- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA WRIT PETITION NO. 11469 OF 2023 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: THE REGISTRAR THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M S BUILDING DR. B R AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560001. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY PUBLIC WORKS, PORTS AND INLAND WATER TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY URBAN DEVELOPMEHT DEPARTMENT M S BUILDING BENGALURU-560001. Digitally signed by AASEEFA PARVEEN Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 3. SRI. G. T. DHANANJAYA, S/O G THIMMAPPA, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, WORKING AS JUNIOR ENGINEER, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM SUB-DIVISION, WARD NO.44, BBMP, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BENGALURU-560086. R/AT NO.195, 2ND MAIN, SYNDICATE BANK LAYOUT, ANDRAHALLI MAIN ROAD, HEROHALLI, SUNKADAKATTE, BENGALURU-560091. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.S.C. DESHMUKH, AGA FOR R1 AND R2; SRI. B. KESHAVA MURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT THEREBY QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 18/11/2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BENGLAURU IN APPLICATION NO.7548/2018, AS PER ANNEXURE-A AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) Heard learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh.S.Arabatti for the petitioner and learned AGA Sri.S.C.Deshmukh for respondent Nos.1 and 2 as well as learned counsel Sri.B.Keshava Murthy for respondent No.3. 2. The petitioner-Karnataka Lokayukta represented by Registrar is before this Court questioning the order dated 18.11.2019 in Application Nos.7547/2018 and 7548/2018 by which the third respondent's application is allowed quashing the order of penalty of withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. 3. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is dated 18.11.2019, whereas the present writ petition is filed before this Court on 01.06.2023, there is more than 3 years delay in approaching this Court. There is no averments to explain the delay in preferring the writ - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 petition. Though there is no prescribed limitation for filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is settled position of law that a person who knocks the door under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, shall approach within a reasonable time. Three years delay that too by petitioner - institution cannot be considered as reasonable period. 4. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and Others, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 551 with regard to the delay in filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at paragraph Nos.9, 10, 11 and 12 is held as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gain said by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There maybe myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,(2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :(1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies evenin case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,[(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v.K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 where under it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held there under: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 5. Be that as it may, learned AGA brings to the notice of this Court that subsequent to the impugned order - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010271842023 NC: 2026:KHC:51356-DB WP No. 11469 of 2023 passed by the Tribunal, the Government has given effect to the order of the Tribunal by passing Government order dated 13.05.2020 which is placed on record along with IA No.4/2023 for disposal, cancelling the order of penalty dated 19.09.2018. In view of the above, the writ petition stands rejected. Pending IA's if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (DR.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA) JUDGE NS CT:TSM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 12