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2026 DAILYLAW 4293 (RAJ)

JAWAHAR LAL REGAR SON OF SHRI NANDRAM v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

CW/1303/2020 · 2026-03-16

Nupur Bhati

body2026

Judgment text

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[2026:RJ-JP:11068] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1303/2020 Jawahar Lal Regar Son Of Shri Nandram, Aged About 43 Years, Resident Of 19, Jai Nagar, Harmada, V.k.i.a., Jaipur. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of Education, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 2. Director, Elementary Education, Bikaner. 3. District Education Officer (Hq) Elementary Education, Jaipur. 4. Chief Block Education Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Govindgarh, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Krishan Chander Sharma Mr. Pawan Sharma Mr. Vaibhav Pancholy For Respondent(s) : Mr. Gopal Krishan Sharma HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NUPUR BHATI Order 16/03/2026 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking following relief(s):- “It is therefore, most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to quash and set the orders dated 17.09.2019 and 03.12.2019 (Annexure-1 and 2) and further be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. Any other order/ direction/ relief which this Hon’ble Court deems proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favor of the petitioner along with cost.” [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (2 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as a teacher on 25.01.1997 and while he was serving at Government Upper Primary School, Dola Ka Bas, Panchayat Samiti Govindgarh, Jaipur, a charge-sheet dated 11.07.2019 was issued to the petitioner by the Chief Block Education Officer alleging that he had been convicted under Sections 302/149 IPC by a competent criminal court and sentenced to life imprisonment, which allegedly tarnished the image of the department. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet alleging therein that although he had been convicted, the sentence awarded to him had already been suspended by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 13.11.2013 in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 538/2012 (SOSA No. 619/2013 : Phoolaram @ Phool Chand & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan). Despite the suspension of sentence by the Hon’ble High Court and further staying of the conviction by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the District Education Officer (HQ), Elementary, Jaipur dismissed the petitioner from service vide order dated 17.09.2019 by invoking Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 on the ground of conduct leading to conviction on a criminal charge. 3. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the Director, Elementary Education, Bikaner, challenging the dismissal order; however, the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 03.12.2019. Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 17.09.2019 and the appellate order dated 03.12.2019, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition before this Hon’ble Court, contending that since the sentence awarded by the criminal court had already [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (3 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] been suspended and further conviction recorded by the criminal court having been stayed, the disciplinary authority ought not to have invoked Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958, as the provision is not mandatory in nature. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been terminated by the respondents vide order dated 17.09.2019 on the ground that the petitioner was convicted in Sessions Case No. 26/2011 vide order dated 18.06.2012 under Sections 302/149 IPC. He submits that during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner had preferred criminal appeal being Hon’ble D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 538/2012, and along with which an application for suspension of sentence was also filed, wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 13.11.2023 had allowed the application with the directions that the sentence shall remain suspended. He submits that during the pendency of the criminal appeal, the petitioner had preferred another D.B. Criminal Stay Application which came to be allowed vide order dated 26.04.2023 in which the conviction recorded against the applicant by the criminal court vide order dated 18.06.2012, qua the applicant, was stayed. The relevant portion of the order dated 26.04.2023 passed by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court while staying the conviction reads as infra: “7. In the present case in hand also, the sentence of applicant stands suspended vide order dated 13.11.2013 and applicant continued to perform his duties as a teacher. The case is squarely covered by the judgments cited herein above, hence, we deem it proper to stay the conviction order qua the applicant till disposal of the appeal to avoid the hardship that has fallen upon the applicant. [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (4 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] 8. Consequently, the judgment and order of conviction dated 18.06.2012 qua he applicant shall remain stayed. 9. Stay application stands disposed.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits in view of conviction recorded against the petitioner having been stayed by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the respondents ought to have reinstated the petitioner back in service with immediate effect the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents is not in a position to dispute that the judgment and order of conviction 18.06.2012 has been stayed qua the petitioner by the Hon'ble Division Bench vide order dated 26.04.2023, he also fairly submits before the court that the petitioner has not informed the respondents department about the fact that the judgment and order of conviction dated 18.06.2012 has been stayed. 