1 2026:CGHC:16385 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 165 of 2019 1 - (A) Smt. Jhulmati (Died Through LRs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 01-05-2025 1(A)1. Neelendrika Paikra D/o Late Shri Brajnandan Sai Aged About 43 Years R/o. Village Dhodhibahar, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) 1(A)2. Bhupendrika Paikra D/o Late Shri Brajnandan Sai Aged About 41 Years R/o. Village Dhodhibahar, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) 1(A)3. Roopwati Paikra D/o Late Shri Brajnandan Sai Aged About 38 Years R/o. Village Dhodhibahar, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) 1(A)4. Yogesh Kumar Sai S/o Late Shri Brajnandan Sai Aged About 35 Years R/o. Village Dhodhibahar, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) 1(A)5. Lavkesh Kumar Sai S/o Late Shri Brajnandan Sai Aged About 32 Years R/o. Village Dhodhibahar, Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) 1.6(B) Smt. Heeramati D/o Late Surjan Aged About 57 Years W/o Ramdev, Caste-Kanwar, R/o Village, Post And Tahsil Sitapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 1.7(C) Smt. Fulmati D/o Late Surjan Aged About 50 Years W/o Cherangu, R/o Mohalla Fundurdihari, Post And Tahsil- Ambikapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 1.8(D) Smt. Ranbagiya D/o Late Surjan Aged About 47 Years W/o Balsai, Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village Karya, Post-Darima, Tahsil- Ambikapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.04.13 16:52:34 +0530 2 2 - Ashok Kumar S/o Late Surjan Ram, Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Gyan Prakash S/o Surajan Ram Aged About 40 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Jeevan S/o Surajan Ram Aged About 40 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh..... (Defendants) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Masat Ram S/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 45 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Lakhan Ram S/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 34 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Balchand S/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 40 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Subhagya D/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 47 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Butni D/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 38 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 3 6 - Maniyaro Wd/o Late Sumaru Ram Aged About 70 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 7 - Sukhmaniya Wd/o Late Jagat Kanwar Aged About 65 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 8 - Radhika D/o Late Jagat Aged About 45 Years Caste- Kanwar, R/o Village- Aamgaon, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 9 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. …. Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Anurag Singh, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruw, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 09/04/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendants under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 03.11.2018 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Surajpur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 14-A/2014 (Surjan Ram (dead) through LRs Smt. Jhulmati & Ors. vs. Masat Ram & Ors.), affirming the judgment and decree dated 18.12.2013 passed by the learned 2nd Civil Judge, Class-I, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 4 16-A/2013 (Masat Ram & Ors v Surjan & Ors.), whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellants/ defendants was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the present suit against the defendants seeking declaration of title, partition, delivery of possession and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property situated at Village Amgaon, Tahsil Surajpur, as detailed in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint, pleading inter alia that the suit property was originally acquired as part of the joint Hindu family property and came to the share of the parties pursuant to earlier civil and revenue proceedings; although the property stood recorded in the name of defendant No.1 Surjan in the revenue records, the plaintiffs and defendants have been jointly cultivating and possessing the same as co-sharers, and the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/3rd share therein. The property traces its origin to the estate of their ancestor Jaimangal, and thereafter devolved within the joint family, remaining in joint possession of all members; that despite such joint status, the application filed by the plaintiffs for mutation was wrongly rejected by the Tahsildar; and the defendant No.1, without any authority, executed gift deeds in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 in respect of portions of the joint family property, which are illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs, and on the basis of such documents, the defendants have got their names mutated in collusion with revenue authorities, thereby necessitating the filing 5 of the present suit. 3. Per contra, defendant Nos. 1 to 4, by filing their written statement, have denied the averments made by the plaintiffs and contended that the suit property is the self-acquired/service land of defendant No.1, over which he has exclusive title and possession, and the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest therein. It is further contended that the earlier civil and revenue proceedings do not confer any right upon the plaintiffs and the mutation order passed by the Naib Tahsildar is illegal, against which an appeal is pending. According to the defendants, the suit property is not a joint Hindu family property but a separate property granted by the State to defendant No.1 under a patta, and he has been in exclusive possession thereof since inception. It is also pleaded that the ancestral properties had already been partitioned long back and the suit property is distinct therefrom. The defendants further contended that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit property and have filed the present false and frivolous suit out of greed. Defendant