IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction Original Side Present :- Hon’ble Justice Amrita Sinha WPO 1230 of 2024 Shipra Das Vs. Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management & Ors. For the writ petitioner :- Mr. Soumya Mazumder, Sr. Adv. Mr. Victor Chatterjee, Adv. Mr. Tapan Sil, Adv. Mr. A. Bhar, Adv. For the respondent nos. 1 & 2 :- Mr. Pijush Biswas, Adv. Mr. Aritra Roy Chowdhury, Adv. Mr. Sudipta Nayan Ghosh, Adv. Mr. Saikat Ghosh, Adv. For State :- Mr. Piush Chaturvedi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Tarun Kumar Das, Adv. Heard on :- 11.09.2026 Judgment on :- 25.09.2026 Uploaded on :- 25.09.2026 Amrita Sinha, J.:- 1. The writ petition has been filed by a retired employee of the respondent no. 1, the Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management, Kolkata (herein after referred to as ‘the Institute’ for the sake of brevity) affiliated to the University of Calcutta. The Board of Governors of the Institute consists of the representatives from the department of higher education of the State of West Bengal. 2 2. The petitioner joined service on 15th January, 1999 as Steno Typist. She was promoted to the post of Personal Assistant on 25th January, 2007 and further promoted to the post of Secretary to the Directorate of the Institute on 23rd December, 2014. 3. According to the petitioner, the Board of Governors of the Institute in its meeting held on 5th April, 2023 took a decision to introduce a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) for the employees who suffers from ailments or otherwise. The petitioner opted for VRS on medical ground. Her request was considered by the Board of Governors in its meeting held on 28th February, 2024 and the same was approved. In a further meeting of the Board of Governors on 9th July, 2024 the prayer of the petitioner was considered again and the Board decided to settle all her legal dues as per the VRS Rules and release the same by 31st July, 2024. 4. As the Institute failed to release her VRS dues in accordance with the decision taken in the meeting of the Board of Governors, the petitioner, by an email communication dated 13th August, 2024, requested for releasing the same. In response thereto the petitioner was served with a letter dated 28th August, 2024 intimating that she would be released from duty on and from 30th August, 2024 and her terminal dues on account of gratuity, provident fund and leave encashment would be transferred to her bank account. It was mentioned that her VRS benefits would be transferred immediately once the signatory issue is resolved. 5. On 2nd September, 2024 the dues of the petitioner on account of gratuity, provident fund and leave encashment was released. Her VRS benefits were, 3 however, not released. The petitioner made repeated requests praying for releasing her VRS dues and lastly, served a notice demanding justice through her advocate praying for release of her VRS dues. 6. In response thereto, the respondent no. 2 by legal communication intimated the petitioner that the Institute has no prevailing VRS rules for its faculty members or employees. The Institute denied to have offered any VRS package to any of its employees. The request of the petitioner for VRS on medical ground was approved by the Institute for which her retirement benefits were released as per the norms of the Institute. In the absence of any scheme for voluntary retirement, the demand of the petitioner for payment of the benefit under VRS could not be cleared. 7. Being aggrieved by the denial of the respondents to disburse the benefits under VRS, the instant writ petition has been filed. 8. It has been submitted that the conduct of the Institute is barred by the principle of promissory estoppel. The Institute has infringed the constitutional right of the petitioner as provided under Article 300A of the Constitution. It is only after noticing the VRS floated by the respondent employer, that the petitioner decided to retire voluntarily or else the petitioner could have continued till her normal date of superannuation. In such case she would have received her salary for the period that she would have rendered service. Due to acceptance of the petitioner’s prayer for voluntary retirement, the petitioner has lost financially as she did not receive her salary for the balance period of her service tenure. 4 9. It has been argued that had the authority not floated the Scheme for voluntary retirement, then no question would have arisen for making the application seeking retirement voluntarily prior to reaching her normal age of superannuation. Once the employer disclosed the decision of the authority relying on which the employee took a stand; the employer ought not to resile from such decision intimated to the employee. 10. It has been submitted that the employer, being an authority which satisfies the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, ought to act as a model employer and ought not to change its stand within a couple of months and deny the relief which ought to flow from the Scheme floated by the employer permitting voluntary retirement. 11. According to the petitioner, she is performing public duty and, as such, relief sought for by the petitioner ought to be allowed in the instant writ petition. 12. Prayer has been made to direct the respondents to release VRS benefits to the petitioner along with interest on account of delayed payment of the same. 13. In support of such submission, learned senior counsel representing the petitioner relies on the judgment delivered by a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Oasys Cybernatics Private Limited reported in (2026) 3 SCC 348 wherein the Court held that the scope of judicial review is confined to test as to whether administrative action of the authority suffers from any illegality, irrationality, mala fide and procedural impropriety. 5 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judicial review in contract matters operates only where the action is palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle. The Court further went on to hold that these principles are neither ornamental nor abstract. They arise from the nuanced understanding that Government contracting, unlike private commerce is an instrument of governance. The Rule of law demands that executive discretion be rational and fair, but it equally demands that Courts respect the autonomy necessary for effective administration. Public interest requires not judicial micro-management but judicial assurance that power has been exercised within lawful bounds. 