IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Before: The Hon’ble Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya C.O. 2942 of 2026 Chandan Kumar Das & Anr. Versus Sri Debaprasad Manna & Ors. For the Petitioners : Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee Mr. Yudhisthir Maity ….. advocates For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Arnab Roy Mr. Satyam Mukherjee Ms. Debosmita Biswas Mr. Kingshuk Dasgupta …advocates Heard on : 16.09.2026 Order passed on : 23.09.2026 Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of Judgment Debtor Nos. 5 and 6 and is directed against the order being no. 43 dated August 01, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), 1st Court at Tamluk, District-Purba Medinipur in Title Execution Case No. 8 of 2000. 2. By the order impugned, the application filed by the petitioners under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for deletion of their names from the execution proceedings stood rejected. 3. Facts giving rise to this civil revision application in a nutshell are as follows. a) One Jyotindranath Manna (since deceased) filed an Other Suit being no. 63 of 1980 against Radhanath Bhunia @ Bhowmik, Sunil Kumar Bhuniya @ Bhowmik, Dhananjoy Bhuniya @ Bhowmik and Manoranjan Bhunia for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 27.05.1979. The said suit was decreed on contest by a judgment and Decree dated 28.02.1994. Sunil, Dhananjoy and Manoranjan preferred Title Appeal No. 21 of 1994 challenging the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Judge and the said appeal stood dismissed by a Judgment and Decree dated 30.11.1999. Second appeal being S.A. No. 103 of 2006 at the instance of defendants stood dismissed for default on 23.08.2022. b) In the meantime the decree was put into execution giving rise to Title Execution Case No. 8 of 2000. Chandan Kr. Das and Lakshman Kumar Das, the petitioners herein, were added as proforma Judgment Debtors in the Title Execution Case vide order dated 06.01.2024 on an allegation that they had purchased a portion of the scheduled property vide registered deed of sale during the pendency of the second appeal and the execution proceedings. c) Petitioners filed an application under Section 151 of the Code dated 17.03.2026 praying for deletion of their names from the execution proceedings. The said application was rejected by the impugned order. 4. Being aggrieved, the Judgement Debtor nos. 5 and 6 have approached this Court. 5. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate for the petitioners contended that the petitioners are not parties to the contract for sale. Petitioners have acquired right, title and interest in respect of a portion of the scheduled property by virtue of purchase through a registered deed of conveyance and are in possession of the said property. He further contended that since the petitioners are claiming independent title and are in possession in respect of the property and are neither necessary nor proper parties in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, their names should be deleted from the execution case. He further contended that since the petitioners were not parties in the suit for specific performance of contract of sale of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit cannot bind them and the Code of Civil Procedure provides adequate remedies for protection of their possession. In support of such contention Mr. Mukherjee placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others reported at (2005) 6 SCC 733. 6. Per contra, Mr. Roy, learned advocate for the opposite parties, submitted that the petitioners being transferee pendente lite have no independent legal right to resist or obstruct execution. He submitted that the petitioners were impleaded in the execution case vide order dated 06.01.2024 for effective adjudication of the execution case and thereafter they appeared, subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and also filed a written objection along with counterclaim and the order dated 06.01.2024 was not challenged before any superior forum. 7. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed. 8. In the written objection filed in the Execution Case, the petitioners contended that Dhananjoy Bhowmik executed a registered deed of gift in favour of Anil Baran Bhowmik on 11.09.2015 and thereafter, Anil executed a registered deed of gift dated 03.01.2020 in favour of Padma Lochan Jana. Petitioners purchased a portion of the decretal property from Padma Lochan Jana by a registered deed of sale dated 08.01.2020. 9. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts the doctrine of lis pendens. Section 52 imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise of any right in any immovable property during the pendency of a suit, provided the conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Page 4 of 11 10. The expression “During the pendency in any court……………. of any suit” used in Section 52 has been given an expanded meaning by the Explanation appended thereto and, the doctrine of lis pendens shall have its applicability even after the final decree is passed till complete satisfaction and discharge of such decree or order. Thus, the said doctrine shall continue during the appeal or execution proceeding. 11. The rule of lis pendens is ingrained in the Code of Civil Procedure under Order 21 Rule 102. 12. By virtue of the said rule, resistance or obstruction by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property during the pendency of the suit in which the decree in execution has been passed is not entitled to protection under Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21. In other words, any transfer of possession of immovable property during the pendency of the suit which involves any right to an immovable property would be incapable in law of affecting the rights that flows from the decree that may be passed in the suit. 13. The question that now arises for consideration is whether a transferee pendente lite can be added as a party in an execution proceeding. 14. Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the procedure in case of assignment before final order in the suit. The marginal note of order 22 Rule 10 and the expression “during the pendency of a suit” raises a doubt as to whether the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 would apply to execution proceedings. 