IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present : The Hon’ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee W.P.A. No. 5070 of 2011 With IA No. CAN 1 of 2023. Satinder Rai -Versus- Union of India & Ors. For the petitioner : Mr. Achin Kr. Majumder, Ms. Ananya Adhikary. For the respondent : Mr. S. N. Datta. Heard On : 20.08.2026 Judgment On : 22.09.2026 Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.: Prelude: 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the legality and tenability of the order of suspension dated 14.12.2010 and the charge-sheet dated 9.2.2011 issued against the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for 2 issuance of an appropriate writ and/or order restraining the respondents from proceeding against him on the basis of the said charge-sheet dated 9.2.2011. Petitioner’s case: 2. Succinctly stated, the facts, as delineated in the writ petition and the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner, are that in December 2010, while the petitioner was serving as an Inspector, Railway Protection Force (for short, “RPF”), Eastern Railway, RPF Post, Andal, the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner (RPF), in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 9(1)(i) of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 (for short, “the 1957 Act”), read with Rule 133 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (for short, “the 1987 Rules”),issued an order dated 14.12.2010, whereby the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 12.12.2010 on the ground that a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against him. 3. Subsequent thereto, a draft charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner. The draft charge-sheet, in substance, alleged that, while functioning as the In- charge of RPF Post, UDL(P), the petitioner had violated the lawful instructions of the DG/RPF by nominating SI R.P. Singh as the Malkhana In- charge, despite the standing instruction that the Post In-charge would remain solely responsible for the Post Malkhana. It was further alleged that the petitioner had failed to take over and physically verify the case properties lying in the Malkhana, had neglected to ensure adequate security and proper supervision thereof, and had thereby facilitated or connived in the 3 disappearance, shortage or substitution of 44 pieces of pig iron, G.C. sheets and other case properties. The draft charge further alleged that the petitioner had illegally disposed of 678 pieces of G.C. sheets relating to UDL(P) Post Case No. 8/89 dated 21.05.1989 for his personal gain and had subsequently attempted to make good the loss by arranging G.C. sheets of different quality. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, the petitioner was charged with serious dereliction of duty, laxity in supervision and involvement in malpractice and irregularities concerning the theft, disappearance and substitution of case properties, allegedly in violation of Rules 146.2, 146.3, 146.6, 147(i) and 147(ii) of the 1987 Rules. 4. In response to the said draft charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted a written reply, inter alia, contending that the draft charge-sheet reflected a concluded and pre-determined opinion of the Disciplinary Authority (for short, “the DA”). It was specifically contended that, in Charge No. 1, the DA had recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner had violated the lawful order of the DG/RPF, without, however, quoting or specifying the particular order alleged to have been violated, thereby depriving the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity to effectively prepare and submit his defence. It was further contended that the DA had, even at that stage, formed a concluded opinion that the petitioner had failed to take charge from the then IPF, S.K. Mandal, approximately one year earlier. 5. The petitioner refuted the allegation forming the basis of Charge No. 1, contending that the DA himself, by his letter dated 05.04.2010, had directed 4 the then IPF, S.K. Mandal, to hand over charge to the petitioner within two days. Pursuant to such direction, on the very next day, S.K. Mandal handed over charge to the petitioner under the supervision of ASC, M.K. Thakur, and in compliance with the instructions of the DA. The petitioner, therefore, alleged that the charge levelled against him was nothing but a deliberate attempt at creating a case against him at the instance of M.K. Thakur. 6. In respect of Charge No. 2, the petitioner contended that the charge alleged that he had directly connived in the theft of 44 pieces of pig iron, G.C. sheets and other case properties. According to the petitioner, the very manner in which the charge had been framed disclosed that the DA had already formed a concluded opinion as to his involvement in the alleged theft, thereby rendering the charge indefensible. The petitioner further questioned that, if he had indeed been involved in the alleged theft, there was no explanation as to why M.K. Thakur had not lodged any FIR against him in respect thereof. 7. In respect of Charge No. 3, the petitioner contended that the charge alleged that he had, for his personal gain, illegally disposed of the case property relating to Case No. 8/89 dated 21.05.1989. It was further alleged in the charge that the DA was satisfied that the petitioner had committed such misconduct. The petitioner questioned the very purpose of holding an open enquiry in such circumstances and submitted that, if the DA had already formed such a clear and concluded opinion regarding the alleged misconduct of the charged official, no useful purpose could be served by subjecting him to an enquiry. According to the petitioner, once the DA had arrived at a pre- 5 determined conclusion regarding his guilt, no defence, however cogent or logical, could possibly persuade the DA to take a different view. 8. The petitioner further alleged that, on a plain reading of the draft charge- sheet, it appeared that the DA had travelled beyond the permissible scope of a preliminary enquiry, although, according to the petitioner, such an approach was beyond the contemplation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that the findings recorded in the Court of Enquiry were vitiated by disregard of the rules governing the subject and that the DA had already concluded that such findings were relevant and adverse to the petitioner. The petitioner apprehended that the action of the DA was intended to remove him from the UDL (P) Post. He further claimed that he had sufficient reason to suspect that M.K. Thakur, in collusion with certain criminal elements, might have engineered such acts for his own wrongful gain. The petitioner ultimately alleged that the action of the DA was actuated by mala fides and constituted an arbitrary exercise of power in the discharge of a quasi-judicial function. 