IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) WPA 9451 of 2026 Eastern Coalfields Limited Vs Union of India & Ors. For the Petitioner : Mr. Manik Das. For the Union of India : Mr. Anil Kr. Gupta, Mr. Amal Kr. Datta, Mr. Bhaskar Dolui. Judgment reserved on : 02.09.2026 Judgment delivered on : 23.09.2026 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an award dated 08.09.2025 passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Asansol, in Reference Case No. 76 of 2006. 2. The learned Tribunal has directed the petitioner herein to provide compassionate appointment to the private respondent no. 5. 3. Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Eastern Coalfields has brought to the notice of this Court that Reference no. 76 of 2006 which 2 has now been decided vide the impugned award, had already been disposed of by passing a "no dispute award" on 17.11.2009. 4. In Reference Case No. was 76 of 2006, the learned CGIT vide the impugned award has also decided the same Reference 76 of 2006. 5. The learned Tribunal has noted in the impugned award that the Reference was made in the year 2006 and during hearing of the Reference, no written statement was filed and on 14.01.2016 an order was passed by the Tribunal that ECL had not filed written statement. It appears that the said order was also passed after the Reference Case had already been disposed of by the "no dispute award", when a prayer for setting aside of the "no dispute award" was made by way of a Misc Case. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the said "no dispute award" has already been implemented on the same being published and thus became enforceable on 22nd March, 2010. 7. Subsequently, the respondent no. 4 preferred an application before the Tribunal for setting aside of the "no dispute award" award and Misc Case 7 of 2010 was initiated for considering the said application for setting aside of the "no dispute award". It appears that the tribunal vide an order dated 25.06.2013, on hearing the parties restored Reference No. 76 of 2006 and the Misc Case was closed. Then the learned CGIT proceeded with the said Reference Case being restored. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Versus Central Government Industrial Tribunal And Others, 1980 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 3 420, submits that once an award has been passed and has been enforced, it cannot be recalled. In the present case admittedly the order recalling the "no dispute award" was passed, after the award had been enforced. 9. It is the case of the petitioner that a fresh reference is not barred, but an award which has already been answered and has been enforced cannot be reopened or recalled and heard afresh. On this ground, the petitioner has preferred the writ application, praying for setting aside of the order. 10. It the case of the petitioner that CGIT has the power to set aside an award until 30 days have not expired after publication of the award as the proceedings with regard to a reference under section 10 of the ID Act would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 20 (3) of the ID Act and the award becomes enforceable under section 17A of the ID Act on the expiry of its publication under section 17 of the Act. 11. Thus the proceedings with regard to a reference under section of the ID Act are deemed to be not concluded until expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication thereby denoting that upon expiry of 30 days from the date of the publication of the award, the Reference shall be deemed to have concluded and the CGIT retained no jurisdiction over the matter on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award dated 17-11-2009 and as such had no power to recall or set aside the award dated 17-11-2009. 4 12. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Award dated 08-09-2025 made by the CGIT, Asansol, in Reference Case No. 76 of 2006 is thus bad in law and is liable to be set aside and/or quashed. 13. The Union of India is present but has left the matter to the Court. 14. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (1980) (Supra) (Paragraphs 3, 6, 7, to 11 and 14), has been relied upon by the petitioner, wherein the Court held:- “3. Two questions arise in the appeal, namely (1) whether the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award, particularly when it was based on evidence, and (2) whether the Tribunal became functus officio on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award under Section 17, by reason of sub-section (3) of Section 20 and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and the Central Government alone had the power under sub-section (1) of Section 17-A to set it aside. 6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary. 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, as substituted by Section 9 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, is in these terms : “11. (1) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, 5 Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit.” The words “shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority may think fit” are of the widest amplitude and confer ample power upon the Tribunal and other authorities to devise procedure as the justice of the case demands. Under clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 11, the Tribunal and other authorities have the same powers, as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, of (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Under clause (d) thereof, the Tribunal or such other authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Although the Tribunal or other authorities specified in Section 11 are not courts but they have the trappings of a court, and they exercise quasi-judicial functions. 8. The object of giving such wide powers is to mitigate the rigour of the technicalities of the law, for achieving the object of effective investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and thus assuring industrial peace and harmony. The discretion thus conferred on these authorities to determine the procedure as they may think fit, however, is subject to the rules made by the “appropriate Government” in this behalf. Part III of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 makes rules in this behalf. Rules 9 to 30 are the relevant rules regulating procedure. State Governments too have made their own corresponding rules. Except to the extent specified in sub- section (3) of Section 11 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not applicable to proceedings before the authorities mentioned in sub-section (1). The provisions of the Evidence Act, in their strict sense, likewise do not apply to proceedings before the authorities. Nevertheless, all these authorities being quasi-judicial in nature objectively determining matters referred to them, have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner, without caprice, and according to the general principles of law and rules of natural justice. 6 9. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central Rules), 1957 framed by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 38 of the Act, provides : “22. If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceedings before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.” Rule 24(b) provides that the Tribunal or other body shall have the power of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the matter of grant of adjournments. It runs thus : “24. In addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely— (b) granting adjournment;” 10. When sub-section (1) of Section 11 expressly and in clear terms confers power upon the Tribunal to regulate its own procedure, it must necessarily be endowed with all powers which bring about an adjudication of an existing industrial dispute, after affording all the parties an opportunity of a hearing. We are inclined to the view that where a party is prevented from appearing at the hearing due to a sufficient cause, and is faced with an ex parte award, it is as if the party is visited with an award without a notice of the proceedings. It is needless to stress that where the Tribunal proceeds to make an award without notice to a party, the award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power but also the duty to set aside the ex parte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh. 11. The language of Rule 22 unequivocally makes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to render an ex parte award conditional upon the fulfilment of its requirements. If there is no sufficient cause for the absence of a party, the Tribunal undoubtedly has jurisdiction to proceed ex parte. But if there was sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have had no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. In other words, there is power to proceed ex parte, but such power is subject to the 7 fulfilment of the condition laid down in Rule 22. The power to proceed ex parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing. 14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by Respondent 3, acting on behalf of Respondents 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was, however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed, the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. We cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders.” 15. In the present case, it is on record that:- 8 i. The self same reference no. 76 of 2006 was disposed of as a ‘no dispute’ award on 17.11.2009. ii. The ‘no dispute’ award was published and enforced on 22nd March, 2010. iii. Vide an order dated 25.06.2013 the CGIT set aside the ‘no dispute’ award by allowing a Misc Case being No. 7 of 2010. iv. The CGIT then proceeded to pass the order impugned. 16. In M/s. Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. vs Phool Chand, in Civil Appeal No. 5650 of 2018, decided on May 18, 2018, the Supreme Court held:- “2. The question arising for consideration in this case is whether the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court is functus officio after the award has become enforceable, and is thus, prevented from considering an application for setting aside an ex parte award. 35. Merely because an award has become enforceable, does not necessarily mean that it has become binding. For an award to become binding, it should be passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice. An award passed denying an opportunity of hearing when there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance can be challenged on the ground of it being nullity. An award which is a nullity cannot be and shall not be a binding award. In case a party is able to show sufficient cause within a reasonable time for its non-appearance in the Labour Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte, the Labour Court/Tribunal is bound to consider such an application and the application cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after the award had become enforceable. The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus officio after the award has become enforceable as far as setting aside an ex parte award is concerned. It is within its powers to entertain an application as per the scheme of the Act and in terms of the rules of natural justice. It needs to be restated that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a welfare legislation intended to maintain industrial peace. In that view of the matter, certain powers to do justice have to be 9 conceded to the Labour Court/Tribunal, whether we call it ancillary, incidental or inherent.” 17. The judgment in Grindlays Bank (Supra) was also considered by the Court while passing the said judgment in M/s. Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. (Supra). 18. Admittedly the order dated 25.06.2013 in Misc Case 7/2010 was never challenged. 19. The challenge is to the impugned final award passed on merit. 20. On perusal of the final award impugned it appears that the learned CGIT has taken into consideration the NCWA applicable and also the eligibility of the claimant on proper appreciation of evidence before it and this Court finds no grounds made out which calls for any interference. 21. WPA 9451 of 2026 is dismissed. 22. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of consequently. 23. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 24. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)