JUDGMENT : MANOJ BAJAJ, J. 1. Appellant-Mahesh Kumar is aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986 passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar in Sessions Trial No. 270/M of 1985, arising out of Case Crime No. 152 of 1985, under Section 307 I.P.C., registered at Police Station Babupurwa, District Kanpur Nagar, whereby he stands convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment. 2. The facts in brief are that the complainant-Ram Pal s/o Ram Dev gave a written complaint on 13.4.1985, to Station House Officer Police Station Babupurwa, wherein he alleged that today at 6:30 am when he left home for work, Mahesh Kumar s/o Late Basant Lal r/o House No. 130/70, Bagahi asked for Rs.500/- from him, and on his refusal, he fired at him with a country made pistol. The gun shot fired at him from a distance of five steps hit in chest and left hand, and this incident was witnessed by Munni Lal, Gokul Prasad and other residents of the colony. Broadly, on these allegations, F.I.R. bearing Case Crime No. 152 of 1985 was registered against the accused for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. 3. After registration of the F.I.R., the investigation in the case was conducted by Investigating Officer namely, S.N. Pandey, Sub Inspector who recorded the statements of witnesses namely, Chandrika Singh, Jagdish Pandey, Uttam Lal, Jata Shankar, Munni Lal and also recorded the supplementary statement of complainant-Ram Pal. During investigation, the injury report was collected and the site plan was also prepared. The statements of other formal witnesses were also recorded and finally the charge sheet was filed against the accused under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. thereby sending him to face prosecution for commission of offence of attempt to murder. 4. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and vide order dated 16.8.1985 the charges against the accused were framed for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. The appellant-accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 5. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused had examined seven witnesses namely, Gokul Prasad (P.W.-1), Jagdish Pandey (P.W.-2), Ram Pal-injured (P.W.-3), Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4), Munni Lal (P.W.-5), S.N. Pandey-Investigating Officer (P.W.-6) and Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7). 5. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused had examined seven witnesses namely, Gokul Prasad (P.W.-1), Jagdish Pandey (P.W.-2), Ram Pal-injured (P.W.-3), Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4), Munni Lal (P.W.-5), S.N. Pandey-Investigating Officer (P.W.-6) and Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7). Besides, the prosecution also adduced documentary evidence i.e. written complaint (Exb.Ka-1), site plan (Exb.Ka-2), charge sheet (Exb.Ka-3), check report (Exb.Ka-4), copy of G.D. No. 24 (Exb.Ka-5) and medical report (Exb.Ka-6), which were proved by the relevant witnesses Ram Pal-injured (P.W.-3), Investigating Officer- S.N. Pandey (P.W.-6) and Dr. J.P. Sigh (P.W.-7). 6. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the statement of accused-appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 22.11.1985, who denied the prosecution evidence and explained that one Brajmohan was murdered at his shop and in this regard, he had given a report to the police, but as his evidence was not to the liking of the police, therefore, police got annoyed and falsely implicated him in this case. No evidence was adduced by the accused-appellant in defence. 7. Upon analysing the prosecution case, evidence and other material on record, the trial court proceeded to convict the appellant-accused under Section 307 I.P.C. and sentenced him to four years rigorous imprisonment. Aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986, the appellant preferred this appeal. 8. Mr. Navin Kumar Pandey, Advocate being Amicus Curiae appeared on behalf of appellant and argued that the injured-complainant had suffered two injuries on his body i.e. on his left hand and chest, but according to the complaint, the accused had fired only one gun shot, therefore, the two injuries suffered by complainant on different parts of his body could not be a result of single shot. Learned counsel submits that the complainant had specifically mentioned in the complaint to the police that the occurrence was witnessed by various residents of the colony including Gokul Prasad and Jagdish Pandey, but the said witnesses when examined as P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, respectively did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. Learned counsel has further argued that the witness Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4) cannot be relied upon being an interested witness, who is son of injured-Ram Pal, and while referring to the deposition of Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4) he emphasized that the complainant’s son arrived at the place of occurrence upon hearing the noise, therefore, the witness had not seen the alleged occurrence. Learned counsel has further argued that the witness Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4) cannot be relied upon being an interested witness, who is son of injured-Ram Pal, and while referring to the deposition of Chandrika Singh (P.W.