that both charges were proved. While in appeal the High Court held that the appellant could neither be tried nor convicted of the offence under Section 5(1)(a) as no sanction had been given in respect of it but upheld the conviction under Section 5(1)(d) for which sanction had been given. A perusal of the sanction would show that the sanctioning authority had applied their mind to only one instance but the prosecution were seeking to make the sanction cover the offence of a habitual bribe-taker which clearly implies that the sanctioning authorities must consider the number of instances when the accused took bribes and on what occasions as would justify a charge of his being a habitual bribe-taker. Sinha, J., as he then was while dismissing the appeal observed at p. 766: “In the present case the sanction strictly construed indicates theconsideration by the sanctioning authority of the facts relating to the receiving of the illegal gratification from Pal Singh and therefore the appellant could only be validly tried for that offence. The contention that a trial for two offences requiring sanction is wholly void, where the sanction is granted for one offence and not for the other, is in our 74 opinion unsustainable. Section 6(1) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of an offence for which previous sanction is required and has not been given. The prosecution for offence under Section 5(1)(d) therefore is not barred because the proceedings are not without previous sanction which was validly given for the offence of receiving a bribe from Pal Singh, but the offence of habitually receiving illegal gratification could not be taken cognizance of and the prosecution and trial for that offence was void for want of sanction which is a condition precedent for the Courts taking cognizance of the offence alleged to be committed and therefore the High Court has rightly set aside the conviction for that offence.” 14. These cases instead of supporting the contention of the learned advocate amply demonstrate that the facts which formed the basis of the sanction and which was accorded after the sanctioning authority had fully applied its mind to them, should be co-related to the particular offence or offences with which the accused is charged or convicted. 15. In our view there is no justification for holding that the conviction under Section 5(1)(c), read with Section 5(2) is bad for want of the requisite sanction.” 84. In the case of Shri Krishan Kumar v. Union Of India9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “The offence of which the appellant; has been convicted is s. 5(1) (c) of the Act which is as follows:- “5. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do”; The word ‘dishonestly' is defined in s. 24 of the Indian Penal Code to be - “Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person. is said to do that thing dishonestly.” ‘Fraudulently’ has been defined in the Indian Penal Code in s. 25 as follows: 91959 INSC 97 75 “A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but, not otherwise.” Wrongful gain includes wrongful retention and wrongful loss includes being kept out of the property as well as being wrongfully deprived of property. Therefore when a particular thing has gone into the hands of a servant he will be guilty of misappropriating the thing in all circumstances which show a malicious intent to deprive the master of it. As was said by Fazl Ali, J., in Harakrishna Mahtab v. Emperor (A.I. R. (1930) Patna 209): “Now I do not mean to suggest that it is either necessary or possible in every case of criminal breach of trust to prove in what precise manner the money was spent or appropriated by the accused; because under the law, even temporary retention is an offence, provided that it is dishonest............ I must point out that the essential thing to be proved in case of criminal breach of trust is whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not. As the question of intention is not a matter of direct proof, the Courts have from time to time laid down certain broad tests which would generally afford useful guidance in deciding whether in a particular case the accused had or had not mens area for the crime. So in cases of criminal breach of trust the failure to account for the money proved to have been received by the 'accused or giving a false account of its use is generally considered to be a strong circumstance against the accused.” The offence under s. 5(1)(c) is the same as embezzlement, which in English law, is constituted when the property has been received by the accused for or in the name or on account of the master or employer of the accused and it is complete when the servant fraudulently misappropriates that property. (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, 3rd Edition, p. 787) In Larnier v. Rex ((1914) A.C. 221) the offence of embezzlement was described as a wilful appropriation by the accused of the property of another. A court of Justice, it was said in that case “cannot reach the conclusion that,the crime has been committed unless it be a just result of the evidence that the accused in what was done or omitted by him was moved by the guilty mind.” So the essence of the offence with which the appellant was charged is that after the possession of the property of the Central Tractor Organisation he dishonestly or fraudulently appropriated the property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant and deprived the owner, i.e., Central Tractor Organisation of that property. It is not necessary or possible in every case to prove in what precise manner 76 the accused person has dealt with or appropriated the goods of his master. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct proof but giving a false account of what he has done with the goods received by him. may be treated a strong circumstance against the accused person. In the case of a servant charged with misappropriating the goods of his master the elements of criminal offence of misappropriation will be established if the prosecution proves that the servant received the goods, that he was under a duty to account to his master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is for him to explain the loss. It is not the law of this country that the prosecution has to eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate him. If these facts are within the knowledge of the accused then he has to prove them. Of course the prosecution has to establish a prima facie case inthe first instance. It is not enough to establish facts which give rise to a suspicion and then by reason of S.106 of the Evidence Act to throw the onus on him to prove his innocence. (See Harries, C.J., in Emperor v. Santa Singh (AIR 1944 Lah 339)).” 85. In the case of K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observation:- “20. The appellant-accused was convicted under Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. To constitute an offence under clause (c) of Section 13(1) of the Act, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused has dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person to do so or converts that property for his own use. The entrustment of the property or the control of the property is a necessary ingredient of Section 13(1)(c). On the findings arrived at by the High Court, it is obvious that the property was neither entrusted nor was under the control of the appellant- accused and thus the appellant-accused could not have been convicted under the section.” 10(2005) 12 SCC 631 77 86. The Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the evidence, read as a connected chain, disclosed a deliberate manipulation of foodgrain stocks and their subsequent diversion through the accused persons. The prosecution relied upon the evidence of the departmental witnesses concerning receipt, storage and distribution of foodgrains, the documentary record relating to release and movement of stocks, the evidence concerning the shortage, the signatures and documents connected with the investigation, the evidence of PW-13 as the handwriting expert and the sanction evidence of PW-15. 87. Particular reliance was placed upon the alleged shortage of foodgrains valued at Rs.13,70,952/-. The appellant contended that the documentary evidence established the movement of foodgrains and the involvement of the accused persons in the relevant transactions. Reliance was also placed upon the evidence concerning the release orders in favour of Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath and upon the prosecution case that the stocks had thereafter ceased to be properly accounted for. 88. The evidence of PW-13 was pressed into service as corroboration of the documentary aspect of the prosecution case. PW-13 had attributed the questioned writings marked Q1 and Q1/1 to the writers represented by the corresponding specimen writings. The appellant submitted that his professional qualification, extensive service as an examiner of questioned documents, training received from 1966 to 1970 and subsequent recognition as an expert gave substantial evidentiary significance to his opinion. 78 89. The appellant further relied upon PW-14's identification of the signatures of R.K. Sarkar appearing upon the FIR, seizure documents, production- cum-seizure memoranda and forwarding letter. The charge-sheet submitted by PW-14 was also relied upon as part of the procedural sequence leading to the prosecution. 90. PW-15 was relied upon for proving the signature of his father, P.C. Sen/Prabodh Chandra Sengupta, upon the sanction order dated 30.04.1987, marked Exbt.-48. The appellant submitted that the evidence concerning the identity and official position of P.C. Sen, together with the documents bearing his signatures, established the sanction relied upon by the prosecution. 91. The appellant accordingly contended that the trial court had attached excessive significance to individual omissions and discrepancies and had failed to appreciate the cumulative effect of the documentary and oral evidence. 92. The respondents disputed the prosecution case at its essential points. The principal submission was that the evidence did not establish a specific entrustment of the alleged quantity of foodgrains to each accused, followed by dishonest conversion or disposal. 93. The respondents placed particular reliance upon the evidence of PW-6 to PW-12. The evidence concerning the functioning of the FCI godown at Ghatal disclosed serious practical difficulties in storage during the relevant period. The godown lacked sufficient capacity; excess supplies were received; foodgrains were, pursuant to directions of superior authorities, kept at other godowns or at the zimme of local M.R. dealers; 79 and loading and unloading assistance from labour was sought from higher authorities but was not supplied. 94. PW-10 proved release orders relating to Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath, but did not attribute any act of misappropriation to them. PW-11 and PW-12 described the circumstances concerning inadequate storage capacity, retention of foodgrains at other places, stock verification and related departmental records, while their evidence did not furnish a direct account of any dishonest diversion by Diptendu Nath. 95. The respondents also relied upon the limitations appearing in the evidence of PW-14. He did not conduct the original investigation, had not visited the residence or godown of the accused during investigation, could not recall material particulars concerning the alleged defalcation and had submitted the charge-sheet after examining the materials collected by the previous Investigating Officer. 96. The delay between the period of the alleged transactions and registration of the FIR was also pressed in service. The respondents submitted that the prosecution had failed to furnish a sufficiently cogent evidentiary bridge between the departmental irregularities and the criminal liability alleged against the individual accused. 