1 In the High Court at Calcutta Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’ble Justice Partha Sarathi Sen WPA 7400 of 2015 Sufera Bibi v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. For the Petitioner : Mr. Amit Kumar Pan Ms. Tanusri Santra For the State : Ms. Smita Pal Mr. Mrinal Kanti Biswas For the Municipality : Ms. Manika Roy Mr. Atanu Sur Heard on and Judgment on : 22-09-2026 Partha Sarathi Sen, J.:- 1. By filing the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ/writs against the respondent authorities, more specifically, against the respondent no.3 authority commanding him to take appropriate steps to determine and disburse compensation in respect of the land of the writ petitioner, particulars of which, has 2 been mentioned in paragraph 2 of the instant writ petition along with other ancillary reliefs. 2. At the time of hearing, Mr. Pan, learned advocate for the petitioner took me to paragraph 4 of the instant writ petition wherein it is the specific pleadings of the writ petitioner that the land of the writ petitioner was requisitioned on 21.12.1948 under Section 3(1) of the Act II of 1948. It is submitted by Mr. Pan that in paragraph 5 of the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner specifically pleaded that she has got no knowledge with regard to the acquisition of the said land of the writ petitioner under Section 4 of the Act II of 1948. At this juncture, attention of this Court is drawn to paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-opposition as filed by the respondent nos.1 to 5 authorities. It is argued by Mr. Pan that in the said paragraph, the respondent State and its instrumentalities have specifically admitted that in respect of the land of the writ petitioner, as involved in the instant writ petition, no acquisition proceeding has been taken place as yet. 3. In his next limb of submission, Mr. Pan contended that the lifetime of Act II of 1948 expired on 31.03.1997 and, as a consequence thereof, it can be safely presumed that the respondent State is in wrongful occupation of the writ petitioner’s land on and from 01.04.1997 without disbursing any compensation therefor. 4. At this juncture, Mr. Pan took me to Section 9(3A) of Act I of 1894. It is pertinent to mention herein that Sub-section (3A) of Section 9 was 3 inserted by way of State amendment. Mr. Pan contended that Section 9(3A) of Act I of 1894 contemplates service of notice by the Collector upon the persons known or believed to be interested in any land as has been requisitioned under Section 3 of Act II of 1948 and, in the event, such notice is served, the provisions of Sections 4(1), 5, 5(A), 6, 7 and 8 of Act I of 1894 would be deemed to have been complied with. 5. It is further argued by Mr. Pan that corollary interpretation of Section 9(3A) would be that the Collector is duty bound to publish the award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of Act I of 1894 and, in the event, no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land would lapse. At this juncture Mr. Pan again took me to Section 24 of Act 2013. It is argued by Mr. Pan that Section 24 of Act XXX of 2013 says that where no award under Section 11 of Act I of 1894 has been made, the provisions of Act XXX of 2013 would apply. It is further submitted by Mr. Pan that in Section 24 of Act XXX of 2013 there is no provision regarding the fate of the requisition proceeding where no acquisition takes effect in terms of Act II of 1948 and/or on account of non- compliance of Section (3A) of Act I of 1894. 6. It is thus submitted by Mr. Pan that in view of the facts and circumstances, the writ petitioner is entitled to damages for wrongful user of the land of the writ petitioner by the respondent/State on and from 01.04.1997. It is further submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner 4 that this is a fit case for issuing appropriate writ/writs against the respondent authorities, more specifically against the respondent No. 3/authority to initiate proceeding under Act XXX of 2013 and to disburse adequate compensation to the writ petitioner in the spirit of Act XXX of 2013. 7. Per contra, Ms. Pal, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent/State, though did not deny the proceeding of requisition of the land of the writ petitioner, however, it is submitted that with the introduction of the provision of Section (3A) of the Act I of 1894 by way of a State amendment, revised estimate of Rs.30,86,915/- has been prepared, however, the final award could not be declared as no fund could be placed with the respondent No. 3/authority by the requiring body. 8. Ms. Ray, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent/NHAI authority in course of her submission places her reliance upon a judgment and order dated 16.04.2025, as passed by this Court in WPA 7392 of 2025 (Amar Kumar Das & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.). It is submitted by Ms. Ray that in the said judgment of Amar Kumar Das (supra), this Court declined to grant relief to the writ petitioner on the ground of delay and laches where the acquisition process was initiated in the year 1972-1973. It is submitted by Ms. Ray that in the case in hand, according to the writ petitioner, the acquisition process was initiated on 21.12.1948 under Act II of 1948. 5 It is further argued by Ms. Ray that for the sake of argument, though no admitted, that the writ petitioner’s right to seek adequate compensation accrued on 01.04.1997, there was no proper explanation in the pleading of the writ petition as to what prompted the writ petitioner to approach this Court so belatedly. 9. It is submitted by Ms. Ray that keeping in mind the spirit of the judgment as passed by this Court in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra) and the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of University of Delhi vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2020)13 SCC 745, the writ petitioner is not entitled to any relief as prayed for. Ms. Ray further placed her reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683. 10. In his reply, Mr. Pan submits before this Court that the inaction of the respondent/State tantamounts to continuous breaches as contemplated under Section 22 of the Limitation Act. It is further argued by Mr. Pan that noticing Section 24 of Act XXX of 2013, which was brought into effect on 01.01.2014 and wherein there is no whisper with regard to the lapsed acquisition proceeding under Act II of 1948, the instant writ petition was filed in the year 2015 and thus by no stretch of imagination it can be said that there occurred delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner in approaching the writ court. 6 11. This Court has meticulously gone through the entire materials as placed before this Court. This Court has given its due consideration over the submissions of learned advocates for the contending parties. 12. Since Ms. Ray, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the NHAI authority has raised the point of delay and laches, this Court at the very outset proposes to deal with the same. 13. On careful perusal of the judgment and order dated 16.04.2025 as passed by this Court in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra), it appears to this Court that the subject matter as involved in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra) was a requisition proceeding of the year 1972-1973. Like this case, in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra), no award was passed in favour of the writ petitioner of the said writ petition either under Act II of 1948 or under Act I of 1894. 14. In the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra), on behalf of the respondent/State it was specifically contended that there was no pleading in the said writ petition being WPA 7392 of 2025, regarding unexplained and inordinate delay and inexcusable laches on the part of the writ petitioner to approach the writ court. 15. While dealing with the rival submission in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra), this Court held thus: “11. Considering the rival submissions of the parties to the instant writ petition, this Court considers that the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of University of Delhi versus Union of India and Others reported in 7 (2020) 13 SCC 745 is required to be looked into. Paragraph 23 of the said reported decision is quoted hereinbelow in verbatim:- “23. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration 8 that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800%.” 12. Keeping in mind the proposition of law as decided in the reported decision of University of Delhi (supra), this Court finds that in the instant writ petition no endeavour has been made by the writ petitioners for explaining the delay as to what prevented them to approach this Court after a considerable length of time, especially when the acquisition proceeding was started in the year 1972-73. As decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the reported decision of University of Delhi (supra) that while considering the condonation of delay written explanation regarding day to day delay is not at all required, however, from the averments made in the writ petition sufficient cause must have been shown by the writ petitioners to justify the delay. 13. This Court has meticulously perused all the paragraphs of the instant writ petition. This Court finds no averment at all on the part of the writ petitioners as to what prompted the writ petitioners to approach this Court for ventilating their grievances after so many decades. 14. Admittedly, the State authorities are not permitted to take law in their own hand infringing the right of the writ 9 petitioners as enshrined under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. However, this Court considers that in the event the aforementioned unexplained and inordinate delay is condoned in absence of any specific pleading in the writ petition that would, in considered view of this Court is against the public interest.” 16. It thus appears to this Court that in the case of Amar Kumar Das (supra), this Court declined to entertain the said writ petition being WPA 7392 of 2025 in absence of any sufficient cause shown by the writ petitioner to justify the delay. 17. In course of his reply, Mr. Pan could not show any averment in the writ petition as to what prompted the writ petitioner to file the writ petition in the year 2015 especially when it is the case of the writ petitioner that the respondent/State is allegedly in unauthorized occupation of the writ petitioner’s on and from 01.04.1997. Mr. Pan made an endeavor to justify the action of the writ petitioner by placing his reliance upon Section 22 of the Limitation Act. 18. In considered view of this Court, Section 22 of the Limitation Act deals with the cases of continuing breach of contract or continuing tort. In considered view of this Court, the subject matter of the instant writ petition is neither continuing breach of contract nor a continuing tort. Therefore, in considered view of this Court Section 22 of the Limitation 10 Act has got no manner of application in this writ petition. The argument of Mr. Pan that in Section 24 of Act XXX of 2013, there was no provision in respect of the lapse proceeding of Act II of 1948, and the said Act of XXX of 2013 came into effect on 01.01.2014 and the instant writ petition was filed in the year 2015, appears to be attractive in first blush, however, on careful perusal of the entire materials as placed before this Court it appears to this Court that the writ petitioner has miserably failed and neglected to explain her inaction in between 01.04.1997 till 31.12.2013 by way of proper pleading. 19. This Court is well aware that there is no period of limitation for filing a writ petition. However, in the event of unexplained and inordinate delay and in absence of any specific pleading in the writ petition, a writ court may decline to invoke its high prerogative writ jurisdiction. 20. As rightly pointed out by Ms. Ray that within the four corners of the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner made no endeavor to explain the delay and laches in filing the instant writ petition especially when it is the specific case that on and from 01.04.1997, the respondent/State is unauthorizedly and unlawfully occupying the land of her. 21. Since this Court has already hold that the instant writ petition cannot be entertained on account of unexplained delay and laches and in absence of any cogent explanation to justify such delay, this Court finds no reason to enter into the merits of the instant writ petition. 11 22. With the aforesaid observations, the instant writ petition is dismissed. 23. There shall, however, no order as to costs. 24. Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all the necessary formalities. (Partha Sarathi Sen, J.) S.R. [AR(C)]/Sws.M[/AR(C)]