IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi C.O. 382 of 2017 Sri Shyamal Dey Vs. Sri Aloke Kumar Bose & Ors. For the petitioner : Mr. Chandra Sekhar Banerjee, Mrs. Riya Banerjee, Mr. Shamit Dutta Heard on : 22.09.2026 Judgment on : 22.09.2026 MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.: 1. None appears for the opposite parties despite service. 2. Heard the learned advocate for the petitioner. 3. The instant revisional application has been filed assailing an order dated 22nd December, 2016 passed by the presiding Member of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as ‘State Commission’). 2 4. By the impugned order the Learned State Commission allowed the complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 with cost to be paid by the opposite party nos. 1 and 2. The same was allowed exparte as against opposite party nos. 3 to 5 therein. The opposite parties were directed jointly and severally to execute the deed of conveyance in respect of the flat as per terms of the agreement for dated 8th June, 2001 within one month from the date, otherwise the complainant shall have liberty to get the deed executed through the machinery of the State Commission. The opposite party nos. 1 and 2 were directed to pay compensation of Rs. 50,000/- each and litigation cost of Rs. 5,000/- each within 30 days from the date of passing of the order. In default the said amounts were directed to carry interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. 5. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner, who was opposite party no. 2 in the proceeding before the State Commission, that there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and the opposite parties, who are the intending purchasers of flats in the disputed building. 6. It is submitted that there was an agreement between the developer and the intending purchasers/opposite parties herein for purchase of flats in the disputed building. The present petitioner or his predecessor in interest had no such contract 3 with the opposite parties. They did not receive any consideration money from the intending purchasers as such the petitioner cannot be obliged to execute the deed of conveyance in favour of the opposite parties. 7. The learned advocate for the petitioner also submitted that the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd December, 2016 also suffers from the violation of the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1986’). He refers to the provisions of Section 14 and Section 18 of the Act of 1986. 8. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the coram for deciding a complaint, in terms of the provisions of the Act of 1986 should comprise of the President and at least one Member of the State Commission. The impugned judgment and order has been passed by a Member of the State Commission and as such it is violative of Section 14 of the Act of 1986. 9. The opposite parties entered into an agreement that the developer opposite party no. 2 herein on 8th June, 2001 for purchase of flat measuring 1135 sq. ft. on the second floor of the premises no. 15C, Abinash Banerjee Lane, P.S.- Beliaghata, Kolkata – 700010 by a consideration of Rs. 9,01,000/-. 10. It was the case of the intending purchasers that the entire consideration money was paid to the developer and accordingly 4 the developer handed over the possession of the disputed flat to the intending purchasers. However, in spite of payment of the entire consideration money, the opposite parties were not executing the due deed of conveyance in favour of the intending purchaser/opposite parties. The purchasers approached the State Commission for a direction upon the opposite parties to execute and register the deed of conveyance and to pay compensation and litigation cost etc. The present petitioner/opposite party no. 2 contested such complaint filed by the purchasers. It was the contention of the petitioner in such proceeding that he did not enter into any contract for sale/purchase of the flats. He did not receive any consideration money. As such he was not liable to execute the deed of conveyance. 11. The learned State Commission while deciding the issue no. 3 held as follows: “The contents of Deed of Agreement clearly postulates that the developer shall complete the construction of the flat by 07.06.2001 with a condition that Completion Certificate shall be obtained later on. The Complainant has paid the entire consideration amount. The OP no. 2 being one of the legal heirs of Kamala Dey (original Land owner), since deceased cannot take the plea that he or other legal heirs has/had no knowledge about the terms of the agreement and as such is not binding upon them. When the OP no. 2 is claiming his interest through Kamala Dey, since deceased, he must also bear the burden of estate of deceased Kamala Dey and he cannot absolve his responsibility by taking a plea that he has no knowledge about the terms of the agreement. Thee is no evidence whatsoever that Kamala Dey, since deceased did 5 not execute the Deed in favour of the developer. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the agreement have binding effect upon the legal heirs of the said Kamala Devi.” 12. The learned State Commission took note of the fact that the predecessor of the present petitioner entered into a development agreement with the developer for development of the building over the properties belonging to the predecessors of the present petitioner. the learned State Commission was of the view that since the predecessor of the present petitioner entered into an agreement of development with the developer opposite party, she or her succors cannot shy away from their responsibilities. 13. It is a fact that the predecessor of the present petitioner entered into a development agreement with the developer opposite party. That agreement was in respect of development of the property owned by the predecessor of the present petitioner. The property was developed. As per such agreement, there was owner’s allocation as well as developer’s allocation. The agreement in question that is agreement dated 8th June, 2001 was in between the developer/opposite party and the purchasers/opposite parties. The developer/opposite party agreed to sale out flats from his allocation in the development agreement. There appears no privity of contract between the petitioner and the intending purchasers. The purchasers paid the consideration money for the flat to the developer/opposite party. As such the petitioner being 6 the successor of the original owner of the land who entered into a development agreement with the developer cannot be obliged to execute deed of conveyance in favour of the purchasers. She had her own allocation in the building as owner’s allocation and she is at liberty to deal with such property in any way she or her successors liked. 14. As regards the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd December, 2016 on the ground of coram is concerned, Section 14 sub-Section 2 provides that every proceeding referred to in sub-Section 1 of Section 14 shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum and at least one Member thereof sitting together. The relevant provision of Section 14 is as follows: “14. Finding of the District Forum.- ……………….. ………………… [(2) Every proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum and at least one Member thereof sitting together: [Provided that where a Member, for any reason, is unable to conduct a proceeding till it is completed, the president and the other Member shall continue the Proceeding from the Stage at which it was last heard by the previous Member.] (2-A) Every order made by the District Forum under sub- section (1) shall be signed by its President and the Member or Members who conducted the proceeding: Provided that where the proceeding is conducted by the President and one Member and they differ on any point or points, they shall state the point or points on which they differ and refer the same to the other Member for hearing on such 7 point or points and the opinion of the majority shall be the order of the District Forum.]” 15. Apparently the impugned judgment and order has been passed and signed by the Presiding Member of such State Commission solely. The President of the State Commission has not signed such order and judgment. Section 18 of the Act of 1986 is as follows: “18. Procedure applicable to State Commissions.- [The provisions of sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder] for the disposal of complaints by the District Forum shall, with such modifications as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the State Commission.” 16. It is provided in Section 18 that the provisions of Section 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by District Forum shall, with necessary modifications, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the State Commission. 17. In that view of the fact it is evident that in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 more specifically Section 14(2) and 14(2)(A) of the Act of 1986, impugned judgment and order passed by the State Commission ought to have been signed by the President and at least one Member of the State Commission. Whereas the impugned judgment and order has been signed only by a Member of such State Commission which is apparently 8 violative of the provisions under Section 14 read with Section 18 of the Act of 1986. 18. Therefore, on the basis of discussions made hereinbefore, the impugned judgment and order is hereby set aside. 19. The learned State Commission shall proceed to decide the issue strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1986 as well as the observations made hereinbefore. 20. With such observations the revisional application being C.O. 382 of 2017 is disposed of. 21. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all necessary formalities. (MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.) B.K.N. A.R. (Court)