97. On behalf of Diptendu Nath, particular emphasis was placed upon the absence of evidence connecting him personally with the alleged shortage. The respondents submitted that the mere fact that foodgrains were released to or kept at premises connected with a private dealer could not, by itself, establish dishonest misappropriation. 80 98. The respondents therefore contended that the acquittal represented a permissible appreciation of the evidence and that the appellate court ought not to substitute another inference merely because a different interpretation of the material might also be suggested. 99. The appellate jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal undoubtedly embraces the power to reappraise the evidence and to reach an independent conclusion upon the facts and the law. The exercise of that jurisdiction nevertheless proceeds upon a distinctly calibrated judicial premise. An order of acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence which attends an accused from the inception of the prosecution, and a reversal cannot rest merely upon the availability of another inference which the appellate Court may regard as attractive. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, recognises the power of the appellate Court to review the entire evidentiary record while preserving the settled rule that, where two reasonable conclusions arise, the conclusion favourable to the accused deserves acceptance. The appellate task, therefore, is not to discover a possible theory of guilt but to determine whether the evidence, tested against the statutory ingredients, renders the finding of acquittal legally and factually unsustainable. 100. The distinction assumes particular significance in the present prosecution because the charges rest upon several juridically separate propositions which cannot be collapsed into a single allegation of shortage. Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code proceeds upon criminal breach of trust by a person occupying the statutory position specified therein. Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, which supplies the substantive content of criminal 81 breach of trust, requires entrustment or dominion over property followed by dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal in the manner prescribed by the provision. Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, similarly requires dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of property entrusted to, or under the control of, the public servant, or the knowing permission of another person to effect such conduct. Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code proceeds upon an agreement to commit an illegal act or to accomplish a lawful act by illegal means. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act attaches penal consequences to contravention of an order made pursuant to Section 3. Each statutory provision consequently demands its own evidentiary demonstration. 101. The decisions cited at the Bar bear upon distinct stages of the statutory and evidentiary enquiry and, read together, furnish the governing parameters within which the prosecution evidence has to be examined. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Supreme Court delineated the scope of appellate jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal and recognised the power of the appellate court to reappraise the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion upon the facts and the law. The judgment, at the same time, preserves the special significance of an acquittal: the presumption of innocence receives further reinforcement by the acquittal recorded by the trial court, and where the evidence reasonably admits of two conclusions, the conclusion favourable to the accused retains its legal preference. The principle assumes particular significance in the present matter because the question is not merely 82 whether another appreciation of the evidence can be conceived, but whether the prosecution evidence furnishes a sufficiently coherent basis for displacing the conclusion reached by the trial court. 102. The decisions concerning Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI, and the principles reiterated in subsequent decisions, place entrustment and dishonest misappropriation or conversion at the centre of the statutory offence. The status of a person as a public servant, by itself, does not complete the offence. Property must first be shown to have been entrusted to the accused, or to have stood within his dominion in the capacity contemplated by the provision; a subsequent act of dishonest misappropriation, conversion, or dishonest use must then be established by evidence bearing a direct nexus with the property and the accused. The statutory sequence consequently matters. Evidence establishing that foodgrains entered the FCI system, evidence showing that a shortage was subsequently detected, and evidence suggesting that the accused had some administrative or commercial association with the storage or release of foodgrains operate at different evidentiary levels. None of those circumstances, taken separately or merely placed in succession, supplies proof of dishonest conversion. 103. The earlier decisions in Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 1390, and Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458, also assume relevance in examining the ingredients of criminal misconduct and criminal breach of trust. The prosecution must establish the property entrusted or placed within the relevant dominion and must further 83 connect the accused with a dishonest act concerning such property. A deficiency in stock may furnish the occasion for an enquiry; it does not, by its numerical expression, identify the person who converted the property, disclose the manner of conversion, or establish the dishonest intention accompanying the act. The distinction becomes particularly important where the prosecution relies upon a substantial figure representing alleged loss but the evidence does not satisfactorily trace the movement of the corresponding quantity of foodgrains from lawful custody into the hands or control of any particular accused. 104. The statutory requirement arising from Section 5(1)(c) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, attracts the same evidentiary discipline. Criminal misconduct of the nature alleged against a public servant requires proof of dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of property entrusted to him or within his control, or proof of his having dishonestly or fraudulently permitted another person to effect such misappropriation or conversion. The prosecution, therefore, had to establish more than administrative responsibility for the Ghatal godown. Evidence showing that Ratan Chandra Batabyal occupied a position of responsibility could establish official control; it could not, without proof of the further statutory ingredients, establish personal conversion or a dishonest permission granted to another. The distinction between official responsibility and criminal responsibility remains material throughout the prosecution case. 105. The decision in Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, dealing with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, addresses 84 another essential component of the prosecution case. Penal liability under Section 7 arises from contravention of an order made pursuant to Section 3. Proof of a shortage, irregular handling of foodgrains, or departure from an administrative practice cannot by itself establish the offence unless the particular regulatory command said to have been contravened is identified and the evidence establishes the act of contravention by the accused. The prosecution consequently had to identify the operative control order, demonstrate the obligation created by it, establish the particular act said to constitute its breach, and connect such act with the accused. The evidentiary enquiry cannot proceed from an assumed regulatory obligation to criminal liability without proof of the intervening statutory elements. 106. The authority of Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 609, assumes significance in relation to the charge of conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Conspiracy may certainly be established by circumstantial evidence, and an express agreement need not invariably be proved by direct testimony. The circumstances relied upon, however, must disclose a meeting of minds directed towards the accomplishment of the unlawful object alleged in the charge. Mere association with the same transaction, acquaintance between persons, participation in separate acts having a common commercial setting, or the existence of opportunities for communication cannot, by themselves, establish the agreement which constitutes the essence of conspiracy. The prosecution therefore had to demonstrate a coherent chain leading from the individual acts attributed to the accused to a common design involving dishonest diversion or misappropriation of FCI stock. Association is not agreement; opportunity 85 is not concert; participation in a transaction is not, without more, participation in a conspiracy. 107. The principle governing expert handwriting evidence, reflected in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704, furnishes another important distinction. Opinion evidence regarding handwriting is relevant and may assist the Court in determining authorship, yet the opinion does not itself establish the truth of the contents of the document or the criminal purpose for which the document was allegedly employed. The expert evidence of PW-13 may therefore assume significance in deciding who wrote the questioned writings, subject to the Court's assessment of the reasons supporting the opinion. A finding of authorship, however, must still be followed by a separate evidentiary enquiry concerning the nature of the document, the transaction to which it relates, the conduct of the accused, and the statutory offence alleged. Handwriting authorship cannot, by itself, bridge the distance between a written entry and dishonest conversion of foodgrains. 108. The decisions concerning Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722, likewise preserve the proper evidentiary sequence. Answers furnished by an accused during examination may be considered along with the other evidence, yet the examination cannot be employed as a substitute for proof of facts which the prosecution was required to establish independently. A circumstance arising from an answer under Section 313 may lend support to an otherwise established prosecution case; it cannot supply the missing link in a chain where the prosecution 86 evidence itself fails to establish entrustment, conversion, dishonest intention, conspiracy, or a particular statutory contravention. 109. Read as a whole, the authorities relied upon by both sides therefore establish a common juridical discipline rather than competing formulas. Each ingredient of each offence must receive evidentiary support commensurate with its statutory character. The prosecution cannot derive entrustment from mere official position, conversion from shortage, dishonest intention from administrative responsibility, conspiracy from association, statutory contravention from an unexplained irregularity, or criminal liability from handwriting authorship alone. The evidentiary chain must remain legally connective at every stage: custody must lead to entrustment, entrustment to the property said to have been converted, conversion to the accused, the act to dishonest intention, individual conduct to the alleged common design, and the regulatory obligation to the precise contravention charged. Where a link depends upon conjecture rather than proof, the succeeding statutory ingredient cannot be supplied by inference merely because the preceding circumstance appears suspicious. The authorities thus require the Court to examine each ingredient separately, test the evidence supporting it, and thereafter determine whether the several proved circumstances form a complete chain capable of sustaining criminal liability. 110. The first question concerns the property itself. Criminal breach of trust cannot exist in the abstract. Property must have been entrusted to the accused or placed within his dominion in the capacity contemplated by Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The expression “entrustment” is of 87 wide amplitude, and dominion over property may satisfy the statutory requirement. N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI, (2021) 18 SCC 70, recognises entrustment or dominion as an essential constituent of the offence. 111. PW-12 stated Ratan Chandra Batabyal was in charge of the Ghatal establishment and dealt with bank drafts and delivery orders. Such evidence bears directly upon his official responsibility and may establish dominion over the foodgrains administered through that establishment. The legal enquiry, however, does not terminate with proof of official control. Dominion establishes the relationship between the accused and the property; criminal breach of trust requires proof of what the accused subsequently did with the property. 112. The evidence concerning the Ghatal godown acquires significance at this stage. PW-11 and PW-12 spoke of a storage capacity of approximately 500 MT and of periods when supplies exceeded that capacity. Foodgrains were then kept at other locations, including premises associated with Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath. PW-12 further spoke of directions of superior authorities, defective weighing arrangements, detention of vehicles and deterioration caused by insects. 113. The evidentiary consequence is precise. Physical custody outside the principal godown does not, by itself, establish a criminal diversion. The prosecution had to establish whether the particular foodgrains said to have been misappropriated formed part of the stock entrusted to the accused, when they ceased to be accounted for, in whose possession they 88 thereafter remained, and by what act their movement or disappearance acquired the character of dishonest conversion. 114. Official dominion cannot be equated with exclusive physical custody of every bag of foodgrain. Administrative responsibility may extend over property stored at several locations without every such movement constituting a breach of trust. The prosecution was therefore required to establish the precise relationship between the official control of Ratan Chandra Batabyal and the particular quantity alleged to have been converted. 115. The distinction between shortage and conversion lies at the heart of the prosecution. 116. PW-1, Asim Kumar Mitra, proved the vigilance examination conducted at Ghatal between 19th November 1985 and 12th December 1985 and proved Exhibits-1 to 5. His evidence establishes the stock discrepancy detected during the vigilance exercise and the prosecution's allegation concerning the resulting loss. 117. A discrepancy in stock, however, establishes a condition of the accounts; Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code requires proof of the criminal act which produced that condition. The prosecution therefore had to travel beyond the proposition that a particular quantity of foodgrains was expected and that a smaller quantity was subsequently accounted for. 118. The evidence had to identify the act of appropriation, conversion, dishonest use or disposal. 119. The evidence had to connect that act with the property entrusted to the accused. 89 120. The evidence had to connect the accused with that act. 121. The evidence had to establish the dishonest character of the conduct. 122. A shortage may legitimately trigger investigation. A shortage does not, by its mere existence, constitute criminal breach of trust. 123. PW-4 proved Invoice No.23652 dated 13th March 1985 relating to 125 bags of wheat weighing 116 quintals 52 kilograms. PW-5 proved fifteen invoices and the corresponding dispatches. PW-6 proved documentary evidence concerning dispatch and receipt. PW-7 identified fifty-nine invoices, while PW-8 identified thirty-seven invoices. 124. Such evidence establishes consignments and documentary movement. The legal significance of an invoice remains confined to the transaction which it proves. The invoice does not establish the subsequent fate of the commodity. The dispatch document does not establish subsequent appropriation. The existence of numerous consignments consequently does not, without a further evidentiary connection, identify the particular foodgrains said to have been converted. 125. The prosecution figure of Rs.13,70,952/- requires the same scrutiny. An arithmetically quantified loss may establish the amount which the prosecution attributes to the alleged deficiency. Criminal liability requires proof of the transaction by which the property represented by that amount was dishonestly converted. 126. The arithmetic of loss and the authorship of loss are separate questions. The former concerns quantification; the latter concerns criminal responsibility. 90 127. The expression “dishonestly” in Sections 405 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code carries substantive significance. The prosecution must establish the mental element accompanying the proscribed conduct. Direct evidence of intention is not indispensable; intention may be inferred from proved circumstances. The circumstances, however, must themselves be established and must bear a rational connection with the inference of dishonesty. 128. No such inference can arise merely from official responsibility. 129. No such inference can arise merely from the existence of a stock deficit. 