Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Sandip Kumar De F.A.T 229 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 CAN 2 of 2026 With F.A.T 228 of 2026 M/s. Marc Project Marketing (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Sri Dipendra Krishna Roy Chowdhury For the appellant : Mr. Joydip Banerjee For the respondent : Mr. Anirban Roy Mr. Debjit Basu Heard on : 29.07.2026 & 14.09.2026 Judgment on : 14.09.2026 2 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. Insofar as FAT 228 of 2026 is concerned, the same is not maintainable before this court due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. 2. Accordingly, FAT 228 of 2026 is dismissed on the ground of non- maintainability due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, with liberty to the appellant to prefer an appeal against the self-same decree dismissing the declaratory suit of the appellant before the concerned District Court. 3. Leave is granted to the learned Advocate-on-record for the appellant to take back the certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree for such purpose, upon furnishing photocopies thereof for the records. 4. FAT 229 of 2026 has been preferred against a judgment whereby the counter-claim for eviction filed by the respondent in the aforementioned suit was decreed. 5. It may be noted that FAT 228 of 2026 had been filed in the judgment passed in the main suit, dismissing the appellant’s suit for declaration of tenancy rights. 6. In such context, an application for stay has been filed in respect of FAT 229 of 2026, which is being taken up now. 7. Affidavit-in-opposition and affidavit-in-reply filed in connection with CAN 1 of 2026 in FAT 229 of 2026 are kept on record. 3 8. The conspectus of the appeal is short and as such, the same is taken up for adjudication along with the connected application. 9. The appeal, bearing FAT 229 of 2026, has been preferred against a decree of eviction granted against the appellant on the basis of the counter-claim filed by the respondent, on the ground that the appellant was a lessee under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short “the 1882 Act”), as opposed to a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short “the 1997 Act”) in view of the admitted rent for the suit premises, which was being used for non-residential purposes, was beyond the ceiling limit as stipulated in Section 3(f)(ii) of the 1997 Act. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that a contradictory stand was taken by the defendant/respondent in the counter- claim, inasmuch as the appellant has been described to be a lessee in paragraph nos.1 and 2 of the counter-claim whereas the jural relationship between the parties has been admitted to be that of a licensor/licensee, since the plaintiff/appellant is referred to as a licensee and the rent has been described as license fees in several parts of the counter-claim. 11. It is, thus, argued that the notice, purportedly under Section 106 of the 1882 Act, which was treated to be the cause of action of the suit by the trial court, was inherently defective, which was fatal to the maintainability of the suit itself. 4 12. In support of such contention, learned counsel appearing for the appellant cites Calcutta Dock Labour Board vs. EIC Holdings Limited, reported at (2008) 4 CHN 308, where it was held that if there is any mistake in the notice and such mistake is through inadvertence and does not touch the very root of the matter, it cannot be held to be fatal, whereas if such mistake and/or omission is deliberate and hits at the root of the suit, such mistake and/or omission is fatal. 13. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that a contradictory case of license versus tenancy was made out by the defendant/respondent in his counter-claim, inasmuch as a part of the counter-claim describes the appellant as a licensee and the other as a lessee whereas in the cross-examination of the defendant/respondent, as DW1, categorically admitted that the defendant had a landlord-tenant relationship with the plaintiff which started from the year 2007. 14. Such contentions are controverted by learned counsel for the respondent, who places reliance on the relevant findings of the learned Trial Judge as well as the materials on record. 15. Upon considering the submissions of the parties, we find that, whether the appellant was found to be a licensee or a lessee under the 1882 Act, the outcome of the suit would have been the same. 5 16. In the event it is construed that the appellant was a licensee, no notice under Section 106 of the 1882 Act or any other provision of law was necessary as a pre-requisite for the filing of the suit, thus, rendering such notice redundant. 17. It is well-settled that in order to evict a licensee, the intimation by the licensor to evict the licensee, including by way of institution of a suit, is sufficient. 18. Thus, if we proceed on the premise that the appellant was a licensee in respect of the suit premises, the suit was, in any event, to be decreed, in view of such relationship between the parties, as the licensee then loses any defence which might be available under the 1882 Act. 19. On the other hand, if the present appellant is treated to be a lessee under the 1882 Act, the necessary pre-requisite for eviction was met by issuance of a prior notice before filing of the suit, giving 15 days to the appellant to vacate the premises, which is squarely in consonance with Section 106 of the 1882 Act. 20. Thus, seen either way, the eviction decree passed by the learned Trial Judge was in order and in accordance with law. 21. However, even if there are apparent contradictions in the counter-claim pleadings, after a trial is conducted on evidence and the trial court looks into the entire gamut of the evidence before it, the question of mere pleadings becomes redundant. 6 22. On the strength of the documentary evidence before the court, it may very well pass a judgment on the basis thereof. 23. From a perusal of the original tenancy agreement between the parties as well as the supplementary agreement entered into subsequently, it is clear that there are instances galore throughout both documents where the appellant has been referred to as a tenant. 24. From the original agreement dated March 1, 2007, we find that even in the description of the parties, the appellant has been mentioned as a tenant. 25. Such description, conspicuously, also includes the heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives and assigns of the appellant, which is necessarily an indicator that a jural relationship which is heritable was intended to be created. 26. A license, it is trite law, is not heritable. 27. Thus, the intention of the parties to treat the jural relationship between themselves as landlord-tenant is evident. 28. Even throughout the tenancy agreement, the appellant has been mentioned as a tenant and the compensation payable for such occupation as rent. 29. Only in a stray expression in Clause 14 of the agreement, although describing the appellant as a tenant, the property was mentioned as a “license property”. 7 30. However, beneath the signature of the parties respectively in the said agreement, they have been again described as landlord and tenant respectively. 31. Thus, the document has to be interpreted as a whole and a stray phrase cannot be culled out of the entire document to determine the jural relationship between the parties. 32. In the supplementary agreement, which was also before the trial court, all through, the appellant has been mentioned as a tenant and the amount payable for the occupation by the appellant of the suit premises as rent. 33. Conspicuously, in the last page of the said supplementary agreement, the expression “LICENSOR”, intended to describe the respondent, was scored through and the term “LANDLORD” inserted in its place, coupled with signatures of the parties at the margin. 34. Hence, all along, the jural relationship between the parties was intended to be that of a lessor and lessee, as borne out by the documentary evidence. 35. That apart, the appellant took a defence that he was a lessee and not that he was a licensee and thus, the appellant is estopped now from taking a different stand before the appellate court. 36. Accordingly, the learned Trial Judge was justified in construing the appellant to be a lessee in respect of the suit property. 8 37. Since the rent of the subject premises was admittedly beyond the ceiling limit of the 1997 Act, the residuary statute, that is, the 1882 Act, becomes automatically applicable. 38. In the present case, the respondent/lessor issued a notice, although not captioned specifically to be so, within the contemplation of Section 106 of the 1882 Act, giving the appellant 15 days’ time, in terms of the said provision, to vacate the premises. 39. Thus, the learned Trial Judge was also justified, upon considering the evidence of the parties, to come to the conclusion that the original jural relationship between the parties was that of lessor and lessee, which was ultimately terminated by a notice within the contemplation of Section 106 of the 1882 Act. 40. Hence, we do not find any merit whatsoever in the present appeal. 41. Accordingly, FAT 229 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the portion of the impugned judgment and decree dated May 7, 2026, whereby the counter-claim filed in respect of Title Suit No.996 of 2022 was decreed, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Second Court at Barasat, District- North 24 Parganas. 9 42. The executing court shall now proceed with the execution levied by the respondent with regard to the decree passed in the said counter-claim. 43. It is expected that the said execution case shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. 44. There will be no order as to costs. 45. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly. 46. CAN 1 of 2026 and CAN 2 of 2026 stand disposed of consequentially. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Sandip Kumar De, J.) AD-13-14 AK