AD-07 Ct No.16 18.09.2026 TN FMAT 312 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 CAN 2 of 2026 CAN 3 of 2026 Jay Prakaash Sarda and another Vs. Kanchan Kumar Choudhury and another Mr. Rishabh Karnani, Ms. Soni Ojha ....for the appellants Mr. Pijush Kanti Khanra, Mr. Somnath Maity, Mr. Uttam Banerjee, Mr. Somnath Khanra …..for the respondent no.1 [ 1. Affidavit-of-service filed today be kept on record. 2. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the explanation furnished for the delay of about six days in preferring the appeal is that some time was consumed in preparation of the appeal and in that the appellants had to attend the concerned police station in view of a complaint having been lodged against them at the behest of the plaintiff/respondent no.1. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent no.1 vehemently opposes the prayer for condonation of delay and submits that no plausible explanation has been furnished. 4. However, taking into account the miniscule period of delay as well as a plausible case having been made out by way of explanation, we are of the view that the delay ought to be condoned. 2 5. Hence, CAN 3 of 2026 is allowed on contest but without costs, thereby condoning the delay in preferring FMAT 312 of 2026. 6. Before we take up the matter for hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent no.1, although not per se having a right of audience at the stage of admission hearing, points out that the appeal is infructuous since the impugned order has been extended from time to time subsequently. However, we do not accept such proposition as good law since the outcome of the appeal against the principal ex parte ad interim order, which has merely been extended from time to time, would be binding on the subsequent orders of extension passed in connection therewith. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that the appellant no.1 is a director of a company which is the true owner of the suit property which is tenanted in respect of the third parties to the suit. Appellant no.2, it is submitted, has no connection with the property. 8. By impleading the present appellants, the plaintiff/respondent no.1 sought a declaration of his tenancy right. However, it is submitted that even from the annexures to the temporary injunction application filed in the trial court, it would be evident that there are gross discrepancies in the same, raising doubt as 3 to the authenticity of such documents as rent receipts. 9. It is submitted that the plaintiff/respondent no.1 alleges that a person, who is merely a security guard in respect of the suit premises, issued rent receipt to the plaintiff/respondent no.1 on behalf of the appellants, despite no authority of such person to issue rent receipts having been established. 10. Furthermore, it is sought to be pointed out that the signatures in several receipts do not tally with each other. 11. Moreover, whereas in some of the purported receipts only the first party has signed, in others, signatures are found above the designation of the second party. 12. Also, apparently a receipt dated January 27, 2022 was allegedly issued in favour of the respondent no.1 for an “advance” amount, despite the tenancy having allegedly granted earlier. Thus, it is submitted that the mention of the term “advance” is absurd and vitiates the said purported receipt as well. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants also submits that certain other documents germane to the adjudication of the lis have been sought to be brought on record by the appellants by way of an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bearing CAN 2 of 2026. 14. However, insofar as the impugned order is concerned, contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the 4 learned Trial Judge adverted to the averments in the plaint and the temporary injunction application as well as took into consideration the photocopies of the rent receipts as well as trade licenses issued by the KMC and a letter of complaint addressed to the Officer-in-Charge of the Girish Park Police Station, which were produced before the Trial Court, and came to a prima facie conclusion that the plaintiff is possessing the suit property and, at this stage, ought not to be forcibly evicted. On such premise, on a reasoned consideration, the injunction impugned herein was granted. 15. Even if the appellate court were to have a different view on the materials produced, merely due to such reason, the appellate court ought not to substitute its own view for that of the learned Trial Judge, particularly since we do not find any perversity or error of law or fact on the part of the trial court. 16. The appellants are justified in contending that there are certain differences between the rent receipts produced in the Trial Court. However, whether such differences amount to discrepancies of such a nature which vitiates the rent receipts themselves can only be considered by the learned Trial Judge at the final hearing of the temporary injunction application. 17. Insofar as CAN 2 of 2026 is concerned, we cannot permit the appellants to bring in further documents at this stage within the limited scope of an appeal 5 against the grant of an ex parte ad interim order of injunction. Since the learned Trial Court itself could not have looked into such documents at the juncture when the impugned ex parte order was passed, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the appellate court to entertain the production of such documents. 18. Be that as it may, all questions raised before us as well as all documents sought to be produced by the appellants can very well be furnished and pleaded along with the written objection to the temporary injunction application which shall be filed by the appellants in the Trial Court. 19. Be that as it may, we do not find any error of law or fact sufficient to admit the appeal. 20. Accordingly, FMAT 312 of 2026 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. It is made clear that the above findings are tentative in nature and it will be open to the learned Trial Judge to dispose of the temporary injunction application and the suit on their own merits, without being unduly influenced in any manner by any of the observations made herein. 22. It is expected that the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the temporary injunction application, subject to the appellants filing their written objection to the same within a fortnight from date in the Trial Court, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one week after the reopening of the Trial Court 6 subsequent to the upcoming Annual Vacation of the said Court. 23. CAN 1 of 2026 as well as CAN 2 of 2026 are disposed of consequentially. 24. There will be no order as to costs. 25. Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Sandip Kumar De, J.)