130. No such inference can arise merely because foodgrains were found at premises associated with another accused. 131. The prosecution must demonstrate conduct from which dishonest appropriation or conversion can properly be inferred. 132. PW-1 did not identify the act by which the alleged shortage was caused. PW-4 to PW-8 did not speak to the subsequent fate of the consignments proved by them. PW-9 proved recovery of documents from the residence of Ratan Chandra Batabyal but did not thereby establish the criminal purpose of those documents. PW-10 proved official release orders but did not establish subsequent dishonest appropriation. PW-11 and PW-12 supplied evidence of alternative storage arising from excess supply and administrative directions. 133. The central evidentiary question consequently remains unanswered by direct testimony: what act of Ratan Chandra Batabyal constituted the dishonest conversion of the foodgrains alleged to have been lost? 91 134. Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code also embraces dishonest use or disposal of entrusted property contrary to the governing legal or contractual direction, together with the wilful suffering of another person to effect such conduct. 135. The alternative statutory limb assumes importance because the prosecution alleges participation by private persons in the handling of the foodgrains. A finding against Ratan Chandra Batabyal need not necessarily rest upon proof that he personally appropriated every quantity said to have been lost. The prosecution could establish criminal liability by proving that he knowingly and dishonestly permitted another person to effect the prohibited conversion. 136. The prosecution had to establish the act of permission. 137. The prosecution had to establish the accused's knowledge of the intended conversion. 138. The prosecution had to establish the dishonest character of that permission. 139. The mere fact that foodgrains were stored at premises associated with Sadhu Charan Pal or Diptendu Nath cannot establish those propositions. PW-11 and PW-12 themselves spoke of excess supply and the consequent storage of foodgrains at other locations. The prosecution therefore had to identify the circumstances which transformed an administratively directed storage arrangement into a dishonest permission to misappropriate. 140. The charge under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, requires an independent statutory analysis even though the factual allegations overlap with Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 92 141. The provision contemplated a public servant who dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted for his own use property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant, or who allowed another person to effect such conversion. 142. The statutory structure contains several distinct enquiries. 143. First, the accused must occupy the position of a public servant. 144. Secondly, the property must have been entrusted to him or remained under his control in that capacity. 145. Thirdly, dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion must be proved. 146. Fourthly, where personal conversion is alleged, the property must be connected with his own use. 147. Fifthly, where the prosecution proceeds upon the alternative limb, the evidence must establish that the public servant knowingly allowed another person to effect the proscribed conversion. 148. The official position of Ratan Chandra Batabyal may satisfy the first requirement. His charge of the Ghatal establishment, as spoken to by PW- 12, bears upon the second. The third, fourth and fifth requirements require independent evidentiary satisfaction. 149. The statute does not impose criminal liability merely because a public servant had control over property which was subsequently found deficient. Control supplies the statutory relationship; dishonest conversion supplies the criminal act. 150. The reasoning in Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 1390, and Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458, requires the Court to 93 preserve the distinction between entrustment and the subsequent conduct constituting criminal breach of trust. 151. The evidence placed against Ratan Chandra Batabyal must consequently establish more than supervisory responsibility. The prosecution had to demonstrate the dishonest or fraudulent act which transformed an administrative discrepancy into criminal misconduct. 152. The conspiracy charge under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code introduces a separate juridical requirement. 153. The essence of conspiracy is agreement. The prosecution must establish an agreement to commit an illegal act or to accomplish a lawful act by illegal means. Direct evidence of such agreement is rarely expected, and the agreement may legitimately be inferred from a combination of circumstances. Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 609, recognises that principle. 154. The inference nevertheless must relate to the existence of the agreement itself. 155. Association is not agreement. Opportunity is not concert. Transaction is not conspiracy. Proximity is not common design. 156. The prosecution therefore had to establish circumstances from which the common criminal purpose of Ratan Chandra Batabyal, Sadhu Charan Pal and Diptendu Nath could properly be inferred. 157. PW-3 proved the search of the shop-cum-godown associated with Sadhu Charan Pal and the seizure of documents. PW-2 and PW-9 proved searches and recoveries associated with Diptendu Nath and Ratan Chandra Batabyal. PW-10 proved release orders relating to the private 94 accused. PW-11 and PW-12 spoke of foodgrains being stored at premises associated with them. 158. Such evidence may establish dealings, possession of documents, release transactions and physical storage. The prosecution still had to demonstrate how those separate circumstances converged upon an agreement to commit the alleged offences. 159. A conspiracy cannot be constructed merely by arranging legitimate transactions chronologically and thereafter attributing a common criminal purpose to the persons who participated in them. The common design must emerge from proved circumstances having a rational and compelling connection with the alleged criminal object. 160. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act presents a further and distinct statutory requirement. Penal liability under Section 7 arises upon contravention of an order made pursuant to Section 3. The prosecution therefore had to establish the particular order relied upon, the command or prohibition contained in it, the act constituting its contravention and the participation of the accused in that act. 161. The existence of foodgrain irregularities cannot substitute for proof of the regulatory prohibition. 162. The Court must know which order governed the conduct, what the order required, what the accused did in breach of that requirement, and how the proved conduct attracted Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. 163. Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh emphasises the necessity of establishing the order whose violation forms the basis of the prosecution. 95 164. Evidence concerning shortage, storage or movement therefore cannot, by itself, sustain the charge. The prosecution had to bring the particular conduct within the particular prohibition. The broad object of the Essential Commodities Act cannot replace proof of the specific regulatory command. 165. PW-13 possesses substantial professional credentials in questioned- document examination and gave evidence concerning the scientific comparison undertaken by him. His opinion rested upon characteristics such as movement, speed, slant, spacing, alignment, relative size and proportion and the quality of the writing line. 166. The evidentiary value of such testimony lies in establishing authorship. 167. The legal consequence cannot travel beyond that sphere. 168. If the handwriting establishes that an accused wrote a particular document, the immediate fact established is that he wrote it. The truth of the contents requires separate proof. The criminal purpose of the transaction requires separate proof. Dishonesty requires separate proof. Participation in conspiracy requires separate proof. 169. Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704, requires the Court to examine the reasons supporting expert opinion rather than treating the opinion as conclusive merely because it emanates from an expert. 170. The carbon opinion and the writings collectively marked Exhibit-32 must consequently be examined within the same evidentiary boundary. 171. PW-14 did not conduct the substantive investigation. R.K. Sarkar had undertaken the earlier investigation, collected the documents and 96 recorded the relevant statements. PW-14 subsequently examined the FIR, the statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the documents collected during investigation and the sanction before submitting the charge-sheet. 172. His evidence establishes the procedural course adopted by the investigating agency. It does not become substantive proof of the acts charged merely because he submitted the charge-sheet. 173. A charge-sheet is an investigative conclusion; it is not evidence of the truth of the allegations contained in it. 174. The distinction assumes importance where the prosecution case requires reconstruction of stock movement, alternative storage, alleged diversion and eventual shortage. The officer who did not personally investigate the relevant premises or transactions cannot supply, through his testimony, factual links which the substantive witnesses did not establish. 175. PW-15 proved the sanction dated 30th April 1987, marked Exhibit 48, by identifying the signature of the competent authority through authenticated documents. 176. The evidence establishes the statutory sanction. 177. The sanction does not establish entrustment. 178. The sanction does not establish conversion. 179. The sanction does not establish dishonest intention. 180. The sanction does not establish conspiracy. 181. The sanction satisfies the statutory requirement concerning prosecution of the public servant; it does not adjudicate the factual accusation. 97 182. The answers given by the accused during examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure form part of the material which the Court may consider. Such answers may furnish an explanation of incriminating circumstances and may, in an appropriate case, lend assurance to a conclusion already supported by proved facts. 183. The provision cannot, however, reverse the burden of establishing the prosecution case. A missing ingredient cannot be created by an adverse answer. A deficient chain of evidence cannot be completed merely because the accused offered an explanation which the prosecution disputes. 184. The prosecution must first establish the circumstances constituting the offence. The explanation of the accused can then be assessed against those established circumstances. 185. The evidence, when arranged according to its actual juridical reach, produces several established propositions. 186. PW-1 establishes the vigilance examination and the stock discrepancy. 187. PW-4 to PW-8 establish consignments, invoices and documentary movement. 188. PW-9 establishes recovery of documents from the residence of Ratan Chandra Batabyal. 189. PW-10 establishes official release orders and connected records. 190. PW-11 and PW-12 establish the storage capacity of the Ghatal godown, the occurrence of excess supply and the consequent storage of foodgrains at alternative locations, together with several operational circumstances attending such movement. 98 191. PW-13 establishes handwriting authorship in respect of specified documents. 192. PW-14 establishes the procedural history of the investigation and submission of the charge-sheet. 