D/L. 13. September 21, 2026. MNS. FMA No. 976 of 2026 + CAN 1 of 2026 + CAN 2 of 2026 Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited Vs. Jodhbir Singh Mr. Shounak Bhattacharya, Mr. Amit Sarkar, Advs. … for the appellant. Re : CAN 1 of 2026 (condonation) 1. There is no contradictory report of the Additional Stamp Reporter as to the delay in preferring the appeal. However, from the materials before us as well as in terms of the submissions of the appellant, we find a delay in preferring the appeal. 2. The Additional Stamp Reporter is directed to furnish a revised report on the reverse first page of the memorandum of the appeal within a week from date. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the filing of the appeal is delayed by 317 days and as such, the appellant filed an application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 4. From a perusal of the papers before us, it transpires that the delay is of about 317 days. 5. The affidavit-of-service filed today be kept on record. 6. Despite service, none appears for the respondent at the time of call. 2 7. From the explanation offered in the condonation application, we find that the reason for the delay in preferring the appeal is that although the impugned order was passed long back, service of copy of injunction application was effected on the appellants in the month of July, 2026, and at earliest thereafter the present appeal has been filed. 8. Upon a perusal of the orders passed in the suit, certified copies of which have also been annexed to the memorandum of the appeal, this Court is satisfied that sufficient explanation for the delay have been furnished. 9. Accordingly, CAN 1 of 2026 is allowed, thereby condoning the delay in preferring FMA No. 976 of 2026. 10. There will be no order as to costs. 11. Accordingly, we take up the appeal for admission hearing. 12. The present appeal has been preferred against an order of ad interim injunction. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant-bank submits that in terms of the loan agreement as well as the existing law, the bank is entitled to take back possession of the vehicle, which was a security for a loan taken by the plaintiff/respondent. 14. However, by the impugned order of ad interim injunction, the learned Trial Judge has virtually rewritten the contract by granting injunction on condition that an amount of Rs. 15,000/- per month will be paid by the respondent. 3 15. It is submitted that the said amount is not in consonance with the instalments payable under the agreement. 16. Secondly, it is argued that an arbitration clause is incorporated in the agreement, in the teeth of which the ad interim injunction order was passed. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant also cites an order rendered by a co-ordinate Bench, to which one of us (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) was a party, where an order of stay was passed in respect of an appeal against a similar order, subject to the appellant/Financial Company therein being restrained by an order of injunction from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff/respondent therein without due process of law and conditional upon the respondent going on depositing an amount per month, which was in consonance with the loan agreement. 18. However, the said order was rendered in the context of the said case and we do not find any universal ratio decidendi, holding that a similar course of action shall be followed in all similar matters, having been laid down as such in the said order. 19. That apart, the grounds taken in the present appeal can very well be canvassed by the appellant by filing a written objection to the temporary injunction application pending in the Trial Court, upon seeking alteration in the conditional amount to be paid in respect of the injunction sought for, if necessary. 4 20. Insofar as the argument as to there being an arbitration clause in the agreement is concerned, the mere existence of an arbitration clause in an agreement is not an absolute bar to a civil suit. It is only subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being complied with that the Court is duty-bound to send the matter for arbitration. 21. In fact, Section 8 confers a waivable right on the defendant, permitting the defendant even to give a go-by to the arbitration clause and participate in the suit itself, thereby subjecting itself to the civil court’s jurisdiction. 22. Thus, the arbitration clause in the purported loan agreement, which is before us, is not per se an absolute bar to the civil suit. 23. Inasmuch as the argument as to the contract being rewritten by the learned Trial Judge by granting a conditional amount not in consonance with the instalments in the loan agreement is concerned, it will be open to the appellant to raise such contention before the learned Trial Judge at the time of final hearing of the injunction application. 24. Mere imposition of a pecuniary condition for injunction may not, in all circumstances, particularly at the ad interim stage, tantamount to rewriting the contract between the parties itself; more so, since it is not a final and conclusive adjudication on the right of the parties. 25. Even otherwise, we find from the impugned order that the learned Trial Judge has categorically mentioned that 5 the injunction has been granted only in respect of “forcible” possession, that too, without due process of law, thereby keeping it open to the appellant to take recourse to due process of law in obtaining possession of the vehicle without employing undue force more than is necessary in law. 26. Hence, there is no scope of interference with the impugned orders dated September 17, 2025 passed by the learned Judge, Tenth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 2095 of 2025. 27. Accordingly, FMA No. 976 of 2026 is dismissed under order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. Consequentially, CAN 2 of 2026 is disposed of as well. 29. There will be no order as to costs. (Sandip Kumar De, J.) (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)