1 2026:CGHC:15448-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 186 of 2017 State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station-Korar, District- North Bastar, Kanker, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus Astimal @ Asti Goti S/o Somji Ram Goti Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Barrebeda Korrampara, Police Station Antagarh, District- North Bastar, Kanker, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Avinash Singh, Govt. Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Bhavika Kotecha, Advocate. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ Judgment on Board (06th April, 2026) Per Rajani Dubey, J Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment dated 06th January, 2017 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kanker, Distt. North Bastar Kanker in ST No.82/2015 acquitting the respondent/accused of the charge under Section 302 of IPC by giving him benefit of doubt. 2 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Ranjita had been living with her sister and brother-in-law for about a month before the incident, along with her three-month-old child. On May 1, 2015, the deceased's husband (accused) also started living there. On the day of the incident, the deceased's sister and brother-in-law had gone to collect tendu leaves. On May 3, 2015, around 3 o’clock when Ranjana and her husband returned home, Ranjita handed over her three-month-old son to her brother-in-law, saying that her husband, the accused, had fed her phorate poison. The deceased then fell onto the bed and died shortly after. The relatives were informed, and a report was lodged at the police station. After receiving the death intimation (Ex.P-2), a panchnama (Ex. P-5) was conducted. The spot panchnama (Ex. P-8), seizure memos (Ex. P-9 and Ex. P-13), and post-mortem report (Ex. P-15) were prepared. Based on these, a first information report (Ex. P-17) was registered. After receiving the query report (Ex. P-16), the accused was arrested (Ex. P-19), and the investigation was completed. The charge sheet was filed against the accused under Section 302 of IPC followed by framing of charge accordingly by learned trial Court which was abjured by him and he prayed for trial. 03. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses in all. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and 3 false implication. However, no witness was examined by him in defence. 04. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused of the charge u/s 302 of IPC by giving him benefit of doubt. Hence this appeal. 05. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that the prosecution witnesses are natural and truthful and have given true version of the occurrence. Learned trial Court wrongly disbelieved the important evidence of PW-1 Subesingh Nareti and PW-2 Smt. Ranjana Bai Nareti merely on the ground of some irrelevant omission and contradiction. Therefore, looking to the overall evidence on record and conduct of the accused, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the respondent/accused be held guilty u/s 302 of IPC and sentenced accordingly. 06. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused supporting the impugned judgment submits that the learned trial court after minute appreciation of oral and documentary evidence has rightly concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him of the charge u/s 302 of IPC. There is no illegality or 4 infirmity in the said finding. Therefore, the present appeal being without any substance is liable to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in the matter of Pinki Vs. Ramdev Ram and others reported in MANU/CG/2005/2024. 07. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 08. It is clear from the record of learned trial court that accused was charged under Section 302 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence learned trial Court acquitted him of the said charge on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against him beyond reasonable doubt. 09. It is not disputed before learned trial Court that the deceased Ranjita was live-in-partner of the respondent/accused Astimal and they were living as husband and wife for the last three years from the date of incident and she died due to poisoning on 3.5.2015. 10. PW-1 Subesingh Nareti, brother-in-law of the deceased, states that deceased Ranjita is his sister-in-law and was in live-in relationship with the accused for the last three years. She has a three months son from the accused. About one month before the incident, on Tuesday, Ranjita came to his house in village Havarkondal with her child and started living there. She told him and his wife Ranjana that her 5 husband Astimal used to beat her after drinking alcohol and did not provide her with proper food. Ranjita also told them that one day before she came to their house, on Monday, Astimal had tried to burn her in a pile of straw (fodder). She said that he had pushed her along with the child into the burning straw, which is why she left that place and came away. During this incident, her clothes were burnt. Ranjita said that she would not return to village Barembeda and would not live there anymore. He states that on 01.05.2015 (Friday), Ranjita’s husband Astimal came to his house in village Havarkondal and stayed there. On 03.05.2015, his wife Ranjana and he had gone in the morning to collect tendu leaves, and Ranjita and her husband were left alone at home. In para 3 he states that in the evening, when they returned home at around 3:00 PM after collecting tendu leaves, Ranjita handed her child to him and said, “Please take care of the child, brother-in-law,” and then collapsed onto the cot. Ranjita told them that her husband, Astimal, had forced her to consume pesticide poison. After this, she became unconscious, foam started coming out of her mouth, and after some time, she died. He admits his signature on merg intimation Ex.P/2 lodged by him, spot map Ex.P/3 prepared by police and spot map Ex.P/4 prepared by Patwari as also Panchanama Ex.P/5. 