193. PW-15 establishes the sanction. 194. The decisive propositions, however, lie beyond that evidentiary catalogue. The prosecution had to establish that the stock discrepancy represented dishonest conversion; that the converted property was entrusted to, or within the dominion of, the accused; that a particular accused committed or knowingly permitted the conversion; that the private accused participated in an agreement constituting conspiracy; and that the conduct charged under the Essential Commodities Act contravened the particular order contemplated by Section 7. 195. The law does not permit custody to be treated as conversion, shortage as misappropriation, authorship as culpability, association as conspiracy or sanction as proof of guilt. Each proposition requires its own evidentiary premise. 196. The prosecution case thus presents a series of proved circumstances, but the decisive question is whether the circumstances are connected by evidence capable of carrying the prosecution from one statutory ingredient to the next. The Court cannot supply the missing links by enlarging the natural meaning of an established circumstance. 197. The distinction becomes particularly significant in the light of PW-11 and PW-12. Their evidence supplies a factual circumstance capable of explaining the presence of foodgrains outside the principal godown 99 through excess supply and administrative arrangements. Such evidence does not establish the innocence of any accused as a positive proposition. It does, however, prevent the Court from treating alternative storage as inherently incriminating. The prosecution consequently had to prove the additional circumstance which transformed an otherwise explainable movement of stock into dishonest diversion. 198. The same principle governs the alleged loss of Rs.13,70,952/-. The amount may represent the financial consequence asserted by the prosecution. Criminal liability requires identification of the act which produced the loss and the person responsible for that act. 199. The prosecution's evidentiary burden cannot be discharged by adding circumstances which individually prove matters peripheral to the substantive offence. The chain must be legally connective, not merely factually consecutive. 200. The distinction is especially important in a prosecution founded upon several documents and numerous transactions spread over a substantial period. A document may prove a transaction. Another document may prove a subsequent transaction. A third document may establish possession or authorship. The Court still has to identify the evidentiary bridge connecting those events with the alleged criminal act. Temporal sequence cannot itself create causation; documentary proximity cannot itself create conspiracy; official responsibility cannot itself create dishonest intention. 201. The evidence may establish the existence of a stock discrepancy at the Ghatal establishment. The evidence may also establish numerous 100 consignments, releases, documents, searches and recoveries. The prosecution has nevertheless to cross the decisive evidentiary threshold separating administrative discrepancy from criminal conversion, physical custody from dishonest appropriation, individual transaction from common design, and regulatory irregularity from statutory contravention. 202. Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code requires proof of criminal breach of trust, not merely official custody accompanied by shortage. 203. Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, requires proof of dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion, or knowing permission for another person to effect such conversion, and not merely official control over the property. 204. Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code requires proof of agreement constituting the common criminal design, and not merely dealings among persons connected with the transactions. 205. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act requires proof of contravention of the particular order made pursuant to Section 3, and not merely proof of irregular movement or accounting of foodgrains. 206. The prosecution evidence, viewed through those statutory requirements, does not establish the complete chain from the alleged deficiency to the criminal act, from the criminal act to the individual accused, and from the individual acts to the alleged conspiracy. The evidentiary record permits the inference of irregularity and raises questions concerning the accounting of the stock; the record does not supply proof of the indispensable criminal links with the degree required for conviction. 101 207. The governing principle in an appeal against acquittal then assumes its full force. The Appellate Court may disagree with the Trial Court, but disagreement alone does not warrant reversal. The acquittal must be shown to rest upon a conclusion which the evidence and law cannot reasonably sustain. A conclusion which accords with a reasonable reading of the evidentiary record cannot be displaced merely because another hypothesis of guilt may be articulated. 208. Criminal conviction demands proof of the prohibited act, the ingredients which render that act criminal, and the participation of the accused in its commission. Suspicion may initiate the process of criminal investigation; it cannot complete the process of criminal adjudication. Where the evidence leaves an essential statutory link to inference rather than proof, the law does not permit that link to be supplied by conjecture. 209. In view of the above discussions, the instant criminal appeal being CRA 141 of 2023 is dismissed. 210. There is no order as to costs. 211. Trial Court records along with a copy of this judgment be sent down at once to the Learned Trial Court for necessary action. 212. Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis on compliance of all formalities. (Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)