1 2026:HHC:14208 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA RSA No. 102 of 2016 Reserved on : 10.4.2026 Decided on: 30.4.2026 Udham Singh & anr. …Appellants Versus Raj Kumar …Respondent _____________________________ ______________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge Whether approved for reporting? ___________________________________________________ For the Appellants: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Tarun K. Brakta, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Shwetima Dogra, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge The appellants have preferred the present Regular Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the judgment and decree, dated 10.12.2015, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, Circuit Court at Nurpur, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate Court’), in Civil 2 2026:HHC:14208 Appeal No. 1-1/XIII/2014, titled as, ‘Udham Singh & anr. versus Raj Kumar’. 2. Vide judgment and decree, dated 10.12.2015, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal, preferred by the appellants, against the judgment and decree, dated 10.12.2013, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Court’), in Civil Suit No. 42 of 2011, titled as, ‘Udham Singh & anr. versus Raj Kumar & anr.’, whereby, the learned trial Court has dismissed the above titled suit. 5. For the sake of convenience, the parties, to the present lis, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 6. Brief facts, leading to filing the present appeal, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 3 2026:HHC:14208 The plaintiffs have sought relief of permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants, their family members, agents and servants from creating any sort of interference, dispossessing them, raising any sort of construction, cutting/removing trees and changing the nature of land, comprised in khata No. 201 min, khatauni No. 294, khasra No. 34, measuring 0-38-58 HM, situated in Mohal Ghagwan, Mauza Surdwan, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’). 6.1 As per the stand taken by the plaintiffs, they alongwith defendants and others are joint owners of khata No. 201, measuring 47-04-42 HM. According to the further stand of the plaintiffs, they are exclusively occupying the suit land, whereas defendants have recently purchased share in whole khata No. 201. As such, it has been asserted that defendants have no right to dispossess them and to raise construction over the suit land. According to 4 2026:HHC:14208 the plaintiffs, on the basis of mutation Nos. 510 and 519, defendants are threatening to dispossess them to raise construction over the suit land. Hence, a prayer has been made to decree the suit. 7. When, put to notice, the suit has been contested, by the defendants, by filing written statement, raising preliminary objections with regard to maintainability, estoppel and concealment of material facts. 8. On merit, joint ownership of the parties over the suit land has not been disputed, however, exclusive possession of the plaintiffs has been disputed. According to the defendants, defendant No. 2 has purchased 0-16-43 HMs land from co- sharer namely Bishan Dass, 0-03-86 HM land from co-sharer Lal Chand, 0-04-92 HM land from co- sharer Prakash Chand and 0-07-68 HM land from co-sharer Govind Singh in Khata No. 201. Similarly, defendant No. 1 has purchased land measuring 0- 00-98 HM from defendant No. 2. Plaintiff No. 1 is 5 2026:HHC:14208 stated to have sold 10 marlas of land to the father of defendant No. 1 and father-in-law of defendant No. 2, vide agreement dated 27.4.1991, for sale consideration of Rs. 2,000/-. 8.1 As per the case of the defendants, the plaintiffs had earlier filed the suit for injunction, with regard to suit land against Desh Raj (father of defendant No. 1 and father-in-law of defendant No. 2), which was dismissed and the appeal was also dismissed by the learned District Judge on 5.6.2008. The aforesaid judgment was assailed by plaintiff No. 1 by way of Regular Second Appeal, which is stated to be pending, in this Court. 9. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 22.11.2011: “1.Whether the suit land is joint between the parties, as alleged?-OPP. 2. Whether the defendants threatened to interfere by raising construction over the suit land, as alleged?-OPP. 6 2026:HHC:14208 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for?-OPP. 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable?- OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit?-OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus-standi?-OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action?-OPD. 8. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts from the Court?-OPD. 9. Relief. 10. Thereafter, parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence. After closure of evidence, upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit, vide judgment and decree, dated 10.12.2013. The said judgment and decree has unsuccessfully been assailed by the plaintiffs, before the learned First Appellate Court. 11. Now, the appellants are before this Court by way of present appeal. The findings of both the Courts below have been assailed on the ground that 7 2026:HHC:14208 controversy, as raised in the plaint, has not been considered properly, by both the Courts below. According to the appellants, both the Courts below have not taken into consideration the fact that the plaintiffs are in possession of khasra No. 34 and the defendants, after purchase of land recently tried to raise construction over the suit land. Although, joint ownership of the plaintiffs is stated to have been admitted by the defendants, but, the learned trial Court has wrongly dismissed the suit. 12. According to the appellants, they have filed the suit on the basis of title, being co-owners of khasra No. 34. After purchase of the land, defendants became co-owners of the entire khata, but persons, from whom, the land was purchased by the defendants, were not in possession of khasra No. 34. It has been re-asserted that partition proceedings have not been initiated by the defendants after purchase of the land by them. 8 2026:HHC:14208 13. On the basis of above facts, the findings, as recorded on issues No. 4, to 7 are stated to be erroneous. 14. As such, a prayer has been made to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, by decreeing the suit. 15. Per contra, Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Shwetima Dogra, Advocate, has submitted that the learned trial Court below has rightly appreciated the controversy, involved in the suit, and rightly dismissed the suit, which has been affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the present appeal. 16. The appeal has been admitted by this Court on 16.5.2016, on the following substantial questions of law: “1.Whether both the learned courts below erred in appreciating the provisions of law applicable, pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced by them in its right 9 2026:HHC:14208 perspective, thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees ? 2. Whether both the courts below misread and mis- appreciated the oral and documentary evidence with specific reference to the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 and documents Ext PW-1/A, Ext PW-2/A and Ext P-1, thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees ? 17. Appellants are before this Court against the concurrent findings, recorded by the learned Courts below. There is no legal embargo for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings, if the same falls within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 18. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of 10 2026:HHC:14208 evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 11 2026:HHC:14208 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition 12 2026:HHC:14208 Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there 13 2026:HHC:14208 is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding 14 2026:HHC:14208 relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 19. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration ,   Kuldeep Singh v. 15 2026:HHC:14208 Commissioner of Police & Ors. ,   Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala ). ” 20. Being guided by the above decisions, now this Court would proceed further to determine the fact whether the findings of the learned Courts below fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’? 21. It is the admitted factual position in the present case that plaintiffs and defendants are co-sharers of the suit land, which has not been partitioned. Learned trial Court, in the present case, has rightly appreciated the undisputed facts, qua the suit land, being jointly owned by the defendants and plaintiffs. 22. The plaintiffs, in the present case, examined plaintiff No. 2 Tarabjeet Singh, as PW-1, who has admitted in the cross-examination that one Sudarshna Devi is also occupying one kanal land in khasra No. 34, i.e. the suit land. Not only this, the father of plaintiff No. 1 and father-in-law of plaintiff No. 2, i.e. Des Raj is also stated to be residing in the said suit land, by constructing their house. When, the plaintiffs have failed to establish their exclusive possession over the suit land, 16 2026:HHC:14208 then, the person, who is admittedly the co-sharer, cannot be injuncted. The land is joint between the parties and possession of one co-sharer is possession of all the co-sharers, in the eyes of law. 23. In the present case, it is not the claim of the plaintiffs that they are seeking simplicitor injunction to protect the subject matter of the lis. Here, they have asserted their exclusive possession over the suit land, which they have failed to establish. 24. The learned First Appellate Court, in the present case, has also considered the stand of the parties and thereafter, dismissed the appeal. 25. In view of above, this Court is of the view that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the documentary, as well as, oral evidence, and thereafter, dismissed the suit, which has rightly been affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court and the findings recorded by both the Courts below, do no fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’, thus, need no interference by this Court. 26. No other point has been urged or argued. 17 2026:HHC:14208 27. In view of above, both the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants and the appeal is dismissed and the judgments and decrees, passed by both the Courts below, are upheld. 28. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. 29. The pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. 30. Send down the record. (Virender Singh) 30.4.2026 Judge Kalpana