15. Learned counsel representing the Institute opposes the submission and the prayer of the petitioner. An issue of maintainability of the writ petition has been raised by the respondents. It has been submitted that the Institute is registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act. The dispute between the parties is of private nature with no public element involved in it. The VRS which is sought to be implemented by this writ petition is not a statutory one. Private contractual dispute between the employer and its employee ought not to be entertained under high prerogative writ jurisdiction. None of the statutory dues of the petitioner has been withheld. 16. It has been submitted that there is a dispute between the members of the Governing Body of the Institute. The Institute does not recognise any VRS. According to the Institute there is no scheme for voluntary retirement. None of the employees of the Institute ever received any benefit of voluntary retirement. The Board of Governors does not have any power to approve VRS. 6 Approval of such scheme has to be from the end of the Board of Trustees. All the properties of the Institute, movable and immovable, are vested in the Board of Trustees. The budget, its preparation, consideration, finalisation and adoption, lies with the Board of Trustees. 17. Prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that the same is not maintainable in law. 18. On the point that the writ petition will not be maintainable, the learned advocate representing the Institute relies on the following precedents: a. HEC Voluntary Retired Employees Welfare Society & Anr. –vs- Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 708 b. K. K. Saksena –vs- International Commission of Irrigation and Drainage & Ors. reported in (2015) 4 SCC 670 c. Joshi Technologies International INC –vs- Union of India & Ors. reported in (2015) 6 SCR 1042 d. Subhodh Kr. Singh Rathour –vs- Chief Executive Officers & Ors. reported in (2024) 15 SCC 461 e. Kausik Majumdar –vs- State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online (Cal) 11902 f. Atal Khandelwal –vs- Institute of Health Management Research and Ors. reported in 2026 : RJ-JP/7422 7 19. Learned senior counsel representing the State respondents supports the contention of the Institute and submits that the writ petition will not be maintainable for adjudication of the subject dispute. Prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of being not maintainable. 20. In support of such submission, learned senior counsel for the State relies on the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi –vs- Sunil Kr. Sharma & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 1683. 21. I have heard and considered the rival submissions made on behalf of all the parties and have perused the documents on record. 22. As a preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition has been raised by all the respondents, the Court intends to decide the said issue first. 23. In the writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a direction upon the respondent no. 1 to release the benefits payable to her under VRS. According to the petitioner, as the Institute is aided by the Government and the Institute receives financial grant from the Government, the Institute cannot deny the role and duty of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. 24. The petitioner also contends that the Institute performs public duties and the service of the petitioner is in aid of the public duty rendered by the Institute. For such purpose, the Institute has to be taken as an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and, thus, would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 8 25. The issue of promissory estoppel has also been relied upon by the petitioner. It has been contended that had VRS not been floated, then the petitioner would not have opted for the same. The request for voluntary retirement by the petitioner relying upon such scheme was duly accepted by the employer, and as such, the employer ought to comply with the terms and conditions of VRS and ought to disburse VRS benefits due and payable to the petitioner. 26. The petitioner has relied upon Oasys Cybernatics (supra) wherein the Court reiterated the settled principle that the State ought to act reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law. 27. Per contra, the definite stand of the respondents is that the writ petition would not be maintainable. There is no scheme for voluntary retirement in the Institute. 28. Subhodh Kr. Singh (supra) has been relied upon by the respondents wherein it has been mentioned that judicial review is permissible to prevent arbitrariness of public authorities and to ensure that they do not exceed or abuse their powers in contractual transactions and requires overseeing the administrative power of public authorities to award or cancel contracts or any of its stipulations. It also held that when contractual power is being used for public purpose, it is certainly amenable to judicial review. 29. Joshi Technologies (supra) has been relied upon in support of the submission that the Court would not exercise discretion in the writ jurisdiction unless the action has some public law character attached to it. If the contract between private party and the State instrumentality is under the realm of private law 9 and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party is to invoke remedy provided under ordinary civil law rather that approaching the High Court and invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Once the facts of a particular case reveal that the nature of controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court under Article 226. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resorting to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. 