1 2026:CGHC:8005 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 176 of 2019 Chetan Kumar Darshan S/o Jeevan Lal Darshan Aged About 61 Years R/o Village Bade Dumarpali, Police Station And Tahsil Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh- (Plaintiff), District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Tarachand Kalar (Deid) Through Legal Heirs Nil 1.1 - (A) Savitri Bai Wd/o Late Tarachand Kalar Aged About 58 Years R/o Village Ulda (Patrapali), Tahsil- Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - (B) Rishi Kumar S/o Late Tarachand Kalar Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Ulda (Patrapali), Tahsil- Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - (C) Geeta Bai D/o Late Tarachand Kalar Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Ulda (Patrapali), Tahsil- Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1.4 - (D) Lakhi Bai D/o Late Tarachand Kalar Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Ulda (Patrapali), Tahsil- Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1.5 - (E) Shakuntala Bai D/o Late Tarachand Kalar Aged About 39 Years R/o Village Ulda (Patrapali), Tahsil- Kharsia, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District- Collector- Raigarh, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgrah., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.02.16 17:29:33 +0530 2 ---- Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Jeet Patel, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Santosh Singh, G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 13.02.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 28/11/2018 passed by the learned Fifth Additional District Judge, District Raigarh, C.G. in Regular Civil Appeal No.2/2018 (Chetan Kumar Darshan Vs. Tarachand & Ors) arising out of the judgment dated 28/11/2017 passed by the learned First Civil Judge Class-I, Raigarh, District Raigarh, C.G. in Civil Suit No.7A/2010 (Chetan Kumar Darshan Vs. Tarachand & Ors). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs preferred a suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit land bearing Khasra No.165/2D, area 1.497 hectares, situated at Village Bade Dumarpali, Tehsil Kharsia, District Raigarh, pleading inter alia that the suit land was previously owned and possessed by one Punau @ Kariya Ghasia, resident of Bade Dumarpali, having right, title, and interest over the said land. Punau Ram Ghasia entered into an agreement to sell the disputed land to the plaintiff and received a consideration amount of ₹20,000 from the plaintiff 3 on 20.03.1990. However, Defendant No. 1, by deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, and by taking undue advantage of a relationship, got his own name entered as purchaser in the sale deed and had the sale deed executed. Defendant No. 1 is the plaintiff’s brother-in-law and is a resident of Village Ulda, Post Office Sarwani, whereas the disputed land is situated in Village Bade Dumarpali, which is also the plaintiff’s village of residence. Nevertheless, from the date of sale, the plaintiff has had lawful possession, right, and interest over the disputed land, and the original sale deed is in the custody of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted an application before the Revenue Court stating that from the date of sale, the plaintiff has lawful right, title, and possession over the disputed land. On this, Revenue Case No. 67/31-6-2008-09 was registered by the Revenue Court. Upon calling for reports from the Patwari and the Revenue Inspector, it was reported that the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the disputed land. 3. In the said Civil Suit, the defendant No.1 submitted a written statement and denied the plaint averments. He submitted that the land bearing Khasra No. 165/2D, area 1.497 hectares, situated at Village Bade Dumarpali, Tehsil Kharsia, District Raigarh, is owned and possessed by Defendant No. 1. The said suit land was previously owned and possessed by Punau, resident of Village Bade Dumarpali, having right, title, interest, and possession over the same. Defendant No. 1 purchased the said 4 land from the vendor Punaau Ram Ghasia by way of a registered sale deed after paying the full sale consideration amount. The mutation was duly carried out in his name by the competent Revenue Authority. From the date of purchase, Defendant No. 1 has been in peaceful possession and cultivating the said land. 4. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the evidence adduced by both the parties as well as the material available on record, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The trial Court held that as per the Patwari report (Exhibit P/4) produced by the plaintiff himself, defendant Tarachand was shown to be cultivating the suit land, while the plaintiff, being a relative, was merely stated to be looking after the same. In view of the said report, it was concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he had purchased the suit land or that he had been in continuous possession thereof since the year 1990. The plaintiff has stated that he had purchased the suit land for ₹20,000/- and that the original sale deed is in his possession; however, he has not produced the sale deed before the Trial Court. 5. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff filed the Civil Appeal before the learned appellate Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/plaintiffs. 5 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the suit was instituted immediately upon the appellant/plaintiff acquiring knowledge that the land in his possession had been recorded in the name of defendant in the revenue records. Both the Courts failed to properly appreciate that the appellant/plaintiff has been in peaceful, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the suit land for more than 25 years, and that no dispute had ever been raised regarding his possession during that period. The learned trial Court, however, failed to duly consider this material aspect of the matter and consequently passed the impugned judgment and decree, which are liable to be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record. 8. As per the Patwari report (Exhibit P/4), which was brought on record by the plaintiff himself, Defendant Tarachand was shown to be in cultivation of the suit land, while the plaintiff, being a relative, was merely stated to be looking after the same. This documentary evidence clearly contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion of exclusive and continuous possession over the suit property. Although the plaintiff claimed to have purchased the suit land for a consideration of ₹20,000/- and asserted that the original sale deed was in his possession, he failed to produce the said sale deed before the Trial Court. In the absence of the sale deed and supporting evidence, the plea of purchase remained wholly 6 unproved. 9. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 10. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiff failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 11. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 13. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the 7 settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 14. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 15. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep