HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 3031 of 2026 Court No. - 51 HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. Despite the fact that notice has been served personally upon opposite party no.2 but no one appears for the opposite party no.2 even in the revised reading of the list. 2. This Criminal Appeal under Section 14A (1) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the S.C./S.T. Act” has been filed with a prayer to quash the 30th January, 2026 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Bareilly in Sessions Trial No. 1884 of 2023 (State Vs. Maqsood Ali & Others), under Sections 323, 325, 504, 427 I.P.C. and Sections 3 (1) (da), 3 (1) (dha) and 3 (2) (Va) of of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station-Sheeshgarh, District-Bareilly, arising out of Case Crime No. 358 of 2022, whereby the learned Trial Court on an application filed by opposite party no.2 under Sections under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has summoned the appellant to face trial along with other accused persons. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that initially the first information report was lodged by opposite party no.2 on 20th November, 2022 against four accused persons, namely, Nanhe, Guddu (appellant no.2), Maqsood and Nasir (appellant no.1). Thereafter, in the statement recorded under 161 Cr.P.C. on 22nd November, 2022, the opposite party no.2 has again made allegations against the appellants along with Nanhe and Maqsood. However, in the re-statement (majid vyan) recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 26th November, 2022, the opposite party no.2 has no made any allegations against the appellants. After investigation, the Police on the basis of re-statement of the opposite party no.2 recorded on 26th November, 2022, has exonerated both the appellants while submitting charge-sheet against Nanhe and Maqsood. On the submission of the charge-sheet Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Ehtesham Afsar Khan Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A. Nasir And Another .....Appellant(s) State of U.P. and Another .....Respondent(s) cognizance was taken and after summoning of accused Nanhe and Maqsood, the charges were framed by the trial court. Whereafter on 22nd April, 2025 i.e. after two years and four months, opposite party no.2 has been examined as prosecution witness no.1, wherein her examination-in-chief and cross- examination has been recorded has been recorded by the trial court, wherein again this time, the opposite party no.2 has made allegations against the appellants qua commission of beating up the opposite party no.2 by them along with other accused. After six months, the opposite party no.2 has filed an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning of the appellants on which the impugned order has been passed. Hence the present criminal appeal. 4. Further the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that in the case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that before summoning the accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C., it is mandatory for the trial court to record its satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction but the trial court in passing the impugned judgment has not recorded its satisfaction. 5. It is highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant that though in the first information report the appellants have been named as accused along with Nanhe and Maqsood but after recording re-statement of the opposite party no.2 under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 26th November, 2022, names of the appellants have been exonerated by the Investigating Officer while submitting the charge-sheet against accused Nanhe and Maqsood and thereafter no protest petition has been filed by the informant against the charge-sheet whereby the names of appellants have been exonerated. It is after long time i.e. two years and four months to be precise on 22nd April, 2025, when the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of informant/opposite party no.2 has been P.W.-1 during the course of trial, again allegations of beating up the opposite party no.2 by the appellants along with other accused have been made against the appellants and then after nearly six months, an application has been filed by the informant praying that the appellants may be summoned under Section 219 Cr.P.C. On the said application the learned Trial Court, on an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., summoned the appellant by the impugned order without there being any new or strong evidence against him. 6.So far as the summoning of the appellants under the Sections 3 (1) (da), 3 (1) (dha) and 3 (2) (Va) of of S.C./S.T. Act is concerned, learned counsel for the appellants submits that from the perusal of version of the first information report, statement and re-statement of the informant/opposite party no.2 and her statement as P.W.1 it transpires that the allegation of abusing the CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 2 informant/opposite party no.2 by using caste indicated words has been assigned to only co-accused Maqsood (reference page no. 84 of the paper book). Therefore, no case is made out against the appellants under Sections 3 (1) (da), 3 (1) (dha) and 3 (2) (Va) of of S.C./S.T. Act. However, the trial court has also not considered the said aspect of the matter while passing the impugend summoning order, which is per se illegal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned summoning order dated 30th January, 2026 is wholly illegal, arbitrary and has been passed in a mechanical manner without proper appreciation of evidence on record. He submitted that the appellant was exonerated during investigation after a thorough and fair inquiry, wherein it was found that he was not present at the place of occurrence and his presence at another place was duly established by Call Detail Records as well as statements of independent witnesses. Despite such categorical findings, the learned Trial Court has summoned the appellant without there being any fresh or incriminating evidence against him. 8. In support of his contention, he has again drawn attention of the Court to the case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra), whereby in paragraphs 105 and 106 of the judgement the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has opined as follows: "105. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra- ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if 'it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence' is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not 'for which such person could be convicted'. There is, therefore, no scope CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 3 for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused. " 9. Referring the aforesaid, he submits that Hon. Apex Court has held that the power under Section 319 CrPC is discretionary and an extraordinary power and thus the same should be used sparingly and it has further been held that much stronger evidences than mere probability of complicity is the rule, where the trial court exercises power under Section 319 of CrPC. 10. He has further drawn attention towards the case reported in the case of Brijendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706 and referred paragraph 14 and 15 of the judgement. Paragraph 14 and 15 of the judgment are quoted hereinunder:- "14. When we translate the aforesaid principles with their application to the facts of this case, we gather an impression that the trial court acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing the summoning order against the appellants. The appellants were named in the FIR. Investigation was carried out by the police. On the basis of material collected during investigation, which has been referred to by us above, the IO found that these