D/L Item No. 34 15.09.2026 KOLE 266413 WP. CT 195 of 2025 Union of India & Ors. -Vs.- Anjan Ray Mr. Souvik Nandy, Mr. A. Bhattacharyya, … for the petitioners. Mr. Kaushik Dey, Mr. A. Datta, … for the respondent. Dictated by Arijit Banerjee, J:- Under challenge in this writ petition is an order dated May 27, 2025, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata, in OA No. 350/00100/2022 being an original application filed by the respondent in this writ petition. By the impugned order, the Tribunal held that the disciplinary proceedings against the present respondent had continued beyond the time period prescribed by the Tribunal in an earlier round of litigation upon the Tribunal rejecting the application for extension of time to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. So holding, the Tribunal set aside the order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The respondents in the original application were directed to restore all consequential benefits to the original applicant. Being aggrieved the railway authorities have challenged that order by way of the present writ petition. The respondent herein was the Chairman of the railway recruitment cell. It appears that he was put in- 2 charge of preparing question paper in connection with a recruitment process. The allegation against him is that he entrusted the job with a little known printing press which did not have the proper set up or infrastructure. The question paper leaked out. The proposed examination had to be cancelled. This caused a financial loss of approximately Rs. 6 crores to the railways. On the basis of the aforesaid allegation, a charge sheet was issued against the present respondent. The respondent challenged the disciplinary proceeding by filing OA 350/1146/2017. A consent order dated January 31, 2019, was passed by the Tribunal, the operative portion whereof reads as follows:- “Accordingly the O.A. is disposed of with consent of Ld. Counsel for both sides with a direction upon the respondent authorities to conclude the pending disciplinary proceedings, initiated against the applicant vide charge memo dated 02.3.2017, as per rules, within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The applicant shall be at liberty to agitate appropriately, if aggrieved with the final order passed by the authority concerned, in the proceedings.” The said order was received by the Disciplinary Authority on February 21, 2019. Three months period from February 21, 2019, elapsed on May 20, 2019. The respondents, however, continued with the disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent employee. On June 3, 2019, an objection was raised by the delinquent employee being the present respondent to the 3 effect that the disciplinary proceedings could not continue since the time period that had been granted for concluding the same had expired. The Disciplinary Authority did not have jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings. In July, 2019, a belated application was made by the respondent authorities before the Tribunal for extension of time for concluding the disciplinary proceeding. The application was kept pending for a few months. In the meantime, the disciplinary proceedings continued. On November 26, 2019, the Disciplinary Authority passed its final order imposing penalty of ‘reduction to lower stage in the time scale (level) of pay by two (02) stages for a period of six (06) months and on the expiry of such period the reduction shall not have the effect of postponing the future increment of pay”. On November 29, 2019, the respondent authority’s application for extension of time for completing the disciplinary proceedings, was dismissed by the Tribunal. Such order of dismissal was not challenged by the respondent authorities before any competent forum and, thereafter, such order attained finality. The order of punishment was challenged by the present respondent in the present round of litigation by filing OA 350/00100/2022. The Tribunal set aside the order of punishment and directed the railways to restore all consequential benefits to the present respondent as we have noted at the very beginning. 4 Appearing for the writ petitioners, Mr. Nandi, learned Advocate submits that there is no inflexible rule of law that a disciplinary proceeding must be concluded within the time period which may be fixed by a Court or a Tribunal. In appropriate cases the Court/Tribunal can extend the time period even if an application is made after expiry of the prescribed time period. Therefore, there was no irregularity in the Disciplinary Authority to continue with the proceedings even beyond the prescribed time period of three months and taking it to its logical conclusion. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in setting aside the order of Disciplinary Authority only on the ground that the order was passed beyond the period of three months granted by the Tribunal in the earlier round of litigation. The merits of the case were not addressed by the Tribunal at all. This is a serious infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. In support of his submission, Mr. Nandi relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors.-vs.-Shravan Kumar, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 2032. In particular Mr. Nandi relied on paragraphs 31 and 36 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- “31. It needs hardly any elaboration to say that fixing of the period of two months by the Tribunal in this case had only been to ensure expeditious proceedings because the matter was being restored for reconsideration in the year 2010, though the disciplinary proceedings related with the incident dated 09.01.2005. However, the said period of two months did not acquire any status akin to that of a statutory mandate that the disciplinary proceedings would have automatically come to an end 5 with its expiry. It remains trite that if an Adjudicating Authority in exercise of its jurisdiction could grant or fix a time period to do a particular thing, in the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary, the jurisdiction to fix such a time period inhers the jurisdiction to extend the time initially fixed. Such conditional orders have regularly been construed by this Court to be in terrorem so as to put a check on the dilatory tactics by any litigant or to guard against any laxity on the part of the Adjucating Authority but, the Court is not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period at any earlier stage. In the case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das: (1961) 3 SCR 763, this Court examined the peremptory order of the Court fixing the period of payment of deficit court fees in the backdrop of the fact that the application for extension of time came up for hearing only after the time fixed by the Court had expired and the application was rejected. This Court put the things in perspective while observing, inter alia, as under: - “5…Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed…” 36. The upshot of the discussion foregoing is that the proceedings in question neither abated nor could have been considered nullity only because of passage of the expected time period stated in the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2010. There was no reason or justification for the High Court to interfere with the just and proper order passed by the Tribunal on 21.06.2013, which deserves to be restored with necessary consequential directions.” Learned Advocate then relied on an unreported decision dated April 23, 2025 of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 14724/2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow-vs.-Ram Prakash Singh). 6 In particular, Mr. Nandi relied on paragraph 63 of the judgment which reads as follows:- “63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.” Mr. Dey, learned Advocate representing the respondent submits that once the period of three months expired, the Disciplinary Authority lost jurisdiction to proceed with the domestic enquiry. It is correct that there can be post-facto extension of time even on an application for extension made after expiry of the prescribed time period. However, if such extension is not granted by the concerned forum, the entire disciplinary proceeding becomes without jurisdiction upon expiry of the prescribed time period for completion of the proceedings. He submits that in the present case exactly that happened. Therefore, the order of the Disciplinary Authority is a nullity being without jurisdiction. Mr. Dey relied on the same decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Prakash Singh (supra) and in particular paragraphs 7, 62 and 64 of the judgment which read as follows:- 7. The present case tasks us to decide the following issues: - (i) Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there was none to present the case of the department, no witness was 7 examined in support of the charges and no document was formally proved, any order of punishment could validly be made? (ii) Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in placing reliance on a report of enquiry prepared by the Enquiry Officer who had looked into documents which were not provided to the respondent and had arrived at findings of guilt only on the basis of the charge-sheet, the reply thereto of the respondent and such documents? (iii) Whether failure or omission or neglect of the disciplinary authority to furnish the enquiry report had the effect of vitiating the enquiry? (iv) Whether the enquiry not having been completed within the time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January, 2014, the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued beyond May, 2014? And (emphasis is ours) (v) Whether, and if at all, the appellant should be granted one more opportunity to conclude the enquiry against the respondent within the time to be stipulated by us? 62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift (2005) 12 SCC 355 action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order 8 of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law. 64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate.” We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties. The orders of Courts/Tribunals are to be taken seriously. In the first round of litigation when 9 the present respondent approached the Tribunal challenging the charge sheet and the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, on consent of the parties, the original application was disposed of by the Tribunal by directing the Disciplinary Authority to complete the proceedings within three months from the date of receipt of the order of the Tribunal. The Disciplinary Authority, as it appears from the records, received a copy of the Tribunal’s order on February 21, 2019. The three months period expired on May 20, 20219. In our considered opinion, immediately thereupon, the Disciplinary Authority lost the power or jurisdiction to continue with the disciplinary proceeding. Upon the respondent herein objecting to the continuation of the disciplinary proceeding on June 3, 2019, in July 2019 an application was made by the respondent authorities before the Tribunal for extending the time period for completion of the disciplinary proceeding. That application was not decided until November 29, 2019. In the meantime, on November 26, 2019, the Disciplinary Authority passed its final order imposing punishment on the present respondent. Had the Tribunal by its order dated November 29, 2019, allowed the application for extension of time, the same would have related back to the time when the prescribed period of three months expired and would have validated the entire disciplinary proceedings. However, the Tribunal dismissed the application for extension of time. Whether or not the dismissal was on valid or legally correct ground is no 10 more relevant since that order was not assailed by the respondent authorities before any higher forum. Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority lost jurisdiction after expiry of the initially prescribed period of three months. Without obtaining an extension of time to complete the disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority could not have passed any order of punishment on the present respondent. This view of ours finds support from the decisions cited by the learned Advocates for the parties, relevant portions whereof have been extracted above. When a litigant is directed by a Court/Tribunal to complete a proceeding within a particular period of time, the litigant is bound by that. If that party feels that it will not be possible for it to complete the proceeding within the stipulated time period, it has two options. It can drop the proceeding or it can approach the forum which stipulated the time period for extension of time to complete the proceeding. No litigant can be allowed to decide the time period within which it will actually complete a proceeding when a competent court/tribunal has prescribed a time period. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in setting aside the order of punishment and passing consequential directions. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to address the merits of the case as the order of punishment was wholly without jurisdiction striking at the root of the power of the Disciplinary Authority to impose such punishment. 11 We see no reason to interfere with the order challenged in this writ petition. WP.CT 195 of 2025 stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities. (Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, J.) (Arijit Banerjee, J.)