Form No. J(2) IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE BEFORE: THE HON’BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI C.O. 185 OF 2026 TAPAS PAUL …PETITIONER -VERSUS- SMT. MAMATA KHUTIA …OPPOSITE PARTY For the Petitioner : Mr. Chinmoy Pal, Adv. Mrs. Swati Mondal, Adv. For the Opposite Party : Mr. Siva Prosad Ghose, Adv. Reserved on : 24.06.2026 Judgment on : 18.09.2026 OM NARAYAN RAI, J.:- 1. This revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to an order dated December 04, 2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Sealdah in Ejectment Suit No. 66 of 2008 whereby the petitioner’s applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 19971 have been rejected and the petitioner’s defence has been struck out by invoking the provisions of Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Shorn of meticulous details, the facts relevant for adjudication of the present revisional application, as may be gathered from the material on record, are as follows:- a. The opposite party has instituted Ejectment Suit No. 66 of 2008 before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Sealdah praying for a decree of eviction of the petitioner inter alia on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable requirement. b. The petitioner entered appearance in the said case on or about July 17, 2008. It is the petitioner’s case that the petitioner had been depositing rent with the Rent Controller as per the advice of his erstwhile learned advocate. As he “was not satisfied with the progress of the said suit” therefore, he obtained a no objection 1 Hereafter “the 1997 Act” from his earlier learned advocate and engaged another advocate for representing him in the said suit. Pursuant to the advice of the newly engaged learned advocate, the petitioner filed two applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 19632 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083. c. The learned Trial Court allowed the application under Section 5 of the 1963 read with Section 151 of the Code by an order dated August 28, 2017 subject to payment of cost to the tune of Rs. 500/- only, for condonation of such delay. Upon the said order being passed, the petitioner started depositing rent in Court. d. Thereafter the petitioner’s application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act was proceeded with by the learned Trial Court. The petitioner remained unrepresented before the learned Trail Court on March 28, 2024, which led the learned Trial Court to fix May 13, 2024 for the petitioner to show cause as to why his application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act would not be rejected. e. Upon the petitioner showing cause, the learned Trial Court fixed September 04, 2024 as the date for hearing the petitioner’s application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act as a last chance. On the said date, the petitioner prayed for an adjournment. Such prayer was rejected by the learned Trial Court and as the petitioner did not advance arguments on his application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act the same was also dismissed on the same day. f. Assailing the said order, the petitioner approached this Court by filing C.O. 4398 of 2024. The same was disposed of by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by an order dated June 24, 2025, thereby setting aside the order dated September 04, 2024 passed by the learned Trial Court while requesting the learned Court “to take up the hearing of the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act on the next date fixed and to make an endeavour to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible”. g. Subsequently, the learned Trail Court heard both the sides and rejected the petitioner’s applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act by the impugned order dated December 04, 2025. By the said order the learned Trial Court has also struck out the petitioner’s defence in terms of the provisions of Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act. 2 Hereafter the 1963 Act 3 Hereafter “the Code” h. Feeling aggrieved by such order, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present revisional application. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 3. A brief summary of the submissions made by Mr. Pal, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, is as follows:- a. The learned Trial Court has committed a serious error by dismissing the petitioner’s applications under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act on the sole ground that the same had been filed beyond the period of one month. b. Once the learned Trial Court had condoned the delay in making such applications by the order dated August 28, 2017, it had no jurisdiction to turn around, reverse its own finding and hold that the applications were not maintainable when the said order was never challenged by the opposite party. c. In any event, since the petitioner had all along deposited the rent with the Rent Controller, without any default, it could not be said that the petitioner was a defaulter. In such cases default, if any, would only be technical and not real. A judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Monoj Lal Seal & Others vs. Octavious Tea and Industries Limited4 was cited to contend that deposit before the Rent Controller can be treated to be a mistake and the defence should not be struck out in such cases. d. A decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Tarak Nath Banerjee vs. Prantosh Kumar Saha5 was relied on to show that in the said case a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had set aside the order of the learned Trial Court by which the defence of the tenant had been struck out and remanded the matter back to the learned Trial Court for deciding the application under Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act afresh upon taking into consideration the rent