9. However, upon perusal of the written defence submitted by the petitioner in response to the draft charge-sheet, the DA came to the conclusion that the explanation furnished by the petitioner was not satisfactory and, accordingly, directed that a departmental enquiry would be held against him. The DA thereafter nominated Mr. V.B. Singh, ASC/ASN, to conduct the DAR enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with Rule 153 of the 1987 Rules and 6 accordingly, final charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner. In the final charge-sheet, following charges were framed against the petitioner: “ (i) Being the In-charge of RPF/Post/UDL(P) he clearly violated the lawful order of Hon’ble DG, RPF/Rly.Board, NDLS and nominated SI/R. P. Singh as the Malkhana In-charge of RPF/Post/UDL(P) for his vested interest, when there is clear cut instruction/order of Hon’ble DG/RPF, that post In-charge will be sole In-charge of Post Malkhana. He also failed to ensure the taking over charge of case property lying in UDL (P) Post Malkhana after duly physically verifying all the case properties from the then IPF/S.K. Mondal. (ii) Being the In-charge of RPF/Post/UDL(P), he never visited open or close Malkhana. Neither he shows his any interest about the adequate/proper security arrangement to protect & safeguard the case property lying in the Malkhana. This itself is not only shows his slack supervision but also proved that he was involved in such malpractice/irregularity as well as directly connivance in respect of the theft of 44 nos. of Pig iron, GC-Sheets and other case properties which were detected short/missing /change by the committee during the Malkhana verification and duly mentioned in the verification report. (iii) During Court of Enquiry it was crystal clear that the case property i.e. 678 Pcs of G.C. Sheet of UDL (P) Post case no. 08/89 dated 21.5.1989 were disposed of illegally by him for his personal gain and later on he tried to make good by arranging quality of G.C. Sheets to befool the 7 Railway Administration, which was detected by the Committee of court of enquiry and mentioned the same in his report. 10. The petitioner submits that the charge-sheet was not issued within 30 days from the date of the order of suspension, as mandated under Rule 135 of the 1987 Rules. He further submits that, instead of merely setting out the charges, the charge-sheet confronted him with definitive conclusions. In the aforesaid conspectus, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the legality and propriety of the order of suspension as well as the charge-sheet. 11. Record would reveal that a coordinate Bench of this Court by an order dated 13.04.2011 directed the parties to exchange affidavit and in addition, passed the following order: “The respondents will be at liberty to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the charge sheet dated February 9, 2011 but the final order should not be passed in the matter without leave of the Court. Liberty is given to the respondents to file application for vacating, variation and/or modification of the above interim order with notice to the petitioner.” 12. Pursuant to the order dated 13.04.2011, the respondents filed an application being CAN 1 of 2023 for recalling and/or vacating the interim order; however, another coordinate Bench of this Court by an order dated 8 17.03.2023 directed that the application shall be heard along with the main writ petition. 13. The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit bringing on record the subsequent events and documents, wherein it was averred that, pursuant to the interim order dated 13.04.2011, the disciplinary proceeding continued on the basis of the charge-sheet dated 09.02.2011. In the course of the proceeding, the petitioner, by his representations dated 17.03.2011 and 03.03.2012, sought supply of 32 (thirty-two) relevant records and documents. By letters dated 17.03.2011 and 16.03.2012, the Enquiry Officer informed the petitioner that, apart from the documents relied upon, the other documents sought by him were not available. 14. Thereafter, the petitioner furnished a list of (16) sixteen defence witnesses, all being railway employees of equal or superior rank, and by representation dated 17.04.2012 requested the Enquiry Officer to secure their production. Despite such request, the Enquiry Officer shifted the responsibility of arranging for the attendance of the defence witnesses upon the petitioner. The petitioner’s prayer for permitting him to engage a retired official as his Defence Friend was also rejected. The petitioner thereafter submitted his written defence dated 08.05.2012, whereupon the Enquiry Officer, by his findings dated 29.06.2012, held the petitioner guilty of the charges. 15. In his written defence, the petitioner highlighted certain illegalities and irregularities committed in the course of the enquiry proceedings and alleged 9 violation of the principles of natural justice. It was also specifically contended that the Enquiry Officer had acted in the capacity of a prosecutor by himself cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and, in the process, had failed to maintain the requisite impartiality. The petitioner further contended that, while submitting his reply to the report of the Enquiry Officer, he had brought all such illegalities and irregularities to the notice of the Disciplinary Authority. However, according to the petitioner, the said issues were glossed over and the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to impose upon him the punishment of reduction of pay by three stages below his existing pay for a period of three years, with cumulative effect vide. his order dated 06.07.2025. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner prayed for quashing of the disciplinary proceeding, including the charge-sheet, the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the order of punishment. Contents of the affidavits-in-opposition and supplementary affidavits filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5: 16. The record reflects that the respondent nos. 1 to 5 have filed two affidavits-in-opposition addressing and controverting the averments made in the writ petition, as also three supplementary affidavits for the purpose of bringing on record certain documents pertaining to subsequent events. 17. It has, however, been contended therein that, on 01.11.2010, Sub- Inspector R.P. Singh of RPF Post, Andal (P), reported that the case properties relating to different cases under the R.P. (U.P.) Act, which had been kept in the open Malkhana, were found scattered. Upon physical verification, 44 10 pieces of pig iron, seized in connection with Case No. 02 of 1990 dated 12.01.1990, were found missing. Consequently, a Court of Enquiry was ordered and a committee was constituted to conduct the enquiry. In the course of the enquiry, the shortage of 44 pieces of pig iron was confirmed and, upon further enquiry, it was detected that 678 pieces of G.C. sheets, which had also been seized in connection with Case No. 08 of 1989, had allegedly been disposed of by the petitioner during the leave period of R.P. Singh. It was subsequently found that certain other G.C. sheets had been kept at a different place away from the Malkhana. 18. It was further contended therein that, in the course of the Court of Enquiry, the petitioner attempted to establish his innocence by producing 666 pieces of G.C. sheets of a different quality, bearing body marks, as against the 678 pieces originally entrusted to his custody, thereby disclosing a shortfall of 12 pieces, including 11 pieces and one sample G.C. sheet of a different quality. The said discrepancy, it was contended, stood confirmed upon expert examination. It was further contended that the exhaustive enquiry had established that the petitioner had intentionally and with a motivated purpose deputed S.I./R.P. Singh to handle the Malkhana, although, being a member of a disciplined Force, it was primarily his responsibility to ensure the safe custody of the case property in accordance with the extant RPF Rules. According to the respondents, the petitioner thereby failed to safeguard the integrity of Government property and had resorted to fraudulent conduct for personal gain. It was, therefore, contended that the petitioner’s allegation of victimisation was wholly unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the 11 case, particularly since an allegation of bias is required to be established by cogent and clear evidence. 19. Ultimately, the Enquiry Committee found the petitioner guilty of gross misconduct and dereliction of duty and held that he had committed serious disobedience of the orders of his superior officers. The Committee further found that the petitioner had indulged in falsehood and fabrication and that there had been a serious lapse in supervision on his part. Consequently, the Committee held the petitioner responsible for negligence of duty within the meaning of Rule 146.2 of the RPF Rules. 20. The competent authority duly considered the written defence submitted by the petitioner and, upon finding the same to be unsatisfactory, issued and served the charge-sheet dated 09.02.2011 upon the petitioner in accordance with the applicable provisions of the RPF Rules, 1987. It was further contended that there was no violation of Rule 35 of the RPF Rules, 1987. 21. It was contended that the petitioner had sought certain documents from the Enquiry Officer; however, the said documents did not form part of the enquiry proceedings and, therefore, were not available with the Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the petitioner was directed to collect the said documents and was afforded reasonable opportunity to do so. The petitioner, however, failed to avail himself of such opportunity. It was further contended that, in terms of Rules 153.10 to 153.16 of the RPF Rules, the delinquent employee is required to produce his own witnesses in support of his defence. As the petitioner failed to produce any witness on his behalf, the Enquiry Officer, upon consideration of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, 12 found the petitioner guilty of all the charges levelled against him. It was specifically denied that EO acted as a prosecutor. Contents of the petitioner's affidavit-in-reply: 22. In his affidavit-in-reply, the petitioner, inter alia, contended that a preliminary enquiry conducted in the course of quasi-judicial proceedings could not be equated with an enquiry by an Enquiry Officer and that no punishment could be imposed solely on the basis of the report of the Court of Enquiry. According to him, the disciplinary authority was required to independently consider the evidence and afford him an opportunity of hearing before arriving at a final decision. The petitioner relied upon the charge-report of the Inspector, Andal (Proper), dated 06.04.2010, to contend that Inspector R.P. Singh, during the leave period of his predecessor, was the custodian of the Malkhana and, therefore, the question of the petitioner having taken charge of the Malkhana, its case properties, dead stock, arms and ammunition and the relevant register did not arise. 23. By his written statement of defence dated 08.05.2012, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges and set out the alleged illegalities and irregularities in the enquiry proceeding, including violation of the statutory Rules and the principles of natural justice, in support of his defence. 24. The Enquiry Officer, by his purported finding dated 29.06.2012, held the petitioner guilty of the charges. According to the petitioner, the finding failed to consider his written statement of defence in its proper perspective and disclosed no reasons for rejecting the same, rendering the finding cryptic, 13 perverse and indicative of non-application of mind. The petitioner further contended that his request for permission to engage a retired officer as his defence friend was rejected and that, in his detailed reply dated 03.10.2012 to the show-cause notice dated 14.09.2012 issued on the basis of the adverse finding, he pointed out various alleged irregularities in the enquiry, including his inability to effectively cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and the Enquiry Officer's having assumed the role of the prosecutor. Submissions: 25. Mr. Majumder, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that, in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority (“DA”) proceeded with a pre-determined mind. Referring to the charge-sheet, he submitted that, in Charge No. 1, it was stated that the petitioner had “clearly violated” the lawful order of the Hon’ble DG, RPF/Railway Board, NDLS. In Charge No. 2, it was stated that “this itself is not only shows his slack supervision but also proved that he was involved in such malpractice/irregularity as well as directly connivance in respect of 44 nos. of Pig iron, GC-sheets and other case properties”. In Charge No. 3, it was stated that “it was crystal clear” that the case property, namely, 678 pieces of GC Sheets, had been illegally disposed of by the petitioner for his personal gain. 26. Therefore, he argued that the DA had already made up his mind and instead of telling the charges, confront the petitioner with definite conclusion and as such, in his view, such a charge sheet cannot be sustained in the eye of law and all subsequent actions based on this charge-sheet are null and void 14 and in support of such contention, he cited a decision, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 (Oryx Fisheries Private Limited vs. Union of India & Ors.). 27. He submits that both the Enquiry Officer (EO) and the Disciplinary Authority (DA) proceeded in a biased manner. Relying upon the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 24, Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors., he submits that the question is whether there was a mere apprehension of bias or a real danger of bias. On this score, the surrounding circumstances are required to be collated and the necessary conclusion is to be drawn therefrom. According to him, the petitioner was adjudged guilty in the course of the Court of Enquiry itself, whereafter a draft charge-sheet was issued. In his written reply, the petitioner specifically raised the issue of pre-judgment by the DA and contended that the proposed charges were therefore indefensible. Nevertheless, without addressing such objection, the same allegations were reiterated in the charge-sheet. 28. Referring to Rule 37.7 framed under Section 7 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, he submitted that, without obtaining the permission of the learned Court before which the enquiry or trial in respect of the case is pending, the case property could not have been verified or the Malkhana inspected. In the present case, however, such verification and inspection were allegedly carried out without obtaining the requisite permission, whereafter the Enquiry Committee proceeded to conclude that the petitioner was responsible for the disappearance of the case property and had committed theft. According to him, the subsequent disciplinary 15 proceeding was conducted merely to lend a formal seal of approval to the conclusion already arrived at. 29. He further submits that, during the enquiry, the petitioner furnished a list of 16 witnesses and requested the Enquiry Officer to summon them; however, the responsibility of producing those witnesses was instead placed upon the petitioner, although several of them were holding ranks superior or equivalent to that of the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner had requested the Enquiry Officer to supply 32 documents, none of which was furnished to him, thereby depriving him of a fair opportunity to defend himself, as guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution. According to him, such non-supply of the documents amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice. 30. He submitted that, in the present case, although the report of the Court of Enquiry led to the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, the said report was not furnished to the petitioner. He asserted that, owing to the non-supply of the documents sought by the petitioner, the entire disciplinary proceeding stood vitiated. In support of such contention, he relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1986 SC 2118 (Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India & Ors.), 1970 SLR 400 (Delhi) (Jug Raj Singh vs. The Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors.), 1983 (1) CLJ 8 (Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani vs. Union of India & Ors.) and 1981 (2) SLR (Cal) 185 (Dola Gobinda Das vs. Union of India & Ors.). 31. Mr. Majumder submits that the Enquiry Officer, being a quasi-judicial authority, is required to return a reasoned finding. In the present case, however, he submits that the Enquiry Officer failed to record any reasoned 16 finding and, furthermore, acted in the capacity of a prosecutor by himself cross-examining the witnesses. According to him, the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be sustained. In support of such contention, he relies upon the decisions reported in 1985 SCC (L&S) 815 (Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer & Ors.) and (2010) 2 SCC 772 (State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha). Relying upon the decision reported in 1992 (7) SLR 51 (Allahabad Bank vs. Sri Pronab Kumar Mukherjee & Ors.), he further submits that, in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment on a charge which was not mentioned in the charge-sheet and, therefore, such punishment and even the entire disciplinary proceeding cannot be sustained. 32. In response, Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, submits that, in matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, the scope of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process and, unless a serious infirmity is found therein, the writ court ought not to interfere. He submits that the writ court cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the Disciplinary Authority imposing penalty upon a delinquent employee, and that interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. In support of such contention, he relies upon the decisions reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 (Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran), (1994) 3 SCC 357 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Upendra Singh), (2022) 6 SCC 563 (State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh) and (2023) 3 SCC 622 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Constable Sunil Kumar). 17 33. He contended, in the present case, the following dates are relevant: on 9th November, 2010, a Court of Enquiry was ordered upon receipt of information regarding the missing of 44 pieces of pig iron from the Malkhana; on 14th December, 2010, the petitioner was placed under suspension; on 5th January, 2011, a memorandum of tentative charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner; on 5th February, 2011, the petitioner submitted his reply to the tentative charge-sheet; and on 9th February, 2011, the final charge-sheet was issued. Referring to the second proviso to Rule 135 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987, he submits that, since the allegations against the petitioner involved embezzlement of property, the stipulation of 30 days contained in the said Rule would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. 34. He contends that, in the covering letter dated 9th February, 2011, under which the charge-sheet was issued, the word “proposed” was employed. According to him, it cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was confronted with any definite conclusion in the charge-sheet. He further submits that the statements contained in the charge-sheet were merely allegations which the management proposed to establish in the course of the disciplinary proceeding. 35. He submits that, in the present case, the petitioner had sought permission to engage a retired personnel as his “friend” to assist him in defending the charges. However, referring to Rule 153.8 of the 1987 Rules, he submits that engagement of a retired personnel for such purpose is not permissible under the said Rule. He further submits that the petitioner had claimed that he furnished a list of 16 witnesses and requested the Enquiry 18 Officer to summon them. Referring to Rule 153.16 of the 1987 Rules, he contends that the Enquiry Officer had neither the power nor the authority to summon such witnesses and that the responsibility for producing the defence witnesses lay upon the petitioner. Referring to Rule 153.13 of the 1987 Rules, he further submits that the Enquiry Officer could not call for documents which did not form part of the record. According to him, all the relied-upon documents had been supplied to the petitioner and, if the petitioner intended to rely upon any other document, it was incumbent upon him to produce the same in support of his defence. 36. He contends that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted in accordance with the applicable Rules and that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself. He further submits that the Enquiry Officer recorded reasoned findings and that the Disciplinary Authority also passed a reasoned order. According to him, in view thereof, there is no scope for interference with either the disciplinary proceeding or the final order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Analysis and conclusion: 37. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that judicial review of administrative action is primarily concerned with illegality, irrationality, including Wednesbury unreasonableness, and procedural impropriety. The doctrine of proportionality has, in appropriate cases, supplemented the traditional test of reasonableness. The object of judicial review is to ensure that administrative action is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, biased or 19 actuated by mala fides. Although the scope of judicial review is ordinarily confined to examining the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself, where a finding is perverse, irrational or wholly unsupported by the materials on record, the Court may examine the relevant evidence or materials to ascertain whether such finding is sustainable. Thus, where the conclusion arrived at by the authority is one which no reasonable person, properly instructed in law and upon consideration of the material before it, could have reached, such conclusion falls within the permissible limits of judicial review. 38. Indisputably, the authority to punish an employee lies within the employer's domain, and courts typically refrain from intervening unless it is established that the enquiry proceedings have been tainted due to the failure to adhere to established rules or principles of natural justice. This includes the denial of a reasonable opportunity for the employee to defend themselves, or where the punishment is found to be disproportionate to the proven misconduct. 39. However, it is also equally well settled that when an officer is appointed as the Inquiring Authority or Disciplinary Authority, he assumes the role of an impartial adjudicator. In this capacity, it is incumbent upon him to independently assess whether the management has successfully established the charges of misconduct, without being influenced by any preconceived notions or biases. Indisputably, the purpose of an inquiry is not tosomehow establish the charges against the delinquent, but to uncover the truth. 