IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) CRR 4719 of 2024 Gopinath Ganguly & Anr. Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners : Mr. Antarikhya Basu, Mr. Anirban Dutta, Mr. Sayan Mukherjee, Ms. Madhumita Basak. For the O. P. No.2 : Mr. Apalak Basu, Mr. Samik Sarkar, Ms. Indira Chatterjee. For the State : Ms. Samira Grewal. Judgment reserved on : 02.09.2026 Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2026 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing and/or setting aside of the proceedings in ACGR Case No: 4235 of 2022 arising out of Bansdroni Police Station Case No: 172/2022 dated 24.09.2022 under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 pending before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at 2 Alipore, 24 Parganas (South), corresponding to Charge Sheet No. 94 of 2023 dated 09.06.2023, under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2. The petitioners’ case in short is that the petitioner no. 1 is the father of the petitioner no. 2. The maternal aunt and the mother of the opposite party no. 2 were joint owners of 2 plots of land being plot no. 3 and 43 situated at Adiganga Road, Police Station Bansdroni, Kolkata 700070. After the death of his mother, the opposite party no. 2 and his brother became the legal heirs of the property being plot no. 3 measuring upto 5 cottahs and plot no. 43 measuring upto 11 cottahs as their father died prior to their mother's death. 3. Thereafter, said legal heirs entered into Development Agreements dated 26.12.2005 with M/s Sudhama Construction being the proprietorship firm of Petitioner no.1. On 27.12.2005, a General Power of Attorney was executed by the owners in respect of petitioner no. 1 giving him right to sign, execute and submit Deed of Conveyance and enter into Agreement of Sale. 4. The said plots had local encumbrances and operational difficulties for which the owners decided to include local contractors/developers. Plot no. 3 was sold to petitioner no. 2 and an Indenture of Sale dated 13.04.2011 was executed between the petitioners. Thereafter, on 24.11.2022, the General Power of Attorney executed earlier was revoked and on the same day a fresh General Power of Attorney dated was executed by the owners in favour of Petitioner no. 1, one Sudhir Mallick and one Samir Kumar Chatterjee (local developers) only in respect of 3 plot no. 43. On the same day, a new development agreement was also executed in respect of plot no. 43 incorporating the names of the local developers. 5. The construction of plot no. 43 as per the Development Agreement dated 24.11.2011 was completed and the possession of the owners' allocation was handed over to the owners including Opposite party no. 2. Suddenly in the year 2020, the opposite party no. 2 and others filed two consumer cases in respect of the plots being CC/241/2020 & CC/290/2020. 6. On the self-same issues that were raised in the consumer case being CC/290/2020 which was filed in respect of plot no. 3, the Opposite party no. 2 lodged a written complaint which led to the registration of the present case, being Bansdroni Police Station Case No. 172/2022 dated 24.09.2022 under Sections 120B/420/406 of I.P.C, 1860. The allegation levelled against the petitioners are to the effect that 45% of the constructed area which was to be given to the owners was sold by Petitioner no. 1 to Petitioner no.2 in a fraudulent manner. It was further alleged that on 23.09.2022, a man representing himself to be the manager of Petitioner no. 1 met the opposite party and showed him a copy of authorization wherein it was written that opposite party and others have authorized Petitioner no. 1 to sell 45% of the property. The signatures on the said document are forged. During investigation only the Development Agreement dated 26.12.2005 pertaining to plot no. 3 was seized. 4 7. Upon conclusion of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 94 of 2023 dated 09.06.2023 under Section 120B/420/406 of I.P.C was submitted. The allegations related to forgery was dropped. 8. The grounds for quashing of proceedings, as made out by the petitioners herein, are as follows:- (i) There is a delay of almost thirteen years in lodging complaint and no explanation for the same has been given in the written complaint by the opposite party. (ii) The opposite party no. 2 has already instituted a consumer case on self-same facts. He is resorting to giving a purely civil case a criminal colour. (iii) The allegations leveled against the petitioner even if taken to be true without admitting to the same, reveal a case that is civil in nature. Even if the allegations are taken to be true, a simple breach of contract cannot amount to penal offences under Section 420/406. There is no mens rea on the part of the petitioner to cause deception from the very inception of the transaction. There was no entrustment of any property that was subsequently misappropriated for the own use of the petitioners. In fact, the opposite party has suppressed all documents such as the subsequent power of attorneys, revocation of the power of attorney dated 27.12.2005, development agreement dated 24.11.2011 that would prove that no case is made out against the petitioners. 5 (iv) Nothing was seized by the investigating agency apart from the first development agreement dated 26.12.2005. (v) The possession letter mentions, an agreement dated 24.11.2011 which indicates that the Opposite party was aware of the subsequent documents executed by the parties and has completely suppressed all such facts. (vi) The criminal proceeding was instituted with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance on the petitioner and as such is liable to be quashed based on the principles laid down in the landmark judgment of the Apex court, State of Haryana vs Ch. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604). 9. The following judgments are relied upon by the petitioners:- (i) V. J. Jose Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2009) 3 SCC 78. (ii) B. Suresh Yadav Vs. Sharifa bee reported in (2007) 13 SCC 107. (iii) Vinod Natesan Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2019) 2 SCC 401. (iv) Lalit Chaturvedi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC. (v) State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 604. (vi) Delhi Race Club Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. 10. The State has placed the case diary. 6 11. In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1570 of 2021), decided on March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court held:- “5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. 6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where 7 a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.” 12. In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2682 of 2020), decided on September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court held:- “11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High Court possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed restraints evolved through judicial pronouncements. 11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories where quashing of proceedings is justified. These are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of 8 the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to balance two competing considerations – (a)preventing abuse of process of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed questions of fact. 11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “minitrial” or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR / complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 , HMT Watches v. Abida12, and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others13]. 11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar 14 , it was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits of the prosecution’s case and holding that 9 charges were not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial. 11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized where the defence relies upon unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of sterling quality – such as documents of undisputed authenticity – which ex facie demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. This principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent decisions. 11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial. 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. 10 (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others18 , it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19 , this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 11 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 20 , this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the wellsettled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.”” 13. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesb & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 690, wherein the Supreme Court held:- “38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405IPC, punishable under Section 406IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also 13 committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC.” 14. From the materials on record including the case diary it appears that the dispute in the present case is clearly a civil dispute and in such cases of alleged breach of agreement, it has to be prima facie shown that there was/is criminal intent present. Admittedly there was a business arrangement in respect of development of a property between the parties. A case is also pending before the consumer forum on the same issue. 15. The materials on record, herein including the case diary, do not prima facie show presence of the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners herein, with also absence of criminal intent and as such the proceeding in this case is liable to be quashed in the interest of Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process of law. 16. CRR 4719 of 2024 is thus allowed. 17. The proceeding in ACGR Case No: 4235 of 2022 arising out of Bansdroni Police Station Case No: 172/2022 dated 24.09.2022 under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 pending before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Alipore, 24 Parganas (South), is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Gopinath Ganguly and Rajesh Ganguly. 18. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of. 19. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 14 20. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 21. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)