deposited with the Rent Controller by treating the said deposits as mere irregularity and not illegality. e. The following judgments were relied on for the proposition that since the 1997 Act is a beneficial legislation, delay in filing applications under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act can be condoned by Courts and defence of the tenant should not be struck out in such cases:- i. Sushila Kumari Raidani & Others vs. American Spring & Pressing Works (P) Limited6 4 MANU/SC/0526/2015 5 MANU/WB/0118/2026 6 MANU/WB/0870/2023 ii. Ashok Kumar Bhagnani vs. Mansur Ahmed & Others7 iii. Bahadur Singh Kathotia vs. Purabi Basu8 iv. Madhabi Mukherjee vs. Dipali Mitra9 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY: 4. A brief summary of the submissions made by Mr. Ghose, learned Advocate, appearing for the opposite party, is as follows:- a. The learned Trial Court is perfectly justified in passing the order impugned inasmuch as the petitioner approached the Court with his applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act about seven years after having entered appearance in the suit. b. In terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School vs. Ismat Ahmed & Others10, the timelines mentioned in Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act are mandatory and the same do not permit entertainment of any application for condonation of delay except in the cases covered by the proviso to Section 7(2) of the said Act. Bijay Kumar Singh & Others vs. Amit Kumar Chamariya & Others11 was also relied on for the same proposition. c. The deposits made before the Rent Controller are all invalid deposits and as such the petitioner cannot get the benefits of such deposits for the purpose of getting protection under Section 7 of the 1997 Act. A judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hindustan Industrial Co. vs. Chandi Prosad More12 was cited in support of such proposition. d. Even if all the aforesaid is ignored, then also the petitioner is not entitled to any relief since the petitioner did not pay the costs condoning the delay whereby November 16, 2017 had been fixed for payment of costs. A judgment of the Hon’ble Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kasam vs. Jakir Hussain13 was relied on to contend that if the party does not pay the cost(s), then only course open to the Court is to disallow the prosecution of the case or the defence as the case may be. 7 MANU/WB/0749/2017 8 MANU/WB/0277/2023 9 MANU/WB/1108/2012 10 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1696 11 AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 5461 12 L.P.A. No. 72 of 1972, decided on March 20, 1975 13 2020 (1) ICC 420 (Pb. & Hry.) REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 5. Mr. Pal, learned Advocate, appearing for the petitioner reiterated his earlier submissions and asserted that costs had been deposited in Court belatedly and the same had been accepted by the Court. ANALYSIS & DECISION: 6. The issue as to whether deposits made before the Rent Controller after institution of the suit can be considered for affording protection under Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (i.e. the predecessor Act) has been conclusively decided by the Hon’ble Full Bench (comprising five Hon’ble Judges) of this Court more than six decades ago in the case of Siddheswar Paul vs. Prakash Chandra Dutta14. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Judges who formed the majority opinion are extracted hereinbelow:- “BOSE, C.J: 6. So it is clear that by reason of the deposit or payment as required by Sec. 17(1) or 17(2) the tenant is regarded as no longer to be in default in payment of rent. In other words, if the tenant follows the mode of discharge of liability for arrears and of the current liability laid down in Sec. 17 no question of default can arise. The fact, however, remains that the character of the deposit which constitutes payment to landlord under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 22 and the character of the payment as contemplated in Sec. 17(1) are different and the one cannot be equated with the other. In some cases stress is laid on the expressions “amount calculated at the rate of rent” and “sum equivalent to rent” and it is contended that the amounts paid or deposited in terms of the Sec. 17(1) is not “rent” but I am unable to accept this contention. It appears to me that the amount paid in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17 is in discharge of the liability for rent, and the distinction sought to be drawn between the expression used in Sec. 17(1) and the expression “rent” is unreal. ********************** ********************** ********************** 8. It has been also faintly argued that the Rent Controller is a Court, and the deposit with the Rent Controller is “deposit in court” within the meaning of that expression as used in Sec. 17(1). The argument is devoid of any substance. The expression “Court” in Sec. 17(1) means the Court in which the suit or proceeding for ejectment is pending. 9. The result, therefore, is that the deposits of rent which were made by the petitioner in the Rent Controller's Office in respect of the rents for the months of November and December, 1960 on 14th December, 1960 and 11th January, 1961 respectively were neither deposits in Court nor payment to the landlord within the meaning of those expressions as used in Sec. 17(1) of the Act and thus there being non-compliance with the provisions of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 17 of the Act the trial Court was right in making the order striking out the defence against delivery of possession. In the circumstances, the rule must be discharged. ********************** ********************** ********************** SINHA, J. 31. In my opinion, the position in law may be summarised as follows: ********************** ********************** ********************** 14 1963 SCC OnLine Cal 95 : (1963-64) 68 CWN 30 : AIR 1964 Cal 105 9. All other amounts required to be deposited or paid under Sec. 17 must be deposited in court or paid to the landlord directly, within the fifteenth day of each succeeding month. ********************** ********************** ********************** 32. Let us now apply above principles to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the writ of summons was served on the tenant on the 30th October, 1960. On that date, he was not in default and under Sec. 4 the rent for October, 1960 was payable by the 15th November, so that the deposit for the rent for October with the Rent Controller on the 9th November, 1960, was quite in order. One month's time expired on 30th November, 1960. The deposits made on 14th December, 1960 and 11th January, 1961, with the Rent Controller were not made in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17 (See Sec. 17(1) and item 6(iii) of the summary above). Therefore, the tenant fell within the mischief of subsection (3) of Sec. 17 and his defence was rightly struck out. A point was incidentally mentioned in course of argument but not much was heard about it. I may however give it a passing mention. As an argument against holding that Sec. 17(1) did not exclude the right of the tenant in depositing the rent with the Rent Controller, even where he was served with a writ of summons, it was said that a tenant who denied tenancy under the plaintiff would, in that case be without a remedy. I don't think that this is so. Sub-section (2) of section 17 provides for an immediate adjudication by the Court of the amount of rent, before the defendant tenant is called upon to make a deposit in court. If he denies the tenancy, he may claim that the amount was ‘nil’, not being payable at all. Then the Court would have to decide that issue, otherwise it cannot determine the ‘amount of rent’ payable. I confess that the language used is inartistic, but as stated at the inception, Rent Control Acts must be interpreted reasonably and not literally. They should be interpreted so as to give effect to the objects of the statute and not to defeat them. ********************** ********************** ********************** MITTER, J.: 97. In my view the first part of Sec. 17(1) does not come into play if there has been no default by the tenant. If he has made default already he must deposit the rent in default including the period subsequent thereto as mentioned in the section together with interest within one month of the service of the writ of summons. If he has made no default but has been depositing the rent with the Rent Controller in terms of section 22 he would be obliged to stop making deposits with the Controller after the lapse of a month from the service of the writ of summons. Any payment thereafter could only be made to the landlord directly or deposited in court. *********************** ********************** ********************** 102. In the case before us the writ of summons was not served on the defendant before October 30, 1960. As the tenant was not in default in respect of any pre-suit period he had no liability to deposit in court any rent upto the 30th November, 1960. Therefore, any rent deposited with the Rent Controller upto the 30th November, 1960 would not fall within the mischief of section 17(1) but after that date he could only deposit rent in court or pay the same to the landlord by the 15th day of each month succeeding the one for which it fell due. 103. Thus he had to deposit in court the rent for the month of November by the 15th of December and so on. Clearly there was a default in this respect and he incurred the liability of having his defence struck out under section 17(3).” (Emphasis supplied) 7. Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 which has been considered by the Hon’ble Full Bench in the aforesaid case is pari materia with Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act - which is the successor Act. In such view of the matter, the aforesaid observations would clearly govern cases under the 1997 Act as well. 8. The said judgment of the Hon’ble Full Bench leaves no room for any debate that in deposits made with the Rent Controller after institution of a suit would neither be treated as payment to the landlord nor deposit in Court and that being so, the tenant would fall within the mischief of Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act. To wit, in cases where deposits are being made with the Rent Controller after institution of suit, the tenant would be required to either pay to the landlord or redeposit in Court the amounts (that have been deposited with the Rent Controller after institution of the suit) within the time specified in Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act to avert striking out of defence under Section 7(3) thereof. 9. The aforesaid judgment in the case of Siddheswar Paul (supra) was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaluram Onkarmal vs. Baidyanath Gorain15. In the said case the Hon’ble Three Judge Bench observed as follows : (in paragraph 21 of the SCC Online report):- “We have carefully considered the reasons given by the two learned Judges who delivered the minority judgments in the Siddheswar Paul's case, but we have come to the conclusion that the majority view on the whole correctly represents the true scope and effect of section 17, as distinguished from sections 21 and 22.” 10. That being the legal position, the petitioner, who admittedly did not deposit (and has still not deposited) the amounts that had been deposited by him before the Rent Controller after the institution of the suit, cannot escape the rigours of Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act. 11. It was contended that since the learned Trial Court had once condoned delay it could not have reversed its own decision and dismissed the application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act. Such argument fails to impress the Court. 12. In the case of Bijay Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an application for determination of a dispute under Section 17(2) of the 1997 Act would not be entertained unless the admitted rent is deposited along with the same and therefore a tenant would not be entitled to take shelter of Section 5 of the 9163 Act if the application is not accompanied by the admitted arrears. The following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School (supra) while taking note of the observations in the case of Bijay Kumar (supra) deserve notice in the above context:- 15 1965 SCC OnLine SC 260 : AIR 1965 SC 1909 “17. In view of the foregoing, while bringing the said Section, the legislative intent was to provide protection to the tenant against eviction, subject to compliance of deposit of arrears of rent if there is no dispute as to amount of rent, within one month from the date of service of summons, along with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. The tenant is further required to deposit the regular rent as prescribed in Section 7(1)(c). In case, there is a dispute of the amount of rent payable, the tenant is required to deposit the amount due as admitted by him within thirty days and file an application conjointly for determination of rent within the same period. The said application may possibly be entertained and decided by the Court thereafter only. This Court in the case of Bijay Kumar (supra) had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 7(2) of the WBPT Act wherein the tenant had not deposited or paid the admitted rent while moving an application seeking determination of rent. Trial Court while allowing such application granted time to pay the admitted rent, but High Court set-aside the order of the Trial Court. While confirming the order of the High Court on the issue of deposit of rent admitted by tenant under Section 7(2) on the application for determination of rent, this Court observed as under - “21. …the deposit of rent along with an application for determination of dispute is a precondition to avoid eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In view thereof, tenant will not be able to take recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act as it is not an application alone which is required to be filed by the tenant but the tenant has to deposit admitted arrears of rent as well.” 18. Thus, in case of disputed rent, this Court was of the view that to avail the benefit of protection against eviction under the WBPT Act, the tenant has to do the following to avoid eviction, first, to deposit rent admitted by him to be due; second, an application for determination of rent payable be filed along with. The tenant had neither deposited, nor paid the admitted rent and had only filed the application for determination of rent belatedly along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. *********************** ********************** ********************** 29. In addition, Section 7(1) and first part of sub-section (2) of Section 7 are comparable, both requiring deposit/pay admitted/undisputed amount of rent. However, Section 7(2) casts an additional obligation on the tenant to file an application for determination for rent along with such deposit within the specified time frame. The Legislature in its wisdom did not provide for any extension of time for payment or deposit under Section 7(1), making it clear that no such extension was intended in the corresponding part in Section 7(2). Since the deposit and application are to be made together by the tenant mandatorily within a specific time, in our considered view, extension of time as given in proviso to Section 7(2) is not applicable to either. Therefore, the proviso can only be construed to permit extension in payment of amount so specified in order of determination passed by the Civil Judge as envisaged in the latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 7. Stated differently, the word ‘may’ used in the proviso of Section 7(2) would only relate to extension of time, which is a discretion vested with the Civil Judge and it would not construe any other meaning. Moreover, it can be said that since in subsection (3) of Section 7, the consequence of non- compliance has been specified, therefore, use of the word ‘shall’ in Sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b) and 7(2) is a mandatory compliance for the tenant, failing which, his defence against eviction shall be struck off.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Furthermore, as would be evident from the afore-quoted extract from the judgment the legal position regarding the mandatory time limits specified under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act has also been explicitly settled. 14. The Hon’ble Court has thus clarified that “The Legislature in its wisdom did not provide for any extension of time for payment or deposit under Section 7(1), making it clear that no such extension was intended in the corresponding part in Section 7(2)” and that “the deposit and application are to be made together by the tenant mandatorily within a specific time”. If that be the case it was never open for the learned Trial Court to condone the delay in even filing the applications under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act. If the Legislature has not provided for extension of time to file such application then indirect extension of time by way of condonation of delay in filing such application could also not be done. It is well settled that what cannot be done directly can also not be done indirectly16. 15. That being so the order condoning delay in filing the said applications was one without jurisdiction. Since the learned Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to even receive the application by reason of the same being barred by time, it also lacked jurisdiction to decide the same. The following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Noharlal Verma vs. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Limited17 deserve notice in such regard:- “32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits.” 16. If the facts of the present case are viewed in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bijay Kumar (supra) and Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School (supra), especially the underlined portions thereof, it would be evident that since the petitioner’s application was not accompanied by admitted arrears (as he was banking upon the invalid Rent Control deposits) the petitioner’s application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act was clearly not maintainable. This also creates a jurisdictional bar on entertainment of the said application. 17. The Court was therefore perfectly justified in dismissing the petitioner’s application as it was not maintainable on at least two counts – i.e. it was filed beyond time and therefore not entertainable and it was not accompanied with valid deposit of rent arrears and therefore not maintainable. The earlier decision of the learned Trial 16 M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath, (2000) 6 SCC 213 17 (2008) 14 SCC 445 Court in condoning the uncondonable delay, therefore, could not have fettered the learned Court in dismissing the application later merely because the same was not assailed by the opposite party before the higher forum. It is now too well established that a question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court does not operate as res judicata. In such context, the following extract from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy18 may be noticed:- “10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.” 18. There is yet another way to look at the matter. The petitioner’s application for condonation of delay in filing the applications under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act was allowed by the learned Trial Court by the order dated August 28, 2017 subject to payment of cost to the tune of Rs. 500/- only. From the copies of the orders dated July 20, 2021 and April 19, 2021, which have been appended to the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner it would be evident that the costs were paid sometime in 2021. 19. Now even if it is assumed that the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay in filing the said tow applications was rightly allowed then also, the petitioner would be entitled to take the benefit thereof only upon depositing the costs. If the petitioner went on depositing the current rents post the order dated August 28, 2017 without payment of the cost such deposits would not be considered to be deposits in the eye of law as the condition precedent therefor was not complied with. This Court is conscious that for making any deposit or paying current rent under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act no application is required to be made but then in such cases the deposits should also be in absolute consonance with the said provision i.e. within the time specified therein. 20. If the deposit can be without application in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act then it also has to be within the time specified therein. If the tenant is allowed to have benefit of the condonation of delay then the benefit must be taken in terms of the order conferring the benefit. The petitioner has failed to take the benefit in terms of the order. That being so none of the 18 (1970) 1 SCC 613 payments/deposits of current rent from the date of the order till the date of the actual deposit of the costs in the year 2021 can be treated to be valid. Accordingly the petitioner would in any case be in default insofar as deposit of current rent for the said period is concerned. This would then obviously attract Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act and led to striking out of defence. 21. The judgment in the case of Monoj Lal Seal & Others (supra) would not aid the petitioner inasmuch as the said case is clearly factually distinguishable. In the said case the tenant had not approached the Court with its application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act belatedly. The said judgment treated the deposit before the Rent Controller as a mistake since the money had come in timely but before a wrong forum. In the instant case the petitioner has simply played with the proceedings and has even after the delay was condoned, though wrongly, not cared to deposit the costs for about four years. Monoj Lal Seal & Others (supra) thus possibly offers an equitable shield to a tenant who can show that it complied with the timeline but blundered the forum. Such is not the case here. While equity may step in to pardon a mistake of forum it will not override a strict statutory limitation of time where the tenant is seen to be clearly negligent. 22. The judgment in the case of Tarak Nath Banerjee (supra) cannot assist the petitioner in view of the clear enunciation of law by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Siddheswar Paul (supra) which stands approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaluram Onkarmal (supra). 23. Sushila Kumari Raidani & Others (supra), Ashok Kumar Bhagnani (supra), Bahadur Singh Kathotia (supra) and Madhabi Mukherjee (supra) cannot come to the aid of the tenant and there cannot be any condonation of delay in cases pertaining to Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School (supra) and Bijay Kumar (supra). 24. Hindustan Industrial Co. (supra) is yet another case where it was held that invalid deposits cannot be considered for the purpose of purging a tenant of default. 25. For all the reasons aforesaid, the order impugned is not interfered with. C.O. 185 of 2026 stands disposed of with the above observations. No costs. 26. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on urgent basis after completion of necessary formalities. (Om Narayan Rai, J.)