[2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 348/2026 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5098/2023 1. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its Commissioner, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur. 2. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its Secretary, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur. ----Appellants/Respondents Versus 1. Ranjeet Singh Meena S/o Lt. Sh. Neta, Aged About 64 Years, R/o Village Chainpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, Rajasthan (Deceased). 1/1. Soni Devi W/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Chainpura Near By Jawahar Cirlce Neta Baba Ki Dhani, Jaipur-302017. 1/2. Geeta Devi Meena W/o Hari Narayan Meena D/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Dulatpura Bagwada, Th. Amer, Jaipur. 1/3. Shila Meena W/o Ram Kailash Meena D/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Jhar Kothi Wali Ki Dhani, Doodhli Bassi, Jaipur. 1/4. Rajvanti Meena W/o Vishram Singh Meena D/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Sungadi, Unbadagav, Tehsil Baswa, District Dausa. 1/5. Kanta Meena W/o Sarwan Kumar D/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Dayarampura Kanota, Tehsil Bassi, Jaipur. 1/6. Savitri Meena W/o Deendayal Meena D/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Village Chainpura Panchu, Ghar Wali Dhani, Tehsil Bassi, Jaipur. 1/7. Hari Mohan Meena S/o Ranjeet Singh Meena, R/o Chainpura Near By Jawahar Circle Neta Baba Ki Dhani, Jaipur. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (2 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 1/8. Ram Babu Meena S/o Ranjeet Singh Mena, R/o Chainpura Near By Jawahar Circle Neta Baba Ki Dhani, Jaipur. ----Respondents/Petitioners 2. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principle Secretary To The Government, Department Of Urban Development And Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur. 3. State Of Rajasthan, Through Joint Secretary (1) To The Government, Department Of Urban Development And Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur. ----Respondents And D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 347/2026 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9017/2023 1. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its Commissioner Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur. 2. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, Through Its Secretary Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Ram Kishore Vyas Bhawan, Jaipur. ----Appellants/Respondents Versus 1. Shri Hanumant Singh, (Since Deceased) Through His Legal Heir- 1/1. Smt. Archana Singh W/o Late Hanumant Singh, Aged About 41 Years, R/o 4-K-10, Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Respondent - Petitioner No.1 2. Shri Nangram Meena S/o Shri Gopal Lal Meena, Aged About 52 Years, R/o Plot No. A 18-19, Prem Colony, Aamali Kothi, Taaro Ki Khonth, Sanganer, Jaipur Rajasthan. ----Respondent-Petitioner No.2 3. Rakesh Meena S/o Late Ram Kumar Meena, Aged About 31 Years, R/o Village Chainpura, Near Jawahar Circle, [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (3 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] Tehsil-Sanganer, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Respondent-Petitioner No.3 4. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principle Secretary To The Government, Department Of Urban Development And Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur. 5. State Of Rajasthan, Through Joint Secretary (1) To The Government, Department Of Urban Development And Housing, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri For Respondent(s) : Ms. Alankrita Sharma with Mr. Yogesh Kalla, Mr. Harshil Bansal and Ms. Nimisha Danga HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order REPORTABLE 17/04/2026 1. These D.B. Special Appeals are filed by the appellants-non petitioners aggrieved from order dated 07.03.2026 in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 5098/2023 (Ranjeet Singh (Dead) through LRs Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.) and SB Civil Writ Petition No. 9017/2023 (Shri Hanumant Singh (Dead) through LR and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 2. Defect(s) in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 347/2026 are over ruled. 3. Learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petitions, has directed as under:- "14. In view of the discussion made above, both the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (4 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] to allow/allot 25% developed land (20% residential + 5% commercial) in lieu of compensation for the land acquired according to the title and share of the petitioners as established in accordance with law. This exercise of approval from the State Government and the allotment be made within a period of one month from the date of submitting a certified copy of this order." 