1 2026:CGHC:15729 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 575 of 2016 Suresh Kumar S/o Late Shankar Lal, Aged About 43 Years R/o Priyadarshini Nagar, At Present Village Lailunga Distt. Raigarh, Civil And Revenue Distt. Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Smt. Janaki Bai W/o Late Mahetaru, R/o Village- Ameri, Tahsil- Takhatpur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2. B.S.Markam, Nayab Tahsildar, Sakari, Tahsil- Takhatpur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4. Pinki D/o Late Shankarlal, W/o Rajendra Kumar Sisodiya, R/o Dada Badi Kota, Tahsil- Kota, District Kota Rajasthan, District : Kota, Rajasthan 5. Mohan Singh S/o Ram Singh, R/o Village- Deepika, Tah. Deepika, Distt. Korba, Chhattisgarh 6. Neelu D/o Late Shankarlal, W/o Ghanaram Solanki, R/o Raisigh Nagar, Tahsil Raisingh Nagar, Distt. Shreeganga Nagar, Rajasthan 7. Jasaji S/o Lalji, Soder Ki Dadi, Gram Panchayat Banad, Tah. And Distt. Jodhpur Rajasthan, District : Jodhpur, Rajasthan ... Respondent(s) JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.09 11:26:11 +0530 2 For Appellant(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate For Respondent No. 3/ State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L. For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan & Mr. Aishwarya Pandey, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 07.04.2026 1. S.A. No. 574 of 2016 and S.A. No. 575 of 2016 were earlier clubbed together as they arise between the same parties, though out of two separate suits. Therefore, both the appeals are being decided separately by this judgment. 2. The plaintiff No.1/appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 30.08.2016 passed by the Learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 118-A/2015 (Suresh Kumar Vs. Smt. Janaki Bai & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 06.08.2015 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 32-A/2009 (Suresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Smt. Janaki & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 3 3. The plaintiffs instituted a Civil suit seeking declaration of title and a decree of permanent injunction pleading inter alia that the suit land was originally owned and possessed by the plaintiffs and defendant No. 05. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 05 had purchased the suit land from its previous owners, namely Mehetaru and Ghasiram, through a registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994, and thereafter obtained title and possession over the same. Subsequently, their names were duly mutated in the revenue records on the basis of the order dated 28.09.2004 passed by the Court of Naib Tehsildar, Sakri in Case No. 70/-6/2003-04. After purchasing the land, the plaintiffs had fenced the suit property with barbed wire and pillars. On 23.04.2005, defendant No. 02 along with certain labourers came to the suit land and attempted to remove the barbed wire fencing. Upon being resisted by the plaintiffs, defendant No. 02 asserted that the suit land had been recorded in his name and threatened to forcibly take possession of the same. Thereafter, the plaintiffs made enquiries from the Patwari and the Tehsil office and came to know that on the basis of an application dated 07.10.2004 filed by defendant No. 02, defendant No. 03 (Tehsildar) had passed an order on the same day deleting the names of the plaintiffs from the revenue records and, on 13.10.2004, the names of defendants No. 01, 02, 03 and defendant No. 06 were recorded in their place. According to the plaintiffs, the 4 said order dated 07.10.2004 was illegal and passed without issuing any notice to the plaintiffs or conducting any proper enquiry. It is further alleged that once the names of the plaintiffs had already been duly mutated in the revenue records, the Naib Tehsildar had no authority to again order mutation. The plaintiffs also alleged collusion between defendants No. 02 and 03 in obtaining the said order. It is further pleaded that during the pendency of the dispute and despite the earlier sale deed being effective in favour of the plaintiffs, a subsequent purchaser, Mohan Singh (defendant No. 6), claimed that he had purchased the land in dispute on the basis of a sale deed dated 26.04.2005 executed in his favour without any consideration. Since the plaintiffs were already the lawful purchasers and in possession of the suit land, the vendors had no authority to execute the said subsequent sale deed. Therefore, the sale deed dated 26.04.2005 is alleged to be null and void. On these grounds, the plaintiffs filed the present suit seeking a declaration that the order dated 07.10.2004 passed by the Naib Tehsildar is illegal and ineffective, and that the plaintiffs along with defendant No. 05 are the owners and possessors of the suit land. The plaintiffs have also sought a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their peaceful possession over the suit property. 4. Defendant No. 06 in his written statement denied the entire 5 claim of the plaintiffs and contended that the suit land, including Khasra No. 480 admeasuring 1.60 acres along with other adjoining land, originally belonged to defendants No. 01 and 02 and their names were duly recorded in the revenue records. According to him, the plaintiffs are claiming title on the basis of a forged sale deed and they never obtained either ownership or possession over the suit land. It is further pleaded that the alleged mutation in favour of the plaintiffs was obtained fraudulently in collusion with revenue officials and was subsequently cancelled by the competent authority. Defendant No. 06 further stated that he had purchased the suit land from defendants No. 01 and 02 through a registered sale deed dated 27.04.2005 after paying full consideration and since then he has been in peaceful possession of the property. The mutation entries made in favour of defendants No. 01 and 02 were also affirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) in appeal. It is also alleged that the sale deed dated 08.06.1994 relied upon by the plaintiffs was fraudulently obtained by their father, Shankar Lal Dagla, by misusing his official position and influence over revenue authorities. Since the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit land, the relief of declaration and permanent injunction is not maintainable. Accordingly, defendant No. 06 prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs and also sought compensatory damages. 6 5. Defendants No. 01 and 02 in their written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint and contended that they had never sold the suit land nor delivered possession to the plaintiffs. According to them, the alleged sale deed dated 08.06.1994 was a forged and fabricated document, which was got executed by the plaintiffs’ father, Shankar Lal Dagla, by fraud and in collusion with the Sub-Registrar at Dabhra. It was alleged that Shankar Lal Dagla, a suspended government officer, misused his official influence and deceitfully obtained the alleged sale deed from the original owner Mehetaru without payment of consideration. It was further pleaded that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit land and that the defendants continued to remain in possession and cultivation of the land. The mutation order dated 28.09.2004, which was passed ex parte in favour of the plaintiffs, was subsequently set aside by the Naib Tehsildar vide order dated 07.10.2004, and the land was restored in the names of defendants No. 01 and 02 in the revenue records. The defendants also contended that they belong to the Gond Scheduled Tribe, whereas the plaintiffs belong to the Dagla caste of Rajasthan, which is not a Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the alleged transfer of tribal land in favour of the plaintiffs without prior permission of the Collector was in violation of Section 165(6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the alleged sale deed was void and 7 ineffective. On these grounds, defendants No. 01 and 02 prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs and compensation, contending that the plaintiffs had filed a false suit only to harass them and to illegally grab their land. 6. The Trial Court, after framing the issues and appreciating the material available on record, held that the burden to prove ownership and possession over the suit land was upon the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs failed to adduce any oral or documentary evidence in support of their case. Neither the plaintiffs examined themselves nor any other witness before the Court. On the contrary, defendant No. 06 examined himself and produced certain documentary evidence in support of his defence. In view of the absence of any evidence from the side of the plaintiffs, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they along with defendant No. 05 were the owners and possessors of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 480/1 admeasuring 0.60 acres. Consequently, the Trial Court further held that the plaintiffs also failed to prove that the order dated 07.10.2004 passed by the Naib Tehsildar was illegal or void. The Trial Court further observed that since the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession over the suit land, they were not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction against the defendants. However, the Trial Court held that the suit was maintainable 8 and that the plaintiffs had properly valued the suit and paid the requisite court fee. On the basis of the above findings, the Trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and accordingly dismissed the suit. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 06.08.2015, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts are contrary to law and facts on record. It is contended that both the Courts have failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, particularly the registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 on the basis of which the plaintiffs had purchased the suit land and were in possession thereof since the date of purchase. It is also argued that the finding of the Trial Court holding the sale deed to be invalid in view of the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code is erroneous, particularly when the defendants had not filed any counter-claim or suit seeking 9 declaration that the said sale deed is null and void. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are unsustainable in law and give rise to substantial questions of law warranting interference in the present second appeal. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 10. The First Appellate Court, upon perusal of the record of the Trial Court, observed that the appellant/plaintiff had failed to adduce any oral or documentary evidence in support of his case. Though an affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff, the same could not be read in evidence as the plaintiff did not subject himself to cross-examination. The order sheets further revealed that despite sufficient opportunities granted by the Trial Court, the plaintiff did not lead evidence and therefore his opportunity to adduce evidence was rightly closed. The Appellate Court further noted that defendant No.6 had filed his affidavit in evidence; however, the plaintiff declined to cross-examine the said witness. Thereafter, the matter was fixed for final arguments, wherein arguments were advanced on behalf of the defendants, while the plaintiff refused to 10 address arguments. It was also observed that the plaintiff had earlier filed an application under Sections 24 read with 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the District Judge alleging that his opportunity to lead evidence was closed despite his illness. However, the said application was rejected on 23.01.2015 after examining the record and it was held that the conduct of the plaintiff was non-cooperative and no arbitrariness or bias on the part of the Trial Court was found. The said order was also upheld by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the plaintiff bearing WP 227 No.862/2014. In view of the fact that the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence or documents in support of his claim, the First Appellate Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the findings recorded by the Trial Court or to remand the matter. It was further observed that although the counter- claim of defendant No.6 had not been decided by the Trial Court, no appeal had been preferred in that regard. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court held that the findings recorded by the Trial Court did not call for any interference and dismissed the appeal, affirming the judgment and decree dated 06.08.2015 passed by the Trial Court. 11. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal 11 involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 15. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the 12 appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings 13 recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti