KIRAN RAVI WANKHEDE @ KIRAN RABI WANKHEDE AND OTHERS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR
CRR/747/2024 · 2026-09-22
Shampa Dutt Paul
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 41945 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 41945 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)
CRR 747 of 2024
Kiran Rabi Wankhede @ Kiran Rabi Wankhede & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Avik Ghatak, Adv.
Ms. Afreen Begum, Adv.
Mr. Shamsher Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Fahad Iman, Adv.
Mr. Dip Dutta, Adv.
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Tanmoy Chowdhury. Adv.
Ms. Ritoprita Ghosh, Adv.
Ms. Sulagna Sarkar,Adv.
For the State
: Mr. Rajendra Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Sayan Mukherjee, Adv.
Judgment reserved on : 01.09.2026
Judgment delivered on : 22.09.2026 SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:-
1. The criminal revision has been preferred praying for quashing of proceeding pertaining to C.G.R No. 5356 of 2016, arising out of Gariahat Police Station Case No. 204 of 2016 dated 22.11.2016, alleging offences punishable under sections 498A/ 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, pending before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24 Parganas South. 2
2. The petitioner no.1 is the mother-in-law, petitioner No. 2 is the father- in-law and petitioner No. 3 is the brother-in-law, of the opposite party No. 2. 3. The allegations made by the de facto complainant in an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, is that the parties were married on 23.12.2002 and out of the said wedlock two daughters were born. The written complaint has been lodged 14 years after marriage. It is alleged that after the said marriage the de facto complainant was subjected to mental and physical cruelty for dowry by the accused persons. At paragraph 20 of the petition of complaint, it appears that the de facto complainant and her children were taken by her husband to Australia. It is stated that even after returning from there, she was inflicted mental and physical cruelty. The parties even went for a holiday to Nepal in June, 2016. It is stated that the de facto complainant and her children were then left in her parents house. The de facto complainant has also noted the articles which were allegedly misappropriated by the accused persons. 4. In course of hearing the State has placed the case diary. 5. It appears from the materials on record, including the case diary that the parties in 2017 had an agreement and a memorandum of understanding was executed between them and for alleged violation of the terms of agreement by her husband, the de facto complainant/opposite party no. 2 asked the police to proceed with
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the case registered by her, which ended in a final report on
04.04.2018. 6. In the present revision, the husband of the de facto complainant is not before this Court. 7. The petitioners are the in-laws, and there is nothing on record to prima facie make out a case against them for the offences alleged. 8. Section 498A of IPC, lays down:-
“498A.
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Ingredients of offence. -The essential ingredients of the offence under sec. 498A are as follows:- (1) A woman was married; (2) She was subjected to cruelty; (3) Such cruelty consisted in -
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(i) any lawful conduct as was likely to drive such woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health whether mental or physical; (ii) harm to such woman with a view to coercing her to meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security or on account of failure of such woman or any of her relations to meet the lawful demand; (iii) the woman was subjected to such cruelty by her husband or any relation of her husband.”
9. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs State of Telangana & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No. ………… of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024, decided on December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court held:-
“15.
An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
“cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 5
16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. 18.
A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations. 25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. 6
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them. 28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State.
However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them. 29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable
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security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case. 30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:
“12.
There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their
“cases” in different courts.”
31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. 32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6
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herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal.
Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.”
10. The materials in the case diary in the present case shows that the allegations are general in nature. As such permitting the case to proceed against the petitioner herein, will clearly be an abuse of the process of law, considering that none of the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged are present against the petitioner herein. 11. In State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335, the Supreme Court held:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
12. The present case is thus clearly covered by the guidelines in State of Haryana vs Bhajanlal (Supra) (Para 102). 13. CRR 747 of 2024 is thus allowed. 14. The proceeding being C.G.R No. 5356 of 2016, arising out of Gariahat Police Station Case No. 204 of 2016 dated 22.11.2016, alleging
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offences punishable under sections 498A/ 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, pending before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24 Parganas South, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Kiran Ravi Wankhede @ Kiran Rabi Wankhede, Ravi Harish Wankhede @ Rabi Harish Wankhede @ Dri Ravi Harish Wankhede and Goutam Ravi Wankhede @ Goutam Rabi Wankhede @ Dr. Goutam Ravi Wankhede. 15. All connected applications, if any, stands disposed of. 16. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 17. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 18. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)