15. A question fell for consideration before an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Taraprasanna Ganguli vs. Nareshchandra Chakraborti reported at AIR 1933 Cal 329 whether Orders 22 Rule 10 applies to execution proceedings. It was held that a reasonable construction must always be put on a decree and the Court should always lean against a construction which would render a decree in executable. On the facts of the said reported case it was held that if there has been a change in the members of the managing committee of a school after the decree, there has been a devolution of interest under Order 22 Rule 10 and the decree can be executed against the assets of the school if the present managing committee members have been brought on record in the execution case. 16. Another Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd. vs. Naresh Narain Roy reported at (1911) 39 Cal 220 held that the provisions of order 22 Rule 12 would imply, by the principle of exclusion, that all the Rules of that Order except Rules 3, 4 and 8 are applicable to proceedings in execution of a decree or order, and that Rule 10 was therefore applicable. 17. In Krishnaji Ramchandra Koshti vs. Bhikchand Ramkaran Marwadi reported at AIR 1942 Bom 82, the question that fell for consideration was whether the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 applies to execution proceedings. 18. The Hon’ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court reiterated the proposition of law that applications in execution are proceedings in suit. It was held that the view expressed by the majority of the Hon’ble Full Bench of Madras High Court in Muthial Chettiar vs. Govindoss Krishnadass reported at (1921) 44 Mad 919 and the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd. (supra) that Order 22 Rule 10 applies to execution proceedings is correct. It was further held that an application to bring an assignee on record in execution proceedings is an application in continuation of the suit and, therefore, during the pendency thereof, the application would fall under Order 22 Rule 10. 19. The view taken in the aforesaid decision was followed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in its subsequent decision in Babu Rama Chauguta vs. Goodwill Bank Ltd. reported at AIR 1973 Bom 342. 20. An issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khemchand Shankar Choudhari and Another vs. Vishnu Hari Patil and others reported at (1983) 1 SCC 18 whether a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of transfer during the pendency of any suit or proceeding can participate in the execution proceeding. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after noting the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that a transferee pendente lite is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. Rule 10 of Order 22 clearly recognises the right of a transferee to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and to be heard before any order is passed. 22. It was held in the said reported decision that the position of a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during the pendency of a suit or proceeding is somewhat similar to position of an heir or a legatee of a party who dies during the pendency of a suit or proceeding. It was further held that an heir or a legatee or a transferee can participate in the execution proceedings even though their names may not have been shown in the decree. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the result of the litigation and such a transferee is a representative in interest of the party from whom he got the property transferred. 24. Mr. Mukherjee would strenuously contend that the petitioners being not parties to the contract for sale are not necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of contract and, therefore, cannot be added in an execution proceeding for executing the decree passed in such a suit. 25. In Kasturi (supra), a question fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court whether a stranger or a third party to the contract, claiming to have an independent title and possession over the contracted property is entitled to be added as a party defendant in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of a property instituted by a purchaser against the vendor. Page 7 of 11 26. In the said reported decision, the strangers/third parties to the contract for sale and not the plaintiff applied for being added in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale. The applicants who sought for impleadment and were added as parties by the trial judge and affirmed by the High Court had set up a claim of independent title and possession over the contracted property. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted the admitted factual position that the applicants who were added as party defendants did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of contract for sale has been filed and also that they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. 28. In the aforesaid admitted factual position, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such applicants/added parties are not necessary parties as an effective decree could be passed in their absence as they had not purchased the contracted property from the vendor after the contract was entered into. It was further held that they were not necessary parties as they would not be affected by the contract entered into between the purchaser and vendor. 29. Another principle weighed in the mind of the Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court that the party who has filed the suit for specific performance of contract for sale is dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court accordingly held that the applicants/added parties are neither necessary parties nor proper parties and therefore, not entitled to be added as party defendants in the pending suit for specific performance of contract for sale. 30. The said decision cannot come to the aid of the petitioner for the reasons as stated hereinafter. 