1 2026:CGHC:6137-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 185 of 2020 • The State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Dabhra, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus • Chakradhar Singh, S/o Ballabh Singh, aged about 32 Years, R/o Faraswani, P.S. Dabhra, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant/State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent : None. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board 04.02.2026 Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. Heard on admission. 1. This acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 22.01.2020 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. in Sessions Case No.32/2018, whereby the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charge under Section 436 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) on the basis of benefit of doubt. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 11.08.2018 at about 1:40 PM, PW-2 Akti Bai lodged an FIR (Ex.P-1) at Police Station Dabhra against the accused/respondent alleging therein that on 10.08.2018, at about AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.02.05 15:55:43 +0530 2 10:00 PM, she was sleeping in her house along with her children after having dinner. It is further alleged that at about 10:00 PM, when her daughter PW-1 Mamta woke up to attend nature’s call, she noticed smoke emanating from another room of the house. Thereafter, she and PW-1 Mamta went towards the said room and allegedly saw accused/respondent- Chakradhar Singh, present there, who fled from the spot upon being noticed. A plastic bottle containing kerosene was allegedly found near the house. Upon raising an alarm, the villagers gathered at the spot and the fire brigade was called, which subsequently extinguished the fire. It is alleged that PW-3 Sohan Lal and PW-4 Arun Sanvra also saw the accused/respondent fleeing from the spot. 3. During the course of investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-9. From the spot, burnt clothes, burnt wooden logs, one plastic bottle emitting the smell of kerosene and burnt ash were seized vide Ex.P-5. The accused/respondent was taken into custody vide Ex.P-14 and the statements of the witnesses were recorded. 4. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the concerned trial Court. The accused/respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of charge leveled against him. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent of the aforementioned charge by recording perverse findings. He further submits that the trial Court has also erred in disbelieving the evidence of 3 PW-1 Mamta & PW-2 Akti Bai, who are natural witnesses and whose testimonies clearly establish that respondent was seen fleeing from the spot immediately after the incident of fire. He further submits that the factum of fire stands duly proved and the recovery of the kerosene bottle further corroborates the prosecution case. Despite the availability of sufficient and cogent evidence on record, the learned Trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the material available on record. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 9. The occurrence of fire in the house of the complainant/PW-2 is not in dispute and stands proved from the evidence of the fire officer (PW-6 Manoj Kumar Rawat, seizure of burnt articles and other documentary evidence. However, the core issue for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the fire was caused by the accused/respondent. 4 10.The prosecution mainly relies upon the evidence of PW-2 Akti Bai and PW-1 Mamta. PW-2 Akti Bai, complainant, stated in her examination-in- chief that on the night of the incident at about 10:00 PM, when she woke up along with her daughter, she saw that respondent had fled from the spot after setting her house on fire. She further stated that a kerosene bottle was lying near the house and that due to fire, household articles including clothes, books and a cash amount were burnt. However, in her cross- examination, she admitted that she had informed the police that she had identified the respondent in the electric light installed near the house of another villager, however, this fact does not find mention in the FIR (Ex.P-1) lodged by her. She also admitted that although she claimed that an amount of Rs.10,000/- kept in the house was burnt, but this fact too is not mentioned in the FIR (Ex.P-1). She also failed to offer any explanation for these omissions. It also emerges from her evidence that the FIR (Ex.P-1) was lodged on the next day in the afternoon, despite the fact that the police had visited the spot during the night. 11.Contradicting the statement of PW-2 Akti Bai, PW-1 Mamta, daughter of complainant, stated that she woke up at about 10:00 PM to attend nature’s call and noticed fire in the house and saw the respondent fleeing from the spot. She further stated that the fire continued for several days and that school books and agricultural tools were burnt. However, in her cross- examination, she admitted that the fire brigade had arrived on the same night. Her statement that the fire continued for nearly a week stands contradicted by PW-3 Sohan Lal, who stated that when he reached the spot, the fire had already been extinguished. 12.This apart, both PW-1 Mamta and PW-2 Akti Bai claimed that independent 5 witnesses had reached the spot on hearing their alarm and that they were shouting that the respondent had set the house on fire. However, independent witnesses PW-3 Sohan Lal and PW-4 Arun Sanwara have not supported this version. Both of them have denied that the complainant or her daughter named the respondent at the spot or that they saw the respondent fleeing from the house. Furthermore, there is also material inconsistency regarding the time of occurrence. While PW-1 Mamta and PW-2 Akti Bai stated that the incident occurred at about 10:00 PM, whereas PW-3 Sohan Lal stated that he noticed the fire at about 7–8 PM. This contradiction is significant, as the prosecution alleges that the respondent was seen fleeing from the spot at about 10:00 PM. In these circumstances, the possibility of an error in observation or some exaggeration in the version of the witnesses cannot be ruled out. 13. Thus, from perusal of the above evidence, it is quite vivid that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW-1 Mamta and PW-2 Aktibai and their testimonies do not corroborate with each other and the other evidence available on record in respect of the alleged incident. Further, PW-3 Sohan Lal and PW-4 Arun Sanvra, who are independent witnesses, have also not supported the version of PW-1 Mamta and PW-2 Aktibai. Apart from this, the omissions in the FIR (Ex.P-1) regarding identification of the accused/respondent in electric light and the alleged burning of cash amount are not minor in nature. These omissions go to the root of the prosecution case and adversely affect the credibility of PW-1 Mamta and PW-2 Akti Bai. Moreover, the delay in lodging the FIR (Ex.P-1), despite the fact that the police had visited the spot, has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Furthermore, there is no cogent and clinching evidence on record to establish that it was the respondent 6 who set the complainant’s house on fire, and in the absence of such reliable evidence, it cannot be held that the accused/respondent is the author of the crime in question. 14.The learned Trial Court, after elaborately discussing and analysing the evidence led by the prosecution, has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused/respondent of the charge levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt. 15.The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:- "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- "(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;' (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re- appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." 7 16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen & Mallappa (supra), the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view. In the absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 17.Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed at the admission stage. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh