[2026:RJ-JP:8090] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2860/2012 Ramu S/o Late Shri Ramkishan R/o Village Golyabas @ Manpur Devri Police Station Mansarovar Jaipur Tehsil Sanganer District Jaipur. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan through PP 2. Roopnarain S/o Sualal 3. Sitaram S/o Sualal 4. Radheyshyam S/o Sualal 5. Sureah S/o Roopnarain 6. Mukesh S/o Sitaram 7. Babulal S/o Balsagar 8. Manish S/o Sitaram All resident of Village Golyabas @ Manpur Devri Police Station Mansarovar Jaipur Tehsil Sanganer District Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Bhardwaj For Respondent(s) For State : : Mr. Ran Vijay Singh Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT Order 20/02/2026 1. Present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed challenging order dated 25.04.2012 passed by Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 8, Jaipur, whereby revision petition preferred by petitioner was rejected, as well as order dated 03.11.2010 passed by Court of Additional District Magistrate, East, Jaipur, whereby complaint filed by petitioner under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) was dismissed. [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (2 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was filed on account of apprehension that respondents were attempting to dispossess petitioner from his ancestral land. It was contended that exercise of powers under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was necessary to prevent any breach of peace and to avoid a law and order situation at the site in question. 3. Learned Additional District Magistrate, after calling for the requisite report and examining the material available on record, observed that in respect of the land in question, interim orders directing maintenance of status quo had already been passed by competent Revenue Court as well as by this Court vide its order dated 21.08.2007. Keeping the same in consideration, learned Additional District Magistrate held that passing any order under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C., including appointment of a Receiver, would amount to violation of said subsisting interim orders; consequently, application filed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was rejected. 4. Revision petition filed against said order was also dismissed by learned Revisional Court, which concurred with the findings recorded by learned Additional Magistrate in the impugned order. 5. Challenging both the said orders, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that mere existence of interim orders passed by Competent Courts cannot ipso facto constitute a ground for declining exercise of jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C. It was urged that despite the subsistence of said interim orders, respondents were attempting to dispossess petitioner from the [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (3 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] land in question, which necessitated the filing of said application under section 145 Cr.P.C. However, learned counsel submitted, this aspect has not been duly appreciated by learned Courts below. 6. It was further argued that exercise of powers under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in the case of petitioner was essential for maintaining peace and preventing breach of law and order, but said application was neither properly entertained nor adjudicated upon in accordance with law by learned Courts below. 7. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that petitioner has failed to establish existence of any situation giving rise to a real apprehension of breach of peace over the land in question. It was contended that application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was filed merely to circumvent and frustrate the effect of status quo orders already in operation. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor also contended that petitioner has failed to demonstrate any illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in orders passed by learned Courts below. Therefore, no interference by this Court is warranted in present petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 9. It was also submitted that present criminal miscellaneous petition is in the nature of a second revision petition, which is not maintainable in view of statutory bar contained in Cr.P.C. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. At the outset, this Court has examined the application filed by petitioner under Section 145 Cr.P.C. A plain reading thereof [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (4 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] reveals that apart from reference to the pending dispute between parties, no specific incident has been set out so as to establish the existence of a real apprehension of breach of peace. The sine qua non for invoking jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is the satisfaction of Magistrate regarding likelihood of breach of peace concerning a dispute over immovable property. In absence of material disclosing such real likelihood, the exercise of jurisdiction under said provision would not be justified. 12. Learned Additional District Magistrate has clearly observed that orders of status quo were already operating pursuant to directions issued by competent Revenue Court as well as by this Court, and there was no material placed on record to indicate violation of such interim orders. In such circumstances, learned Magistrate has rightly refused to exercise its powers under Section 145 Cr.P.C. Even Learned Revisional Court, after considering entire facts and circumstances, concurred with aforesaid findings and held that in absence of any real threat or apprehension of breach of peace, exercise of powers under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was not called for, and doing so would amount to violation of said interim orders. 13. A perusal of present petition shows that the very same factual and revenue-related aspects which were considered by learned Courts below are sought to be reagitated. Though filed as a criminal miscellaneous petition, present petition is, in substance, a second revision petition, which is not maintainable. 