1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE BEFORE: THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL) WPA 5358 of 2026 M/s. Hindustan Unilever Limited Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. For the Petitioner :Mr. Ranjay De, Adv. Mr. Basabjit Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Adityajit Abel Bose, Adv. For the Respondent No.3 : Mr. Lakshman Chandra Halder, Adv. Judgment reserved on : 13.08.2026 Judgment delivered on : 14.09.2026 SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:- 1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an award dated 30.12.2025 passed by the learned 7th Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata, West Bengal to annex no.VIII-12/2019. Vide the impugned award the tribunal decided the following issues:- “i) Whether the termination from service of Sri Abhishek Mitra, S/O Sri Pankaj Mitra, N-274, Fatepur 2nd Sarani, Kolkata-700028 by the management of M/s. Hindustan Unilever Ltd., 63, Garden Reach, Kolkata- 700024 is justified? 2 ii) To what relief, if any, the workman is entitled?” 2. On the findings that termination of applicant was due to unsatisfactory performance and the same being no doubt stigmatic in nature, the learned tribunal, disposed of the case as follows:- “that the instant case being No. VIII-12/2019 u/s. 10(2A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 be and the same is allowed on contest but without any order as to costs against the OP/Company. The letter dated 03.11.2017 (Exhibit-3) is set aside being bad, illegal and unjustified. The applicant/ workman is entitled to be reinstated in service with effect from 05.11.2017 with full back wages all other consequential benefits thereto arising out of such reinstatement and continuity of service and the service of the applicant/workman shall be deemed to be continuous service without any break. The OP/Company is directed to pay full back wages along with all other consequential benefits thereto arising out of such reinstatement till the date of reinstatement and also other benefits being paid to other workman/workmen under various beneficial, welfare and/or benevolent schemes of the OP/company. The OP/Company is further directed to ensure that the applicant/workman is not deprived of the annual increments which fell due from time to time since 05.11.2017. The OP/Company is also directed to pay all the dues and outstanding as directed by this Tribunal with interest @ 10% per annum within thirty days from the date of this order.” 3. Both parties have filed their written notes. 3 4. The petitioner‟s case in short is that by a letter dated 06.10.2016 the Respondent No. 3, the ex-employee herein was appointed as Trainee Workman in Assistant Technical Trainee (ATT) cadre under unskilled category with effect from 6th October, 2016 for an initial period of one year. As per Clause 6 of the letter of appointment dated 06.10.2016 issued to the Private Respondent, it is evident that during his training period his performance would be reviewed at the end of each six monthly phase and his training extension and retention will be subject to the discretion of the management based on his performance. Moreover, Clause 12 of the said letter also empowers the Company to terminate his service during the period of probation. 5. The Company being a professional run company, adheres to the policy of performance appraisal and accordingly the Private Respondent's performance was assessed and he was completely aware of it. The 'PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL TRAINEES' bears his signature along with the Appraiser, Appraiser's Line Manager and other authorities of the factory. It would be deciphered from the following tabular statement as to how his traineeship on probation came to an end as per the stipulation made in the said letter of appointment. Sl.No. Nature of the document W.P. Page Nos. Subject Matter 01 Appointment Letter dated 50 and 51 Clause 1 of the appointment letter speaks for 1 year probationary 4 06.10.2016 period from 06.10.2016, Clause 6 speaks about evaluation of the training at the end of each 6 monthly phase. The extension of training period shall not be for a period of more than 2 months in each instance. Clause 12 speaks about termination of service during the period of training/probation. 02 Performance Appraisal For Trainee/ Probationer for Quarter March, 17 55 and 57 Last page of the Exhibit bears the signature of the private respondent and his line Manager. In the said appraisal, it was suggested to improve his nature of work and learning capability. 03 Performance Appraisal For Trainee/ Probationer for Quarter June, 17 58 and 60 Last page of the Exhibit bears the signature of the private respondent and his line Manager Improvement was there but not upto the mark and as such should improve very fast. 04 Performance 61 and 63 Last page bears the signature of the 5 appraisal – Trainee private respondent appraiser‟s LM, HR Manager and Factory Manager. Improvement was very slow and it was suggested to extend the trainee period for 1 month. 05 Letter dated 05.10.2017 addressed to Sri Mitra 64 By this letter, the training period of the Private Respondent was extended by another period of 1 month commencing from 06.10.2017. 06 Performance Appraisal Trainee 65 and 67 Last page bears the signature of the private respondent appraiser‟s LM, HR Manager and Factory Manager. Although the private respondent was given an opportunity to improve his traineeship but he could not improve any office skills. 07 Non renewal of traineeship as per the stipulation in contract of employment 68 The management of the company issued the letter as per his contract of employment since the performance of the private respondent as unsatisfactory in nature and he could not improve 6 despite extending his probationary period. 6. The petitioner company argues that the private respondent not being a permanent employee was never victimized. It is stated that the private respondent in his evidence has admitted that he was not given appointment in the company as a permanent employee. The petitioner states that the father of the Respondent no.2 was an ex employee of the petitioner company. He also confirmed that his son Sri Abhishek Mitra, the respondent no.3 was not a permanent employee. The material portions of the cross examination dated 24.01.2024 is as follows:- “Cross-examination of P.W.2 dated 24.01.2024. My son was never a permanent employee of the O.P. Company. My son was not a member of the Hindustan Unilever permanent workers union.” 7. The petitioner further states that getting statutory benefits as a probationer does not make an employee permanent. The petitioner relies upon the judgment of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831, at paragraph 65. “65. The fact of holding an enquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment (see State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das [AIR 1961 SC 177 : (1961) 1 SCR 606 : (1961) 1 SCJ 209] ). If there is an enquiry the facts and circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance (see Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 531 : (1963) 3 SCR 716 : (1963) 2 SCJ 185] ). In R.C. Lacy v. 7 State of Bihar [ Civil Appeal No. 590 of 1962, decided on October 23, 1963] it was held that an order of reversion passed following an enquiry into the conduct of the probationer in the circumstances of that case was in the nature of preliminary inquiry to enable the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken. A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311(2) (see R.C. Banerjee v. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1552 : (1964) 2 SCR 135 : (1964) 1 SCJ 578] ). A preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee has been held not to attract Article 311 (see Champaklal G. Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854 : (1964) 5 SCR 190 : (1964) 1 Lab LJ 752] ). On the other hand, a statement in the order of termination that the temporary servant is undesirable has been held to import an element of punishment (see Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 449 : (1964) 1 Lab LJ 418] ).” 8. The petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr. reported in (2010) 12 SCC 783 at paragraph 23 and Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2025) 9 SCC 297 at paragraph 50-54, in support of his contention that non confirmation upon unsatisfactory performance in respect of a probationer is not a stigmatic one and that in the case of a „probationer‟ no right can be accrued in his favour. 9. The petitioner relies upon the judgment in State Bank of India & Ors. v. Palak Modi & Anr. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607 at paragraph 25 to support his contention that no right can be accrued in favour of a probationer. 8 10. The petitioner then relies upon the judgment of M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India, Machilipatnam, A.P and Anr. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 323 at paragraph 9 and 15 and submits that Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-the exceptional clause applies when the termination has taken place as per the stipulation made in the letter of appointment. “9. Regulation 14 aforesaid has to be read as a statutory term of the contract of employment between the Corporation and the appellant. The order of appointment had fixed a target in respect of the performance of the appellant which admittedly the appellant failed to achieve within the period of probation which was extended up to two years. As such the Corporation was entitled not to confirm the appellant in terms of the order of appointment and to terminate his service during the period of probation without any notice in terms of Regulation 14(4) aforesaid. Clauses 10 and 11 of the order of appointment along with Regulation 14 shall be deemed to be stipulations of the contract of employment under which the service of the appellant has been terminated. Any such termination, even if the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable in the case of the appellant, shall not be deemed to be “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo), having been covered by exception (bb). Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo), there were only three exceptions so far as termination of the service of the workman was concerned, which had been excluded from the ambit of retrenchment — (a) voluntary retirement; (b) retirement on reaching the age of superannuation; and (c) on ground of continued ill- health. This Court from time to time held that the definition of “retrenchment” being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even 9 discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of “retrenchment”. (State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money [(1976) 1 SCC 822 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 132 : AIR 1976 SC 1111] , Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala [(1980) 3 SCC 340 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 409 : AIR 1980 SC 1219] .) Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2(oo), under clause (bb) the legislature has excluded from the purview of “retrenchment” (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry; (ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). In the present case, the termination of service of the appellant is as a result of the contract of employment having been terminated under the stipulations specifically provided under Regulation 14 and the order of the appointment of the appellant. In this background, the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 25-F shall not vitiate or nullify the order of termination of the appellant. 15. Even under general law, the service of a probationer can be terminated after making an overall assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before termination of such service. This aspect has been examined by this Court in the case of The Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr Pandurang Godwalkar [(1992) 4 SCC 719 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1993) 23 ATC 389 : AIR 1993 SC 392] where it has been pointed out that if the performance of the employee concerned during the period of probation is not found to be satisfactory on overall assessment, then it is open to the competent authority to terminate his service.” 10 11. It is thus submitted that undisputedly the private respondent was appointed as Assistant Technical Trainee on probation for a period of 1 year. The clause 6 of the said appointment letter speaks about the period of training probation which can be extended time to time but not more than 2 times, each one will be for 1 month. The management was not all satisfied with his performance during the traineeship/probationer. By the letter dated 05.10.2017 the period of probation was extended and by a letter dated 05.10.2017 the same was again extended and by a letter dated 03.11.2017 he was again informed about non renewal of traineeship as per the stipulation in contract of employment. 12. The petitioner thus, prays for setting aside of the impugned order passed by the tribunal. 13. The respondent workman by filing written notes has argued that the petitioner vide its letter dated 6th October, 2016 appointed the respondent no.3, workman, by giving the status as an Assistant Technical Trainee for initial period of one year. Said period of one year is divided into two phases of six months of each i.e. (1) Orientation and Skill Training (2) On the Job intensive Skill Training. In the said appointment letter terms and conditions as applicable to an employee has been set out. The respondent workman had to work in shift duties like other employees were doing and some conditions imposed in the appointment letter, are applicable to the permanent employees of the petitioner company particularly Para 21,22. In the written statement of 11 the workmen specifically pleaded in Para 10 at page 75 of the writ petition that respondent workman was granted all benefits like permanent workman of the company. In the instant case like a regular employee respondent was allowed to draw wages and was also given the benefit provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Employees State Insurance and deduction from wages were made. 14. It is submitted that statutory benefit like Provident Fund, ESI, Bonus, HRA are all applicable to the employees working in the establishment. A trainee who has been engaged for acquiring knowledge in the field may be granted some emoluments like stipend. After completion of one year from 6th October 2016, the respondent no.3/workman was allowed extension of further one month vide letter dated 5th October 2017. 15. In Para 6 of appointment letter dated 6th October 2016, it is stated that:- “.......the management however reserve the right to release you from employment at the end of any of the training phases without any further extension...”. 16. It is stated by the private respondent that the service of the respondent workman was discontinued on 3rd November 2017 i.e. before expiry of closing hours of 5th November 2017 on the ground of unsatisfactory performance. The respondent workman claims that he was in continuous service within the meaning of Section 25B of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and such discontinuance of service amounts to 'retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 12 17. The respondent workman submits that the management failed to place material evidence before the Learned Tribunal to satisfy that grounds of termination is justified and that the opportunity was given to the workman. 18. The management tired to contend before the Learned Tribunal that termination of the respondent workman is non-renewal of contract of employment within the meaning of sub-clause 2(bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The Learned Tribunal on consideration of material evidence of records was pleased to find and hold that the termination of service the respondent workman does not fall within the proviso (bb) as provided under Section 2(oo) of the Act. 19. The learned Counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. M NILAJKAR v. TELECOM DISTRICT Manager as reported in (2003) 4 SCC 27, Para no. 13 and 14, wherein the Court held that the termination ground of unsatisfactory performance is stigmatic. In such cases the respondent workman should have got an opportunity of hearing before such extreme punishment of termination. He has also relied upon the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Utkal Machinery Ltd. vs Santi Patnaik (Miss) reported in 1966 (1) LLJ page 396 and Express Newspapers, Ltd. vs Labour Court, Madras, and Anr. 1964(1) LLJ page 9. 20. Finally the private respondent submits that the learned Tribunal considering the materials and evidence on record came to the right 13 conclusion that the respondent no.3 is an workman and has been in continuous of service for more than 240 days and termination of service is retrenchment and there is non compliance of Section 25(f) of the Act. As such it is submitted that the impugned order being in accordance with law requires no interference. 21. From the materials on record it is evident that:- i. The respondent/employee was appointed as a „trainee‟ in the petitioner company as Assistant Technical Trainee on 6th October, 2016. ii. While still undergoing training which was being extended from time to time as there was no improvement in the performance of the respondent employee, his training period was not extended any further after 03.11.2027 for „unsatisfactory performance‟. The employee‟s period of training was for about a little less than 13 months. iii. The periodical assessment was duly informed to the respondent employee who signed on the appraisal report from time to time. 22. The judgment relied upon by the respondent in Utkal Machinery Ltd. (Supra) lays down that for “discharge” of a probationer during the period of probation, evidence is required to be adduced by the employer before the labour Court dealing with the dispute as to the “unsatisfactory work” of the concerned employee. 14 23. In the present case it has been clearly proved by way of the documents of periodical assessments, bearing the employee‟s signature that sufficient opportunity was given to him to improve, which unfortunately did not happen. 24. The employee never raised any objection to the said periodical assessments and duly accepted the same. As such he was made aware of his „unsatisfactory performance‟ with no improvement in spite of several sufficient opportunity being given. 25. In the case of Express Newspaper Ltd. (Supra), the Supreme Court held “within the period of probation the services of a probationer could not be dispensed with, except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons”. 26. In the present case, as discussed above, sufficient opportunity was granted to the respondent/employee to improve his performance, which he was made aware by being informed in writing. But consistent „non performance‟ led to his training not being extended for „unsatisfactory performance‟. 27. The respondent has further relied upon the judgment in S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. vs Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27, wherein the Court held that “employment must be shown to be under a contract, where the workers must be shown to have been made aware of such stipulation at the commencement of their employment”. 15 28. In the present case, the periodical assessment report being signed by the employee from time to time shows that the employee was made aware of his unsatisfactory performance. 29. Applying the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Samsher Singh (Supra) and M. Venugopal vs Divisional Manager (Supra), it is clear that the respondent/employee‟s letter for appointment is of a trainee worker (unskilled) and contained the following clause:- “6. During the training period your learning will be reviewed at the end of each six monthly phase and your appraiser shall decide whether you will be retained for the next phase of training or whether your training needs to be extended. In the event the training is extended during any of the 2 phases, such extension will not be for a period of more than 2 months in each instance and at the end of this extension if your learning is still not found suitable you shall be released from the traineeship with the company without any further extension. In the event that your learning is substantially below par, the Management however reserves the right to release you from employment at the end of any of the training phases without any further extension. In all cases of extension /non extension and/or final determination of traineeship, the decision of the management /appraiser is final.” And as such could be terminated without any notice. 30. The word „undesirable‟ has been discouraged by the Courts but the term “unsatisfactory service” does not cast an aspersion on the individual‟s character or harm their future employment prospects. 31. In a case similar to the present writ application, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Chaitanya Prakash & Anr. vs H. Omkarappa, 2010 (2) SCC 623, decided on 12 January, 2010, held:- 16 “16. It is no longer res integra that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be said to be stigmatic. In this connection, we make a reference to the decision of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences (supra), wherein also a similar letter was issued to the concerned employee intimating him that his performance was unsatisfactory and, therefore, he is not suitable for confirmation. We have considered the ratio in light of the facts of the said case and we are of the considered opinion that the basic facts of the said case are almost similar to the one in hand. There also, letters were issued to the concerned employee to improve his performance in the areas of his duties and that despite such communications the service was found to be unsatisfactory. In the result, a letter was issued to him pointing out that his service was found to be unsatisfactory and that he was not suitable for confirmation, and, therefore, his probation period was not extended and his service was terminated, which was challenged on the ground that the same was stigmatic for alleged misconduct. The Supreme Court negatived the said contention and upheld the order of termination. 17. In Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd., (supra) also the concerned employee was kept on probation for a period of two years. During the course of his employment he was also informed that despite being told to improve his performance time and again there is no such improvement. His shortfalls were brought to his notice and consequently by order dated 16.01.1997 his services were terminated, wherein also a reference was made to his unsatisfactory service. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has held that on the basis of long line of decisions it appears that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. In Pavanendra Narayan verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520; this court had the occasion to determine as to whether the impugned order therein was a letter of termination of services simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After considering various earlier decisions of this court in paragraph 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated by this Court thus :- 17 "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld." 19. In Abhijit Gupta (Supra.), this Court considered as to what will be the real test to be applied in a situation where an employee is removed by an innocuous order of termination i.e whether he is discharged as unsuitable or he is punished for his misconduct. In order to answer the said question, the Court relied and referred to the decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank Officers Assn. V. Allahabad Bank (1996) 4 SCC 504; where it is stated thus :- "14.......As pointed out in this judgment, expressions like "want of application", "lack of potential" and "found not dependable" when made in relation to the work of the employee would not be sufficient to attract the charge that they are stigmatic and intended to dismiss the employee from service." 20.In our considered opinion, the ratio of the above-referred decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The respondent was time and again informed during the probation period about his deficiencies and was given ample opportunities to improve them. Therefore, enough precautions were taken by the appellants to see that the respondent improved his performance and such an opportunity was provided to him. But such advices and opportunity were totally misplaced as the respondent considered the same as unnecessary encroachment and interference in his work and wrote back rudely in an intemperate language. Whether or not a person is suitable to be retained and confirmed in service could be considered and assessed by the Managing Director, namely, appellant no. 1, but he after making an appraisal submitted his report along with all other records of the respondent before the Board of Directors, who finally took the decision. The Board of Directors constituted of responsible persons and they while deciding the suitability of the respondent not only considered the Performance Assessment Report but also 18 considered all other records, and thereafter they took a considered and conscious decision that the respondent was not suitable for confirmation and terminate his service. The said decision of the Board of Directors appears to be in parity with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of this Court (supra). The reasons mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1999 - terminating the services of the respondent cannot be said to be stigmatic. The appellant had time and again specifically brought to the notice of the respondent his short comings and no misconduct as such is alleged against the respondent by the appellant and therefore the present case is a case of termination simpliciter due to unsuitability of the respondent and not a case of punishment for misconduct. 21. It was brought to our notice during the course of argument by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the order of dismissal of the respondent dated 29.11.1999 was stigmatic is also proved from the fact that subsequent to his termination, the respondent was called for interview for the post of Managing Director of M/s Spices Trading Corporation Ltd. and that when he reached the venue of interview, he was informed by the Selection Board that he was not required to attend the interview because the appellants informed the said company that the service of the respondent was terminated due to his unsatisfactory service performance. Referring to and relying on the same, it was submitted by the counsel appearing for the respondent that it indicated and fortified the vindictive attitude of the 1st appellant herein from issuance of the aforesaid letter. We have perused the relevant records and on the basis of the same we are of considered opinion that the appellants informed M/s Spices Trading Corporation Ltd. company on being specifically asked by the said company about the performance of the respondent and consequently it was informed that his service was terminated due to unsuitability, which is a fact. If, they would have not intimated the same to the company despite their specific query then they would have been suppressing the material fact. In our considered opinion the aforesaid aspect does not in any manner support the case of the respondent. 22.In view of the above, we hold that the impugned order is not stigmatic and as such the decision of the High Court is erroneous and vitiated. We accordingly, hereby set aside 19 the same and restore the order dated 29.11.1999 passed by the appellant.” 32. Thus if the employer simply looked at the records, noted that the training performance was poor, and decided not to continue employment, the motive is purely administrative (Non-Stigmatic). If the employer actually used "unsatisfactory performance" as a mask to fire the employee for a specific, alleged crime or misconduct without proving it in a trial, the court has to look past the language. In that scenario, it becomes a disguised punishment (Foundation is misconduct) and will be struck down as “stigmatic”. As long as the decision is genuinely driven by poor training output and performance, using the words "unsatisfactory performance" does not damage one’s reputation in the eyes of the law, making it completely non-stigmatic. 33. While the language of the order might look harmless on paper, courts can "lift the veil" if the probationer challenges it. If the real foundation of the action was an unproved allegation of misconduct (like theft or insubordination) disguised as "unsatisfactory performance," then the order is stigmatic. 20 If the order strictly attributes the lack of extension to professional performance or training metrics, it is legally safe, non- punitive, and non-stigmatic. 34. Thus an order denying the extension of training or probation on the ground of "unsatisfactory performance" is generally not considered stigmatic. Non-Stigmatic (Termination Simpliciter): Merely stating that a probationer's performance is "unsatisfactory," "not up to the mark," or "unsuitable" for the job does not cast a stigma. It is a purely administrative assessment of fit. The employer has the legal right to judge a probationer's efficiency during this period. Stigmatic: An order becomes stigmatic only if it enters the territory of misconduct, moral turpitude, financial irregularities, or character defects. 35. The observation of the tribunal in the impugned award that termination in this case due to “unsatisfactory performance” was no doubt stigmatic in nature is thus not in accordance with law, as herein all rules were duly followed by the petitioner, as follows:- a) The employee‟s appointment letter shows that he was appointed as a trainee and clause 6 therein is clear about his training period as to how he would be assessed. b) The employee was informed in writing about his performance at periodic intervals. 21 c) He was not terminated. His period of training was extended from time to time and in spite of being informed on periodical basis, there being no improvement, his training period was not extended after a reasonable period, as per clause in the appointment letter, as there was no improvement. 36. Thus there being no illegality in the conduct of the petitioner in issuing letter dated 3.11.2017, which was done in accordance with law, the impugned award dated 30.12.2025 passed by the learned 7th Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata, West Bengal to annex no.VIII-12/2019 is quashed and set aside being, perverse and erroneous thus bad in law. 37. WPA 5358 of 2026 is allowed. 38. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of consequently. 39. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 40. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)