31. In Paragraph 21 of Kasturi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court sounded a note of caution that if the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale even after receiving the notice of claim of title and possession of such third parties does not want to join such strangers in a pending suit, it is always done at the risk of the plaintiff because he cannot be forced to join such third parties as party defendants in such suit. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. reported at (2010) 7 SCC 417 held that in Kasturi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a suit for Specific Performance of Contract only parties to the contract or any legal representative of the parties to the contract or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mumbai International Pvt. Ltd. (supra), held that the Court has the discretion either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be the proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.N. Real Estate vs. Shailendra Pradhan and others reported at 2025 SCC Online SC 1015 noticed the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai vs. Paras Finance Co. Regal Partnership Firm Beawer reported at (2007) 10 SCC 82 wherein it was observed that it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed, a third party can never be impleaded in that suit. In Sumtibai (supra) it was held that if the third party can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. 34. In J.N. Real Estate (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after noticing the decisions in the case of Kasturi (supra), Sumtibai (supra) and Mumbai International (supra) held that a party who is seeking impleadment may not be a necessary party but still could be termed as a proper party. A necessary party is a person in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. Whereas a proper party is one whose presence would enable the Court to effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit. 35. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered view that a discretion is left with the Court to decide whether the presence of a party is required for proper and effective adjudication of the dispute. 36. To the mind of this Court Kasturi (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that a party upon whom title devolved under Order 22 Rule 10 in respect of the property involved in the suit from the parties to the suit cannot be added as a party in the suit or execution proceeding. 37. Keeping in mind the aforesaid proposition of law, this Court has to now decided whether the learned Judge of the Executing Court was right in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for deleting their names from the Execution case. 38. In view of the derivation of title as stated in the written objection filed by the petitioners before the Execution case, which forms part of this civil revision application, it appears to this Court that the petitioners are claiming title in respect of a portion of the decretal property by way of successive transfers from one of the judgment debtors. Petitioners are not claiming any right adverse of the title of the judgment debtors. 39. To the mind of this Court, in view of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner shall be bound by the result of the litigation. This Court holds that the petitioners are representatives-in- interest of one of the Judgment Debtors from whom he got the property transferred by way of successive transfers. Thus, the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code shall apply to the case on hand. 40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram reported at (2008) 7 SCC 144 held that the person purchasing the property from the judgment debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of the decree. It was further held that for invoking Order 21 Rule 102, it is enough for the decree holders to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment debtor. 41. For the reasons as aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that rejection of the application for deletion resulted in taking away the liberty of the petitioners to protect their possession by taking recourse of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession. 42. This Court has already held that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 would also apply in execution cases. 43. A copy of the order being no. 25 dated 06.01.2026 adding the petitioner as proforma judgment debtors have been produced in course of hearing of this civil revision application which was taken on record. This Court finds that the learned Judge of the Executing Court in exercise of its discretion deemed it appropriate that the petitioner should be heard in the execution case. The said order has already attained finality as the same has not been challenged in accordance with law. 44. However, the petitioner approached the executing Court praying for their deletion from the Execution Case. 45. The learned Judge of the Executing Court took note of the factual position that a portion of the decretal property was transferred in favour of the petitioner by a registered deed dated 08.01.2020 prior to dismissal of the second appeal. 46. The applicability of the provisions of law including Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Order 21 Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the facts of the case on hand was examined in details and the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was correctly applied by the learned Judge of the Executing Court. 47. When the learned Judge of the Executing Court in exercise of its discretion added the petitioners on the ground that their presence is necessary for proper and effective adjudication of the execution case, this Court holds that the order impugned rejecting the prayer for deletion does not call for any interference. 48. For all the reasons as aforesaid, this Court holds that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. C.O. No. 2942 of 2026 stands dismissed without any order as to costs. 49. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the parties, if applied for, after compliance of all the formalities. (HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J.)