14. Legal position in this regard is well-settled and admits of no ambiguity. Section 397(3) of Cr.P.C. expressly stipulates that [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (5 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] where an application for revision has been previously preferred by any person either before the High Court or the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other Court. The statutory intent is clear: it imposes a categorical prohibition against a second revision petition at the instance of the same party. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh [(1979) 1 SCC 560], elucidated the objective behind this provision as follows: "The object of Section 397(3) is clear. It is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Criminal Court is given the option to approach either the Session Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. The language of Section 397(3) is clear and peremptory and it does not admit of any other interpretation." 16. It is a fundamental principle of law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. A party, having exhausted their revisional remedy before the Sessions Judge, cannot be allowed to circumvent the statutory bar under Section 397(3) by merely re-characterizing the challenge. It is not open to litigants to assail the same order again by invoking the inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Such an attempt would effectively render the legislative prohibition nugatory and result in prolonging the proceedings indefinitely. [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (6 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] 17. Recently, this Court, in its order dated 10.02.2026, passed in S.B. Criminal Misc (Pet.) No. 2676/2024 titled Jai Kishan v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., has held thus: - “3. The procedural history unequivocally demonstrates that the petitioner, having suffered an adverse order from the Magistrate, availed the statutory remedy of revision before the Sessions Court and, upon failure therein, has attempted to re-open the identical issue before this Court. Such a course, irrespective of the terminology employed, partakes of the character of a second revision. 4. It is a settled tenet of procedural law that courts must look beyond form to substance. The true nature of a proceeding is to be determined by the essence of the relief claimed and not by the nomenclatural device adopted by the litigant. Judicial scrutiny cannot be thwarted by semantic innovation. Where the legislative scheme imposes an embargo, the same cannot be diluted by procedural ingenuity. 5. Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts a clear prohibition against entertaining a second revision at the behest of the same party. The object underlying this statutory restraint is to ensure finality in adjudication, to maintain procedural discipline, and to prevent multiplicity of challenges that would otherwise impede the expeditious administration of criminal justice. 6. This Court is not unmindful of the amplitude of its inherent and supervisory jurisdiction, which may be invoked to rectify patent illegality, jurisdictional transgression, or manifest miscarriage of justice. However, such extraordinary powers are not to be employed as a substitute for revisional remedies already exhausted. Their exercise is reserved for rare and compelling situations where palpable injustice stares at the face of the record.” 18. This Court also finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate any illegality, jurisdictional error, or other error in the impugned orders of learned Courts below. In the absence of any such infirmity on record, interference by this Court is not warranted. Scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well settled. The [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (7 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] Hon’ble Apex Court, in Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.: AIR 2008 SC 251, has held as follows: “23… every court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the court exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power of the court can be exercised in the following categories of cases: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.” 19. This Court further finds it desirable to place reliance upon observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation & Anr., (2005) 2 SCC 571, wherein it was held as follows: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilized as a substitute for second Revision. Ordinarily, when a Revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to Revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of law were not complied with and when the High Court feel that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.” [2026:RJ-JP:8090] (8 of 8) [CRLMP-2860/2012] 20. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, in Gajraj Singh Tomar v. State and Ors., Crl. M.C. No. 4024/2008 decided on 02.02.2009: 2009 (108) DRJ 544, upheld aforesaid legal position and held as under: “...The facts of this case needs to be analysed in the light of the ratio of the aforesaid judgments which circumscribe the powers vested in this Court under Section 482, 483 of Cr. P.C. whenever an attempt is made to again invoke the power of revision though in the garb of petition under Sections 482, 483 in view of the bar created under Section 397(3) Cr. P.C. once the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision in respect of his grievance by approaching the Sessions Court. The ratio of the judgment, as quoted above, makes it abundantly clear that while the powers vested in this Court under Sections 482, 483 Cr. P.C. are wide enough to still interfere in a case where even the revisional jurisdiction has already been invoked by the Sessions Court on a petition filed by the petitioner under Section 397(1) of the Cr. P.C. but it has to be exercised only in a case where there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court or where the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or where there is failure of justice or that the order passed or sentence imposed requires correction.” 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in present criminal miscellaneous petition and hence the same is hereby dismissed. All pending applications, including stay application, also stand dismissed. (SANJEET PUROHIT), J Arun/12