20 40. The basic concept of fair play in action is squarely applicable in administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial field. When an authority assumes jurisdiction to discharge quasi-judicial function, then such authority must act fairly, impartially and without any bias or pre-determined mind. If the court finds that authority has acted arbitrarily with closed mind and in violation of rules of natural justice and in derogation of the statutory rules, the Court can extend the compass of judicial review to render justice. 41. In a departmental enquiry entailing adverse or penal consequences, there must be fair play in action and investigations into the charges in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the rules and/or regulations in vogue. Procedural fairness is as much as an essence of right and liberty as the substantive law itself. 42. In the present case, the petitioner has specifically contended that the DA had proceeded with a pre-conceived notion. In charge no. 1, it was stated that the petitioner had ‘clearly violated’ the lawful order of the Hon’ble DG, RPF/Rly. Boardand in charge no. 2, it was stated that the petitioner had never visited open and closed Malkhana nor he did show any interest about the adequate/proper security arrangement to protect & safeguard the case property and as such, this inaction was not only showed his slack supervision but also ‘proved’ that he was involved in theft of 44 Pcs. Pig iron, G.C. sheet and other case properties and in charge no. 3, it was stated that it was ‘crystal clear’ that petitioner disposed of 678 Pcs. Of G.C. Sheet illegaly for his personal gain and in the charge sheet, it was also stated that “The above act of the IPF/S.Rai is‘clearly shows’ his serious dereliction of duty, slack 21 supervision and involved in such malpractice/irregularity in respect of theft/missing Pig iron, changing of G.C. sheets as well as other case properties ..” 43. In Oryx Fisheries Private Limited (supra), the show cause notice contained expressions such as “it has been proved beyond doubt”, “you have dishonoured” and “this irresponsible action has brought irreparable damage to India’s trade relation with UAE”. Taking note of such expressions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the authority had proceeded with a pre- determined mind. It was observed that where, instead of merely setting out the charges, the delinquent is called upon to answer a definite conclusion as to his alleged guilt, the subsequent disciplinary proceeding would be reduced to an empty formality and the proceeding founded on such a charge-sheet would stand vitiated. 44. In the present case also, the repeated use of expressions such as “proved”, “clearly violated”, “crystal clear” and “clearly shows” in the charge-sheet cannot be regarded as mere inadvertent or innocuous expressions, particularly when such expressions are employed while setting out the allegations against the petitioner. They prima facie indicate that the author of the charge-sheet had already formed an opinion as to the petitioner’s guilt even before the commencement of the disciplinary enquiry. The covering letter accompanying the charge-sheet, wherein the expression “proposed” was used, cannot alter the character of the charge-sheet itself, particularly when such covering letter was not relied upon as a document in the disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Dutta that the use of the 22 expression “proposed” in the covering letter would render the allegations contained in the charge-sheet mere allegations is of little substance. In such circumstances, the petitioner’s contention that the subsequent disciplinary proceeding was reduced to an empty formality, as the conclusion as to his guilt had already been arrived at inthe charge-sheet itself, cannot be lightly brushed aside. 45. The charge-sheet will indicate that in the charge no.1, it was alleged that the petitioner being the In-charge of RPF/Post/UDL (P) had clearly violated the lawful order of Hon’ble DG, RPF/Rly. Board, NDLS and nominated SI/R.P.Singh as the Malkhana In Charge for his vested interest. However, admittedly, the lawful order had not been specified. 46. It is well settled proposition that a charge in a disciplinary proceeding must be clear, definite and specific and must contain the material particulars necessary to enable the delinquent to understand and effectively defend the allegation.In the absence of the date, number, contents and nature of such order, the petitioner was left to speculate as to the precise direction allegedly violated by him and, consequently, was deprived of an effective opportunity to meet the charge and it is axiomatic that no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. (see, the case of Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78). 47. In Charge No. 1, it was further alleged that the petitioner had failed to take over charge of the case property lying in the UDL (P) Post Malkhana after duly physically verifying all the case properties from the then IPF, S.K. Mondal. The petitioner, however, in his reply specifically stated that he had 23 taken over charge of the case properties from S.K. Mondal on 6th April, 2010, pursuant to the direction of the Sr. DSC/E.Rly./ASN. and under the supervision of ASC, M.K. Thakur. The aforesaid specific defence of the petitioner has not been considered or dealt with by the Enquiry Officer in his report. Nevertheless, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to conclude that the charge stood proved, without recording any finding on the petitioner's specific assertion regarding the actual taking over of charge. 