Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
ASSIGNED MATTER
17.09.2026
In the High Court at Calcutta Ct. No. 446
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Sl. Nos.5 & 6
akd C. R. R. 2564 of 2012
(C. R. A. N. 1 of 2021)
(C. R. A. N. 2 of 2024)
In Re: Partha Sarkar
... Petitioner
W IT H
C. R. R. 1201 of 2022
(C. R. A. N. 1 of 2022)
(C. R. A. N. 2 of 2022)
In Re: Partha Sarkar & Ors. ... Petitioners
Mr. Tapabrata Bhattacharya
… for the petitioner
1. By an order dated 11th September, 2015, passed upon mentioning, the revisional application being CRR 2564 of 2012 was tagged with another revisional application being CRR 1201 of 2022, on the premise that the parties thereto, as also the criminal cases out of which the aforesaid two revisional applications arose, were the same. Upon scrutiny, however, it was found that while one revisional application arose out of a complaint case, the other had been instituted in connection with an FIR lodged by the opposite party. In such circumstances, the aforesaid two revisional applications are de-tagged and are taken up for consideration separately. Re : C. R. R. 2564 of 2012
2. Affidavit-of-service filed on behalf of the petitioner is taken on record. However, despite service, nobody appears on behalf of the opposite party. 2
3. This revisional application has been filed at the instance of the accused/petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying for quashing of C.R. No. 164 of 2011, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dakshin Dinajpur at Balurghat, under Sections 499 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as also all orders passed in connection therewith, including the order taking cognizance of the offences punishable under the aforesaid provisions of Sections 499 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner and the opposite party/wife, who is a WBCS (Exe.) Officer, tied the knot on 6th May, 2007, as per Hindu rites and customs. After marriage, they started living together as husband and wife at the petitioner’s parental house. However, subsequently, dispute arose in their marital life and they started living separately. Such dispute led to registration of certain civil and criminal proceedings. 5.
The petitioner instituted a suit praying for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which was registered as Matrimonial Suit No. 94 of 2008 before the learned District Judge, Alipore, South 24-Parganas. The petitioner obtained an ex parte decree in the said suit in the year
2009. Subsequently, the said decree was put into execution and the execution proceeding was registered as Matrimonial Execution Case No. 6671 of 2011. The petitioner also instituted another proceeding, being Misc. Case No. 17620 of 2011, under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Alipore, alleging commission of forgery by the opposite party/wife. 6. Likewise, the opposite party/wife also instituted a complaint case, being C.R. Case No. 164 of 2011, before the learned Chief Judicial
3 Magistrate, Dakshin Dinajpur at Balurghat. She also lodged a complaint resulting in Balurghat Police Station Case No. 559 of 2012 dated 9th September, 2012, under Sections 498A/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(1)(q) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against the petitioner and the other inmates of his family. 7. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submits that, in the meantime, the opposite party/wife filed an application under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Hon’ble Court, which was registered as C.O. No. 1062 of 2012, praying for transfer of Matrimonial Suit No. 94 of 2008, together with Matrimonial Execution Case No. 6671 of 2011, to any competent court at Dakshin Dinajpur having jurisdiction to try the said suit and the execution proceeding arising therefrom. 8. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submits that the opposite party/wife instituted a matrimonial suit, being Matrimonial Suit No. 6 of 2012, before the learned District Judge, Dakshin Dinajpur at Balurghat, praying for a decree of divorce.
The petitioner, in turn, filed an application under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for transfer of the said matrimonial suit to any competent court at Alipore, South 24-Parganas, having jurisdiction to try the same. The said application was registered as C.O. No. 2547 of 2012. During the pendency of the said proceeding, the parties amicably settled their disputes outside Court and filed a compromise petition before this Hon’ble Court. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, in terms of the settlement recorded in the said compromise petition, both parties were required to withdraw the respective cases instituted by them against each other. 4
9. Subsequently, Mr. Bhattacharyya submits, the parties jointly filed an application seeking a decree of divorce by mutual consent before the learned District Judge, Dakshin Dinajpur, in Matrimonial Suit No. 19 of 2014, and a decree of divorce by mutual consent was accordingly granted on 20th February, 2015. 10. Mr. Bhattacharyya submits that, in terms of the stipulations contained in the said compromise petition, the petitioner has withdrawn the matrimonial suit and the execution proceeding instituted in connection therewith, as also Misc. Case No. 17620 of 2011, which had been filed alleging commission of forgery by the opposite party/wife. He further submits that the opposite party/wife, however, did not comply with the obligations undertaken by her in terms of the said compromise. Accordingly, he prays for quashing of the complaint case, which is still pending. It is submitted that continuation of the said criminal proceeding, notwithstanding the settlement arrived at between the parties, would amount to an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 11. Heard the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner and perused the materials on record. 12. Needless to state, the power to quash a criminal proceeding is to be exercised with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Though the power conferred upon the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide, the same is not unbridled and/or unlimited. In State of Haryana & Ors.
v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court delineated, by way of illustration, the categories of cases in which such power may appropriately be exercised. It was, inter alia, held that where
5 the dispute is essentially civil in nature and the criminal proceeding has been instituted maliciously with an ulterior motive, permitting such proceeding to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 13. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab &Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding, FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power of a criminal court to compound an offence under Section 320 of the Code. The inherent power of the High Court is to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of any court. 14. In the decision of Gian Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that criminal cases having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purpose of exercise of the power of quashing, particularly offences arising out of commercial,financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or similar transactions, as also offences arising out of matrimonial disputes relating to dowry and other family disputes, where the wrong is essentially private and personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In such cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if, having regard to the compromise arrived at between the parties, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice to the accused, resulting in grave injustice despite the parties having arrived at a full and complete settlement. 15.
In the present case, from the compromise petition jointly filed by the petitioner and the opposite party, it appears that the parties had amicably settled the disputes between them and, in terms of such
6 settlement, jointly filed an application seeking a decree of divorce by mutual consent before the competent court. Pursuant thereto, a decree of divorce by mutual consent was granted and the petitioner has already withdrawn the proceedings instituted by him against the opposite party. The parties are now living separately and have no subsisting relationship or connection with each other. However, the opposite party/wife, on her part, has not withdrawn the criminal proceeding in question. 16. In the present case, the complaint was instituted alleging commission of offences under Sections 499 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It is pertinent to note that Section 499 IPC merely defines the offence of defamation, which is punishable under Section 500 IPC. The offence punishable under Section 500 IPC is compoundable under Section 320(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, whereas the offence punishable under Section 406 IPC is compoundable with the permission of the Court under Section 320(2) thereof. In the complaint, it was, inter alia, alleged that, in connection with the execution proceeding, the petitioner had filed an application praying fora direction upon the concerned authority to produce the salary statement of the opposite party/wife; that he had alleged that she had secured employment by claiming the benefit of reservation under a Scheduled Caste category despite allegedly belonging to the general category; and that he had addressed communications containing such allegations to various departmental heads. It was further alleged that, by reason of such acts, the opposite party/wife was defamed and that the petitioner had attempted to lay claim to her hard-earned earnings. 7
17.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the parties have already amicably settled the disputes between them, obtained a decree of dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent and, pursuant to the compromise petition filed before this Court, undertaken to withdraw the respective proceedings instituted by them against each other, I am of the considered view that, applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh (supra), continuation of the present criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of law and would not serve the ends of justice. 18. Accordingly, the complaint case being C.R. No. 164 of 2011, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dakshin Dinajpur at Balurghat, under Sections 499 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, and all orders passed therein, stand quashed. 19. The revisional application being CRR 2564 of 2012 stands disposed of. All connected applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 20. Let Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)