7. Having regard to the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that it is well settled that when the conviction of an employee is stayed by a competent court, the consequences flowing from such conviction, including dismissal from service on that ground, cannot be allowed to operate so as to cause undue prejudice to the employee during the pendency of the appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lok Prahari v. Election Commission of India reported in AIR 2018 SC 4678, has authoritatively held that where the conviction itself is stayed under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the disqualification or adverse consequences which arise solely on account of the conviction would cease to operate during the [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (5 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] subsistence of the stay order. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “12. The above position was reiterated by a Bench of three judges of this Court in Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali MANU/SC/8600/2006 : (2007) 1 SCC 673 , after adverting to the earlier decisions on the issue, viz. Rama Narang v.Ramesh Narang (supra), State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Jaganathan MANU/SC/0620/1996 : (1996) 5 SCC 329,K.C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh MANU/SC/0409/2001 : (2001) 6 SCC 584,B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N. (supra) and State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan MANU/SC/1077/2003 : (2003) 12 SCC 432. This Court concluded as follows: It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the Rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. As order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only nonoperative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying that consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the Appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the Respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction. 13. In Lily Thomas (supra), it was urged that in the absence of Section 8(4), a Member of Parliament or of the State Legislature would be left without a remedy even if the conviction was "frivolous". Rejecting the submission, this Court held (relying on Ravi Kant Patil (supra): In the aforesaid case, a contention was raised by the Respondents that the Appellant was disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly Under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act as he had been convicted for an offence punishable Under Sections 366 and 376 of the Penal Code and it was held by the three-Judge Bench that as the High Court for special reasons had passed an order staying the conviction, the disqualification arising out of the conviction ceased to operate after the stay of conviction. Therefore, the disqualification Under Sub-sections (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act will not operate from the date of order of stay of conviction passed by the appellate court Under Section 389 of the Code or the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code. [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (6 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] 14. These decisions have settled the position on the effect of an order of an appellate court staying a conviction pending the appeal. Upon the stay of a conviction Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the disqualification Under Section 8 will not operate. The decisions in Ravi Kant Patil and Lily Thomas conclude the issue. Since the decision in Rama Narang, it has been well-settled that the appellate court has the power, in an appropriate case, to stay the conviction Under Section 389 besides suspending the sentence. The power to stay a conviction is by way of an exception. Before it is exercised, the appellate court must be made aware of the consequence which will ensue if the conviction were not to be stayed. Once the conviction has been stayed by the appellate court, the disqualification Under Subsections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 will not operate. Under Article 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e), the disqualification operates by or under any law made by Parliament. Disqualification under the above provisions of Section 8 follows upon a conviction for one of the listed offences. Once the conviction has been stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the disqualification which operates as a consequence of the conviction cannot take or remain in effect. In view of the consistent statement of the legal position in Rama Narang and in decisions which followed, there is no merit in the submission that the power conferred on the appellate court Under Section 389 does not include the power, in an appropriate case, to stay the conviction. Clearly, the appellate court does possess such a power. Moreover, it is untenable that the disqualification which ensues from a conviction will operate despite the appellate court having granted a stay of the conviction. The authority vested in the appellate court to stay a conviction ensures that a conviction on untenable or frivolous grounds does not operate to cause serious prejudice. As the decision in Lily Thomas has clarified, a stay of the conviction would relieve the individual from suffering the consequence inter alia of a disqualification relatable to the provisions of Sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 8.” 8. In view of the above and taking into consideration the fact that the conviction of the petitioner was stayed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 26.04.2023. This court finds that the disqualification which operated as a consequence of the conviction order does not remain in effect and therefore the writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. However, it is made clear that such reinstatement shall remain subject to the final outcome of D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 538/2012 pending before this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:11068] (7 of 7) [CW-1303/2020] 9. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present writ petition and stay petition stand disposed of. (DR.NUPUR BHATI),J ANMOL /50