1 2026:CGHC:16512 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 416 of 2026 Jay Chopda S/o. Sampatlal Chopda Aged About 55 Years R/o.- Old Civil Line, Mahasamund, P.S., Tehsil And District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus Rajeev Chandrakar S/o. Munnalal Chandrakar Aged About 40 Years R/o.- Village Parsada, P.S., Tehsil And District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) Order on Board 09/04/2026 1. Heard. 2. Present is a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 16.03.2026 passed by SUMIT KUMAR Digitally signed by SUMIT KUMAR Date: 2026.04.13 18:51:48 +0530 2 learned First Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mahasamund in Civil Suit No. S-9B/2024 whereby the plaintiff’s right to lead evidence have been forfeited and the case has been fixed for recording of the defendant’s evidence. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though the petitioner is the plaintiff before the learned trial Court and he prosecuting the civil suit for recovery of the amount of Rs. 5,90,000/- against the defendant, however, due to unavoidable circumstances which coincidentally occurred on the date of incident, could not produce his witnesses before the learned trial Court for their examination. He would further submit that on the earlier occasions, there was sufficient reason for adjournment of the proceeding and the learned trial Court adjourned the proceeding of the case after deposing cost which has been deposited before the learned trial Court. He would further submit that the plaintiff’s suit was for the recovery of the amount and forfeiting his right to lead evidence which amounts to depriving from the legal remedies for the reason which is beyond his control. He would further submit that one opportunity may be granted to the petitioner to examine the witnesses before the learned trial Court. He would also submit that on 16.03.2026, the petitioner had gone to Raipur for treatment of his mother as there is no other male member in his family to take her care. The application for adjournment was made before learned trial Court but the same was dismissed and the right to lead evidence has been forfeited, therefore, opportunity may be granted to the petitioner/plaintiff to lead there evidence. He would also submit that no prejudice is being caused to the defendant as the 3 defendant’s witnesses yet not have been started. Therefore, the impugned order may be set aside and opportunity may be granted to him. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition. 5. From perusal of the order sheets, it transpires that after framing of the issues, the case was fixed for recording the plaintiff’s evidence on 16.04.2025, however, on that day, an application under Order 7 Rule 14(3) of the CPC was filed by the plaintiff which was allowed on 10.06.2025, thereafter, the case was sent for mediation and it was ultimately came back to the learned trial Court on 19.08.2025. The case was again fixed for recording of the plaintiff’s evidence on 22.09.2025, however, on 22.09.2025, the case was again adjourned for the reason that there was a condolence proceeding on account of death of an Advocate and the case was fixed for 08.10.2025. On 08.10.2025, on the request made by the plaintiff, the case was adjourned and it was again fixed for 19.11.2025, however, on 19.11.2025, the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was again adjourned for 15.12.2025. On 15.12.2025, an application was again made by the plaintiff that due to some religious ceremony, he is out of station and prays for adjournment and on that day, the case was adjourned subject to payment of cost of Rs. 500/-, subsequently, on 23.01.2026 also, an application was made by the plaintiff that he is out of station due to his family work and again the date was adjourned subject to payment of cost of Rs. 1000/- and last opportunity was given to him. On 20.02.2026, again the plaintiff sought adjournment on the 4 ground of marriage function of the relatives, again the case was adjourned subject to payment of cost of Rs. 2000/- and the case was fixed for 16.03.2026. 6. On 16.03.2026, when the matter was called for hearing an application was again filed by the plaintiff for adjournment of the case on the ground that he had gone to Raipur for treatment of his mother and he being the lonely son has to take her care. On 16.03.2026, the learned trial Court rejected the application and forfeited the right to lead evidence of the plaintiff and fixed the case for defendant’s evidence. The reasons for adjournment in the earlier occasions may not be considered for subsequent adjournment and the reason assigned on that particular day would be relevant to decide the application for adjournment. 7. From perusal of the document annexed with the petition and the application filed on 16.03.2026, it transpires that the petitioner/plaintiff sought adjournment on the ground that he had gone to Raipur for treatment of his old aged mother and he being the lonely son has to take her care. Although, the learned trial Court has earlier repeatedly granted adjournment for recording the plaintiff’s evidence, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, instead of forfeiting the right of the plaintiff to lead evidence, one more opportunity should be granted to him subject to payment of cost. 8. The Court is required to balance procedural discipline with the overarching objective of doing substantial justice. The record reveals that though multiple adjournments were granted to the plaintiff for leading evidence, the reason assigned on the date, i.e. 16.03.2026, 5 cannot be brushed aside as wholly frivolous or dilatory. The petitioner has explained his absence on the ground of taking his aged mother for medical treatment at Raipur, and there is nothing on record to suggest that such ground was either malafide or intentionally devised to delay the proceedings. In "Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and Another" 1955 (1) SCC 323, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that procedural laws are intended to facilitate justice and should not be applied in a manner that results in injustice. The learned trial Court ought to have considered that denial of opportunity would result in failure of justice. In para 14 of the judgment, it has been held that:- 14. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. 9. It is equally settled that though adjournments cannot be granted in a routine manner, denial of opportunity to lead evidence, particularly in a civil suit for recovery, amounts to shutting out a party from proving his case on the merits. The power to close evidence must be exercised cautiously and only in cases of persistent negligence or abuse of process. In "Kailash v. Nanhku and Others" 2005 (4) SCC 480, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that procedural provisions, even if couched in mandatory terms, should be construed as directory where strict adherence would defeat justice. Relying upon the judgment of "Sangram Singh" (supra), in para 31 of its judgment, the Hon'ble 6 Supreme Court has held in para 28 and 29 in the case of "Nanhku" (supra) that:- 28. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar¹º are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6) "The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. ... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence processual, as much as substantive." 29. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari the Court approved in no unmistakable terms the approach of moderating into wholesome directions what is regarded as mandatory on the principle that: (SCC p. 720) "Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice." In Ghanshyam Dass v. Pominion of India the Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. 10. In the present case, the plaintiff has already been subjected to costs on earlier occasions, which indicates that the Court had adopted corrective measures short of denying opportunity. 7 11. This Court also takes into consideration that no serious prejudice would be caused to the defendant if one final opportunity is granted to the plaintiff to adduce evidence, particularly when the defendant's evidence has not yet commenced. The cases should be decided on merits rather than technicalities. 12. Therefore, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to set aside the impugned order to the limited extent of granting one last opportunity to the plaintiff to lead evidence, subject to imposition of costs so as to compensate the defendant and ensure expeditious disposal of the suit. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 16.03.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned trial Court is set aside. The plaintiff is permitted to lead his evidence, and the learned trial Court is directed to fix a date for recording the plaintiff's evidence, subject to payment of the cost of Rs. 5,000/- payable to the defendant before the trial Court. It is made clear that the plaintiff shall not be granted any unnecessary adjournment and shall examine their evidence on the date fixed by the learned trial Court. 13. With the aforesaid observation, the present writ petition is allowed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Sumit