1 62wp6454.2026.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, AT NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO. 6454 OF 2026 (Imran Khan s/o Harun Khan Vs. The Collector, Buldhana and ors) __________________________________________________________________________________________ Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders appearances, Court's orders of directions and Registrar's orders __________________________________________________________________________________________ Mr. M.N. Ali, Advocate for petitioner. Ms. K.P. Marpakwar, AGP for respondent/State. CORAM : ANIL S. KILOR & RAJNISH R. VYAS,JJ. DATE : 24/08/2026 Heard. 2. In the present case, the grievance raised by the petitioner is to the order/Suchanapatra, dated 10.8.2026, issued by respondent no. 4, refusing permission to conduct Eid Milad-un-Nabi Procession, scheduled on 26.8.8.2026, mentioned in the application dated 17.7.2026. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that to profess a religion and to take out procession is his fundamental right. He further submits that not allowing to take out procession from a route as suggested by him amounts to infringement of his rights. 4. On the other hand, it is pointed out by respondents/State that on submission of representation by certain members of Muslim community headed by the petitioner, for taking out procession in Khamgaon City, District Buldhana, the said representation was forwarded to the Collector, Buldhana, Superintendent of Police, Buldhana, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Khamgaon, Police Station Belkhede 2 62wp6454.2026.doc Officer, Shivaji Nagar, Police Station, Kahamgaon and Police Station Officer, Khamgaon City Police Station, Khamgaon. 5. It is submitted that a permission to take out the procession was not rejected but an alternate route was suggested for the same, which the petitioner refused to accept. 6. It is submitted that some members of Muslim community also raised an objection to grant such permission to the petitioner. Further, it is pointed out that in the year 1986, there were communal riots in Khamgaon city, therefore, since then, procession takes place only from Barde Plot, Saukat Colony, Abdul Hamit Chowk and Mastan Chowk and except these areas, procession does not take place anywhere else in Khamgaon City. 7. This court recently vide order dated 14.8.2026, on in Writ Petition No. 6151/2026 (Deepak s/o Devidas Nechwani Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others) has held thus: “27. From the above referred exposition of law, as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, it is evident that in the matter relating to the law and order, the Courts should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities. They are by and large the best to assess and to handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities, within their special knowledge. Past conduct and antecedents of a person or group or an organisation may certainly provide sufficient material or basis for the action contemplated on a reasonable expectation of possible turn of events, which may need to be avoided in public interest and maintenance of law and order. Thus, by applying the above referred principles, we cannot interfere with the police reports placed before the respondent No.3 in the present matter. Belkhede 3 62wp6454.2026.doc 28. Similarly, in the case of Sharif Ahmad and other (supra), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, has held thus: “10. So far as permission for the new route to reach the Karbala sought by the petitioners is concerned, the stand of the respondents is that taking the procession on the said route, which is the Sirsi-Bilari Main Road, has been opposed by members of other religious communities, saying that this is not the customary route for the Muharram procession and that they oppose the establishment of a new tradition. It is their stand that if permission to take out the Tazia/Alam procession along the Sirsi-Bilari Main Road reaching the Karbala is permitted, for one, it would be against the agreement arrived at between parties, including the petitioners and the district administration above referred, and further, that there is opposition by members of other religious communities. 11. It must be remarked that while there is a right guaranteed by the Constitution vide Article 25 to practice one's religion, the exercise of this right is certainly subject to larger interest of law and order, public order and the needs of other sections of the population, that might be adversely affected, if the exercise of the right in a particular manner is insisted upon and permitted. The exercise of a right to practice one's religion is one thing and to practice it in a particular way is different. The earmarking of routes to take out processions, that involve a multitude of people, is a matter that essentially relates to law and order, for which the civil and the police administration bear responsibility. If, upon assessment of the situation, physical and geographical, and opinions of members of other communities, the respondents have taken a decision that a new route, as proposed by the petitioners, cannot be permitted to take out the Tazia procession, there is no right inhering in the petitioners to take out the procession along the particular route that they propose. This is not a case where the petitioners have been asked not to take out the procession at all. It is not a case where the right to the practice of religion or the particular part of it has been prohibited. What has been refused is the use of a particular route for the taking out the Tazia procession, and a fortiori, practice of the Belkhede 4 62wp6454.2026.doc religious rites by using a particular route. There is absolutely no fundamental right to the practice of one's religion, that may entitle them or the community to use a particular road for the performance of religious rites. In case, in the opinion of the civil or the police administration or the Government, it would be objected to by members of other religious communities and lead to social frictions; may be, breaches of law and order or public order.” 29. From the above referred observations, it is evident that the right guaranteed by the Constitution of India under Article 25, to practice one's religion is certainly subject to larger interest of law and order, public order and the needs of other sections of the population, that might be adversely affected, if the exercise of the right in a particular manner is insisted upon and permitted. 30. The exercise of right to practice one’s religion is one thing and to practice it in a particular way is another. 31. The earmarking of routes to take out processions, that involve a multitude of people, is a matter that essentially relates to law and order, for which the civil and the police administration bear responsibility. If, upon assessment of the situation, physical and geographical, and opinions of members of other communities, the respondents have taken a decision that a new route, as proposed by the petitioners, cannot be permitted to take out the procession, then there is no right inhering in the petitioners to take out the procession along the particular route. 32. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has no right to compel the respondents to give him permission to take out the procession from the route, as proposed by the petitioner only. 33. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bharat Mukti Morcha and Anr. (supra), has held thus: “18. To put the whole concept in different words, we would say that a citizen, while exercising his fundamental right to hold a public meeting, must be Belkhede 5 62wp6454.2026.doc mindful of what consequences it would have vis-a vis the fundamental right of other citizens to live in peace and tranquillity and when there is a reasonable apprehension that the effect of exercise of the right is likely to be of disturbing the social order, any curtailment of the fundamental right to preserve the public order would not be arbitrary and unreasonable on the touchstone of the aforestated well entrenched principles of law. 19 to 21 *** 22. So, it is clear that whenever a restriction is imposed in whatever form it is, it must be reasonable and it must stand the scrutiny of judicial review. It must not be arbitrary and excessive and must have a direct and proximate relation with object sought to be achieved by it inasmuch as it must be within the framework of law as prescribed under Article 19(3) of the Constitution, insofar as it seeks to curtail fundamental right to hold a public meeting. Article 19(3) speaks of the grounds on which the restriction on the fundamental right to assemble peaceably and without arms can be imposed. One of the two grounds stated therein is of maintenance of public order. It is argued that the impugned order restricts the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(b) on the ground of maintenance of law and order and not on the ground of preservation of public order and, therefore, it is unreasonable. It is also argued that there is a difference between the expression "law and order" and the words "public order". While it is true that “law and order” is not the ground available under Article 19(3) to restrict the right under Article 19(1)(b), there are instances where a situation starting off as an issue of “law and order” has burgeoned itself into one of “public order” in no time. Let us, therefore, see as to how the difference between these two concepts has been dealt with by the Supreme Court. 23 to 25 *** 26. From above discussion, it would be clear that right to hold a public meeting under Article 19(1)(b) can be restricted or curtailed not on the ground of maintenance of law and order but on the ground of preservation of public peace, that there is a distinction between "law and order" and "public order", that it is not necessary that every disturbance of law and order would lead to public disorder though, in a given case there is a possibility that large-scale disturbance of Belkhede 6 62wp6454.2026.doc law and order may give rise to an apprehension of breach of public peace and tranquillity and if the apprehension of emergence of public disorder is founded on reasonable material, the fundamental right to hold a public meeting under Article 19(1)(b) can be temporarily curtailed, only to meet an emergency. We may add here that to live in peace and tranquillity is a community right inherent in Article 19(1)(b), which is clear from the words "to assemble peaceably and without arms" used in Article 19(1)(b). It would then follow that whenever there is an apprehension of danger to "greater community interest" or "interest of the collective or social order" it is a situation which threatens public order warranting abridgement of right to hold a public meeting only to meet the emergent situation and temporarily.” 34. It is evident from the observations that whenever there is an apprehension of danger to “greater community interest” or “interest of the collective or social order”, it is the situation which threatens the public order which warrants the abridgment of right to take out the procession.” 8. Considering the facts of the above referred judgment and since the facts of the present case are similar, the said judgment will squarely apply to this case. 9. In that view of the matter, the petition is dismissed. (RAJNISH R. VYAS, J.) (ANIL S. KILOR, J.) Belkhede Signed by: Mr. R. S. Belkhede Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 25/08/2026 20:47:44