Form No.J(2) IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present : The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya & The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandip Kumar De FMA 761 of 2026 with CAN 1 of 2026 with CAN 2 of 2026 with CAN 3 of 2026 Birchbury Hirise LLP and Ors. Vs. Durga Ghosh and Ors. For the appellants : Mr. Jaydip Kar, Sr. Adv., Mr. Rahul Karmakar, Mr. Soumyadeb Sinha, Mr. Hiranyak Gangopadhyay, Advs. For the respondent nos. 1, 2, 4, 6-9, 12, 14, 16-20, 22, 23-30, 32-50 : Mr. Debojyoti Basu, Sr. Adv., Mr. Diptomoy Talukder, Ms. Reshma Hossain, Advs. For the respondent nos. 11, 12A, 21 & 31 : Mr. Haradhan Bandyopadhyay, Sr.Adv. Mr. Subrata Ghosh, Mr. Somnath Gangopadhyay, Sk. Mojaffar Rahaman, Advs. 2 Heard on : September 15, 2026. Judgment on : September 15, 2026. Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.: 1. Affidavit of service filed today be kept on record. 2. Since all parties are represented through counsel, we take up the appeal itself for hearing along with the application. 3. In a suit filed by the plaintiffs/appellants for declaration that certain deeds of conveyance executed by defendant nos. 1 to 9 in favour of defendant nos. 10 to 50 are void ab initio, inoperative and/or not binding upon the plaintiffs, for further declaration that the defendant nos. 1 to 50 have not acquired any right, title or interest in the suit property, and for other declarations and consequential reliefs. In the said suit, the plaintiffs/appellants also filed an application for interim and ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant nos. 1 to 50 from disturbing and/or interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession in respect of the suit property and/or from creating any encumbrance or third party interest in respect of the suit property. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge refused to grant ad-interim injunction. 3 4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argues that the learned Trial Judge, despite having held that the plaintiffs might have a good case for trial, refused ad-interim injunction only on the specious ground that at this stage, the prayer for injunction is liable to be heard “in the presence of other sides” and thus, the prayer for ad-interim injunction “is entitled to be refused at this stage”. It is argued that such finding and conclusion are contradictory to each other. 5. Secondly, learned senior counsel argues that on the strength of the plaint averments and the pleadings in the injunction application as well as the documents filed along with the plaint, sufficient prima facie arguable case was made out. 6. Learned senior counsel points out that in the injunction application itself, a newspaper advertisement was annexed to indicate that the respondents are attempting to claim that they have purchased the subject property from the daughters of the original owner Late Lalmohan Bangal and have taken possession of the same, which is contrary to the facts. 7. Learned senior counsel argues that as per the plaint case, the said Lalmohan Bangal was originally the owner of the property. Subsequently, with the coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, the property vested in the State under Section 4 of the 1953 Act. Subsequently, korfa tenancy was granted in favour of the sons and nephews of Lalmohan Bangal. Thereafter, the said korfa tenants, who became raiyats within the contemplation of the West 4 Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (under Section 4 thereof), having ownership rights, transferred the property in favour of the plaintiffs, either directly or through interim vendors. 8. Learned senior counsel contends that the plaintiffs have produced before the learned Trial Judge sufficient evidence to substantiate their case, by way of title deeds, documents relating to mutation and RERA registration as well as sanction plan for making construction on the suit property. 9. Learned senior counsel further argues that conversion has also been duly obtained in respect of the suit property, which was originally an agricultural land. 10. Learned senior counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid facts being brought before the learned Trial Judge, ad-interim order ought to have been granted to protect the possession as well as to prevent third party transfer in respect of the suit property. 11. Learned senior counsel appearing for respondent nos.11, 12A, 21 and 31, in reply, contends that in an appeal, the Appellate Court can only interfere with an order of the Trial Court in the event the latter is bad in law and/or there is any error of law or fact. Merely because a different view is possible, the Appellate Court cannot substitute its own views for that of the learned Trial Judge. 12. Learned senior counsel further submits that the said respondents are in custody of extracts of Records of Rights to indicate that certain persons were recorded as bargadars in respect of the suit property, 5 which facts and other relevant circumstances, it is alleged, were grossly suppressed by the plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court. 13. Thus, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. 14. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent nos.1, 2, 4, 6- 9, 12, 14, 16-20, 22-30 and 32-50, on the other hand, argues that even on the basis of the plaint case as made out before the Trial Court, the prayer for injunction was rightly refused. 15. Learned senior counsel submits that the copy of the RS records which have been handed over to court and was also apparently produced in the Trial Court clearly appears to be fraudulent. 16. The attestation of the said document, it is pointed out, was done by the appropriate authority on March 15, 1956, that is, before coming into force of the 1955 Act. 17. Secondly, it is contended that in the self-same document, the name of Lalmohan Bangal, whose title allegedly vested in the State, has been shown simultaneously with the purported korfa tenants, that is, the sons and nephews of Lalmohan Bangal. 18. It is submitted that such palpable discrepancy can only lead to the conclusion that the document is a fraudulent one and cannot be relied upon. 19. Learned senior counsel next argues that from the plaint case itself, a self-contradiction would be evident inasmuch as allegedly the original 6 owner Lalmohan Bangal, at the time of his demise, had left a Will, the probate of which was sought but was dismissed. 20. Hence, the simultaneous sale of the property by the sons and nephews of Lal Mohan while applying for a probate of Lalmohan’s purported Will clearly establishes that the plaintiffs are not sure as to the derivation of their own title. 21. Moreover, the suit filed by the daughters of Lalmohan, who, directly or indirectly, were the vendors of the present respondents, also operates as a bar to grant of injunction. 22. Since the matter is already sub judice in the daughters’ suit, it is argued, the court was justified in refusing ad-interim injunction. 23. Learned senior counsel next submits that in the plaint reliefs, there is no prayer for declaration of the plaintiffs’ own title whereas negative injunction in respect of cancellation of deeds, to which the plaintiffs were not parties, has been sought. Hence, it is argued that the reliefs sought in the suit cannot be granted in the present form; thus, no prima facie case has been made out. 24. Learned senior counsel appearing for both sets of respondents unanimously submit that the test of balance of convenience and inconvenience has not been satisfied before the learned Trial Judge to be in favour of grant of injunction, nor has the test of irreparable injury and/or urgency been met by the plaintiffs. 25. Upon considering the submissions of the parties, certain facets of the matter strike the eye. 7 26. In the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge narrated the plaint case and thereafter went on to observe that in the given circumstances and considering the entire materials on record, the court was of the view that the plaintiffs might have a good case for trial. 27. In the teeth of such recording, however, the learned Trial Judge refused to grant ad-interim injunction on the absurd logic that at this stage the prayer for injunction is “liable to be heard in the presence of other sides” and that the said prayer “is entitled to be refused at this stage”. 28. As rightly contented by the appellants, the conclusion of the said impugned order is diametrically opposite to the findings therein. 29. Hence, we cannot but examine the prima facie case made out by the plaintiffs in the Trial Court independently. 30. The plinth of the plaint case is that Lalmohan Bangal was the original owner of the property and his title vested in the State with the advent of the 1953 Act. 31. Thereafter, according to the plaint case, korfa tenancy was created in favour of the sons and nephews of Lalmohan who, in turn, sold the property, either directly or indirectly, to the plaintiffs. 32. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have not even suppressed that simultaneously an application for probate of an alleged Will of Lalmohan was made by his sons. 8 33. However, it is categorically mentioned in the plaint that the same became irrelevant in view of the vesting of the property in the State with the coming into force of the 1953 statute. 34. Hence, we do not find suppression of any material fact in the plaint. The mention of the application for probate is, in the circumstances, not a contradiction in terms with the selling out of the property, in view of the plaintiffs having taken a stand that the application for probate became redundant with the vesting of the plot in the State and subsequent grant of korfa tenancy in respect of their vendors. 35. Insofar as the apparent contradictions sought to be pointed out by learned senior counsel appearing for respondent nos. 1, 2, 4, 6-9, 12, 14, 16-20, 22-30 and 32-50 etc. are concerned, we do not find any substance in the same. 36. The scheme of the 1953 Act contemplates that upon vesting under Section 4 of the said Act and the exercise of retention rights under Section 6 thereof is completed, the Records of Rights were to be drafted and finally published under Section 44 of the Act itself. 37. Under Section 45A of the said Act, the entries in the Records of Rights would be corrected accordingly. In the extract of the Records of Rights, a certified copy of which has been handed over to us, it is clearly recorded that the same was prepared under Section 45A, without mentioning the statute, which is obviously the 1953 Act, since 9 there is no corresponding provision in the subsequent statute of 1955 i.e. the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. 38. The simultaneous appearance of the names of Lalmohan and his sons and nephews in the self-same records is easily explained by the fact that they have been depicted under different heads. Whereas Lalmohan’s name is reflected in the RS Records as the superior owner, whose title vested in the State, under the heading “current occupants”, the sons and nephews of Lalmohan have been named as korfa tenants. Thus, the said narrative is chronological and not temporally simultaneous. 39. In such view of the matter, the Records of Rights which were produced in the Trial Court, a copy of which has been handed over to us, sufficiently substantiates the plaint case, at least at a prima facie level. 40. Even otherwise, the title deeds in their favour were produced by the plaintiffs/appellants in the Trial Court, along with proof of mutation having been granted in their name and RERA registration as well as sanction plan having been issued in favour of the plaintiffs. Although learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 11, 12A, 21 and 31 submits that no document regarding conversion of the property has been produced in the Trial Court, fact remains that in view of the other documents indicated above, sufficient prima facie proof of title and possession has been made out by the plaintiffs for the suit to go for trial. It is trite law that at the stage of temporary and/or 10 ad-interim injunction, the Court cannot hold a mini trial and it is only a triable issue which is to be made out by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are not required to prove their prima facie title to the hilt. 41. Insofar as the balance of convenience and inconvenience is concerned, we find that the plaintiffs/appellants are already equipped with mutation and RERA registration as well as sanction plan in their favour. Moreover, the names of the appellants’ predecessors have been recorded in the RS Records of Rights, whereas the name of the plaintiffs/appellant no. 1 has been recorded in the LR Records, against the subject property. Hence, at this stage, if the possession of the plaintiffs is disturbed by the respondents, as well as third party interests are created, unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings will ensue and thus, there is every chance that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury by the time the suit is finally disposed of. 42. Also, in the light of the above observations, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is definitely in favour of grant of ad- interim injunction. 43. As regards urgency, from the annexures to the injunction application filed in the Trial Court, we find that the defendants/respondents are trying to assert title on the strength of deeds executed by the daughters of Lalmohan, who prima facie did not have any title in the property at the relevant juncture, as well as to go so far as to claim possession of the suit property, in the teeth of the contrary materials produced by the plaintiffs in the Trial Court. 11 44. Thus, the urgency involved is extreme and justified grant of ad- interim injunction even without service of notice on the respondents. 45. Even otherwise, since the present appeal arises out of an ad- interim refusal of injunction, it was beyond the charter of the learned Trial Judge to look into materials other than those produced by the plaintiffs and the Court had to proceed on the premise of the plaint and injunction applications averments as well as the documents produced therewith being sacrosanct for the purpose of consideration of such limited prayer. 46. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to expand the horizons of the appeal by traversing into a realm which was beyond the zone of consideration of the Trial Court itself at the juncture of passing the impugned order. Thus seen, the Appellate Court cannot look into any new document sought to be produced by the respondents at this stage. The appropriate remedy for the respondents would be either to take out an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging suppression, as argued before us, and/or to file a written objection and contest the injunction application itself on merits. 47. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Trial Judge erred in law and on facts in refusing to grant ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. 48. Thus, FMA 761 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned order, bearing Order No. 01 dated May 15, 2026 passed 12 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), First Court at Barasat, District – North 24 Parganas in Title Suit no. 521 of 2026, and granting ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents and/or their men and agents from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs/appellants in respect of the suit property in any manner whatsoever and/or selling, transferring, alienating and/or creating any third party interest and/or encumbrance in respect of the suit property, both till disposal of the temporary injunction application pending in the Trial Court. 49. In view of the defendants/respondents having already appeared in the present appeal and being posted with the pleadings of the plaintiffs/appellants, it is expected that the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the temporary injunction application as expeditiously as possible upon giving adequate opportunity to the defendants/respondents to file their respective written objections to the injunction application. 50. CAN 1 of 2026, along with CAN 2 of 2026 and CAN 3 of 2026, are consequentially disposed of. For such purpose, CAN 3 of 2026 is treated to be on the day’s list. 51. We make it clear that the above findings are tentative in nature and shall not influence the learned Trial Judge at any further stage of the suit, either at the final hearing of the temporary injunction application or the hearing of the suit itself. 52. There will be no order as to costs. 13 53. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities. I agree. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Sandip Kumar De, J.) AD-16 Ct No.16 (AK/SSS)