15.09.2026 M/L No.34 Court No.12 (gc) MAT 1224 of 2026 CAN 1 of 2026 Aparna Konar Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. Mr. Raghunath Chakraborty, Mrs. Sabnam Sultana, Ms. Dipanwita Das, Ms. Rushali Chatterjee …for the Appellant. Ms. Parna Roychoudhury …for the PNB. Ms. Susmita Saha Dutta, Ld. AGP, Mr. Niladri Saha, Ms. Madhurima Basu …for the State. 1. The appeal arises out of an order dated April 10, 2026 passed by a learned Single Judge in WPA 29775 of 2025. His Lordship dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the grievance of the appellant was against the steps taken by the bank under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) and in view of a statutory remedy available under Section 17 of the said Act, the writ petition was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 2. We are informed that a review had been preferred from the said order and His Lordship’s decision 2 dated April 10, 2026 was neither recalled nor modified in the review. We find that there is no appeal from the order passed in the review petition. In the review, the applicant/appellant was granted liberty to approach the Tribunal for ventilation of her grievances. 3. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Advocate for the appellant submits that the appellant could not have approached the learned Tribunal under Section 17 of the said Act. The appellant had challenged the order of the District Magistrate passed under Section 14 of the said Act and Section 14(3) provides that the decision of the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the said Act could not be challenged in any court or authority. 4. We are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Chakraborty, as in our view, any person aggrieved by any measure referred to under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or its authorized office under the said Chapter, may approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction. 5. Mr. Chakraborty submits that the order of the District Magistrate would not be covered under Section 17 of the said Act. We disagree with Mr. Chakraborty’s submission on the ground that taking possession of a secured asset of a borrower 3 including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset is the first step under Section 13(4) of the said Act. 6. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of His Lordship. The most important fact which the appellant had failed to bring it to our notice and to the notice of the learned Single Judge is that, the borrower (the husband of the appellant) had already filed IA 2152 of 2025 challenging the order of the District Magistrate dated March 5, 2025, on the self-same ground, which has been urged before us. It was contended by the appellant’s husband before the DRT that the while taking possession of the secured asset the bank had wrongly taken possession of the property, which was in the name of his wife. He filed two title deeds with English translations, thereby praying for restoration of possession of the property of the wife. The self-same prayers have been made in the writ petition. The prayers in the writ petition are quoted below:- “In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, your petitioner most humbly prays that Your Lordship would graciously be pleased to pass following orders; a) A Writ in the nature of Mandamus by directing the respondent their men, agents and associates to forthwith remove the lock 4 and restore possession of the petitioner's property measuring 2.5 satak together with the portion of the residential structure standing thereon; b) A Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing by the respondent their men, agents and associates to quashing the actions of the respondents bank insofar as the same relate to the petitioner's unmortgaged property forthwith; c) A Writ in the nature of the Mandamus by directing respondent their men, agents and associates to quashing the actions of the respondents bank as the respondent authority by forcibly locked the entire residential house including the petitioner's portion measuring about of 2.5 satak, by acting in excess of authority, in colourable exercise of power, and in blatant disregard of the limits imposed by the District Magistrate's own order dated 05.03.2025 forthwith; d) A Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing by the respondent their men, agents and associates to restrain the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's peaceful possession of her property in any manner whatsoever; e) A Writ in the nature of Mandamus by directing the respondent their men, agents and associates to direct an enquiry into the illegal action of the respondent authorities; f) Issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari calling upon the respondents to certify and transmit to this Hon'ble Court all 5 relevant records so that the same may be set aside and/or quashed and conscionable Justice be done; g) Ad interim order in terms of prayer (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)and (f); a) Pass an ad-interim order of restoration of possession and restraint against further coercive action; b) Such further and/or other order and/or orders be passed and/or directions be given as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.” 7. The respondent bank filed an objection to IA 2152 of 2025 and filed the copy of the loan sanction letter dated June 3, 2014. As per the sanction letter, two title deeds bearing nos.1358 of 2010 and 0604 of 2010 covering a land of 8 satak was deposited as security interest for OD limit of Rs.22 lacs. The Tribunal found that as per the sanction letter dated June 3, 2014, the applicant before it had also created security of interest in respect of title deed nos.0646 of 2010 and 1358 of 2010 for the entire 8 satak of land. The applicant/husband did not file title deed no.0646 of 2010. Therefore, the bank was directed to file English translation of the Deed of Gift No.1358 of 2010 and title deed no.0646 of 2010 by way of an affidavit. On the perusal of the District Magistrate’s order, the Tribunal found that he had passed the order in respect of the secured 6 asset described as property no.1, part and parcel of bastu land measuring 6.16 satak and property no.2, part and parcel of bastu land measuring 2 satak of land with a two storied building. 8. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal did not pass any interim order but directed filing of affidavits. Thus, the issues urged before the writ court were already pending for adjudication by the learned Tribunal. The Tribunal is the appropriate authority to adjudicate the correctness of the order passed by the District Magistrate. 9. Section 14(3) provides that no other court or authority would have any jurisdiction to decide on issues and matters arising out of steps taken by the bank under Section 14 of the said Act, because Section 17 provides adequate remedy to any person aggrieved by any step taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the said Act. We refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of United Bank of India vs Satyawati Tondon and Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, paragraphs 42 and 43 are quoted below:- “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not 7 only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 10. The issue involved in the writ petition is also the issue involved before the DRT. The DRT was approached at a prior date. The fact that an SA was pending at the instance of the husband has been mentioned in the writ petition, but the appellant has conveniently suppressed the fact that her husband had already approached the DRT with the self-same prayers as made in the writ petition and 8 no interim protection had been granted. The issue is pending adjudication. 11. Under such circumstances, the appeal and the application are dismissed and we impose cost for wasting the time of the Court and for suppression of material facts to the tune of Rs.50,000/- . The same shall be paid to the State Legal Services Authority, Kolkata for remittance to the fund of the Juvenile Justice Committee, High Court. 12. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all necessary formalities. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) (Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)