Form No.J(2) IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present : The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya & The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandip Kumar De FMA 1148 of 2026 with CAN 1 of 2026 Smt. Rama Devi Goenka Vs. All India Trinamool Congress For the appellant : Mr. Soumo Mazumdar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Tonmoy Mukherjee, Mr. Moyukh Mukherjee, ` Mr. Kaustav Lal Mukherjee, Ms. Shrestha Bhattacharjee, Ms. Sagnika Banerjee, Advs. For the respondent : Mr. Shoeb Alam, Sr. Adv., Mr. Anirban Ray, Sr. Adv., Mr. Souradipta Banerjee, Mr. Nipun Saxena, Mr. Agnish Basu, Mr. Sarbajit Mukherjee, Mr. Vipul Vedant, Mr. Gourav Bose, Mr. Aditya Roy, Advs. Heard on : September 23, 2026. Judgment on : September 23, 2026. Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya , J. : 1. Affidavit of service filed today be kept on record. 2. The appeal is admitted, to be heard on the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal. 3. In view of the short issues involved, we take up the appeal itself for hearing, along with the connected application. 4. The premise of the challenge in the suit, from which the appeal arises, is in respect of an eviction notice purportedly given under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by the appellant. 5. Admittedly, the defendant/appellant is a lessor. 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant argues that by the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge granted status quo in respect of the suit premises till disposal of the suit, whereas the matter was at the ad-interim stage, thereby disposing of the temporary injunction application itself, thus traversing beyond jurisdiction. 7. Secondly, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge erred in law in passing a blanket order of status quo without taking into consideration whether the suit is maintainable at the threshold. 8. Learned senior counsel submits that the principal relief sought in the suit is that a notice of eviction issued by the defendant/lessor/appellant for eviction of the lessee dated August 25, 2026 cannot be acted upon. 2 9. It is contended that such a prayer for injunction would have the effect of restraining the lessor/appellant from prosecuting a judicial proceeding for eviction on the strength of the said notice, which relief is barred under Section 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 10. It is further argued that the notice was issued for the termination of a lease which, by its very nature, is determinable. Hence, such an agreement cannot be specifically performed in terms of Section 14(d) of the 1963 Act and, consequentially, a suit for injunction in respect of the same is barred under Section 41(e) of the said Act. 11. Learned senior counsel next submits that whereas the lease deed was executed with the West Bengal Trinamool Youth Congress, described as a unit of All India Trinamool Congress, the suit has been instituted by the All India Trinamool Congress itself, describing the lessee, that is, West Bengal Trinamool Youth Congress as one of its units. 12. Thus, whereas the All India Trinamool Youth Congress is the admitted lessee, the suit has been instituted by a different entity, which strikes at the very maintainability of the suit. 13. Learned senior counsel further points out that although only 24 hours have been granted to the plaintiff/respondent to vacate the suit premises, which is less than the notice period contemplated in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the notice is also covered by Section 111 of the said Act, which permits eviction in case of breach of any of the terms of the contract between the parties. In the present 3 case, since there is an allegation of default and other breaches of the terms of the registered lease deed between the parties, the notice was very much valid. Consequentially, it is submitted that the status quo granted by the impugned order was contrary to law as well as the terms of the lease deed. 14. Learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, on the other hand, controverts such allegations and points out that the notice was purportedly issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, whereas the mandatory period of 15 days was not given in the said notice. 15. Secondly, sub-section (1) of Section 106 of the 1882 Act subjects the provisions of the said Section to the contract between the parties. By placing reliance on Clause 7 of the lease deed and its sub-clauses, it is argued by the respondent that there is only one window for the lessor to terminate the deed of lease. As per Clause 7.1, in the event of non-payment of lease rent by the lessee, that too, for a period of 6 consecutive months after the same has become due, the lessor may, after the expiry of the said 6 months of non-payment, at his sole option, by a notice of not less than 15 days to the lessee, terminate the deed of lease. In the present case, no such prior opportunity has been given to the lessee/respondent to make good the default, even if there be any, prior to taking recourse to an eviction notice. 4 16. Furthermore, it is argued that the eviction notice falls short of the mandatory period of 15 days as envisaged in Clause 7.1 as well as Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 17. Regarding the argument of the appellant that Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act operates independent of the contract between the, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submits that the question of whether there has actually been any breach of the terms of the lease agreement is arguable on facts and on law and as such, forms a triable issue, all the more necessitating an injunction to be granted to protect the possession of the respondent. 18. On the query of Court as to the bar under Section 41(a) of the 1963 Act, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submits candidly that by way of the prayer made in the injunction application, the intention of the plaintiff/respondent was not to restrain the defendant from initiating any proceedings in accordance with law but merely to protect the plaintiff’s possession. 19. We find from the arguments advanced before us that there is substance in the contention of the respondent as to the issues raised by the defendant/appellant being arguable, thus giving rise to triable issues. 20. Insofar as the maintainability of the suit is concerned, since conflicting positions of law have emerged from the respective arguments of the parties, as discussed above, the said issue is left open to be decided by the learned Trial Judge tentatively at the final disposal 5 of the temporary injunction application as well as conclusively at the final disposal of the suit. 21. Insofar as the alleged discrepancy between the names of the lessee and the plaintiff in the suit is concerned, an arguable case has been made out by the respondent to the extent that in the notice impugned in the suit, the defendant/lessor apparently proceeded on the footing that the lessee, that is, the All India Trinamool Youth Congress, is a unit of All India Trinamool Congress, which is the plaintiff in the suit. 22. Although the said issue cannot be conclusively decided at this premature stage, definitely, such issue raises an arguable question to be decided at the final disposal of the injunction application as well as the suit. 23. However, we accept the contention of the appellant that the learned Trial Judge acted beyond jurisdiction in granting blanket status quo in respect of the suit premises, thereby traversing beyond even the prayers made in the temporary injunction application. Secondly, the learned Trial Judge also acted without jurisdiction in granting injunction till disposal of the suit whereas the injunction application was at the ad-interim hearing stage. Even if the defendant/appellant, who was on caveat, advanced arguments, the same was confined to the ad interim stage. The defendant never specifically relinquished the right to contest the temporary injunction application on merits by filing written objection thereto. 6 24. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the purpose of justice would be subserved if the enjoyment and possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property is protected in the interregnum before the temporary injunction application is disposed of finally, subject of course to the defendant/appellant resorting to due process of law for the purpose of eviction of the plaintiff. 25. Accordingly, FMA 1148 of 2026 is disposed of on contest, thereby modifying the impugned order, bearing Order no. 2 dated September 2, 2026, to the extent that the defendant/appellant shall remain restrained by an order of injunction from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff/respondent in respect of the suit property till disposal of the temporary injunction application pending in the Trial Court, except in accordance with law and by following due process of law. 26. The appellant shall file her written objection to the temporary injunction application within a fortnight from date. It is expected that the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the injunction application itself on merits, without being unnecessarily influenced by any of the observations made above, as expeditiously as the business of the said court permits, preferably within a fortnight from the re-opening of the Trial Court after the upcoming Annual Vacation. 27. It is made clear that none of the above observations shall unnecessarily influence the learned Trial Judge at the time of final disposal of the temporary injunction application and/or the suit. All 7 questions raised by the parties respectively are kept open for being decided at the time of final disposal of the temporary injunction application as well as the suit. 28. CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of as well. 29. There will be no order as to costs. 30. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities. I agree. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Sandip Kumar De, J.) AD-18 Ct No.16 (SSS) 8