appellants were in Jaipur city when the incident took place in Kanaur, at a distance of 175 kms. The complainant and others who supported the version in the FIR regarding alleged presence of the appellants at the place of incident had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the police investigation revealed that the statements of these persons regarding the presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence was doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view of the documentary and other evidence collected during the investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct. This record was before the trial court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons in their examination-in-chief, with no other material to support their so- called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the 'evidence' recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which was already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the present where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether 'much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even if CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 4 we presume that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when this material on record was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny. " 11. On the above premise, learned counsel for the appellants urges that since the trial court while passing the impugned order has committed gross error and has not considered the appreciation of evidence in its true manner, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. 12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 2 has opposed the aforesaid contentions and submitted that a detailed and reasoned order dated 30th January, 2026 has been passed by the learned Trial Court after due consideration of the material available on record. He further submits that informant/opposite party no. has specifically named the present appellants and have clearly stated in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and her testimony as P.W.-1 regarding their involvement in the alleged incident of murder, which carries great evidentiary value and cannot be disbelieved in the absence of exceptional circumstances. It is further argued that the learned Trial Court has thoroughly discussed all relevant aspects of the matter in the impugned order, and therefore, the said order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Hence, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned A.G.A. and perused the record including the impugned order, this Court finds that the appellants were admittedly not charge-sheeted and were exonerated by the Investigating Officer after a thorough investigation specifically the re- statement of informant/opposite party no.2, wherein their presence at the place of occurrence was not found. Neither the appellants have been arrested nor anything incriminating has been recovered from the possession of the appellants or their pointing out. This Court further finds that no new, strong or cogent evidence has emerged during the course of trial so as to justify invocation of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The versions of the informant/opposite party no.2 as unfolded in the first information report, in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., in the re-statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and further in her examination-in-chief and cross- examination as P.W.1, are contradictory. It is only the basis of such CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 5 contradictory version of the informant/opposite party no.2 that the appellants have been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by means of the order impugned. 14. Further Section 319 of Cr.P.C envisages an extraordinary power conferred upon a Court to do substantial justice and thus should be exercised cautiously as the investigating agency found no evidence against such allegedly accused person during course of the investigation. The very purpose of Section 319 of Cr.P.C is to avoid any escape of a guilty person from the trial and therefore discovery of the further evidence must disclose more than prima facie case. The settled law is that the Courts should not exercise its power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C in a supine and cavalier manner but if the Court is on a material conclusion that there are more than prima facie evidence against an accused, certainly this power can be exercised. 15. In case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab (Supra), it has categorically been held that Section 319 of CrPC is a discretionary and extraordinary power which is to be exercised when there is a strong and cogent piece of evidence against an accused person and thus it should be exercised sparingly. The apex Court has very cautiously interpreted the abovesaid provision and held that for exercising of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity. 16. The Apex Court later on, in case of Brijendra Singh and Others (Supra) has also discussed the law enunciated in Hardeep Singh's case and has held that power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised by the trial Court at any stage during the trial and any person can be summoned as an accused for facing the trial. The Apex Court has very clearly held that the word 'evidence' means the material brought before the Court during trial. The material/evidence collected by the Investigating Officer at the stage of enquiry can only be utilised for corroboration thereof. 17. No satisfaction has been recorded by the Court below with respect to the fact that the prosecution succeeded to establish that there are more than prima facie or much stronger case against the appellant and if such an evidence are adduced, there are chances of conviction of the appellant. Further, the learned trial Court has also skipped the law enunciated by the Apex Court. 18. With regard to offence under Sections 3 (1) (da), 3 (1) (dha) and 3 (2) (Va) of of S.C./S.T. Act, this Court is of the firm opinion that no case is made out against the appellants, as from the from the perusal of first information report, statement and re-statement of the informant/opposite party no.2 and her CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 6 statement as P.W.1, this Court finds that the allegation of abusing the informant/opposite party no.2 by using caste indicated words has been assigned to only co-accused Maqsood (reference page no. 84 of the paper book). In that regard also, the trial court has failed to record its satisfaction. 19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned the 30th January, 2026 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Bareilly in Sessions Trial No. 1884 of 2023 (State Vs. Maqsood Ali & Others), under Sections 323, 325, 504, 427 I.P.C. and Sections 3 (1) (da), 3 (1) (dha) and 3 (2) (Va) of of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station-Sheeshgarh, District-Bareilly, arising out of Case Crime No. 358 of 2022, suffers from illegality and perversity and is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned order dated 30th January, 2026 is, therefore, is set aside. 20. The trial court is directed to consider and decide the application filed by opposite party no.2 under Section 319 Cr.P.C. afresh on merits, in accordance with the observations and law laid down by the Apex Court referred to above, by means of a reasoned and speaking order, preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned without granting any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties, if there is no other legal impediment. 21. Accordingly, the present criminal appeal is allowed subject to the observations/directions made above. May 7, 2026 Sushil/- CRLA No. 3031 of 2026 7 (Madan Pal Singh,J.) Digitally signed by :- SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad