1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR] PRESENT: THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MADHURESH PRASAD WPA/442/2026 SUKUMAR MONDAL … PETITIONER VS. THE ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ADMINISTRATION AND OTHERS … RESPONDENTS For the petitioners : Mr. KMB Jayapal For the respondents : Ms. Babita Das Heard on : September 22, 2026 Judgment delivered on : September 22, 2026 MADHURESH PRASAD, J. 1. Heard learned advocate representing the petitioner as well as the learned advocate representing the State respondents. 2. The petitioner is claiming invocation of the discretion vested in the Tehsildar under Regulation 161 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulation, 1966 (hereinafter referred as 1966 Regulation, for short). The regulation invoked reads: “161. (1) If after the commencement of this Regulation any tenant is disposed of any lands held by him otherwise than by process of law, 2 he may within two years from the date of such dispossession, apply to the Tehsildar for his reinstatement in such land. ….” 3. The preliminary issue therefore arising for invocation of jurisdiction of the Tehsildar is whether the writ petitioner approached the forum within two years from the date of his alleged dispossession. 4. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the writ petitioner that two years period specified in Regulation 161 is directory and not mandatory as it does not specify any consequences for non- compliance or non invocation of the jurisdiction within two years from alleged dispossession. 5. Reliance is also placed on the Regulation 98 of the 1966 Regulation. 6. This Court finds no force in such submission of the learned advocate for the writ petitioner. 7. The two years limitation is specified in Regulation 161 does not leave any discretion in the Tehsildar for condonation. 8. No such provision is brought to the notice of the Court under which the petitioner could claim that the Tehsildar should entertain the plea beyond two years limitation as specified under Regulation 161. 9. The material on record does not reveal that the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar within two years. The 3 material on record suggests the contrary, that he approached the Tehsildar long after he was dispossessed. 10. Such being the circumstances, an issue of the period being directory or mandatory does not arise. 11. The issue arising in the present case is an issue of limitation inherent in Regulation 161 of 1966 Regulation. 12. The 1966 Regulation was promulgated under Article 240 of the Constitution of India in furtherance the objective contains therein. The Regulation therefore, is for a special/specific objective enshrined in Article 240 of the Constitution of India. The relevant part of the Regulation 161 extracted above vest the Tehsildar (Revenue Officer) to make an enquiry in the respective claim of the parties and thereafter pass orders on an application for restoration of possession and to put the applicant in possession of land. Vesting of such power in a Revenue Officer under Regulation 161 contains an inherent check on the power by prescribing therein a limitation of two years from dispossession for making an application. No provision is pointed out by the learned advocate for the writ petitioner to show that the Tehsildar was clothed with power under the 1966 Regulation for condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 13. Under the circumstances, this Court deems it apposite to consider the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the 4 case of Patel Brothers v. State of Assam and others reported in (2017) 2 SCC 350. Para 22 of the judgment read as follows:- “22. The High Court has rightly pointed out the well-settled principle of law that Patel Bros. v. State of Assam, SCC OnLine Gau para 19) “19. … ‘the courts cannot interpret a statute the way they have developed the common law “which in a constitutional sense means judicially developed equity”. In abrogating or modifying a rule of the common law the courts exercise “the same power of creation that built up the common law through its existence by the Judges of the past”. The court can exercise no such power in respect of statutes. Therefore, in the task of interpreting and applying a statute, Judges have to be conscious that in the end the statute is the master not the servant of the judgment and no Judge has a choice between implementing the law and disobeying it. What, therefore, follows is that the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implication.” 14. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the view that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar under Regulation 161 of the 1966 Regulation after two years of alleged dispossession. 15. The petitioner may avail other remedy, in accordance with law. 16. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 17. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. ( Madhuresh Prasad, J. )