-4) he emphasized that the complainant’s son arrived at the place of occurrence upon hearing the noise, therefore, the witness had not seen the alleged occurrence. According to learned counsel, these material defects in the prosecution case were ignored by the trial court while convicting the appellant. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that the alleged weapon used in the commission of crime was not recovered during investigation, and even no blood stains were found at the alleged place of occurrence, therefore, the entire case of the prosecution is rendered doubtful. Learned counsel highlighted that no FSL report was filed by the Investigating Officer to prove the charge against the appellant, and further he referred to the injuries suffered by complainant to vehemently argue that there is no evidence on record to suggest that the nature of injuries was dangerous to life, and thus, according to learned counsel, in the absence of this imporant evidence, it would be unsafe to maintain the conviction of the appellant under Section 307 I.P.C. He prays that the impugned judgment of conviction as well as order of sentence dated 7.5.1986 be set aside, and the appellant be acquitted. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Singh, learned A.G.A.-I has argued that the case of the prosecution is fully proved as the alleged injuries suffered by the complainant-injured were proved by him as P.W.-3, as well as by an independent witness Munni Lal (P.W.-5), who deposed before the trial court that they had seen the accused-appellant firing at Ram Pal-injured. Learned State Counsel has further argued that Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7) in his evidence has clearly stated that the injuries were caused by gunshot and analysing the entire evidence on record, the trial court has rightly convicted the appellant. 11. Learned State Counsel has further argued that Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7) in his evidence has clearly stated that the injuries were caused by gunshot and analysing the entire evidence on record, the trial court has rightly convicted the appellant. 11. Learned A.G.A. while refuting the arguments addressed by learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that even if, the prosecution witnesses P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 have not supported the complainant’s version, that alone would not be sufficient to doubt the prosecution case, and similarly, even if, there are certain defects in the investigation, that too would not be enough to discard the prosecution case, which is fully supported by other cogent evidence and material witnesses. According to learned A.G.A., the trial court has meticulously examined the prosecution evidence while holding the appellant guilty for commission of offence of attempt to murder punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. He prays that the appeal be dismissed. 12. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and with their assistance, case file and the trial court record has been perused carefully. 13. According to the prosecution, the accused-Mahesh Kumar was involved in commission of an offence against human body, who by firing at P.W.-3-Ram Pal (Injured) caused two injuries, and thus was prosecuted for commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. Before analysing the facts, circumstances and evidence on record to ascertain the alleged commission of offence by the appellant, it becomes necessary to have a glance at Section 307 I.P.C., which reads as under :- 307. Attempt to murder.— Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 14. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 14. A reading of the above penal provision would make it abundantly clear that in order to test the culpability of an offender under Section 307 I.P.C., a satisfaction has to be recorded that the offender had an intention or knowledge to cause death, followed by an overt act to execute the said intention, and if, these two essentials exist, the offence of attempt to murder is complete. 15. Now, while analysing the facts of the case in hand, this Court finds that the complainant-injured (P.W.-3) clearly deposed before the trial court that on his refusal to pay Rs.500/- to the accused, he fired at him, which resulted in two injuries. The witness further categorically stated that the accused had fired at him from a distance of five steps, therefore, on seeing the firearm weapon pointed at him, the complainant-injured might have raised his hand to thwart injury on his vital part of the body, but the single gunshot caused injuries on his left hand also, before hitting chest. Thus, the argument by learned counsel for the appellant that single gunshot could not have resulted in injuries on two different parts of the body of the injured is without any merit, and is negated. 16. Further, the version of the complainant-injured is supported by another independent witness namely, Munni Lal (P.W.-5), who deposed that when he was returning from Kidwayi Nagar, he had seen the accused and complainant engaged in a conversation, and later, the accused fired at complainant. This witness has clearly deposed before the trial court that he had seen the accused firing at Ram Pal-injured. The testimony of these two material witnesses has gone unimpeached, despite lengthy cross-examination by defence, as the witnesses maintained their candid stand relating to the involvement of the accused in commission of crime. 17. Apart from the ocular version, the testimony of Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.- 7) also supports the prosecution case, who had examined the injured to find following injuries on his person :- “1. Multiple firearm wound of entry measuring 0.25 cm X 0.25 cm x skin or muscle deep on front of left wrist towards palm in area of 9 cm X 8 cm blackening and tattooing was present. 2. J.P. Singh (P.W.- 7) also supports the prosecution case, who had examined the injured to find following injuries on his person :- “1. Multiple firearm wound of entry measuring 0.25 cm X 0.25 cm x skin or muscle deep on front of left wrist towards palm in area of 9 cm X 8 cm blackening and tattooing was present. 2. Multiple fire arm wound of entry each measuring 0.25 cm X 0.25 cm x depth not probed on front of chest and upper abdomen in an area of 14 cm X 13 cm. No blackening and tattooing present.” 18. Of course, the deposition of Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7) does not contain any opinion about the nature of injuries that the same were dangerous to life, but in order to attract the provision of Section 307 I.P.C. it is not necessary that the act attributed to the offender must result in bodily injuries to the victim, capable of causing death. For illustration, if an offender fires gunshot and the same went pass the victim without resulting in any injury, the offence of attempt to murder would still be complete. Even otherwise, the language employed in the Section 307 I.P.C., particularly the expression “hurt” does not contemplate that the injury suffered by the injured has to be “grievous” or “dangerous to life.” Therefore, even if, the injury suffered by P.W.-3 was not described as dangerous to life, it cannot be said that the alleged offence would not fall within the ambit of Section 307 I.P.C. Here it will be useful to rely upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Mohan and others , 2013 AIR SCW 4663. The relevant paragraph reads as under:- “The High Court was of the opinion that the injuries have not been caused on the vital parts of the body. In order to attract Section 307, the injury need not be on the vital parts of the body. In order to attract Section 307, causing of hurt is sufficient. If anybody does any act with intention or knowledge that by his act he might cause death and hurt is caused, that is sufficient to attract life imprisonment. Section 307 uses the word “hurt” which has been explained in Section 319 IPC and not “grievous hurt” within the meaning of Section 320 IPC. If anybody does any act with intention or knowledge that by his act he might cause death and hurt is caused, that is sufficient to attract life imprisonment. Section 307 uses the word “hurt” which has been explained in Section 319 IPC and not “grievous hurt” within the meaning of Section 320 IPC. Therefore, in order to attract Section 307, the injury need not be on the vital part of the body. A gunshot, as in the present case, may miss the vital part of the body, may result in a lacerated wound, that itself is sufficient to attract Section 307. The High Court is, therefore, in error in reducing the sentence, holding that the injury was not on the vital part of the body. Period undergone by way of sentence also in our view is not commensurate with the guilt established.” 19. According to Dr. J.P. Singh (P.W.-7), the above noticed injuries could have been caused by firearm weapon, therefore, considering the evidence of P.W.-3, P.W.-5, and P.W.-7, this Court finds that the charges against the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. are well established. 20. Although, the investigation in the case does not seem to be proper as the weapon of offence was not recovered, and the place of occurrence was also not inspected promptly upon receiving the information of commission of crime, and was inspected later, therefore, the evidence of blood stains could not have been collected. However, in the considered opinion of this Court these omissions in investigation would not be significant to disbelieve the prosecution case, particularly in the light of other crucial evidence on record, which directly connects the accused with the crime. 21. By now, it is settled law, that if, the investigation is not conducted in a proper manner, that alone would not be a sufficient ground to discard the prosecution case if, the other evidence on record conclusively proves the charge against the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. K. Yarappa Reddy , (1999) 8 Supreme Court Cases 715 while dealing with the issue of defective investigation made following observations:- “19. But can the above finding (that the Station House Diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the other evidence in this case? The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. K. Yarappa Reddy , (1999) 8 Supreme Court Cases 715 while dealing with the issue of defective investigation made following observations:- “19. But can the above finding (that the Station House Diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the other evidence in this case? If the other evidence, on scrutiny, is found credible and acceptable, should the court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated by the Inves-tigating Officer in conducting investigation or in preparing the records so unscrupulously. It can be a guiding principle that as investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal or even suspicious the rest of evidence must be scrutinized independently of the impact of it. Otherwise criminal trial will plummet to that level of the investigating officers ruling the roost. The Court must have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials over the action taken by investigating officers. Criminal justice should not be made the casually for the wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the case. In other words, if the court is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true the court is free to act on it albeit investigating officer's suspicious role in the case.” 22. Again in C. Muniappan and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu , (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 567, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the above view and observed as under :- “55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation.” 23. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan and others Vs. State of Kerela , 2025 INSC 28 dealt with this issue and the relevant findings are reproduce below:- “22. A cumulative reading of the entire evidence on record suggests that the investigation has not taken place in a proper and disciplined manner. There are various areas where a properly investigation could have strengthened its case. In the case of Paras Yadav & ors. vs. State of Bihar, 1999 (2) SCC 126 , the Apex Court observed as under: “Para 8 - ..the lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer should not be taken in favour of the accused, may be that such lapse is committed designedly or because of negligence. Hence, the prosecution evidence is required to be examined de hors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. For this purpose, it would be worthwhile to quote the following observations of this Court from the case of Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar and others, J.T. (1998) 3 SC 290. Hence, the prosecution evidence is required to be examined de hors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. For this purpose, it would be worthwhile to quote the following observations of this Court from the case of Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar and others, J.T. (1998) 3 SC 290. "In such cases, the story of the prosecution will have to be examined de hors such omissions and contaminated conduct of the officials otherwise the mischief which was deliberately done would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party and this would obviously shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice." Hence, the principle of law is crystal clear that on the account of defective investigation the benefit will not inure to the accused persons on that ground alone. It is well within the domain of the courts to consider the rest of the evidence which the prosecution has gathered such as statement of the eyewitnesses, medical report etc. It has been a consistent stand of this court that the accused cannot claim acquittal on the ground of faulty investigation done by the prosecuting agency…...” 24. Thus, keeping in view the above pronouncements by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the argument addressed by learned counsel for the appellant that the lapses in the investigation would render the prosecution case doubtful is also without any merit and is hereby rejected, as the deposition of P.W.-3 (Ram Pal), P.W.-5 (Munni Lal), P.W.-7 (Dr. J.P. Singh), coupled with documentary evidence would show that the prosecution has successfully discharged the onus. 25. Most importantly, a perusal of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986 would show that the trial court has carefully examined the facts, circumstances and evidence on record to ascertain the involvement of the accused-appellant in commission of crime. The findings and observations made by the trial court in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986 are founded upon proper appreciation of prosecution evidence as well as material on record. 26. Further, it is not a case where the evidence adduced by prosecution gives rise to any doubt, much less to favour the defence. The findings and observations made by the trial court in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986 are founded upon proper appreciation of prosecution evidence as well as material on record. 26. Further, it is not a case where the evidence adduced by prosecution gives rise to any doubt, much less to favour the defence. The evidence adduced by the prosecution is not only consistent to the guilt of the accused, but if, examined conversely, it is inconsistent to his innocence. Consequently, this Court does not find any meritorious ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7.5.1986. 27. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Court below forthwith.