ORDER : C.S.DIAS, J. 1. The Criminal Miscellaneous Case is filed by the 1 st accused to quash Annexure A4 Final Report and all further proceedings in C.C.No.493/2020, on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-I, Thamarassery, (‘Trial Court’, in short), which has originated from Crime No.1057/2019 registered by the Thamarassery Police Station, Kozhikode, alleging the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 406 , 420, 465, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , (‘ IPC ’, in short). 2. The essence of the 1 st respondent’s (de facto complainant) case in the complaint (Annexure A1) is that, on 17.03.2016, the 1 st respondent had purchased a lorry bearing registration No. KL-73A-5253 from a distributor by paying Rs.12,10,600/-, out of which, he availed a vehicle loan for Rs.9,07,000/-. He registered the vehicle in his name and, on an oral agreement, he entrusted the vehicle to the 2 nd accused along with the original documents, to manage the vehicle, subject to the condition that the 2 nd accused would remit the equated monthly instalments towards the loan amount to the financier, and after the loan account is closed, he would hand over possession of the vehicle to the 1 st respondent. The 1 st respondent also paid Rs.3,00,000/- for the building of the body of the vehicle. The vehicle's records were handed over to the 2 nd accused in the presence of two witnesses. In the meantime, the 2 nd accused went abroad. Later, he informed the 1 st respondent that he had already handed over the vehicle to his brother, the petitioner (1 st accused), in March 2019. As requested by the accused, the 1 st respondent had sent a letter to the finance company to close the loan account and a ‘No Objection Certificate’ was issued. Despite repeated requests made by the 1 st respondent, the 1 st accused failed to return the vehicle and the original documents. On enquiry, it was learnt that the 1 st accused had transferred the vehicle to his name by forging the 1 st respondent's signature. Thus, the accused have committed the above offences. 3. I have heard, Shri. Prabhu K.N., the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri. Luiz Godwin D. Couth, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent and Shri.C.S. Hrithwik, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor. 4. Thus, the accused have committed the above offences. 3. I have heard, Shri. Prabhu K.N., the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri. Luiz Godwin D. Couth, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent and Shri.C.S. Hrithwik, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, even if the allegations in Annexure A1 complaint and Annexure A4 Final Report are taken on their face value, the same would not attract the offences against the petitioner. The dispute is between the 1 st respondent and the 2 nd accused. There was no transaction between the petitioner and the 1 st respondent. There are no materials on record even to prima facie establish that the petitioner has fabricated or forged any documents. The very fact that the vehicle was purchased in 2016, but the complaint was filed in 2019 proves the falsity in the crime as against the petitioner. Furthermore, the learned Magistrate failed to consider the crucial aspect that the complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [2015 KHC 4242] and Babu Venkatesh and others v. State of Karnataka and another [ (2022) 5 SCC 639 ] . Although, by Annexure A6 order, this Court had rejected the petitioner’s prayer to quash the proceedings, by Annexure A7 order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order and permitted the petitioner to file a fresh Crl.M.C. There is no material to substantiate the petitioner’s culpability in the crime. Hence, the entire proceedings against the petitioner may be quashed. 5. The learned counsel for the 1 st respondent stoutly opposed the Crl.M.C. He contended that a reading of the allegations in the complaint and the final report clearly reveals the petitioner’s culpability in the crime. The petitioner had fabricated the documents and forged the 1 st respondent's signature, and transferred the vehicle to his name, with the intention of making unlawful gain for himself and causing unlawful loss to the 1 st respondent. The petitioner had fabricated the documents and forged the 1 st respondent's signature, and transferred the vehicle to his name, with the intention of making unlawful gain for himself and causing unlawful loss to the 1 st respondent. In the Annexure A6 order, this Court has in unequivocal terms found that it is after the affidavit was filed in the complaint that the Trial Court referred the complaint to the Police under Section 156 Cr.P.C. In Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not held that the affidavit is to be filed along with the complaint. A mere six-day delay in filing the affidavit cannot be a ground to reject the complaint. Moreover, the investigation in the case is complete, and the final report has been filed. This Court may not embark upon a mini-trial and conclude that the petitioner has not committed the above offences. The contentions raised in the complaint are matters to be decided after trial. Hence, the Crl. M.C. may be dismissed. 6. It is trite that, in order to attract the offence of cheating, the deception has to be there at the very inception. The complainant is required to show that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or representation (read the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vesa Holdings Pvt Ltd. and another v. State of Kerala and others [ (2015) 8 SCC 293 ] . 