11. In cross-examination he admits that neither he nor his wife saw the accused administering poison to the deceased, nor did they see the deceased consuming poison herself. He admits that before 6 becoming unconscious, the deceased only made gestures and did not say anything verbally about the cause of her death. He further states voluntarily that she had only said to take care of the child. 12. PW-2 Ranjana Bai Nareti, sister of the deceased, has also made similar statement. She states that after collecting tendu leaves when they returned home at 3 o’clock, the deceased handed over her child to her husband and fell on the cot. Ranjita informed them that the accused had administered poison to her and then she fell unconscious and after some time died. She admits her thumb impression on her statement of Ex.P/6 recorded before the Magistrate, the inquest notice Ex.P/7, inquest Ex.P/8, spot map of Ex.P/4 and panchanama of Ex.P/5. In cross-examination she also admits that neither she nor her husband saw the accused administering poison to the deceased, nor did they see the deceased consuming poison herself. She admits that before becoming unconscious, the deceased only made gestures and did not say anything verbally about the cause of her death. She also admits that no dispute or quarrel ever took place between the deceased and her husband in their house either before herself or her husband. 13. The other witnesses namely PW-3 Tijuram, PW-4 Smt. Rajim Bai, PW-5 Smt. Ram Bai, and PW-6 Banshilal did not support the 7 prosecution case and were declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution where they denied all the suggestions of the prosecution. 14. PW-11 Dr. AK Dhruv who conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased opined that cause of death is asphyxia and mode of death is asphyxia due to poisoning of organophosphate. However, regarding nature of death, he opined that it depends on circumstantial evidence. The postmortem report is Ex.P/15 and he admitted his signature thereon from A to A part. In his examination-in-chief he states that as per circumstantial evidence in the case, the death may be homicidal or suicidal. 15. Learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and found that statements of PW-1 Subesingh Nareti and PW-2 Ranjana Bai Nareti are not reliable. Rather these witnesses admitted that neither they saw the accused administering poison to the deceased nor did they see the deceased consuming poison herself. PW-2 Ranjana, sister of the deceased, also admitted that no dispute or quarrel ever took place between the deceased and her husband in their house either before herself or her husband. They also admitted that after coming to their house, the deceased never made any complaint or report against the accused. No motive for commission of this crime has been proved by the prosecution. The autopsy surgeon (PW-11) in the postmortem report has not mentioned 8 the nature of death but in his examination-in-chief stated that as per circumstantial evidence, it could be homicidal or suicidal. 16. This Court in the matter of Pinki (supra) observed in paras 10 & 11 of the judgment as under: “10. As held by the Supreme Court in C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair MANU/SC/0968/2002 : AIR 2003 SC 182, unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha MANU/SC/0854/ 2003 : AIR 2004 SC 1053, the appellate Court considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 11. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0320/1987 : 1987:INSC:91 : AIR 1987 SC 1083, the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:- “...the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the 9 order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 has held in para 42 as under:- “42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; 10 (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 18. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments, in the present case, we find that the prosecution has neither been able to prove any motive nor nature of death of the deceased. No direct evidence is there against the accused. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are also not of such a nature which could lead to an irresistible conclusion about guilt of the accused. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, who are brother-in-law and sister of the deceased, does not inspire confidence. The other independent witnesses have not at all supported the prosecution case. Being so, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, looking to the overall evidence available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the learned trial court is a 11 plausible one and we find no good reason to interfere with the said finding of acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Sd/ Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Khan MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Digitally signed by MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Date: 2026.04.07 15:41:58 +0530