30. In HEC Voluntary Retired Employees Welfare Society (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that an offer for voluntary retirement in terms of a scheme, when accepted, leads to a concluded contract between the employer and the employee. An employee has an option either to accept or not to opt therefor. Although the Company is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the terms and conditions of service would be governed by the contract of employment. Thus, unless the terms and conditions of such a contract are governed by a statute or statutory rules, the provisions of the Contract Act would be applicable both at the formulation of the contract as also the determination thereof. When an employee opts for VRS he makes an offer, which upon acceptance by the employer gives rise to a contract. The matter relating to voluntary retirement is not governed by any statute. 31. In K. K. Saksena (supra) the Court held that writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. Even if writ petition would be maintainable against an 10 authority, which is ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to be satisfied with the action of such authority, which is challenged, whether the same is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law. Ordinary private law remedies are not enforceable through extraordinary writ jurisdiction even though brought against public authorities. The Court further held that even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review. Only those decisions which have public element therein, can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. 32. In Army Welfare Education Society (supra) the Court held that imparting education involves public duty, however, the relationship between the respondents and the appellant Society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. 33. In Kausik Majumdar (supra) the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court relying on the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary’s Education Society vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 reiterated that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions become amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of matters relating to service where they are not 11 governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. The actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of being ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognized as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of being ordinary contract of service. 34. In Atal Khandelwal (supra) the Hon’ble Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan reiterated the principles laid down in Army Welfare Education Society (supra) and St. Mary’s Education Society (supra). 35. In the instant case it appears that the service condition of the petitioner did not prescribe any VRS. It is only late during her service tenure, that VRS was allegedly proposed by her employer. She relied on such proposal and submitted her application seeking voluntary retirement. The specific stand of the employer is that there is no VRS in the service regulation of the petitioner. The body which floated VRS is not the competent authority to take a decision on financial matters of the Society. 36. The very foundation of VRS has been disputed by the employer. Admittedly, VRS benefits sought for by the petitioner is not a statutory obligation of the employer. It is merely a scheme which the petitioner claims to have been floated by the employer, but such contention has been categorically denied by the employer. The sheet anchor of the petitioner’s prayer, i.e., the scheme for voluntary retirement is not accepted rather denied by the employer. Till the Court is satisfied with the fact of existence of VRS in the service condition of 12 the petitioner, it will be improper for the writ Court to endeavour to adjudicate the issue. 37. In the precedents relied upon by the respondents it has been held that VRS is a contract between the employer and the employee and any dispute with regard to the same has to be dealt with under the ordinary civil law. Writ petition will not be maintainable for adjudication of such dispute. Relying on such principle, the writ petition filed by the petitioner will not be maintainable. 38. In K. K. Saksena (supra) and Army Welfare Education Society (supra) it has been held that though the employer may be an authority under Article 12, any action of the employer which does not have a public law element involved in it will not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. In the case at hand, the petitioner has a dispute with her employer. The said dispute is an individual dispute of the petitioner. The same is private in nature and does not have any public law element attached to it. Thus, the writ will not be maintainable. 39. Oasys Cybernatics (supra) relied upon by the petitioner speaks about rational and fair action of the State. Here, the action of the Institute does not appear to be either irrational or unfair in any manner. The Institute has internal management disputes. VRS sought to be implemented by the petitioner has been disputed. VRS is not statutory in nature. It will be absolutely improper for the writ court to grant relief to the petitioner despite noticing the disputed questions of facts involved herein. At the same time, it does not appear that any public law element is involved in the dispute raised by the petitioner. Neither any statutory law appears to have been violated or infringed. 13 40. The principle of promissory estoppel cannot be enforced in the instant proceeding. The petitioner may or may not have a very good case on merit; but the writ Court will not be the competent forum to adjudicate the dispute raised by the petitioner. The petitioner ought to approach the competent forum for relief. 41. In view of the above, the dispute raised by the petitioner is held to be not maintainable for adjudication before the writ Court. The relief sought for by the petitioner cannot be allowed in the writ petition. 42. The writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 43. It is, however, made clear that dismissal of the writ petition will not stand in the way of the petitioner to approach the competent forum for remedy, in accordance with law, if so advised. 44. All parties to act on the basis of the server copy of this judgment duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. 45. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties or their advocates on record expeditiously on compliance of usual legal formalities. (Amrita Sinha, J.)