4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submit that the writ petitions were filed for direction to allot 25% developed land (20% residential + 5% commercial), in view of the policy dated 24.09.2020 (amended on 04.11.2020) as well as circular dated 01.06.2022 and 12.07.2024 issued by the State Government, in lieu of compensation for acquired land. He further submits that the writ petitioners have claimed that their ancestral land was acquired and compensation has not been paid to them. 5. Learned counsel further submits that a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short 'the Act of 1953') was issued on 21.08.1969 for acquiring aforesaid land for expansion of Aerodrome and objections were filed by khatedars and ultimately, notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 was issued in the year 1973 and thereafter, award was passed on 17.05.1975. He further submits that the khatedars have not accepted the compensation amount and same was deposited in the Reference Court on 10.02.1979, 12.07.1979 and 09.12.1999 respectively. He also submits that earlier the land acquisition was challenged by the landholders but the writ petitions were dismissed. He further submits that the possession over the land has already been taken by the Jaipur Development Authority (for short 'JDA') and the land in question has already been mutated in the name of JDA. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (5 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of JDA has further submits that a false and frivolous writ petitions were filed by legal heirs of erstwhile Khatedars on the ground that the JDA and the State Government be directed to allot 25% of developed land to the Khatedar in lieu of compensation, without disclosing the fact that the compensation amount has already deposited in the Court. He also submits that the learned Single Judge has overlooked the principle of law while allowing the writ petitions and directing the appellants for allocation of 25% of land to the writ petitioners. He further submits that possession memo dated 23.11.1976 and fensing order dated 21.04.2017 are sufficient to establish the de jure and de facto possession of JDA. He also submits that the compensation amount has already been deposited in the Reference Court and nothing is survived after deposition of compensation amount and taking over of possession of the land by JDA. 7. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. She further submits that after notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1953, neither compensation was paid nor possession was taken by the appellants. She also submits that land in question is still in possession of landholders and as per judgment dated 16.03.2026 in DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.658/2010 (Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Sai Darshan Hotels and Motels Private Limited and Anr.), the writ petitioners are entitled for developed land from JDA. She submitted that learned Single Judge has rightly considered the contentions of the writ petitioners in light of the policy of the Government. She also submits that the [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (6 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] policy to allot developed land in lieu of compensation is already approved by Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the writ petitioners are entitled for allocation of land as per policy. 8. She further submits that in the instant case, neither compensation is paid nor possession was taken, therefore, the dispute with regard to land acquisition is still pending, thus the appellants are duty bound to consider their case on basis of notification and circulars as referred by learned Single Judge. She further submits that the land acquisition was prior to 2005 and the guidelines as referred by learned Single Judge are applicable upon the facts of the case.Thus there is no illegality in allowing the writ petitions by learned Single Judge. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners further submits that several representations were made by the writ petitioners to the JDA and also the State Government but no action was taken till filing of the writ petitions. She also submits that after examining the case of the writ petitioners, the appellants have recommended the case of the writ petitioners for allocation of developed land to the writ petitioners and same was lying pending on date of filing of writ petitions but all of sudden, the appellants have informed to this Hon'ble Court that a decision has been taken by the State Government and the proposal has been returned. She further referred the cases of regularization as mentioned in writ petitions and submitted that similarly situated schemes were regularized by the appellants and the State Government. The case of the writ petitioners is already covered under the guidelines and circular, issued by the State Government. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (7 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 10. Heard learned learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments as referred by learned counsel for the respondents- writ petitioners and also perused the record. 11. The brief facts of the case are that on 21.08.1969, a notification under Section 4 of the Rajastan Land Acquisition Act of 1953 was issued for village Chainpura acquiring the Khatedari land bearing Khasra Nos. 63, 64, 65 & 67 (new Khasra Nos. 288, 286, 289) recorded in the name of Shri Neta (father of original petitioner Ranjeet Singh) and land bearing khasra Nos. 68, 168, 169, 170, 173, 179 & 185 (new Khasra Nos. 290, 296, 291, 294, 295, 306, 308 & 304/271) in the khatedari of one Tariya for expansion of Jaipur Airport. On 22.04.1973, a notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 was issued and award was passed on 17.05.1975. Litigation History Relating to Same Land:- 12. The Writ Petition No.942/1974 titled as Neta Vs. State and Ors. was filed after the acquisition and same was decided on 08.05.1975. Thereafter, a Civil Writ Petition No. 743/1975 titled as Tarya Vs. State and Ors. was filed and same was decided on 19.03.1978. Alleging that the appellants-JDA is taking possession of land bearing Khasra Nos.63, 65, 67, 179, 185, 68, 168, 169, 170 and 173 situated in village Chainpura, Sanganer, District Jaipur, Ranjeet Singh Meena and others (writ petitioners) have filed a D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3534/2010 to challenge vires of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was dismissed on 13.08.2012 by a Division Bench of this Court. Admittedly, an SLP (Civil) was also filed by Ranjeet Singh Meena and others but same was also dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (8 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 13. The writ petitioners Ranjeet Singh Meena and others have again filed a Writ Petition No. 578/2015 which was dismissed on 13.04.2017 and aggrieved from said order a D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.612/2017 was filed. The D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.612/2017 was dismissed on 22.08.2023 by a Division Bench of this Court considering judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129. 14. The facts mentioned in Writ Petition No.9017/2023 also demonstrate that S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1923/2022 titled as Ranjeet Singh Meena and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. was also filed but the writ petition was dismissed on 29.11.2022. Discussions and Analysis- 15. The list of dates and events mentioned by appellants in D.B. Special Appeals (Writ) are as under:- Date Event 21.08.1969 Section 4 Notification issued for the expansion of Jaipur Airport (Village Chainpura). 17.05.1975 Land Acquisition Award passed. The land stood vested in the State 08.05.1975 First Litigation Round: S.B.C.W.P. No. 942/1974 (Neta v. State) challenging the acquisition was Dismissed on merits. 23.11.1976 Transfer of Possession: Possession of Khasra Nos. 63, 65, 67, 179, 185 was otaken via Khabza- Fard. 10.02.1979 Compensation Deposited: Compensation deposited in Civil Court (Ref. No. 1576) as Khatedars refused to accept. 21.04.2017 Physical Enforcement: Following the dismissal of a fresh challenge (Ranjeet Singh v. State, CW 578/2015), JDA removed encroachments and fenced the land under Order No. 1055. 17.10.2022 State Government Objection: The UDH [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (9 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] Department returned JDA's proposal for further verification and exercise. 16. The payments details as mentioned by the appellants in D.B. Special Appeals (Writ) are as under:- Kasra Nos. (Old) Area Amount Deposited Date/Ref No. 68, 168, 169, 170, 173 7 Bigha 9 Biswa Rs.45,259.25/- D-1576 dt. 09.12.1999 (Chq 831440) 63, 65, 67, 179, 185 4 Bigha 19 Biswa Rs.35,066.37/- D-89 dt. 10.02.1979 (Chq 034673) 64 (1/2 share) 10 Biswa Rs.7,170/- D-82 dt. 12.07.1979 (Chq 936378) 17. The writ petitioners have submitted representation to the appellants and State Government on basis of policy dated 01.06.2022 for giving 25% developed land in lieu of the compensation for the land for which award has been passed prior to 27.10.2005. The writ petitioners have sent legal notice for demand of justice as no heed is paid to their representation. In the meanwhile, certain orders were issued by the Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan. The petitioners have filed writ petitions before learned Single Judge and allowed by impugned order. 18. The material on record clearly indicated that before filing of writ petitions, the compensation was already deposited after passing of the award and no record is placed to show that any reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was ever made to the reference Court by the writ petitioners. After passing of award, the land acquisition proceedings were challenged by filing writ petitions and same were dismissed. Thereafter, on multiple times, the writ petitions were filed and every point of [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (10 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] time, the writ petitioners remained unsuccessful, which is evident from the records. 19. In case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129, Hon'ble Supreme Court has overruled earlier judgment in case of Pune Municipal Corp.& Anr vs Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. reported as (2014) 3 SCC 183 and held that satisfaction of either of the conditions, namely taking possession of acquired land or payment of compensation to land owners would be sufficient to save the acquisition from being left in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, (hereinafter referred as 'the Act of 2013'). The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (supra) are reproduced as under:- "355. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. V. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy :(1970) 1 SCC 613 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank Vs. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. : (2018) 16 SCC 228, where the decision of Mathura Prasad [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (11 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. The State of Bihar : (2012) 12 SCC 443 in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice issued under Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India : (1994) 1 SCC 4 to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner. 356. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (12 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein. 357. We are also of the considered opinion that the decision in an earlier round of litigation operates as res judicata where the challenge to the legality of the proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings of taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend to reopen proceedings which have been concluded. The decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of no avail. Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt about it that proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or aspects relating to it) can be questioned but within a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof. 358. So far as the proposition laid down in Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (supra) is concerned, inaction and delay on the part of acquiring authorities have been taken care of under Section 24. The mischief rule (or Heydon's Mischief Rule) was pressed into service on behalf of landowners relying upon the decision in Bengal Immunity Co v. The State of Bihar (supra), it was submitted that Act of 1894 did not provide for lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring Authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. Mischief has been sought to be cured by the legislature by introducing the Act of 2013 by making provisions in Section 24 of the lapse of proceedings. The submission is untenable. The provisions made under section 24 have provided a window of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings, and if there is a delay of 5 years or more, there is a lapse and not otherwise. The provision cannot be stretched any further, otherwise, the entire infrastructure, which has come up, would have to go and only the litigants would reap the undeserving fruits of frivolous litigation, having lost in several rounds of litigation earlier, which can never be the intendment of the law. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (13 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 363. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 1. Under the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. 2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. 3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 4. The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (14 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b). 7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (15 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition." 20. A Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in case of LRs of Late Sh. Takhat Singh Kothari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. : D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1452/2025 (decided on 07.03.2026) after relying upon judgment in case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal (supra) has observed as under:- "9. Firstly, we notice that the observations made in paras 359 and 360 clearly reflect that the present proceedings are nothing but misuse of the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. In the present case, we have already noticed that earlier challenge to the acquisition proceedings had failed, therefore, fresh proceedings under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 could not have been taken up and a fresh cause of action does not arise merely because Section 24 having come into force under the new Act of 2013. Secondly, we notice that so far as the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relating to Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, the same are to hold that before coming into force of Section 24 if there had been no action taken for last 5 years then the proceedings would lapse in terms of the Section 24 (2). However, the counting has to be done from the date of coming into force of the Act of 2013 i.e. with effect from 01.01.2014 backwards. Thus, if the compensation would not have been paid or possession would not have been taken for any acquisition proceedings in the previous 5 years i.e. from 2011 to 2014, the right would accrue for claiming lapse of the acquisition proceedings. But in the present case, we find that the compensation was already deposited in the year 2007 and further the paper possession had also been taken in 2007 itself, therefore, the claim of the petitioner for benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 of there being no action taken for 5 years is misconceived. It is apparent that the [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (16 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] petitioner is counting the 5 years from the date of award till the date of making the compensation whereas, the provisions of Section 24 (2) contemplate counting the 5 years’ period back from the date of coming into force of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The concept of claiming “Lapse” clause has been introduced in the Act of 2013 and, therefore, the time period has to be counted with reference to the Act of 2013 which has come into force from 01.01.2014. The arguments, therefore, fail." 21. In case of Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Sai Darshan Hotels and Motels Private Limited and Anr. (supra), a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court while dismissing DB Special Appeal (Writ) has observed as under:- "27. With regard to policy dated 13.12.2001 regarding validity of allotment of 15% developed land is no more res integra, the Apex Court in Lalaram Vs. Jaipur Development Authority and Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 31 has upheld the said decision of the State. The JDA is bound by the orders passed by the State Government. The orders have attained finality by dismissal of the appeal as well as SLP. 28. Independently, we have examined the case of the JDA and find no force in its submissions. The orders passed by the State Government cannot be said to be illegal and unjustified and are strictly in accordance with the policy of the State Government, moreso, as the enhanced compensation which was awarded in reference, increasing price of land from Rs.6000/- to Rs.24000/- per bigha vide order dated 24.03.1990 and not been paid, as is apparent from the affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary, Department of UDH (supra)." 22. Here in this case, after issuance of notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, an award was passed on 17.05.1975. The timeline as referred hereinabove indicate that the compensation was deposited in the reference Court and [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (17 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] possession was taken. Even after physical enforcement of possession, writ petitions were filed in the year 2010 and 2015 respectively, but the writ petitioners were unsuccessful, all the time. The writ petitioners have filed this writ petition in year 2023, meaning thereby, there were multiple rounds of litigation since 2010. Earlier round of litigation was instituted by predecessors of the writ petitioners as last writ petition was dismissed on 19.03.1978. The appellants have placed reliance upon Moka report (on site report) prepared pursuant to order dated 21.04.2017, to show that possession was affirmed after removal of encrochment made by the writ petitioners. The claim of deposition of compensation in Reference Court and further taking over of possession is not only pleaded in the current writ petitions but also in previous litigations. The writ petitioners remained unsuccessful as they have failed in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 3534/2010, when they were dispossessed. 23. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, reproduced as under:- "16. Power to take possession. When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government] [Substituted by A.O.1937.]], free from all encumbrances." 24. It means possession can be taken soon after passing of award. In the instant case, after award on 17.05.1975, the possession can be taken at any time. The resistance to such attempt by the writ petitioners have failed on multiple times. Thus, the appellants have affirmatively established factum of possession pursuant to land acquisition proceedings. [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (18 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] 25. The material placed on record, including previous litigations between the parties (instituted by writ petitioners) clearly indicate that the rights of these writ petitioners were already decided and time and again they reapproached to this Court. After the award dated 17.05.1975, no proceedings were filed for enhancement of compensation, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The writ petitioners or their predecessors-in-title have not made any effort for making a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The challenge to land acquisition has already came to an end in year 1978, but all of a sudden in 2010, one round of litigation was instituted and thereafter in 2015, another round of litigation and now again a fresh round of litigation for seeking compensation in lieu of acquired land for which award was passed on 17.05.1975. 26. The deposition of Amount has already been made and same is stated by the appellants, not only in current proceedings but also in previous proceedings between the parties. Therefore, considering the legal position as mentioned hereinabove, the writ petitioners have no right to assert that the dispute pertaining to land acquisition is still pending and they are entitled for allotment of 25% of land in lieu of compensation amount. Thus, the learned Single Judge has committed serious error by allowing the writ petitions. 27. In case of Udyami Evam Evan Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha Vs. State of UP reported in (2008) 1 SCC 560, it was held that one should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amount to abuse of the process of law. In case of Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors. Vs. State of UP and [2026:RJ-JP:16523-DB] (19 of 19) [SAW-348/2026] Anr. reported as 2021 SCC Online SC 191, it was held that frivolous litigation should not become the order of day in India. Therefore, these Special Appeals (Writ) are liable to be allowed. 28. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) Nos. 348/2026 and 347/2026 are hereby allowed and judgment and order dated 07.03.2026 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 5098/2023 and 9017/2023 are set aside. As a result, the Writ Petition Nos. 5098/2023 and 9017/2023 are dismissed. 29. Misc. application, if any, also stands disposed. 30. No order as to costs. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J MR/202 & 205