7. In the present case, going by the allegations in the complaint and the final report, the alleged oral understanding was undisputedly between the 1 st respondent and the 2 nd accused. The vehicle was purchased by the 1 st respondent on 17.03.2016 and handed over to the 2 nd accused. It was the 2 nd accused who undertook to remit the equated monthly instalments to the finance company and, after closing the loan account, return the vehicle to the 1 st respondent. Admittedly, at that point in time, the petitioner was nowhere in the picture, and there is no allegation that he had induced the 1 st respondent to deliver the vehicle to him. Admittedly, at that point in time, the petitioner was nowhere in the picture, and there is no allegation that he had induced the 1 st respondent to deliver the vehicle to him. The only allegation against the petitioner is that, in March 2019, i.e., three years after the vehicle was purchased, the 2 nd accused handed over the vehicle to the petitioner, and the petitioner fabricated the documents, forged the 1 st respondent's signature, and changed the vehicle's registration to his name. Therefore, at the time of entrusting the vehicle by the 1 st respondent to the 2 nd accused, it cannot be said that the petitioner had the intention to cheat the 1 st respondent. If at all the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC are attracted, it can only be attributed against the 2 nd accused and not the petitioner. 8. In Arshad Neyaz Khad v. State of Jharkhand [2025 SCC Online SC 2058], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphatically held that the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC cannot co-exist simultaneously. The complaint cannot contain both offences, as they are independent and distinct and are antithetical to each other. 9. In the light of the above exposition of law and findings rendered above, particularly that the vehicle was delivered by the 1 st respondent to the 2 nd accused, who allegedly made the promise, I am convinced that the offences under Sections 406 and 420 are not attracted against the petitioner. 10. Now coming to the offences under Sections 465 , 468, and 471 IPC . Undisputedly, the transaction was between the 1 st respondent and the 2 nd accused, who allegedly requested the petitioner to give a letter to the finance company to obtain the No-Objection Certificate for the vehicle. The No-Objection letter was received by the 1 st respondent. There is no material on record indicating that the petitioner had fabricated documents or forged the 1 st respondent's signature, other than for the 1 st respondent's assertion. The said documents were not subjected to forensic science examination. There are also no independent witnesses to prove the alleged fabrication and forgery. CWs.9 and 10 only state that the documents were handed over to the transfer the ownership of the vehicle. All the relevant documents were handed over to the Registering Authority to transfer the ownership. The said documents were not subjected to forensic science examination. There are also no independent witnesses to prove the alleged fabrication and forgery. CWs.9 and 10 only state that the documents were handed over to the transfer the ownership of the vehicle. All the relevant documents were handed over to the Registering Authority to transfer the ownership. The mere allegation of the 1 st respondent is insufficient to attract the above offences alleged against the petitioner. 11. In addition to the above findings, I find that Annexure A1 complaint was filed before the Trial Court on 17.10.2019. But the affidavit was filed only on 23.10.2019, i.e., after the complaint was filed (read paragraph 6 of the Annexure A6 order). 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Babu Venkatesh’s case (supra) has categorically held that, if a complaint is not supported by an affidavit, the Magistrate ought not to entertain the complaint in view of the law laid down in Priyanka Srivastava’s case. Therefore, the interpretation that the affidavit was filed before taking cognizance offence is also found to be untenable. 13. Going by the allegations in Annexure A1 complaint, which led to the filing of Annexure A4 Final Report, I am satisfied that the dispute is between the 1 st respondent and the 2 nd accused and not against the petitioner. 14. In the celebrated decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down exhaustive principles to quash a criminal proceeding by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of this Court. The salient principle is that, if the allegations in the complaint are taken at their face value, they do not attract the offence; or, if the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides or an intention to wreak vengeance, the power under Section 482 can be exercised. 15. In Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and others [ (2007) 12 SCC 1 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the Courts must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. 16. 15. In Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and others [ (2007) 12 SCC 1 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the Courts must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. 16. On an overall consideration of the facts and materials on record, the law on the point and the rival submissions made across the Bar, I am convinced and satisfied that even if the allegations alleged against the petitioner are taken on their face value, the same will not attract the offences against the petitioner. Furthermore, the 1 st respondent has failed to follow the principles laid down in Priyanka Srivastava and Babu Venkatesh’s cases (supra) by not filing the affidavit with the complaint. Thus, I am satisfied that this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the aforesaid circumstances, I allow the Crl.M.C. by quashing Annexures A1 complaint, Annexure A3 FIR, Annexure A4 Final Report and all further proceedings in C.C.No.493/2020 on the file of the Trial Court, as against the petitioner.