48. In Charge No. 2, on the one hand, it was alleged that the petitioner had never visited the open and closed Malkhana and had failed to evince any interest in ensuring adequate and proper security arrangements for the protection and safeguarding of the case properties lying therein. On the other hand, the charge proceeded to allege that such inaction, apart from constituting slack supervision, indicated the petitioner’s involvement in the alleged malpractice/irregularity and his direct connivance in the theft of 44 pieces of pig iron, G.C. sheets and other case properties. The charge, in such form, appears tobe inherently self-contradictory. If the allegation against the petitioner was that he had been negligent or had failed to take adequate measures for the security of the case properties, it is difficult to comprehend how such negligence, by itself, could lead to the further conclusion that he was directly involved in or had connived at the theft of the said properties. The distinction between negligence in supervision and direct involvement in the commission of theft could not have been glossed over in this manner. 49. Moreover, the materials on record disclose that it was the petitioner himself who lodged the FIR alleging the theft of the pig iron, pursuant to 24 which one Anath Bauri was arrested and, on the basis of the information furnished by him, 44 pieces of pig iron were recovered. Though this material fact was noticed by the Enquiry Officer in his report, the Enquiry Officer nevertheless proceeded to hold the petitioner guilty of Charge No. 2 without adequately explaining how his conduct in reporting the theft and facilitating the recovery of the stolen property could be reconciled with the allegation of his direct connivance in the theft. The finding of guilt, therefore, does not appear to have been arrived at upon a proper consideration of the material aspects bearing upon the charge. 50. In Charge No. 3, as noticed hereinbefore, it was alleged that, during the Court of Inquiry, it had become “crystal clear” that 678 pieces of G.C. sheets had been illegally disposed of by the petitioner and that, thereafter, he had attempted to make good the alleged shortage by arranging G.C. sheets of another quality so as to mislead the Railway administration, which was detected by the Committee constituted for the Court of Inquiry and recorded in its report. Thus, in order to substantiate the said charge, two distinct facts were required to be established, namely, (i) that 678 pieces of G.C. sheets had in fact been disposed of illegally by the petitioner; and (ii) that, thereafter, the petitioner had arranged G.C. sheets of another quality with the intention of making good the alleged shortage and misleading the Railway administration. 51. In the enquiry report, regarding charge no. 3, the EO observed as follows: ‘678 Pcs. Of G.C. Sheets of case of no. 8/89 dated 21.05.1989 U/s. 3(a) RP (UP) Act was kept in closed Malkhana but suddenly it was found missing. During the course of court of 666 Pcs. Of new G.C. Sheets were found in a room of office 25 barrack. The room was under lock and key but the same day before that room in open condition & same old Patra were seen lying in the same . The Court of enquiry team got the G.C. sheet examined by the expert Sri Neerajkumar, JE/Works/UDL. Sri Neeraj Kumar, JE/Works/UDL examined the G.C. sheets, tallied with seizure list regarding thickness & found different accordingly he issued certificate. Gone through the finding of court of enquiry conducted by Sri M.K. Thakur, ASC/UDL, Sri T.S. Banerjee, IPF & Sri S. Ganguly and I am agreed with this findings.” 52. Therefore, on a plain reading of the aforesaid observations and conclusions, it can, at best, be said that during the Court of Inquiry, 678 pieces of G.C. sheets were found to be missing and that, in their place, 666 pieces of G.C. sheets of a different quality were found. What remains unexplained, however, is how the petitioner was connected with this occurrence. There is no clear finding as to how the alleged disposal of 678 pieces of G.C. sheets by the petitioner was established, or how the alleged replacement of those sheets by 666 pieces was attributed to him. The mere finding of shortage of 678 pieces and the presence of 666 pieces of different quality, by itself, does not explain or establish the petitioner’s involvement in either the alleged disposal or the alleged replacement. 53. It is axiomatic that an Enquiry Officer discharges a quasi-judicial function and is required to act fairly, reasonably and objectively. [See Rup Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570; Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 541]. It is equally well settled that the 26 findings of an Enquiry Officer must be based on the evidence on record and cannot rest on conjectures, surmises or mere reproduction of the materials placed before him. The Enquiry Officer is required to independently consider the evidence and record reasons showing how the misconduct alleged against the delinquent stands established. In the present case, however, the enquiry report does not disclose any such independent consideration. It substantially reproduces the charges and the statements of the witnesses, records that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself and, thereafter, merely expresses agreement with the report of the Committee of the Court of Inquiry. The report does not disclose any independent reasoning as to how the individual charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. The findings of the Enquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be said to be informed by reason. 54. In the present case, the petitioner claimed that he had furnished a list of 16 witnesses and 32 documents and requested the Enquiry Officer to summon the said witnesses, particularly as they were either superior or equal in rank to the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer declined to secure the documents on the ground that the documents were not available with him. Mr. Dutta, however, contended that the Enquiry Officer had no authority to summon any witness or call for any document from the department. Such contention cannot be accepted in view of Rule 153.16, which expressly empowers the Enquiry Officer to refuse a witness or document sought to be produced in defence only upon recording reasons for considering the same irrelevant or inadmissible. Thus, the Rule necessarily recognizes the Enquiry Officer’s power to summon witnesses and call for documents. In the present case, 27 instead of exercising that power, the Enquiry Officer shifted the burden of producing the witnesses upon the petitioner and declined to call for the documents merely on the ground that they were not available with him. The approach of the EnquiryOfficer was, therefore, contrary to the procedure contemplated under Rule 153.16. 55. In the present case, it appears that EO was inclined to somehow to put a seal of approval on the report of the Court of Enquiry and he has not independently assessed the evidence brought on record and did not undertake to arrive at a conclusion independently. The DA also did not independently examined the enquiry report and the materials on record and undertake any exercise to ascertain as to whether based on such materials on record, any prudent man could have reached to this conclusion, as the EO had reached. Citing all these events, Mr. Majumder claimed biasness in the mind of the EO and DA. 56. In N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 653, the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew a distinction between a mere suspicion of bias and a likelihood of bias. It was observed that the proper test is whether there exists a real danger of bias, and not merely a possibility or preponderance of probability thereof. The Court further held that the test is whether a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant facts and circumstances, would have a reasonable apprehension that the Enquiry Officer would not act impartially. This principle assumes significance in the present case, where the repeated use of expressions such as “proved”, “clearly violated”, “crystal clear” and “clearly shows” in the charge-sheet, coupled with the manner in which the Enquiry Officer dealt with the petitioner’s defence and arrived 28 at his findings, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the enquiry was not approached with the degree of impartiality and objectivity expected of a quasi- judicial authority. 57. Therefore, having regard to the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner’s contention that the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority proceeded with a pre-determined mind cannot be said to be without substance. Even at the cost of some repetition, it may be noted that the draft as well as the final charge-sheet repeatedly used expressions such as “proved”, “clearly violated”, “crystal clear” and “clearly shows”; the Court of Inquiry was conducted in the absence of the petitioner; and, despite the FIR having been lodged by the petitioner himself and 44 pieces of pig iron having subsequently been recovered in course of investigation, he was held guilty in respect of thealleged theft thereof. He was also charged with violation of an alleged order of the DG, RPF/Railway Board without the order itself being identified or specified. Again, although the petitioner had stated that he took over charge of the case properties under the supervision of a superior officer, he was nevertheless held guilty of failing to take proper charge. Viewed cumulatively, these circumstances lend considerable weight to the petitioner’s contention that the enquiry was not conducted with the requisite impartiality and objectivity. 58. Similarly, while the materials did not establish the petitioner’s connection with the disappearance of 678 pieces of G.C. sheets or the replacement thereof by 666 pieces of sheets of a different quality, nor did they establish that the petitioner had personally effected such disposal or replacement, he was still held guilty of the 29 charge. Therefore, considered cumulatively, these circumstances lend substantial force to the petitioner’s contention that the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority had approached the matter with a pre-determined mind. Accordingly, the suspension order, charge-sheet, disciplinary enquiry and the consequential order of punishment, therefore, cannot be sustained. 59. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Dutta have been carefully considered. The legal principles emerging therefrom have been noticed and discussed in the foregoing paragraphs and have been duly kept in view while considering the issues arising in the present case. The conclusions reached herein are founded upon an application of those principles to the facts and materials on record. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the principles laid down in the decisions relied upon by Mr. Dutta and the findings recorded in this order. The observations and conclusions herein are thus not intended to depart from, dilute or disregard the binding principles laid down in the said decisions, but are arrived at upon their due application to the facts of the present case. 60. Thus, upon consideration of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs and upon applying the principles laid down in the decisions referred to hereinbefore, I am of the view that the writ petition succeeds. Consequently, the order of suspension dated 14th December, 2010, the charge-sheet dated 9th February, 2011, the Enquiry Report dated 29th June, 2012, and the order of punishment dated 6th July, 2025, whereby the petitioner was visited with the penalty of reduction of pay by three (03) stages below the existing pay, for a period of three years, with cumulative effect and with immediate effect, are hereby set aside 30 and quashed. The respondents are directed to release and disburse the full salary and arrears of pay to which the petitioner would have been entitled had the disciplinary proceeding not been initiated against him. The entire exercise shall be completed and all admissible payments shall be released to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 61. With these observations and order, the writ petition being WPA 5070 of 2011 alongwith its connected application being CAN 1 of 2023 are, thus, disposed of; however, without any order as to the costs. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)