No.1 had full authority to execute the registered gift deeds in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4, pursuant to which lawful mutation has been carried out. Hence, the suit is without cause of action, barred by limitation, not maintainable, and also liable to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Defendant Nos. 5 & 6 also filed their written statement by 6 supporting the case of the plaintiffs, contended that the suit property is the joint Hindu family property of the parties, in which they are also entitled to a 1/3rd share. It is pleaded that after the death of Jagat (husband of defendant No.5 and father of defendant No.6), they have stepped into his share and are entitled to partition. It is further contended that in the earlier civil suit, the suit property was not held to be the exclusive property of defendant No.1, and the said judgment operates against him. According to them, defendant No.1, being the eldest member and karta of the family, was managing the property on behalf of all and had assured that the property would be partitioned among all members; relying on such assurance, they continued in joint possession and cultivation. It is further averred that the suit property originally came to late Rati in family partition and thereafter remained joint among his sons and their families. The gift deeds executed by defendant No.1 in favour of his sons are stated to be illegal, void and not binding, as no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to defendant Nos. 5 and 6 at the time of mutation. Hence, the said transfer and consequential mutation are liable to be declared null and void. 5. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs have established their title and possession over the suit land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 7 18/12/2013, the defendants preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the learned Courts are wholly perverse, erroneous both on facts and in law, and thus liable to be set aside. He submits that both the Court have failed to appreciate that the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, inasmuch as the legal heirs of Jaymangal were not impleaded, rendering the suit itself not maintainable. Learned counsel further submits that the suit property was the self- acquired property of late Surjan and stood recorded exclusively in his name in the revenue records, which aspect has been completely ignored by the Courts. He further submits that during his lifetime, late Surjan had validly executed a will/gift deed in favour of the appellants, conferring lawful rights upon them, but the same has not been properly considered. The learned First Appellate Court, in particular, has failed to appreciate the documentary and oral evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded findings which are contrary to the material available on record. Learned counsel also submits that an earlier suit bearing Civil Suit No. 77-A/1991 filed by the appellants against their uncle 8 in respect of the very same land had already been adjudicated and findings were recorded in the judgment dated 01.09.1992 (Ex.P-18), which have a bearing on the present controversy but have not been considered. He thus urged that the substantial questions of law arise for consideration as to whether the impugned judgment is perverse, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property, and whether the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment and decree be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 8. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the suit property is not the exclusive self-acquired property of defendant No.1, but is joint family property in which the plaintiffs are entitled to a share. The Courts have recorded a categorical finding that although the land was granted in the name of defendant No.1 in the year 1951, at that time the family was joint and there had been no prior partition of the suit land, and therefore, in view of the applicable provisions of the revenue laws and the settled legal position, the property 9 assumed the character of joint Hindu family property. It has further been held that the plaintiffs, being the legal heirs of one of the coparceners, are entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property and are also entitled to seek partition and separate possession thereof. 9. The plea of exclusive ownership raised by defendant No.1 has been disbelieved in light of the admissions made in earlier proceedings as well as the consistent evidence on record. It has also been concurrently held that the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 to 4 is valid only to the extent of his own share and void to the extent of the remaining share belonging to the plaintiffs. The objections regarding limitation, valuation, non-joinder of parties, and requirement of notice under Section 80 CPC have been duly considered and rejected with cogent reasons. The findings regarding entitlement of the plaintiffs to declaratory relief, partition, and permanent injunction have thus been affirmed concurrently, and no perversity, misreading of evidence, or substantial legal infirmity is made out so as to warrant interference with such concurrent findings in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. As far as the plea raised by learned counsel for the appellants that an earlier suit filed by the appellant against his uncle in respect of the land in question had already been decided is concerned, a 10 bare perusal of the judgment of the learned Trial Court clearly reveals that no issue on the point of res judicata was framed or considered. Moreover, the appellants neither specifically pleaded such a ground in their written statement nor advanced any argument on this aspect before the Trial Court. Hence, the said plea, having not been raised at the appropriate stage, cannot be permitted to be agitated at this stage. 11. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ defendants failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of 11 the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 15. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just 12 and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar