ANKUR S/O SHAMBHUBHAI VAATALIYA THRO VATILYA SHAMBHUBHAI NANJIBHAI v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
SCR.A/3010/2026 · 2026-03-23
Ilesh J Vora, R T Vachhani
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 401 (GUJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 401 (GUJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3010 of 2026 ========================================================== ANKUR S/O SHAMBHUBHAI VAATALIYA THRO VATILYA SHAMBHUBHAI NANJIBHAI Versus COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & ORS. ========================================================== Appearance: MR MOHDDANISH M BAREJIA(10612) for the Applicant(s) No. 1 MS MEGHNA CHITALIYA APP for the Respondent(s) No. 2 ==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 23/03/2026
ORAL ORDER (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
1. The petitioner herein came to be preventively detained vide the detention order dated 16.02.2026 passed by the respondent – authority as a “dangerous person” as dened under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
3. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respective parties.
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026
4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public
order”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, as registration of the o4ence cannot be said to have either a4ected adversely or likely to a4ect adverse the maintenance of public order as contemplated under the explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, 1985 and therefore, where the o4ences alleged to have been committed by the detunue have no bearing on the question of maintenance of public order and his activities could be said to be a prejudicial only to the maintenance of law and order and not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
5. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing the application contended that, the detenue is habitual o4ender and his activities a4ected at the society at large. In such set of circumstances, the Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
6. Having considered the facts as well as the
submissions made by the respective parties, the issue arise as to whether the order of detention passed by
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026 the Detaining Authority in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law?
7. The order impugned was executed upon the petitioner and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention, a reference of two criminal cases registered under the provisions of BNS Act, against the petitioner is made and further it is alleged that, the activities of the detenue as a “dangerous person” a4ects adversely or are likely to a4ect adversely the maintenance of public order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of
1985. Admittedly, in all the said o4ences, the petitioner was granted bail.
8. After careful consideration of the material, we are of the considered view that on the basis of aforesaid cases the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our opinion, the said o4ences do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein, the detention order was made on the basis
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026 of the registration of the two prohibition o4ences. The Apex Court after referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10 held and observed that mere disturbance of law and
order leading to detention order is thus not necessarily su@cient for action under preventive detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which read thus:
“17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, where the distinction between `law and
order' and `public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
10. "Does the expression `public order' take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to speci/c persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and /ght and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026 ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always a2ects
order but before it can be said to a2ect public order, it must a2ect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly a2ect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local signi/cance which primarily injure speci/c individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily su4cient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will a2ect public order comes within the scope of the Act."
18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti- social activities of the petitioner adversely a2ect or are likely to a2ect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true some
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026 incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged o2ences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the o2ences cannot be said to have a2ected the even tempo of the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in sub- section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger a2ect adversely or are likely to a2ect adversely the maintenance of public order We have carefully considered the o2ences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these o2ences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld.”
R/SCR.A/3010/2026 ORDER DATED: 23/03/2026
9.
For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered opinion that, the material on record are not su@cient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either a4ected adversely or likely to a4ect adversely the maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. 10. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned dated 16.02.2026 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted. (ILESH J. VORA,J) (R. T. VACHHANI, J) sompura Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges. Digitally signed by: MANISHKUMAR JYOTINDRA SOMPURA(HC00189), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 23/03/2026 14:09:11