JUDGMENT : Arun Bhansali, CJ. 1. This special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (‘Rules, 1952’) is directed against order dated 04.09.2025 passed in RERA Appeal No. 72 of 2025, whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant against judgment dated 14.05.2025 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow (‘UPREAT’). 2. The facts, in brief, may be noticed thus: 3. The respondent made a booking in the project of the appellant and was allotted a flat/apartment and a builder buyer agreement was executed between the parties in which the expected offer of possession was in December 2019. On account of the delay, the respondent made a complaint for grant of compensation under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘Act, 2016’) before the Adjudicating Officer at Gautam Buddha Nagar. The appellant filed objections to the complaint and raised preliminary objections with regard to the absence of jurisdiction. 4. The Adjudicating Officer, by order dated 10.02.2023, granted certain reliefs to the respondent. The appellant assailed the judgment and order dated 10.02.2023 by filing appeal before the UPREAT. The UPREAT, by its judgment and order dated 14.05.2025, quashed and set aside the order dated 10.02.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Officer and substituted the same by its own directions for payment of delayed interest on the deposited amount. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal. 6. Aggrieved of the order passed by the UPREAT and the learned Single Judge, the present appeal has been filed. 7. The appeal was initially reported to be barred by limitation by the office which delay has been condoned by order dated 19.01.2026. 8. When the appeal came up before the Court for admission, a preliminary objection was raised by counsel for the respondent that special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 was not maintainable. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others : AIR 2010 All 46 (FB). 9. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others : AIR 2010 All 46 (FB). 9. Learned counsel for the respondent made submissions that from a plain reading of provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952, it is very clear that a special appeal from the judgment passed by one Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court will not lie, as has been laid down by judgment in the case of Sheet Gupta (supra) as well and as neither the adjudicating authority nor the Tribunal are a court, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant made submissions that judgment in the case of Sheet Gupta (supra) as well as provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 do not bar filing of the appeal against judgment impugned, inasmuch as the restriction is ‘in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court’ and that the judgment impugned before the learned Single Judge was of the Tribunal and not Court and therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr. Vs. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors.: (2006) 7 SCC 613 , wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court, based on provisions of Section 100-A CPC, came to the conclusion that special appeal, irrespective of the provisions of Letters Patent of a particular High Court, would not be maintainable. 12. Counsel for the appellant made detailed submissions placing all his emphasis on a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armassuisse & Anr. : 2023:DHC:6352-DB and submitted that the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the said case, has thoroughly considered the effect and implication of judgment in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) and in a case where the special appeal was filed against a judgment of learned Single Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, it was held that such an appeal would be maintainable. Based on the said judgment, it was sought to be emphasised that the appeal would not be barred under Section 100-A CPC. 13. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the appellant and have perused the judgments in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) and Promoshirt (supra). 14. It would be appropriate to notice that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), in a case where Special Leave Petition was filed from judgment of a Single Judge passed under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956, wherein an objection was raised that Letters Patent appeal was maintainable before Division Bench of the High Court and therefore, the Special Leave Petition should not be entertained, came to the following conclusion: “21. But after the amendment the power which was being exercised under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act by the learned Single Judge of the High Court is being exercised by CLB under Section 10-E of the Act. Appeal against the order passed by CLB, lies to the High Court under Section 10-F of the Act. Therefore, the position which was obtaining prior to the amendment in 1991 was that from any order passed by the Single Judge exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, the appeal used to lie before the Division Bench of the High Court. But after the amendment the power has been given to CLB and appeal has been provided under Section 10-F of the Act. Thus, Part 1-A was inserted by the amendment with effect from 1.1.1964. But the constitution of the Company Law Board and the power to decide application under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act was given to CLB with effect from 31.5.1991 and appeal was provided under Section 10-F of the Act with effect from 31.5.1991. Therefore, on reading of Sections 10-E, 10-F, 397 and 398 of the Act, it becomes clear that it is a complete code that applications under Sections 397 and 398 the Act shall be dealt with by CLB and the order of CLB is appealable under Section 10-F of the Act before the High Court. No further appeal has been provided against the order of the learned Single Judge. Mr. No further appeal has been provided against the order of the learned Single Judge. Mr. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that an appeal is a vested right and, therefore, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, the appellants have a statutory right to prefer appeal irrespective of the fact that no appeal has been provided against the order of the learned Single Judge under the Act. In this connection, learned counsel invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury and in that it has been pointed out that the appeal is a vested right. The majority took the view that the appeal is a vested right. It was held as follows: (SCR p.488) “... that the contention of the applicant was well-founded, that he had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court on and from the date of the suit and the application for special leave should be allowed. The vested right of appeal was a substantive right and, although it could be exercised only in case of an adverse decision, it was governed by the law prevailing at the time of commencement of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from court to court, which really constituted one proceeding. Such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment." 22. So far as the general proposition of law is concerned that the appeal is a vested right there is no quarrel with the proposition but it is clarified that such right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment. Parliament while amending Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, by amending Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002, took away the Letters Patent power of the High Court in the matter of appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. Parliament while amending Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, by amending Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002, took away the Letters Patent power of the High Court in the matter of appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: “100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge." 23. Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by a Single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed by CLB and against that an appeal has been provided before the High Court under Section 10-F of the Act, that is an appeal from the original order. Then in that case no further letters patent appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. This amendment has taken away the power of the Letters Patent in the matter where learned Single Judge hears an appeal from the original order. Original order in the present case was passed by CLB exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act and appeal has been preferred under Section 10-F of the Act before the High Court. Learned Single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as Parliament in its wisdom has taken away its power. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a letter from the then Law Minister. That letter cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute is very clear, whatever statement by the Law Minister made on the floor of the House, cannot change the words and intendment which is borne out from the words. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a letter from the then Law Minister. That letter cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute is very clear, whatever statement by the Law Minister made on the floor of the House, cannot change the words and intendment which is borne out from the words. The letter of the Law Minister cannot be read to interpret the provisions of Section 100-A. The intendment of the legislature is more than clear in the words and the same has to be given its natural meaning and cannot be subject to any statement made by the Law Minister in any communication. The words speak for themselves. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Therefore, the power of the High Court in exercising the Letters Patent in a matter where a Single Judge has decided the appeal from the original order, has been taken away and it cannot be invoked in the present context. There are no two opinions in the matter that when CLB exercised its power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority. It may not be a court but it has all the trapping of a court. Therefore, the CLB while exercising its original jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act passed the order and against that order appeal lies to the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed.” 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when Company Law Board (‘CLB’) exercised its powers, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority, it may not be a court but it has all the trappings of a court. Therefore, CLB, while exercising its original jurisdiction passed the order and against that order, appeal lies to the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed. 16. In the present case, the proceedings were initiated before the Real Estate Adjudicating Officer under Section 31 of the Act, 2016. Section 35 of the Act, 2016 deals with powers of officer to call for information, conduct investigations and Section 36 thereof grants power to issue interim orders, Section 37 confers the power to issue directions and Section 38 confers the power to impose penalty or interest. Section 35 of the Act, 2016 deals with powers of officer to call for information, conduct investigations and Section 36 thereof grants power to issue interim orders, Section 37 confers the power to issue directions and Section 38 confers the power to impose penalty or interest. Section 39 gives power for rectification of orders and Section 40 provides for procedure for recovery of interest or penalty or compensation and enforcement of orders. 17. Section 44 of the Act, 2016 provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal against the decision of the Adjudicating Officer. The powers of the Appellate Tribunal are enumerated in Section 53, which reads as under: “ 53. Powers of Tribunal .—(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure. (3) The Appellate Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). (4) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses or documents; (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or directing it ex parte; and (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. (5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).” 18. Further, under Section 57 of the Act, 2016, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal are executable as a decree, which provision reads as under: “ 57. Further, under Section 57 of the Act, 2016, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal are executable as a decree, which provision reads as under: “ 57. Orders passed by Appellate Tribunal to be executable as a decree .-(1) Every order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court, and for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by the court.” 19. Against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the appeal lies to the High Court under Section 58, which reads as under: “ 58. Appeal to High Court.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, file an appeal to the High Court, within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. Explanation.—The expression “High Court” means the High Court of a State or Union Territory where the real estate project is situated. (2) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal with the consent of the parties.” 20. A bare perusal of above provisions reveals that the Act, 2016 provides for a complete machinery for adjudication of disputes between promoters and allottees or the real estate agents. (2) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order made by the Appellate Tribunal with the consent of the parties.” 20. A bare perusal of above provisions reveals that the Act, 2016 provides for a complete machinery for adjudication of disputes between promoters and allottees or the real estate agents. The Adjudicating Officer under Section 35 has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Appellate Tribunal under Section 53(4) has same powers as are vested in civil courts under the CPC in respect of the matters enumerated in the said sub-section, and sub-section (5) provides that all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings and Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for the purpose of certain provisions of IPC and CrPC respectively. 21. The appellate provision under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 provides for appeal from the order of the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court. 22. In Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors : 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “98. But then is the Speaker or the Chairman acting under Paragraph 6(1) a Tribunal? "All tribunals are not courts, though all courts are tribunals". The word "courts" is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice. By Administration of Justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. (See Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala: (1962) 2 SCR 339 . In that case Hidayatullah, J. said: (SCR p. 362) "...By ‘courts’ is meant courts of civil judicature and by ‘tribunals’, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that the courts have ‘an air of detachment’. But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient." 23. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association & Anr. : (2012) 10 SCC 353 , has dealt with the aspect in the following manner: “18. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws and to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of rules will determine whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts, which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a lis between two contesting parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority may be called as a quasi-judicial authority i.e. a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act; (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the subject; and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and the contest is between the authority and the subject; and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial decision. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a “court”, but not all. In case certain powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be held to be a court.” 24. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a “court”, but not all. In case certain powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be held to be a court.” 24. From the above judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that Tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the Administration of Justice are courts and have been described as bodies of men which are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. The procedure before the Tribunal and Courts may differ but the functions are not essentially different. Further, it depends on a particular Act whether the functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts which provide for the basic administration of justice. 25. The powers of CLB, which were the subject matter before Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), inter alia under Section 10E(4C) and (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, provided as under: “ 10E. Constitution of Board of Company Law Administration.- … ... (4C) Every Bench referred to in sub-section (4B) shall have powers which are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :- (a) discovery and inspection of documents or other material objects producible as evidence; (b) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and requiring the deposit of their expenses; (c) compelling the production of documents or other material objects producible as evidence and impounding the same; (d) examining witnesses on oath; (e) granting adjournments; (f) reception of evidence on affidavits. (4D) Every Bench shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and every proceeding before the Bench shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and for the purpose of section 196 of that Code.” 26. As would be seen, the emphasis of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) for applicability of provisions of Section 100-A CPC was that the CLB has all the trappings of a court. 27. A comparison of provisions of Section 10E(4C) and (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956 with provisions of Section 53 of the Act, 2016 dealing with powers of the Appellate Tribunal, would reveal that the same are almost in identical terms, wherein both the CLB and the Tribunal have been deemed to be civil court and proceedings before them to be judicial proceedings. Further, the power of review along with their orders being executable, are also identical in nature. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the UPREAT has trappings of the court similar to the CLB and therefore, the ratio of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) would apply with all force to the present case as well, thereby no special appeal would be maintainable against an order passed under Section 58 of the Act, 2016 before the Division Bench. 28. So far as the Division Bench judgment in the case of Promoshirt (supra), heavily relied on by counsel for the appellant is concerned, one of the considerations for coming to the conclusion regarding maintainability of appeal and for distinguishing the judgment in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) can be noticed in para 58, which reads as under: “58. In Kamal Kumar Dutta the Supreme Court came to conclude that Section 100-A of the Code would bar a further appeal in terms of a letters patent provision since it found that while the erstwhile Company Law Board may not be a court it had all the trappings thereof. We in this regard bear in mind the provisions of Section 10E (4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, which had ordained that all proceedings before the Company Law Board would be deemed to be judicial proceedings albeit for the limited purposes indicated therein. We note that similar is the position which prevails under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with Section 169 thereof, prescribing that the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for purposes enumerated therein. We note that similar is the position which prevails under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with Section 169 thereof, prescribing that the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for purposes enumerated therein. It is also relevant to note that the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, as it existed prior to the promulgation of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 had been clothed with an identical status by virtue of Section 92. The decisions that thus came to be rendered in Kamal Kumar Dutta, Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi, Rouf Ahmad Zaroo and United India Insurance all emanated from special statutes with a deeming provision. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai arose out of proceedings instituted under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 whose distinguishing characteristics have already been explained hereinabove.” 29. The Division Bench attempted to distinguish the judgment on the ground that in case of CLB, there is a deeming provision under Section 10E(4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, quoted herein before, which features distinguish the case. In view of the fact that such deeming provisions, as existed in Section 10E(4D) of the Companies Act, 1956, are available under Section 53 of the Act, 2016, the judgment as such would have no application to the present case. 30. Besides the above, recently the Calcutta High Court in Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited & Ors. : 2025 SCC Online Cal 8647, has dissented with the view taken in the case of Promoshirt (supra) and has come to the conclusion that Letters Patent appeal against judgment of learned Single Judge sitting in the Intellectual Property Rights Division under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 would not be maintainable. 31. In view of above discussion, we are firmly of the opinion that the present appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 against order passed by learned Single Judge on an appeal under Section 58 of the Act, 2016, would be barred under Section 100-A CPC. 32. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.